RFC 6189: ZRTP é finalmente un patrón!

Finalmente ZRTP foi atribuída unha misión oficial RFC, RFC6189 ZRTP: Acordo Key Path Medios para Unicast seguro RTP.

Tiña como unha dependencia do SRTP con AES de 256 bits de tamaño de chave que xa foi definido como RFC6188 .

É emocionante ver o RFC finalmente lanzado, xa que é un marco importante para definir ZRTP como o estándar oficial para cifrado end-to-end así como PGP foi para correos electrónicos.

Agora, calquera organización no mundo será oficialmente capaz de aplicar ZRTP para cifrado de protocolo voz end-to-end

Actualmente tres diferentes implementacións públicas de protocolo ZRTP existe:

Cada un deles ofrecen diferentes recursos do protocolo, pero o máis importante son coñecidos para ser interoperable.

Unha nova onda está a benvida ao mundo da criptografía de voz, irrupting nunha zona gris onde a maioría das empresas que fan sistemas de cifrado teléfono está a aplicar cifrado personalizado.

Agora, un estándar foi a instalación e hai poucas razóns esquerda a posta en marcha de algo diferente.

Hurra Sr Zimmermann e toda a comunidade de empresas (como PrivateWave ) e individuos (como Werner Dittmann ) que traballou con el!

Hoxe é un gran día, este tipo de tecnoloxía xa é oficial e tamén con múltiples implementación existente!

Felipe, vostede fixo iso de novo, os meus saúdos ao seu espírito puro e determinación:-)

Progreso para GSM rachaduras en Freiburg universidade

O emocionante mundo dos protocolos móbiles (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, etc) piratería está quedando actividades oficiais de investigación das universidades.

O investimento a facer versións de código opensource de fendas software está dando a oportunidade aos estudantes de universidade para traballar nel, melloralo e facer a investigación forte.

A Universidade de Freiburg acaba de publicar o papel exercicio práctico sobre o GSM cifrado A5 / 1 , xunto con un gsmframencoder ferramenta de apoio para mellorar o sniffing, desencriptación e proceso de craqueamento.

Abrindo hardware, software abrir, protocolo de apertura demostrar a debilidade de calquera tipo de método ou proceso de construírse as tecnoloxías de comunicación e seguridade de propiedade.

Debe ser o obxectivo de calquera científico para tentar abrir-up e crack calquera tipo de tecnoloxía propietaria e pechada para forzar a industria a pasa só coa visión interoperable e aberto ao proxecto protocolos de telecomunicacións.

A miña experiencia nó de saída TOR tentando filtrar o tráfico ruidoso

A principios deste ano eu decidir que é hora de facer un nó de saída TOR entón eu trouxo un VPS en hetzner.de (porque son listados como unha boa TOR ISP ) e configurar o no de saída con apelido privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch con 100 Mbit / s de conexión para o primeiro 1 TB de datos mensuais, entón 10Mbit / s plana.

Tamén executar TOR2WEB software no http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

Eu configurar a -política de saída , como suxerido pola execución do nó de saída co acoso mínimo e preparou un modelo de resposta abuso .

O primeiro día eu estiven correndo o no i recibiu inmediatamente DMCA reclamar debido ao peer to peer tráfico.

Entón eu decidir filtrar-out un tráfico P2P empregando OpenDPI módulo iptables e DMCA queixa automaticamente desapareceu:

iptables -A OUTPUT -m opendpi -edonkey -gadugadu -fasttrack -gnutella -directconnect -bittorrent -winmx -soulseek J REJECT

Entón, por que eu son italiano, decidín evitar o meu nó TOR para conectarse ao espazo de enderezos internet italiano, a fin de reducir a posibilidade de que un promotor estúpido me acordaba de mañá porque non entendeu que eu estou correndo un nó TOR.

Intento, coa axuda de hellais que escribiu un guión para facer política de saída rexeitan declaración , para rexeitar todo netblocks italianos en base a de IOError blockfinder pero descubrimos que as configuración torrc arquivos con 1000 liñas estaba facendo TOR accidente.

Fomos para abrir un ticket para informar o accidente sobre a nosa intento de bloquear política de saída TOR polo país e atopou un intento semellante en que contribuíu, pero aínda parece ser unha cuestión-aberto.

A conclusión é que non é posible facer unha política de saída do país para o nó de saída TOR dunha forma limpa e educada, entón eu decidir ir polo camiño sucio usando iptables / geoip . Despois de loitar para compilalo la correctamente, era unha liña de iptables para bloquear o tráfico indo a Italia:

iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -m state -Estado NOVO geoip -m -dst-cc J TI rexeitar

Agora o meu nó de saída sen conexión con redes italiano vai ser feito e estou seguro contra promotores posiblemente estúpidas non entender TOR (eu teño unha excepción para todos os enderezos IP nodo TOR aplicado antes).

Despois dalgúns outros días comece a recibir queixas debido ás actividades portscan orixinado meus nós tor.

Desde o meu punto de vista quero apoiar rede anonimato, intento de hacking non anónimo e así que quero para filtrar-out portscan e ataques de orixe do meu node.That é unha cuestión complexa que require algún estudo, por tanto, nese medio tempo eu instala scanlogd e bufar porque quero avaliar como moitos ataques, que tipo de ataques están quedando fóra do meu nó de saída TOR.
Posteriormente vou tentar arranxar algún tipo de filtrado para estar seguro de ser capaz de filtrar grandes ataques.
Para o que está relacionado coa PortScan parece que non hai ferramentas públicas para detectar e filtrar saída portscan pero só para filtrar entrada portscan entón probablemente terá que escribir algo ad hoc.
Vou me referir como as cousas están indo e se haberá algunha boa forma de aplicar de forma de ondas luminosas bufo-inline para selectivamente intento de ataque de gran filtrar-out proveniente meu nó de saída.

O meu obxectivo é manter un nó de saída executado longo prazo (polo menos 1 TB de tráfico ao mes doados a TOR), reducindo o esforzo relacionado ao ISP reclamar e tentar facer o meu mellor para realizar o nó de saída cun pasivo razoable.

TETRA piratería está chegando: OsmocomTETRA

É moi emocionante ver o lanzamento do OsmocomTETRA , o primeiro SDR opensource ( Software Defined Radio ) implementación de TETRA demodulador, PHY e inferior capas MAC.

É a versión TETRA de GSM airprobe que desbloquear o acceso aos datos e estrutura de protocolo de comunicación TETRA, dando así unha gran oportunidade de hacking!

Agora que tamén tecnoloxía TETRA foi aberto hai que esperar, durante este 2011, a ver opensource sniffers TETRA e moi probablemente tamén cifrado TEA (o algoritmo de cifrado Tetra) rachado!

TETRA é usado pola policía, servizos de emerxencia e militares como unha rede de comunicación móbil alternativa que pode funciona mesmo sen a dispoñibilidade de cobertura da rede (só móbil-móbil sen unha estación base) algúns servizos especiais e ofrecer alta dispoñibilidade.

Eu escribín sobre TETRA no meu diapositivas Maior Voz Security Protocol comentario .

En listas de correo OsmocomBB xa discusión sobre algúns estado da rede TETRA:

  • Bélxica Policía TETRA rede Astrid: sen cifrado
  • Alemán rede TETRA proba policía en Aachen: sen cifrado
  • Algúns ex jugoslawia rede TETRA: sen cifrado
  • Netherland C200 rede TETRA: TEA2 encriptado con claves estáticas
  • Reino Unido rede Airwave TETRA: TEA2 cifrado con TEA2

Vai ser moi divertido ver que os novos policías e servizos de rescate hackers volvendo de idade avanzada analóxicos para os novos radios dixitais:-)

Goberno 2.0, WikiLeaks Datos Abertos e

Os conceptos detrás de WikiLeaks, OpenLeaks, GlobalLeaks, BalkanLeaks é moito máis que só revelar segredos ao público.

É parte dunha revolución que está por vir na organización do goberno, transparencia e cooperación cos chamados '2.0 / wiki' web sistemas colaborativos.

Bótalle un ollo en quen Government 2.0 - Introdución por Anke Domscheit Berg, Programa do Goberno Innovative Leads de Microsoft Alemaña e esposa de Daniel Berg, co-fundador do WikiLeaks e agora fundador do OpenLeaks .

Bótalle un ollo a Open Data goberno 2.0 iniciativa para reforzar a transparencia do goberno, reducir a corrupción e mellorar o rendemento da organización do goberno.

Esta revolución é só máis do que un grupo de rapaces funk anarco-libertário que queren crear o caos, espallando segredos, é só o comezo da carreira para acadar o novo modelo de organización dos gobernos, aproveitando a transparencia completa e unha forte cooperación cos cidadáns.

Zorg, novo C ++ e Java ZRTP implementación lanzamento público

Ola todo, hoxe en PrivateWave Italia SpA, empresa italiana involucrada no desenvolvemento de tecnoloxías para protección de privacidade e seguridade da información en telecomunicacións de voz onde estou CTO, liberamos Zorg, unha nova implementación do protocolo ZRTP de código aberto dispoñible para descargar a partir de http: // www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1], prevé o intercambio de chaves fin de final con Curva Elíptica Diffie-Hellmann 384bit e cifrado SRTP AES-256.

Zorg foi orixinalmente desenvolvido e aplicado en produtos de cifrado de voz PrivateGSM de PrivateWave dispoñibles para as seguintes plataformas: Blackberry, Nokia e iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C ++ foi integrado con PJSIP código aberto VoIP SDK [2] e se inclúe como parche de integración contra PJSIP 1.8.5. Foi probado no iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux e Mac VOS X.

Zorg Java foi integrado dentro dunha versión personalizada do MJSIP [3] código aberto SDK na plataforma Blackberry e inclúe optimizacións de uso de memoria necesarios para reducir a actividade mínima colector de lixo.

Ambas plataformas separáronse e modulares criptográficas back-ends para que a implementación de algoritmos de cifrado pode ser facilmente trocado con outros.

. Zorg está licenciado baixo a GNU AGPL e código fonte está dispoñible no GitHub en https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Estamos liberando-o baixo o código aberto e en coherencia coa nosa visión para a seguridade [4] como nós realmente esperamos que pode ser útil para o ecosistema de código aberto para crear novos sistemas de cifrado de voz en apoio á liberdade de expresión.

Máis de 20 baseado pjsip código aberto software de cifrado de VoIP e varios escritos en Java pode beneficiarse directamente da liberación Zorg.

Ficaríamos felices en recibir proposta de cooperación, nova integración, os novos back-ends de cifrado, erro de aferição e todo útil para mellorar e deixar ZRTP afirmar como estándar de cifrado de voz.

Zorg está dispoñible a partir de http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] visión de seguridade: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Móbil cifrado para chamadas de teléfono fixo con Asterisk 1.8

Acaba de lanzar un howto técnico sobre como construír móbil seguro á infraestrutura VoIP fixo con:

Nas próximas semanas, outros howto como este vai saír a usar outras plataformas de servidor, como FreeSWITCH, todo o espírito de transparencia e de alavancagem de tecnoloxías de seguridade opensource.

Oito Fallo épico de Regulación Cryptography

Un artigo moi esclarecedor sobre Oito Fallo épico de Regulación Criptografía e erro común por reguladores do goberno que non ten unha visión ampla sobre como a tecnoloxía funciona.

Reguladores do goberno ignorantes non entenderon que unha regulación estrita tería as seguintes desvantaxes:

  1. Vai crear riscos de seguridade
  2. Ela non vai parar os bandidos
  3. El pode danar a innovación
  4. El pode danar negocios en Estados Unidos
  5. Custará consumidores
  6. Será inconstitucional
  7. Será un enorme gasto de dólares de impostos

PrivateGSM: cifrado de voz Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia móbil con ZRTP ou SRTP / SDES

Eu absolutamente evitar de usar o meu propio blog persoal para facer a promoción de calquera tipo de produto.

Ese tempo non é diferente, pero quero dicirlle feitos sobre produtos en que traballo sen marketing fantasía, pero permanecendo técnico.

Hoxe, no PrivateWave onde estou CTO e cofundador , lanzamos produtos de cifrado de VoIP móbil publicamente para Blackberry, iPhone e Nokia:

logo-privatewave-colore.png

No PrivateWave usan unha visión diferente en relación á maioría empresa cifrado de voz por aí, lea a nosa visión para a seguridade .

A relevancia destes produtos na tecnoloxía e na industria paisaxe poden ser resumidas como segue:

  • É a primeira empresa de cifrado de voz usando só protocolos de seguridade de patróns (e esperamos que o mercado vai reaccionar, como está claro que tecnoloxía propietaria que vén da herdanza do CSD non pode fornecer mesmo valor)
  • É a primeira aproximación en criptografía de voz para utilizar só o código aberto e mecanismo de cifrado estándar
  • É a primeira visión de cifrado de voz para ofrecer diferente modelo de seguridade mediante diferentes tecnoloxías (end-to-end para ZRTP e -end-to-site para SRTP )

Aqueles conxunto de clientes Secure Mobile, deseñado para uso profesional de seguridade só utilizando as mellores tecnoloxías de telecomunicacións e de seguridade, proporcionar un alto grao de protección, xunto con un bo rendemento tamén en condicións de rede malas:

As aplicacións son:

icona-pgsm.png

Os dispositivos móbiles compatibles son:

Canto ZRTP decidimos destacar e estirar toda a seguridade e funcionalidade paranoico do protocolo con algúns pouco diso:

O noso rigoroso integración da axenda de enderezos, vai alén RFC ZRTP especificación, que pode ser vulnerable a certos ataques, cando se emprega en teléfonos móbiles por mor do comportamento do usuario de non mirar para pantalla do móbil.

A nosa forma de usar paranoy ZRTP mitigar tales condicións, imos escribir sobre iso máis tarde e / ou engadirá detalles específicos para RFC inclusión.

Algunhas palabras sobre PrivateGSM Profesional con cifrado end-to-end con ZRTP

Ler ficha técnica alí!

Para baixa-lo , prema aquí e pode poñer o seu número de teléfono

Estes son os resultados dun traballo árduo de toda a miña equipo moi cualificado (16 persoas traballaron neste 6 proxectos para tres diferentes plataformas) sobre tecnoloxías de cifrado reto (voz) nun ambiente operativo difícil (redes móbiles sucios e sistemas operativos móbiles sucios) para máis de 2 anos.

Estou moi orgulloso do noso equipo!

Cal será a próxima?

Nas próximas semanas verá liberación de gran conxunto de documentacións, como a integración con asteriscos, freeswitch e outra de seguridade activada PBX, xunto con algúns emocionante outras noticias tecnoloxía de seguridade que eu estou seguro que vai ser notado;)

Foi un traballo árduo e moito máis ten que ser feito, pero estou seguro de que a comunidade de seguridade e opensource vai gusta destes produtos e nosa visión transparente tamén con lanzamentos importantes abertos e integración de código aberto que fan unha tecnoloxía moi políticamente neutra (backdoor libre) .

Unha parella de proveedor de VPN agradable

There are a lot of reason why one would need to access internet trough a VPN.

For example if you live in a country blocking certain contents (like anti-local-government website, porn, etc) and/or protocols (like skype, voip) you would probably want to move your internet connectivity outside the nasty blocking country by using encrypted VPN tunnels.

I evaluated several hosted VPN server and a couple of them sounds quite good among the widespread offering of such services:

SwissVPN

Exit to the internet from Switzerland.

Cost 6 CHF / months

Optional public fixed IP address

Useful if you need:

  • Just bypass local country filters with good high bandwidth
  • Expose public services trough the VPN with the optional fixed public IP address.

Overplay

Exit to the internet by choosing among 20 different countries (each time you connect).

Useful if you need to do:

  • business intelligence on competitor (appearing to come from country X when connecting them)
  • see film/telefilm allowed only from national IP web spaces
  • see google results among different countries

Not every elliptic curve is the same: trough on ECC security

 A miña propia análise de seguridade curva ECC e selección

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Uso de criptografía máis moderna curva elíptica de cifrado (ECC), que, cun tamaño de chave pequena e reducir o poder de computación, dan forza do sistema de cifrado tradicional coñecida como DH (Diffie-Hellman) ou RSA (Rivest, Shamir e Adleman) seguridade equivalente.

Non todo o mundo sabe que o cifrado ECC é seleccionado para todas as aplicacións de cifrado futuros e que mesmo TLS / SSL (cifrado empregado para protexer a web) está movendo ECC.

Penso moito dos chamados "produtos de cifrado de propiedade", que abandonaron RSA e DH para vai con alternativas ECC, que tenden a clave tamaño arbitrario uso bit ECC, aínda sen especificar que tipo de ECC Crypto afacerse.

However there is a lot of confusion around Elliptic Curves, with a lot of different names and key size making difficult for a non-cryptographically-experienced-user to make your own figure when evaluating some crypto stuff.

Por mor da confusión tan difundida que decidín facer a miña propia análise para descubrir cales son as mellores curvas de cifrado e tamaño de chave ECC ECC dereito a usar.

This analysis would like to provide a security industry based choice among various curves and key sizes, leaving the mathematical and crypto analytical considerations that has been already been done during the years, summarizing the various choices taken in several standards and security protocols.

First the conclusion.

Da miña análise só as curvas ECC deben ser considerados para uso en sistemas de cifrado, porque é o único seleccionado entre diferentes autoridades (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC Brainpool), diferentes patróns de protocolo de seguridade (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) eo único combinando os requisitos de seguridade NSA Conxunto B (patrón de-feito tamén para o ambiente militar da OTAN):

  • Elliptic Prime Curve 256 bit – P-256
  • Elliptic Curve Prime 384 bits - P-384

con opcional, só para realmente paranoico que desexa máis clave pouco tamaño, aínda non consideradas útiles:

  • Elliptic Prime Curve 521 bit – P-521

Quere dicir que as curvas de Koblitz debe ser evitado, en calquera tamaño de chave (163/283/409/571), como eles non ten garantía suficiente no Crypto actividade analítica e eficaz son eles:

  • Not part of NSA Suite-B cryptography selection
  • Not part of ECC Brainpool selection
  • Non forma parte da selección ANSI X9.62
  • Not part of OpenPGP ECC extension selection
  • Non forma parte da extensión Kerberos para selección curva ECC

Convida o lector a seguir a cadra miña análise para entender os fundamentos que poderían ser entendidas mesmo sen profundo coñecemento técnico, pero, polo menos, cunha boa base tecnolóxica a algúns pouco básico de cifrado.

Here we go with the analysis
 

O meu obxectivo é facer unha análise sobre o que / como a comunidade científica e de seguridade aberta escoller o sistema de cifrado ECC para uso en protocolos de seguridade e estándares definidos polo IETF RFC (os que definen normas de Internet dunha forma aberta e peer-reviewed).

Abaixo un conxunto de RFC introdución ECC no sistema existente que se analizou a entender o que é mellor usar eo que é mellor eliminar:

  • RFC5639 : Curvas ECC Brainpool Standard & Curve Generation
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B criptográfica Suite para IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B en no Seguro / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Determinar puntos fortes para chaves públicas utilizadas para o intercambio de chaves simétricas
  • RFC5349 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Support for Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP cifrado de voz pola curva Philip Zimmermann ECC
  • ECC in OpenPGP (draft d raft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 )
  • ECC Curves selected by Microsoft for Smartcard Kerberos login

We will use the choice made by scientist defining Internet Security Protocols to make part of our evaluation.
Ademais, débese entender que a selección Curve vén de diferentes autoridades que fixeron a súa propia selección de curvas, a fin de contar coa industria o que usar e que ignorar:

Usaremos a elección feita polo científico establecer requisitos de seguridade nas oficinas de normalización para facer parte da nosa avaliación.
Additionally, something that most people does not know, but that it's extremely relevant to our analysis, is that there are different kind of ECC curve cryptography and their “size” it's different depending on the kind of curve:

  • ECC Curves over Prime Field (often referred as Elliptic Curve and represented by P-keysize )
  • ECC Curves máis binario campo (moitas veces referido como Curva Koblitz e representados por K-KeySize)

Given a security strength equivalence the Elliptic Curve and the Kobliz Curve have different key size, for example when we read ECC 571 we are referring to Koblitz Curve with an equivalent strength to ECC 521 Prime curve.

Unha comparación de forza entre as curvas elípticas e curvas Kotbliz é informar a continuación (a partir de Mikey ECC internet Proxecto ):

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
| 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15360

Below there's a comparison of all selected curves by all the various entities and their respective name (from IETF RFC4492 for ECC usage for TLS ) :

Curve names chosen by different standards organizations
------------+---------------+-------------
SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
------------+---------------+-------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | B-409 NIST
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | B-571 NIST
secp160k1 | |
secp160r1 | |
secp160r2 | |
secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
------------+---------------+-------------

Que inmediatamente parece é que hai só dúas curvas seleccionadas por todas as autoridades, e que hai un xeneral despejo de curvas desenvolvidas pola KOBLITZ por ANSI.The só comunmente acordados entre as autoridades 3 son os dous seguintes curva ECC:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Daqueles selección de curva ECC ao TLS RFC5430 ignorado curvas completamente Koblitz, sendo seleccionado para uso:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The ECC Brainpool skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected for usage the following ECC Curves:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (que é o único especial porque non é P-521, pero P-512, a única clave de tamaño referido por ECC Brainpool. tnx Ian Simons de Athena SCS )

O proxecto Internet OpenPGP para uso ECC en PGP d balsa-jivsov-openpgp-ECC-06 ignorado totalmente curvas Koblitz e seleccionou os seguintes curvas ECC

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

A extensión do protocolo Kerberos para uso ECC, definido no RFC5349 e definidas por Microsoft para sesión de tarxeta intelixente ignorar completamente curvas Koblitz e seleccionou os seguintes curvas ECC:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Así, soa claro que a elección ben de ECC é para P-256, P-384 e P-521, mentres que a curva Koblitz foron ignorados para Top Secret usar e para calquera protocolo de seguridade sensibles (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS).

Why i made this analysis?

Eu teño feito esta análise tras unha discusión que tiven con respecto a determinados produtos de cifrado de voz, todo baseado en personalizados e propietarios protocolos, que son todos a usar Curva Elíptica Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571/571 bits ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits.
Todos eles están usando o K-571 que, segundo se describe anteriormente, foi eliminado todo o ambiente sensible de seguridade e protocolos, e sendo eu mesmo un estudio de cousas cifrado de voz creo que a elección de cifrado non é absolutamente a mellor opción de seguridade.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz curva elíptica son máis rápidos do que a curva elíptica privilexiada top secret activado e así dar o director de produto a oportunidade de ofrecer "máis pouco" no seu propio produto, mantendo o intercambio de chaves rápido.

É unha cuestión de liberdade filosófica.

Prefiro seguir a tendencia da comunidade científica coa humildade de non considerar un experto en criptografia, máis cualificado do que a seguridade xeral e da propia comunidade científica.

I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
Prefiro contar a cantidade de cerebros traballando na Crypto eu uso, que comproba se realmente seguro, que avaliar se hai algunha debilidade.

Número de Brais traballando Crypto amplamente difundidos son de orde de magnitude máis que o número de cerebros traballando cifrado utilizado por só poucas persoas (como curva Koblitz).
Entón eu non estou demonizando que usan ECDH 571 usando Koblitz Curve, pero seguramente podo afirmar que non tomou a mellor opción en termos de seguridade e que calquera profesionais de seguridade facendo unha avaliación comparativa de seguridade ía considerar o feito de que de Curva Elíptica Diffie Hellman 571 bit feito con Koblitz Curve non é amplamente difundido, é despexado de protocolos de seguridade por defecto e non é certificado para uso secreto.

ESSOR, European Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

Abordaxe SDR é un sistema revolucionario que está cambiando completamente a forma como científico e industria é abordar calquera tipo de tecnoloxía sen fíos.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

Por exemplo, a USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) de Ettus Research , que custou 1000-2000USD totalmente cargado, a través da opensource gnuradio cadro vimos implementación opensource de:

E moito máis protocolos e tecnoloxías de transmisión.

Este tipo de nova visión para a Radio Sistema de Transmisión está destinado a cambiar o sistema vía radio son aplicados, dando nova capacidade, como actualizar o "propio protocolo de radio" no programa, a fin de proporcionar "protocolo de radio" melloras.

De conformidade curtos tamén vimos investigación de seguridade moi forte uso de tecnoloxías SDR como o GSM fendas eo sniffing Bluetooth .

Podemos esperar que outras tecnoloxías, débiles por deseño, pero protexidos pola restrición aos dispositivos de hardware para cortar os protocolos de baixo nivel, pronto será hackeado. Na primeira lista realmente quere ver a piratería de TETRA, unha tecnoloxía nace con mentalidade pechada e algoritmos de cifrado secreta, algo que realmente non me gusta;-)

Product management and organization

I had to better understand the concepts, roles and duties related to Product management and Product marketing management in software companies, why are needed, which are the differences and how they fit inside an organization structure.

Most person i know never interested into this specific area of work, but when you want to be a product company (and not a consulting or solution company), you start having different products on different platforms for different target customers sold trough different channels with different pricing with a installation/different delivery process and that complexity must be managed in the proper way.

You realize that in order to let the product company grow in the right direction you need to organize product management activities formally, not closing your mind in rigid organization roles such as Marketing, Sales, R&D.

When we speak about Product Management i recommend the reading of the illuminating The strategic role of Product Management (How a market-driven focus leads companies to build products people want to buy) that clarify a lot of things, even if it outlook net separation of roles in product management, something t hat’s too heavy for a small company like a startup .

Still it provide a differentiation of duties between Product Management and Product Marketing .

A good understanding of the product management related to startup i s given in the article Creating Product Management at Startup showing up different case related to the roles of the product visionary into the company.

It introduce the terms ceo of the product in the sense that the product management duties jump around into the various organization function by providing focus and effort where it's needed, independently from the fact that the internal function requiring more effort is Development, Marketing, Sales or Communication. That's means practically enhancing the product vision as it's needed across all major product-related functions making the vision corporate-wide coherent.

A good representation of product management and product marketing activities is well described with the differentiation of between Strategical, Technical and Marketing sector and is not clearly separated between Management, Marketing(and Sales) and R&D :

Triad.jpg

I read that product manager background and knowledge are different depending on the company focus ( where does product management belong in the organization? ):

  • B2C -> Marketing experience
  • B2B -> Technical experience

An illuminating (for me) and very important differentiation regarding product management duties is the differentiation between:

  • Product Management
  • Product Marketing

The specific duties belonging to Product Marketing vs Management are greatly explained in Role Definitions For Product Management and Product Marketing that i suggest to read, letting you to better define tasks and responsibilities across your organization. It also provide a good definition of job requirements if you need to look for that figure!

At the same time it's important to understand what's NOT product management, effectively Product management is not just feature prioritization .

At the same time it's important to understand which professional figure is NOT itself a product manager:

  • Product manager is not a marketing manager – while product management is usually seen as a marketing discipline, marketers are focused on the marketing plan and are usually not driving the overall product direction. In that context could however be found Product marketing manager that's the arms of the marketing of the product, especially in small organization.
  • Product manager is not a sales manager – sales manager are about finding out how to sell a product, following which sales methodology, technique and channels and they could drive the company from a market oriented company ( product) to a customer oriented company (solution and consulting)
  • Product manager is not a developer – Developers are focused on the technology and not the overall product. Some great product managers are former developers, but it is difficult to do both at once. There is a natural tension between developers and product managers that should be maintained to create a balanced product.
  • Product manager is not a software manager – the software manager is a functional manager and usually not focused on the product or the customers.
  • Product manager is not a project manager – project managers are about how and when, while the product manager is about what. Project managers work closely with product managers to ensure successful completion of different phases in the product life cycle.

The typical product management activities could be in extreme synthesis summarized as follow:

  • Strategy: Planning a product strategy
  • Technical: leading product developments
  • Marketing: providing product and technical content
  • Sales: provide pre sales support and work effectively with sales

Product management so it's not precisely development, is not precisely marketing, it's not precisely sales, so typically it's difficult to identify “where it should stay” inside the organization structure (it's even difficult to understand that's needed)?

The Silicon Valley Product Group provide a nice insight on Product Organization Structure by pointing out which are the advantages and risks of several choices. Still the Cranky Product Manager say that It doesn't matter where the product manager live in the organization .

It's relevant to be careful not to have persons that are too much technical or too much sales oriented in order to fill the gap among different organization. Too much fragmentation of assigned duties across the organization may lead to bureaucracy, too much duties on one person may lead to ineffective implementation of needed tasks in some area and to a internal competition perception respect to the traditional roles.

Check there a very nice Resume of a professional with practical experience in product management (it's an half techie/half marketing guys).

Ah! Another very common misunderstanding is to confuse marketing with communication where ai found a so good definition of Marketing that i really like and understand for strict relationship with Product Management:

Marketing is know the market so well that the product sell itself

But what happen when you don't handle a product management and product marketing management process in a defined way?

A nice story is shown as example in The strategic role of Product Management :

Your founder, a brilliant technician, started the company years ago when he quit his day job to market his idea full time. He created a product that he just knew other people needed. And he was right. Pretty soon he delivered enough of the product and hired his best friend from college as VP of Sales. And the company grew. But before long, the VP of Sales complained, “We're an engineering-led company. We need to become customer-driven.” And that sounded fine. Except… every new contract seemed to require custom work. You signed a dozen clients in a dozen market segments and the latest customer's voice always dominated the product plans. You concluded that “customer-driven” meant “driven by the latest customer” and that couldn't be right.

If you want to be a product company it's relevant to precisely follow a strategy driven by product marketing and management and not by sales.

Confusion between duties of product management/marketing and sales could lead to unsuccessful product company that are not able to proceed within their strategy, simply because they getting opportunities that drive the business out-of-scope.

A product company must invest in it's own product development and marketing in order to let sales activity stay focused and guarantee that the organization is every day more effective on the market.

After this reading, my understanding is that it's relevant to identify how to create a set of flexible business process on how to handle various product management and product marketing duties separating them from sales.

Remotamente interceptar snom teléfonos VoIP

I suggest reading remotely tapping VoIp phones ” on VoIP Security Alliance Blog by Shawn Merdinger .

A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Voice communication security workshop

Ola,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

27C3 - CCC Congreso PCP: Nós vimos en paz

We come in peace

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We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Chamada de papel para a participación de 27C3 CCC congreso está aberto, e eu nunca vin un retorno tan emocionante:-)

Velo en 30 de decembro de 2010, en Berlín!

GSM rachaduras metodoloxías de proba de penetración (OSSTMM)?

Como a maior parte deste lector do blog xa saben, nos últimos anos houbo unha serie de actividades relacionadas coa investigación pública para auditoría GSM e rachaduras.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Reivindicacións de seguridade de aceite de serpe sobre produtos de seguridade de cifrado

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

Escape de privacidade Web2.0 en aplicacións móbiles

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! Eu estou de acordo! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

Algoritmo AES seleccionada para o seu uso no espazo

Eu atopei un bo papel en relación á análise e consideración sobre a cal algoritmo de cifrado que é máis axeitado para o seu uso no espazo por unha nave espacial e equipamentos.

O papel foi feito polo Comité Consultivo para Sistemas Espaciais de Datos , que é un consorcio de toda a axencia espacial en torno a que, cumulativamente, moveu máis de 400 misión ao espazo .

topban.jpg

Ler o documento Encryption Algorithm Comercio inspección , pois dá conta interesante e comparación entre diferentes algoritmos de cifrado.

Obviamente, o algoritmo finalmente seleccionado é AES , mentres Kasumi (utilizado en redes UMTS) foi evitado.

Blackberry Seguridade e Criptografía: Diaño ou anxo?

Blackberry ten unha boa e mala reputación a respecto da súa capacidade de seguridade, dependendo de que ángulo mira para el.

Este post é un conxunto resumido de información para que o lector a imaxe get, sen tomar moito dunha posición como RIM Blackberry e pode considerarse, dependendo do punto de vista, unha plataforma moi segura ou un moi perigoso.

bblock.jpg

Imos continúa.

Dun lado Blackberry é unha abundancia plataforma de recursos de cifrado, recursos de seguridade en todas as partes, o dispositivo cifrado (con cifrado personalizado), comunicación cifrada (con protocolos personalizados propietarias como IPPP), moi bo Configuración avanzada de seguridade, estrutura de cifrado de Certicom ( agora propiedade da RIM ).

Por outra banda, eles non proporcionan só un dispositivo, pero unha rede de acceso de superposición, chamados BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), que é unha rede de área ampla en todo o mundo global, onde o seu blackberry entrar mentres navega ou CheckMail usando AP blackberry.net.

Cando é unha aplicación, use o blackberry.net APN non está só conectarse a Internet coa conexión de internet transportadora, pero xa está entrando dentro da rede de RIM que procuración e actuar como unha porta de entrada para acceder a internet.

O mesmo acontece cando ten un uso corporativo: Tanto o dispositivo BB e BES corporativos conectarse á rede de RIM, que actúan como unha especie de rede concentración vpn .

Entón, basicamente, todas as comunicacións infraestrutura cruz servizo cocho RIM en formato cifrado cun conxunto de protocolos de cifrado e de comunicación donos.

Así como un aviso, creo que Google forneza GTalk sobre blackberry.net APN, fixo un acordo, a fin de ofrecer un servizo dentro da rede BB aos usuarios do BB. Cando se instala o GTalk se engadiu 3 cadernos de servizos que ligan con GTALKNA01 ese é o nome da porta de entrada Gtalk dentro da rede de RIM para permitir a comunicación intra-BIS e actuar como unha pasarela Gtalk á internet.

As operadoras de telefonía móbil xeralmente non son sequera autorizados a inspeccionar o tráfico entre o dispositivo Blackberry e da Rede Blackberry.

Entón, RIM e Blackberry son de algunha maneira única para a súa visión como eles proporcionan unha plataforma, unha rede e un servizo de todos xuntos e non pode só "conseguir o dispositivo eo software", pero o usuario eo corporativo son sempre vinculados e conectado ao servizo rede.

Isto é bo e que é malo, porque significa que RIM ofrece moi bos recursos de seguridade e capacidades para protexer a información, teléfono e acceso á información en distintos niveis contra terceiros.

Pero sempre é difícil estimar a ameaza eo risco relacionado á propia RIM e que podería facer presión política contra RIM.

Por favor, considere que eu non estou dicindo que "RIM está mirando para os seus datos", pero facendo unha análise obxectiva de risco: de como a plataforma está feito RIM ten autoridade sobre o seu dispositivo, na información on-the-dispositivo e na información que atravesar a rede. (Ler a miña Mobile Security diapositivas ).

Por exemplo, imos considerar o mesmo contexto para teléfonos Nokia.

Xa que o teléfono sexa vendido, Nokia non ten autoridade sobre o dispositivo, nin sobre a información on-the-dispositivo nin na información que atravesar a rede. Pero tamén é certo que Nokia só proporcionar o dispositivo e non ofrece os servizos de valor engadido, como a integración da empresa (O túnel VPN RIM), a rede de acceso BIS e todas as características de seguridade provisionado locais ou remotos que fornecen Blackberry.

Entón é unha cuestión de considerar o contexto de risco de forma adecuada ao elixir a plataforma, cun exemplo moi semellante ao elixir Microsoft Exchange Server (no seu propio servizo) ou a obtención dun servizo de SaaS, como Google Apps.

En ambos os casos precisa confiar no provedor, pero en primeiro exemplo, ten que confiar Microsoft que non pon un backdoor no programa, mentres que no segundo exemplo, ten que confiar Google, como provedor de plataforma e servizos, que non forma acceso a súa información.

Polo tanto, é un paradigma diferente para ser avaliado en función do seu modelo de ameaza.

Se o seu modelo de ameaza deixar considerar RIM como unha subministradora de confianza de servizos de terceiros (moi parecido a Google) que é ok. Se tes un contexto moi alto risco, como un top-secret, entón imos considerar e avaliar coidadosamente se non é mellor manter os servizos de BlackBerry totalmente illados do dispositivo ou empregar outro sistema sen interacción con servidores e servizos do fabricante.

Agora, imos volver a máis procuras e algúns feitos sobre blackberry ea propia seguridade de BlackBerry.

Primeiro de todo varios gobernos tiveron que tratar con RIM, a fin de forzalos a proporcionar acceso á información que atravesar as súas redes de servizos, mentres que outros decidiron prohibir o uso Blackberry directamente altos funcionarios por mor de servidores situados no Reino Unido e Estados Unidos, mentres que outros decidiron instalar os seus propios backdoors.

Hai moita discusión cando os temas son RIM Blackberry e gobernos, por varias razóns.

Abaixo un conxunto de informacións oficiais no ámbito da seguridade na plataforma de RIM BlackBerry:

E aquí un conxunto de Seguridade non oficial e Hacking informacións relacionadas na plataforma de RIM Blackberry:

Por 23.32 (GMT + 1), eu estou canso, eu creo que este post vai acabar aquí.

Espero ter solicitado ao lector un conxunto de información útiles e consideración para ir máis a fondo na análise e considerando a seguridade de BlackBerry xeral (no bo e no malo, el sempre depende do seu modelo de ameaza!).

Saúde

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps eu estou xestionado a seguridade de desenvolvemento de tecnoloxía (voz cifrado tecnoloxía) na plataforma Blackberry, e podo dicir-vos que, do punto de vista do desenvolvemento é absolutamente mellor que a Nokia en termos de compatibilidade e velocidade de desenvolvemento, pero usa só rimos 5.0+!

Celebrando "Hackers" despois de 25 anos

Un libro de culto , sempre verde desde 25 anos.

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Foi 25 anos dende que "Hackers" foi publicado. Autor Steven Levy reflexiona sobre o libro eo movemento.

 http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html 
Steven Levy escribiu un libro a mediados da década de 1980 que introduciu o termo "hacker" - a connotación positiva - para un público amplo. Nos 25 anos que se seguiron, esa palabra ea súa comunidade que acompaña pasaron por unha tremenda cambio. O libro en si tornouse un esteos en bibliotecas tecnoloxía.
O'Reilly lanzou recentemente unha edición de aniversario de 25 actualizada de "Hackers", entón eu chequei con Levy para discutir o desenvolvemento do libro, a súa influencia, e os hackers seguen a desempeñar papel.

Botnet para RSA fendas?

Lin un artigo interesante sobre a colocación de 1.000.000 computadores, dada a oportunidade de un propietario botnet grave para obtelo, para romper o RSA.

O resultado é que, en tal contexto, atacando unha chave RSA 1024bit levaría só 28 anos, en comparación con 19 millóns teórico de anos.

Lectura do presente artigo , é moi interesante, xa que dá a nosa consideración moi importante no que se refire a forza cifrado para o poder de computación necesario para seguir rachando intento, xunto coa visión da industria para "nivel de seguridade estándar".

Eu diría que unha lectura obrigatoria.

Os dereitos de patente e opensource: poden co-existir?

Cantos de vostedes tiveron que xestionar tecnoloxías patentadas?

Como moitas das tecnoloxías patentadas vostede tratou tamén foi "segredo" na súa implantación?

Así, hai un conxunto de tecnoloxías cuxa aplicación é de código aberto (copyright), pero que son patentadas (dereito de propiedade intelectual).

Un artigo moi bo sobre o tema opensource e patentes que eu suxiro a lectura é de Fenwick & West e se pode descargar aquí (pdf) .

Políticas de cifrado China

Ola todo,

Eu atopei este artigo moi interesante sobre a China Encryption Import / Export / regulamentos domésticos feito por Baker & McKenzie en EEUU.

É fortemente empresarial e regulatórios orientado dando unha visión moi ben feito sobre como China regulamentos funciona e como pode comportarse no futuro.

Ler aquí Descifrar Regulamentos de China cifrado (forma Bakernet web).

IOScat - un Porto de Netcat para Cisco IOS

A portabilidade do famoso netcat para Cisco sistema operativo iOS router: IOSCat

O único límite principal é que non soporta UDP, pero iso é unha ferramenta moi legal!

Un bo txt ler é Netcat manual de hackers .

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

SecurStar GmbH PhoneCrypt responde sobre o caso Infosecurityguard / Notrax: absolutamente irracional! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Saúdos,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Abaixo evidencia de que a revisión de seguridade feito por un hacker anónimo en http://infosecurityguard.com está feitos un plan de marketing deshonesto pola SecurStar GmbH para promover o seu produto de cifrado de voz.

Eu xa escribín sobre iso análise Crypto voz que me pareceu moi sospeitoso.

Agora está confirmado, é unha investigación de seguridade de hackers independente falso por SecurStar GmbH, é só un truco de marketing!

Como sabemos que Infosecurityguard.com, a investigación falsa de seguranza independente, é un truco de marketing da SecurStar GmbH?

1) Eu postei nun http://infosecurityguard.com comentarios a un post con un link para o meu blog para que o artigo en ministerio israelian de certificación defensa

2) O autor do http://infosecurityguard.com foi para aprobar o comentario e ler a ligazón no meu propio blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Alcanzar o meu blog el baleirou o enderezo IP de onde estaba benvida 217.7.213.59 (onde eu só clic desde a interfaz estatística WordPress)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) Os nomes do PBX interno confirmar 100% que é a SecurStar GmbH:

6) Hai evidencias 100% que o hacker anónimo de http://infosecurityguard.com é de SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

Cando le un enlace que vai dun sitio a outro hai unha cabeceira de protocolo HTTP, a "Referencia", que dicir de cal páxina alguén vai a outra páxina web.

O encamiñamento demostrado que os autores do http://infosecurityguard.com ler o meu post, porque estaba vindo http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php esa é a páxina que usa como autor WordPress / editor aprobar / rexeitar comentarios. E aquí non había a ligazón.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 - - [30 / Jan / 2010: 02: 56: 37 -0700] "Get / 20100129 / licenciada-por-israel-ministerio de-defensa-how cousas - real-obras / HTTP / 1.0" 200 5795 "http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php" "Mozilla / 4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident / 4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322 ;. Net CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2) "

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

A SecurStar GmbH PBX está aberta en internet, que contén os nomes de todos os seus empregados e confirmar-nos que o autor do http: /infosecurityguard.com é que empresa e é o hacker anónimo chamado Notrax.

Aquí non é o seu post no foro onde os mozos SecurStar GmbH son depuración IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk xuntos (por iso tamén ver detalles do que eles usan), onde hai o ip 217.7.213.59.

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

Eles venden telefonía seguro, pero o seu sistema de telefonía da empresa é abertamente vulnerable en internet. :-)

Eu estaba a pensar en chamar o CEO, Hafner, vía SIP no seu escritorio PBX interior de anunciar que o descubriu trucos ..: ->

Eles mediron súa actividade de marketing

Mirando para os rexistros do meu sitio eu penso que eles estaban sentindo a distribución google de información para as palabras clave, a fin de comprender como efectivamente soubo atacar produtos competidores. É razoable, se investir diñeiro nunha campaña de marketing que quere ver os resultados:-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 - - [30 / Jan / 2010: 02: 22: 42 -0700] "Get / HTTP / 1.0" 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” "Mozilla / 4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident / 4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2) "

217.7.213.59 - - [30 / Jan / 2010: 04: 15: 07 -0700] "Get /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP / 1.0 "200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” "Mozilla / 4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident / 4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2) "


The domain registration data

O dominio foi rexistrado o 01 de decembro de 2009, só dous meses para comezar a preparar a campaña de marketing deshonesto:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Secretario: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Data de actualización: 01-Dec-2009

Data de creación: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Hackers Notrax non existe en Google
Como vostede sabe que calquera hacker que conseguir público xeralmente teñen presenza del é actividade en Google, listas de discusión presentes, foro, páxina de inicio, investigacións anteriores, a participación de conferencias, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Só uns alcanzou preto dun navegador anónimo chamado Notrax pero nada sobre ese hacker.
Quizais cando SecurStar sempre que a ferramenta anonimato á súa axencia de marketing, para axudalos a protexer o anonimato para a investigación falsa, o seu proporcionou-lles o navegador anónimo notrax.So a cara de marketing pensar o apelido deste hackers falsos usados ​​que? Notrax! :-)

A "avaliación independente" completamente orientada na divulgación PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

Como podes imaxinar, en calquera tipo de avaliación do produto independente, para todos os produtos, existen produtos e puntos malas. Non. Neste hai un único produto que son bos e produtos que son malas.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

Non avaliado recursos básicos de seguridade que deben estar nese tipo de products.That, a fin de non deixar ninguén ver que eles non seguiron as regras básicas de seguridade na construción da súa PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

Eu teño un aviso dun lector sobre Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar fundador, CEO e especialista en seguridade.

Foi detido en 1997 por fraude relacionada a telefonía (check segundo artigo sobre Phrack) gañando de fraude telefonía 254,000 USD causando danos a empresas de telecomunicacións locais gamela blueboxing para 1,15 millóns de dólares.

El non estaba facendo "Blueboxing" polo pracer de phreaking e conectarse con outros hackers, pero para gañar cartos.

Hacking para o beneficio (e non por diversión), en 1997 ... brrr .... Sen ética do hacker en todo!

Todo en todo, é que legal?

Badmouthing unha cantidade concorrente a unha práctica de competencia desleal na maioría das xurisdicións, polo que é discutible (para dicir o mínimo) que SecurStar é certo nun terreo legalmente son aquí.
Ademais, existen algunhas leis específicas en determinadas xurisdicións que prevén a prohibición directa na práctica estamos falando. Por exemplo, no Reino Unido, o Instituto Británico de Practitioners in Advertising - conforme a protección dos consumidores de regulación comerciais desleais - decidiu que:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

Nós non temos ningunha dúbida de que prpr (que é o * compañía PR acollida no Reino Unido para SecurStar GmbH, liderado por Peter Rennison e Allie Andrews indicadas na SecurStar Press Release ) non proporcionar os seus clientes con esta información. Heck, eles * son * no Reino Unido, eles simplemente non pode ignorar isto!

IANAL, pero eu non sería quedei sorprendido se alguén entrou con unha queixa-crime ou iniciar contencioso cível por competencia desleal contra SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. Con todo, é bastante claro que SecurStar GmbH parece ser, como mínimo, eticamente cuestionable e realmente non vale de confianza.

Boa tentativa, señores ... con todo, a próxima vez só facelo dereito (sexa "certo" para eles significa "de xeito honesta" ou "de forma a non ser collido" Vou deixalos elixir) "

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Si
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Si
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Si
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Si
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Si

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!