Arquivo da categoría: Seguridade

RFC 6189: ZRTP é finalmente un patrón!

Finalmente ZRTP foi atribuída unha misión oficial RFC, RFC6189 ZRTP: Key acordo mapa dos medios de comunicación para Unicast seguro RTP.

Tiña como unha dependencia do SRTP con AES tamaño de chave de 256 bits, que agora foi definida como RFC6188 .

É emocionante ver o RFC finalmente lanzado, xa que é un marco importante para definir ZRTP como o estándar oficial para cifrado end-to-end así como PGP foi a correos electrónicos.

Agora, calquera organización no mundo será oficialmente poder aplicar ZRTP para end-to-end encryption voz Protocolo

Actualmente tres diferentes implementacións públicas de protocolo ZRTP existe:

Cada un deles ofrecen diferentes recursos do protocolo, pero o máis importante son coñecidos por ser interoperables.

Unha nova onda está chegando ao mundo da criptografía de voz, irrupting nunha área gris onde a maioría das empresas que fan sistemas de cifrado de teléfono está a aplicar cifrado personalizado.

Agora, un estándar se configurou e hai poucas razóns para a esquerda para aplicar algo diferente.

Hurra Mr Zimmermann e toda a comunidade de empresas (como PrivateWave ) e individuos (como Werner Dittmann ) que traballaron nel!

Hoxe é un gran día, este tipo de tecnoloxía xa é oficial e tamén coa implementación múltiple existente!

Felipe, vostede fixo iso de novo, os meus cumprimento ao seu puro espírito e determinación :-)

Acción

Progreso para GSM rachaduras en Freiburg universidade

O excitante mundo de protocolos de móbiles (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, etc) hacker está quedando actividades oficiais de investigación das universidades.

O investimento a facer lanzamentos de código de software opensource fendas está dando a oportunidade aos estudantes de universidade para traballar nel, melloralo e facer a investigación forte.

A Universidade de Freiburg acaba de publicar o papel Exercicio práctico sobre o GSM cifrado A5 / 1 , xunto con un gsmframencoder ferramenta de apoio para mellorar o Sniffer, desencriptación e rachaduras proceso.

Apertura hardware, software apertura, o protocolo apertura demostrar a debilidade de calquera tipo de método ou proceso patentes para a acumulación de tecnoloxías de comunicación e seguridade.

Debe ser o obxectivo de todos os científicos intentando abrir-up e romper calquera tipo de tecnoloxía propietaria e pechada para forzar a industria a pasa só coa visión interoperable e aberto ao proxecto protocolos de telecomunicacións.

Acción

TETRA piratería está chegando: OsmocomTETRA

É moi emocionante ver o lanzamento do OsmocomTETRA , a primeira opensource SDR ( Software Defined Radio ) implementación TETRA demodulador, PHY e Mac capas inferiores.

É a versión de Tetris GSM airprobe que desbloquear o acceso aos datos e cadro de protocolo de comunicación TETRA, dando así unha grande oportunidade de hackers!

Agora que tamén tecnoloxía TETRA foi aberto hai que esperar, durante este 2011, a ver opensource sniffers TETRA e moi probablemente tamén cifrado TEA (o algoritmo de cifrado Tetra) rachado!

Tetris é usado pola policía, servizos de emerxencia e militares como unha rede de comunicación móbil alternativa que pode funciona mesmo sen a dispoñibilidade de cobertura da rede (só móbil-móbil sen unha estación base) e prestar algúns servizos especiais de alta dispoñibilidade.

Eu escribín sobre Tetris no meu slide voz importante revisión Protocol Security .

En OsmocomBB listas de correo xa discusión sobre algúns estado da rede TETRA:

  • Bélxica Policía TETRA rede Astrid: non cifradas
  • Policía alemá rede de proba TETRA en Aachen: non cifradas
  • Algúns rede TETRA ex jugoslawia: non cifradas
  • Netherland C200 rede TETRA: TEA2 cifrada con claves estáticas
  • Reino Unido Airwave rede TETRA: TEA2 cifrada con TEA2

Vai ser moi divertido ver que a nova policía e do servizo de rescate de hacking volvendo de cando analóxicos antigos para os novos radios dixitais :-)

Acción

Cifrado móbil para chamadas de teléfono fixo con Asterisk 1.8

Acaba de lanzar un howto técnicas sobre como construír Secured móbil á infraestructura VoIP fixo con:

A próxima semana outros howto como este vai saír a usar outras plataformas de servidor, como FreeSwitch, todo no espírito de transparencia e de alavancagem de tecnoloxías de seguridade opensource.

Acción

Oito Fallo épico de Regulación Cryptography

Un artigo moi esclarecedor sobre Oito Fallo épico de Regulación Criptografía e equívoco común polos órganos reguladores do goberno que non ten unha visión ampla sobre como a tecnoloxía funciona.

Reguladores do goberno ignorantes non entenderon que unha regulación estrita tería as seguintes inconvenientes:

  1. Vai crear riscos de seguridade
  2. Ela non vai parar os bandidos
  3. Vai prexudicar a innovación
  4. Vai prexudicar empresas en Estados Unidos
  5. Vai custa-consumidores
  6. Vai ser inconstitucional
  7. Será un gran investimento de diñeiro dos impostos

Acción

PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia cifrado de voz móbil con ZRTP ou SRTP / SDES

Eu simplemente evitar de utilizar o meu propio blog persoal para facer a promoción de calquera tipo de produto.

Este tempo non é diferente, pero quero dicirlle feitos sobre produtos i traballar sen marketing fantasía, pero permanecendo técnico.

Hoxe, no PrivateWave onde estou CTO e cofundador , lanzamos publicamente produtos móbiles de cifrado de VoIP para Blackberry, iPhone e Nokia:

  • O primeiro xa Blackberry VoIP cifrado con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Profesional
  • A primeira vez iPhone VoIP cifrado con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Profesional
  • A primeira vez cliente VoIP Blackberry cifrado con SRTP con SDES clave cambial sobre SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Empresa

logo-privatewave-colore.png

O PrivateWave usan unha visión diferente para a maioría refírese empresa cifrado de voz por aí, lea a nosa achegamento á seguridade .

A relevancia destes produtos na tecnoloxía e da industria paisaxe poden ser resumidas como segue:

  • É a primeira empresa de cifrado de voz usando só protocolos de seguridade normas (e esperamos que o mercado vai reaccionar, porque está claro que tecnoloxía propietaria que vén da herdanza do CSD non pode fornecer mesmo valor)
  • É a primeira aproximación na criptografía de voz a usar só código aberto e mecanismo de cifrado estándar
  • É a primeira visión de cifrado de voz para ofrecer modelo de seguridade con diferentes tecnoloxías (end-to-end para ZRTP e end-to-site para SRTP )

Aqueles conxunto de clientes Secure Mobile, deseñado para profesionais de seguridade empregar só utilizando mellor telecomunicacións e tecnoloxías de seguridade, proporcionan un alto grao de protección, xunto co bo desempeño tamén en malas condicións de rede:

As aplicacións son:

icona-pgsm.png

Os dispositivos móbiles compatibles son:

Canto ZRTP decidimos destacar e estirar toda a seguridade e funcionalidade paranoico do protocolo con algúns pouco diso:

Noso rigoroso integración libro de enderezos, vai alén ZRTP RFC especificación, que pode ser vulnerable a determinados ataques cando se usa en teléfonos móbiles por mor do comportamento do usuario de non mirar para pantalla do teléfono móbil.

A nosa forma de usar paranoy ZRTP mitigar tales condicións, imos escribir sobre iso máis tarde e / ou engadirá detalles específicos para RFC inclusión.

Algunhas palabras sobre PrivateGSM profesional con cifrado end-to-end con ZRTP

Ler ficha técnica alí!

Para baixa-lo prema aquí e simplemente poñer o seu número de teléfono

Estes son os resultados do traballo duro de toda a miña equipo moi cualificado (16 persoas traballaron nesta 6 proxectos para tres diferentes plataformas) en tecnoloxías reto (cifrado de voz) nun ambiente operativo difícil (redes móbiles sucios e sistemas operativos móbiles sucios) para obter máis de 2 anos.

Estou moi orgulloso do noso equipo!

Cal será o próximo?

A próxima semana vai ver liberación de gran conxunto de documentacións, como a integración con asteriscos, freeswitch e outro de seguridade activada PBX, xunto con algunhas outras noticias excitante tecnoloxía de seguridade que eu estou seguro que vai ser notado ;)

Foi un traballo árduo e moito máis ten que ser feito, pero estou seguro de que a seguridade ea comunidade opensource vai gusta destes produtos ea nosa visión transparente tamén con lanzamentos importantes abertas e integración de código aberto que fan unha tecnoloxía moi políticamente neutra (backdoor libre) .

Acción

Unha parella de bo proveedor de VPN

Hai unha serie de razóns por que alguén vai ter acceso a internet a través dunha VPN.

Por exemplo, se vive nun país bloquear certos contidos (como a web anti-lugar-goberno, pornografía, etc) e / ou protocolos (como o Skype, VoIP), probablemente quere mover a súa conexión a Internet fóra do país bloqueo desagradable usando túneles VPN cifrado.

Avaliei varios servidor VPN aloxado e un par deles soa moi bo entre a oferta xeneralizada destes servizos:

SwissVPN

Saír á Internet de Suíza.

Custo 6 CHF / mes

Enderezo IP fixo público opcional

Útil se precisa:

  • Só evitar os filtros lugares do país con boa ancho de banda alta
  • Expoñer a través de servizos públicos a VPN co enderezo IP público fixo opcional.

Overplay

Saír á Internet, escollendo entre os 20 países diferentes (cada vez que conecta).

Útil se ten que facer:

  • intelixencia de negocios no concorrente (que parece vir de país X ao conecta-los)
  • ver película / telefilme permitida só a partir de espazos nacionais web IP
  • vexa resultados de Google entre os distintos países

Acción

Nin toda curva elíptica é o mesmo: a través da seguridade ECC

 A miña propia seguridade curva ECC e análise de selección

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Máis moderno Crypto uso Elliptic Curve cifrado (ECC), que, cun tamaño menor clave e reducir o poder de computación, dar forza do sistema tradicional de cifrado coñecido como DH (Diffie-Hellman) ou RSA (Rivest, Shamir e Adleman) seguridade equivalente.

Non todo o mundo sabe que o cifrado ECC é seleccionado para todas as aplicacións de cifrado de futuros e que mesmo TLS / SSL (cifrado empregado para protexer a web) está movendo ECC.

Penso moito dos chamados "produtos de cifrado de propiedade", que abandonou a RSA e DH vai con alternativas ECC, que tenden a usar ECC tamaño da clave bits arbitrario, aínda sen especificar o tipo de cifrado ECC afacerse.

Con todo, hai unha gran confusión arredor das curvas elípticas, cunha chea de nomes diferentes e tamaño da clave, facendo difícil para un non cifrada experimentado usuario para facer a súa propia figura, ao avaliar algunhas cousas Crypto.

Por mor da confusión tan difundida que decidín facer a miña propia análise para descubrir cales son as mellores curvas de cifrado e tamaño de chave ECC ECC dereito de usar.

Esta análise quere proporcionar unha selección baseada en industria de seguridade entre varias curvas e tamaños de clave, deixando os matemáticos e crypto consideracións analíticas que xa ser feito ao longo dos anos, resumindo as varias opcións tomadas en varios estándares e protocolos de seguridade.

En primeiro lugar, a conclusión.

Da miña análise só as seguintes curvas ECC deben ser considerados para o seu uso en sistemas de cifrado, por que é o único seleccionado entre diferentes autoridades (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC Brainpool), diferentes patróns de protocolo de seguridade (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) eo único correspondentes requisitos de seguridade NSA Suite B (estándar de feito tamén para o ámbito militar da OTAN):

  • Elliptic Curve Prime 256 bits - P-256
  • Elliptic Curve Prime 384 bits - P-384

co opcional, só para realmente paranoico que desexa máis fundamental bit tamaño, aínda non considerados útiles:

  • Elliptic Curve Prime 521 bits - P-521

Gustaríame afirmar que as curvas de Koblitz debe evitarse, en calquera tamaño de clave (163/283/409/571), como eles non ten garantía suficiente na actividade analítica Crypto e eficaz son:

  • Non forma parte da NSA selección cifrado Suite-B
  • Non forma parte do ECC selección Brainpool
  • Non forma parte da selección ANSI X9.62
  • Non forma parte do OpenPGP selección extensión ECC
  • Non forma parte da extensión do Kerberos para a selección de cóbado ECC

Convida o lector a seguir paga a miña análise para entender os fundamentos que poderían ser entendidas, aínda sen coñecemento técnico profundo, pero polo menos cunha boa base tecnolóxica a algúns pouco básico de cifrado.

 Aquí imos nós coa análise
 

O meu obxectivo é facer unha análise sobre o que / como o científico aberto e elixir un sistema de cifrado de seguridade comunidade ECC para uso en protocolos de seguridade e as normas establecidas polo IETF RFC (os que definen patróns de internet dunha forma aberta e peer-reviewed).

Continuación un conxunto de RFC Introducing ECC no sistema existente que son analizadas para entender o que é mellor usar eo que é mellor para eliminar:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool defecto Curves & Xeración da curva
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B criptográficas Suite para IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B perfil para Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B en en Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Puntos fortes determinante para chaves públicas utilizadas para o intercambio de claves simétricas
  • RFC5349 : Curve Cryptography (ECC) Elliptic Soporte para cifrado de clave pública para autenticación en Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suite Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP cifrado de voz por Philip Zimmermann ECC curva
  • ECC en OpenPGP (draft d balsa-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 )
  • ECC Curves seleccionados por Microsoft para smartcard Kerberos sesión

Usaremos a escolla feita polo científico establecer protocolos de seguridade de internet para facer parte da nosa avaliación.
Ademais, debe ser entendido que a selección Curve vén de diversas autoridades que fixeron a súa propia selección de curvas, a fin de contar coa industria o que usar eo que saltar:

We will use the choice made by scientist defining security requirements in the standardization agencies to make part of our evaluation.
Additionally, something that most people does not know, but that it's extremely relevant to our analysis, is that there are different kind of ECC curve cryptography and their “size” it's different depending on the kind of curve:

  • ECC Curves over Prime Field (often referred as Elliptic Curve and represented by P-keysize )
  • ECC Curves over Binary Field (often referred as Koblitz Curve and represented by K-keysize )

Given a security strength equivalence the Elliptic Curve and the Kobliz Curve have different key size, for example when we read ECC 571 we are referring to Koblitz Curve with an equivalent strength to ECC 521 Prime curve.

A comparison of strength between Elliptic Curves and Kotbliz Curves is reported below (from Mikey ECC internet Draft ):

| Koblitz | ECC | DH/DSA/RSA
| 163 | 192 | 1024
| 283 | 256 | 3072
| 409 | 384 | 7680
| 571 | 521 | 15360

Below there's a comparison of all selected curves by all the various entities and their respective name (from IETF RFC4492 for ECC usage for TLS ) :

Curve names chosen by different standards organizations
------------+---------------+-------------
SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
------------+---------------+-------------
sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
sect163r1 | |
sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
sect193r1 | |
sect193r2 | |
sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
sect239k1 | |
sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
secp160k1 | |
secp160r1 | |
secp160r2 | |
secp192k1 | |
secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
secp224k1 | |
secp224r1 | | NIST P-224
secp256k1 | |
secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
------------+---------------+-------------

What immediately appear is that there are only two curves selected by all authorities, and that there is a general dumping of koblitz curves by ANSI.The only commonly agreed among the 3 authorities are the following two ECC curve:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Of those selection of ECC curve for TLS the RFC5430 skipped completely koblitz curves and selected for usage only:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The ECC Brainpool skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected for usage the following ECC Curves:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 ( that's the only particular because it's not P-521 but P-512, the only key-size referred by ECC brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons from Athena SCS )

The OpenPGP internet draft for ECC usage in PGP d raft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The Kerberos protocol extension for ECC use, defined in RFC5349 and defined by Microsoft for smartcard logon skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

So, sounds clear that the right selection of ECC is for P-256, P-384 and P-521 while the Koblitz curve have been skipped for Top Secret use and for any security sensitive protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS).

Why i made this analysis?

I have done this analysis following a discussion i had regarding certain voice encryption products, all based on custom and proprietary protocols, that are all using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571 / 571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits .
All them are using the K-571 that, as described before, has been removed from all security sensitive environment and protocols and being myself a designer of voice encryption stuff i think that their cryptographic choice is absolutely not the best security choice.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz elliptic curve are faster than the top secret enabled prime elliptic curve and so give the product manager a chance to provide “more bit” in it's own product while keeping the key exchange fast.

It's a matter of philosophical choice.

I prefer to follow the trend of scientific community with the humility of not to considering myself a cryptographic expert, knowledgable more than the overall security and scientific community itself.

I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
I prefer to count the amount of brains working on the crypto i use, that check that's really secure, that evaluate whether there's some weakness.

The number of brais working on Crypto widely diffused are of order of magnitude more than the number of brains working on crypto used by just few people (like Koblitz curve).
So i am not demonizing who use ECDH 571 using Koblitz Curve, but for sure i can affirm that they did not taken the best choice in terms of security and that any security professionals doing a security benchmarking would consider the fact that Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit done with Koblitz Curve is not widely diffused, it's dumped from standard security protocols and it's not certified for top secret use.

Acción

ESSOR, Secure Software Europea Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.

That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.

In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .

We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)

Acción

Remotely intercepting snom VoIP phones

Suxiro a lectura tocando remoto teléfonos VoIP "en VoIP Security Alliance Blog por Shawn Merdinger .

Un exemplo concreto de como infraestrutura de telefonía actual están cada vez máis vulnerables a ataques cibernéticos.

Acción

Taller de seguridade de comunicación de voz

Ola,

eu fixen unha charla sobre tecnoloxías de seguridade de comunicación de voz da Universidade de Trento, tras un intercambio de información interesante con Crypto Lab logrou Profesor Massimiliano Sala .

Eu sugiro que as persoas interesadas en lelo, especialmente na segunda parte, xa que hai unha categorización innovador das distintas tecnoloxías de cifrado de voz que son utilizados en diversos sectores.

Intento explicar e saír deste sector tecnolóxico amplamente fragmentado, e ofrece unha ampla visión sobre as tecnoloxías que xeralmente son absolutamente independentes un cada-outro, pero practicamente todos eles se aplican a voz de cifrado despois da categorización:

  • Industria estándares de cifrado de voz móbil TLC
  • Goberno e Militar estándares de cifrado de voz
  • Estándares de cifrado de voz de seguridade pública
  • IETF estándares de cifrado de voz
  • Varios tecnoloxías de cifrado de voz propietarias

É unha enorme slideware, 122 diapositivas, eu suxiro ir ler a 2 ª parte saltando visión tecnoloxías de interceptación xa cubertos pola miña presentación de 2009.

Seguridade das comunicacións de voz

Especialmente me gusta do concepto de cifrado de grao chocolate que quere fornecer algunha innovación no concepto de cifrado Snake Oil.

Pero eu teño para obter máis en profundidade sobre o contexto de cifrado de grao Chocolate, probablemente ha facer antes de fin de ano, ofrecendo un curso aplicado na comprensión e valoración práctica no contexto diversas tecnoloxías de cifrado de voz de seguridade real.

Acción

27C3 - CCC Congreso PCP: Nós vimos en paz

Nós vimos en paz

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

Nós vimos en paz, dixo que os conquistadores do Novo Mundo.

Nós vimos en paz, di o goberno, cando se trata de colonizar, regular e militarizar o novo mundo dixital.

Nós vimos en paz, din as compañías estado-nación porte que estableceron para monetizar a rede e cadea os usuarios aos seus novos dispositivos brillantes.

Nós vimos en paz, dicimos como hackers, geeks e nerds, cando previstos para o mundo real e tentar mudalo, porque invadiron o noso hábitat natural, o ciberespazo ...

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

Acción

GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Acción

Seguridade de aceite de serpe afirma en produtos de seguridade de cifrado

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ..... Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

Acción

Web2.0 privacy leak in Mobile apps

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

thumb.php.jpg

On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

Acción

AES algorithm selected for use in space

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

Acción

Seguridade Blackberry e Criptografía: Diaño ou anxo?

Blackberry teñen unha boa e mala reputación a respecto da súa capacidade de seguridade, dependendo do ángulo que mira para el.

Este post é unha resumidos conxunto de informacións para que o lector a imaxe get, sen tomar moito unha posición como RIM Blackberry e pode ser considerado, dependendo do punto de vista, unha plataforma moi seguro ou un extremadamente perigoso.

bblock.jpg

Imos continúa.

Nun Blackberry banda é unha abundancia plataforma de recursos de criptografía, recursos de seguridade en todas as partes, o dispositivo cifrado (co costume de cifrado), comunicación cifrada (con protocolos propietarios individuais como IPPP), moi boa opcións avanzadas de seguridade, estrutura de cifrado do Certicom ( agora propiedade da RIM ).

Por outra banda, eles non proporcionan só un teléfono, senón unha rede de acceso de superposición, chamado BIS ( BlackBerry Internet Service ), que é unha rede de área ampla global de todo o mundo que o seu blackberry entrar mentres navega ou CheckMail usando blackberry.net AP.

Cando ou unha aplicación, use o APN blackberry.net non está só conectarse a Internet coa conexión de internet operador, pero xa está entrando dentro da rede de RIM que vai proxy e actúan como unha porta de entrada para chegar á internet.

O mesmo acontece cando ten un uso corporativo: Tanto o teléfono BB e BES corporativos conectarse á rede de RIM que actúan como unha especie de rede concentración VPN .

Entón, basicamente, as comunicacións atravesar a través de infraestrutura de servizos de RIM en formato cifrado cun conxunto de cifrado propietaria e protocolos de comunicación.

Así como un aviso, creo que Google para proporcionar Gtalk sobre blackberry.net APN, fixo un acordo, a fin de ofrecer un servizo dentro da rede BB aos usuarios BB. Cando se instala o Gtalk vostede engádense tres cadernos de servizos que ligan con GTALKNA01 que é o nome da porta de entrada Gtalk dentro da rede de RIM para permitir a comunicación intra-BIS e actuar como unha pasarela Gtalk á internet.

Os operadores móbiles xeralmente non son aínda autorizados a inspeccionar o tráfico entre o dispositivo Blackberry e da Rede Blackberry.

Entón, RIM e Blackberry son dalgunha forma única para a súa visión como eles proporcionan unha plataforma, unha rede e un servizo de todos xuntos e non pode simplemente "aproveitar o teléfono eo software", pero o usuario ea empresa están sempre conectados e conectados ao servizo rede.

Isto é bo eo que é malo, porque significa que RIM ofrece moi bos recursos de seguridade e capacidade para protexer a información, teléfono e acceso á información en varios niveis contra terceiros.

Pero sempre é difícil estimar a ameaza eo risco relacionado á propia RIM e que podería facer presión política contra RIM.

Por favor, considere que eu non estou dicindo que "RIM está a ollar para os seus datos", pero facendo unha análise obxectiva de risco: de como a plataforma está feito RIM ten autoridade sobre o dispositivo, na información on-the-teléfono e sobre a información que atravesan a rede. (Ler meus diapositivas Mobile Security ).

Por exemplo, imos considerar o mesmo contexto para teléfonos Nokia.

Xa que o seu dispositivo se vende Nokia, Nokia non ten autoridade no dispositivo, nin na información sobre a orixe, nin sobre a información que atravesan a rede. Pero tamén é certo que Nokia só proporcionar o teléfono e non ofrece servizos, tales como a integración da empresa (O túnel VPN RIM), a rede de acceso BIS e as características locais e remotos de seguridade provisionais Blackberry que fornecen o valor engadido.

Entón é unha cuestión de considerar o contexto de risco de forma adecuada ao elixir a plataforma, cun exemplo moi semellante ao elixir Microsoft Exchange Server (no seu propio servizo) ou conseguir un servizo SaaS como Google Apps.

En ambos os casos hai que confiar no provedor, pero, en primeiro exemplo, ten que confiar en Microsoft que non poñer unha backdoor no programa, mentres que no segundo exemplo, ten que confiar en Google, como un provedor de plataforma e de servizo, que non accede a súa información.

Polo tanto, é un paradigma diferente para ser avaliado en función do seu modelo de ameaza.

O seu modelo de ameaza deixalo considerar RIM como un provedor de servizos terceirizados de confianza (moi parecido Google) que é ok. Se tes un contexto moi alto risco, como top-secret un, entón imos considerar e avaliar coidadosamente se non é mellor manter os servizos de Blackberry totalmente illada do dispositivo ou outro sistema sen interacción con servidores e servizos fabricante.

Agora, imos volver máis procuras e algúns feitos sobre BlackBerry e BlackBerry propia seguridade.

Primeiro de todos os distintos gobernos tiveron que tratar con RIM, a fin de forzalos a ofrecer acceso á información que cruzan as redes de servizos, mentres outros decidiron prohibir o uso Blackberry directamente altos funcionarios por mor de servidores situados no Reino Unido e Estados Unidos, mentres outros decidiron instalar os seus propios backdoors.

Hai moita discusión cando os temas son RIM Blackberry e gobernos, por varias razóns.

Continuación un conxunto de informacións relacionadas coa seguridade oficial na plataforma BlackBerry RIM:

E aquí un conxunto de seguridade non oficial e información sobre Hacking na plataforma Blackberry RIM:

Por 23.32 (GMT +1), estou canso, eu creo que este post vai acabar aquí.

Espero ter solicitado ao lector unha serie de información útil e consideración para ir máis a fondo na análise e tendo en conta a seguridade global blackberry (no bo e no malo, sempre depende do seu modelo de ameaza!).

Saúde

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps eu estou controlando o desenvolvemento da tecnoloxía de seguridade (cifrado de voz tecnoloxía) na plataforma Blackberry, e podo dicir-lle que, do punto de vista do desenvolvemento é absolutamente mellor que Nokia en termos de compatibilidade e velocidade de desenvolvemento, pero usa só rimos 5.0 +!

Acción

Celebrando "Hackers" despois de 25 anos

Un libro de culto , sempre verde desde 25 anos.

201007010924.jpg

Foi 25 anos dende que "Hackers" foi publicado. Autor Steven Levy reflexiona sobre o libro eo movemento.

 http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html 
Steven Levy escribiu un libro a mediados dos anos 1980, que introduciu o termo "hacker" - a connotación positiva - a un público amplo. Nos 25 anos que se seguiron, esa palabra ea súa comunidade acompaña pasaron por unha tremenda cambio. O libro en si tornouse un piar en bibliotecas tecnoloxía.
O'Reilly lanzou recentemente unha edición do 25 aniversario actualizada de "hackers", entón eu chequei con Levy para discutir o desenvolvemento do libro, a súa influencia e ao papel que os hackers seguen a desempeñar.
Acción

Botnet para RSA fendas?

Lin un artigo interesante sobre a colocación de 1.000.000 computadores, dada a oportunidade de un propietario botnet grave para obtelo, para romper RSA.

O resultado é que, en tal contexto, atacando unha clave RSA 1024bit levaría só 28 anos, en comparación á teórica de 19 millóns de anos.

Lectura do presente artigo , é moi interesante porque dá a nosa consideración moi importante no que respecta a forza cifrado para o poder de computación necesario para seguir rachando intento, xunto coa visión da industria para "nivel de seguridade por defecto."

Eu diría que unha lectura obrigatoria.

Acción

Políticas Encryption China

Ola todo,

atopei este artigo moi interesante sobre a China de cifrado de Importación / Exportación / Políticas domésticos realizados por Baker & McKenzie en EEUU.

É fortemente comercial e regulatorias orientada dando unha visión moi ben feito sobre a forma como as normativas china funciona e como pode comportarse no futuro.

Ler aquí Descifrar Políticas de China de criptografía (forma Bakernet web).

Acción

IOScat - un Porto de Netcat para Cisco IOS

A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

Acción

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Romper códigos: Unha tarefa imposible por BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Acción

Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

Acción

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

Acción

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Acción

Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

Acción

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Acción

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

Acción

FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

Acción

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Acción

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

Acción

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Acción

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Acción

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Si
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Si
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Si
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Si
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Si
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Si

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Por que?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Ben pensado! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

Acción

Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

Acción

Recuva: Nice windows data recovery tool

Not a professional tool but an easy, quick and free one.

If you just accidently deleted some files on windows or your employee leave the company deleting all his data, well that you get out from trouble quickly.

It also came out in a 'portable' version to be loaded from an usb stick drive.

Check Recuva recovery tool

Acción

Military contractors going commercial

Most military contractors are suffering from the restriction of government's budgets for military expenses and are moving into commercial markets, still they have to adjust a lot of things.

Read here a nice analysis from rochtel on how military contractors should adapt their strategy.

Acción

Brazilian Electrical Blackout: preview of cyberwar

In 2005 and 2007 in Brazil million of people was targetted by a blackout.

Initially it appeared like an accident.

Now it's known that was caused by a cyber attack against electricity control systems.

That was just a preview of what a cyber attack in a cyberwar means.

In near future we'll probably see something like 'virtual custom offices' at internet borders, defining what get in and what get out like several “not so democratic” countries are doing.

Does the cyberwar will affect digital rights? Probably yes, even i hope not.

Acción

Conventionality is not morality.

During my daily RSS OCD reading I had to deal with this article : it has been written by a “senior anti-virus researcher at Kaspersky Lab's “. Talk about personal interest.

I wont comment on the practical implications of useless signature based AV's and how cyber criminals will never need amateur-ish projects to carry on their malicious tactics.

But what is always interesting is watching the very same people who use billion dollar scare tactics to sell you a perfectly useless piece of software (which will give you a false sense of security, hence will make you more insecure), talking about ethics.

Acción

Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

Acción