RFC 6189: ZRTP er endelig en standard!

Endelig ZRTP er blevet tildelt en officiel RFC opgave, RFC6189 ZRTP: Media Path Key aftale om Unicast Secure RTP.

Det havde som en afhængighed af SRTP med AES nøgle størrelse 256bit som nu er blevet defineret som RFC6188 .

Det er spændende at se RFC endelig frigivet, da det er en vigtig milepæl for at indstille ZRTP som den officielle standard for end-to-end kryptering meget gerne PGP har været i e-mails.

Nu enhver organisation i verden vil være officielt stand til at gennemføre ZRTP til end-to-end protokol voice kryptering

I øjeblikket 3 forskellige offentlige implementeringer af ZRTP protokol findes:

Hver af dem giver forskellige funktioner i protokollen, men vigtigst er kendt for at være interoperable.

En ny bølge kommer til voice kryptering verden, irrupting ind i en gråzone, hvor de fleste af de virksomheder, der gør telefonen krypteringssystemer har gennemført custom kryptering.

Nu er en standard har været setup, og der er nogle grunde tilbage til at gennemføre noget andet.

Hurra Mr. Zimmermann og alle Fællesskabets virksomheder (som PrivateWave ) og enkeltpersoner (ligesom Werner Dittmann ), der arbejdede på det!

I dag er det en stor dag, en sådan form for teknologi er nu officiel og også med flere eksisterende implementering!

Philip, du gjorde det igen, min kompliment til din rene ånd og beslutsomhed:-)

Fremgang for GSM revner i Freiburg universitet

Den spændende verden af ​​mobile protokoller (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS osv) hacking bliver officielle forskningsaktiviteter fra universiteter.

Den investering at gøre opensource kode udgivelser af revner software giver mulighed for at studerende på universitetet for at arbejde på det, forbedre det og gøre stærk forskning.

The University of Freiburg netop frigivet papiret praktisk øvelse på GSM Encryption A5 / 1 sammen med en gsmframencoder støtte værktøj til at forbedre den sniffing, afkodning og krakningsproces.

Åbning af hardware, åbne software, åbne protokol demonstrere svaghed af enhver form for proprietær metode eller proces at opbygge kommunikation og sikkerhedsteknologier.

Det bør være målet for alle forskere til at forsøge at åbne op og knække enhver form for proprietære og lukkede teknologi for at tvinge industrien til at går kun med interoperable og åbne tilgang, mens designe telekommunikation protokoller.

Min TOR exit node erfaring forsøger at bortfiltrere larmende trafik

Tidligt i år besluttede jeg, det er tid til at køre en TOR exit node, så jeg bragte en VPS ved hetzner.de (fordi de er opført som en god TOR ISP ) og opsætte den exit-node med kaldenavn privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch med en 100Mbit / s forbindelse for første 1TB af månedlige data, så 10Mbit / s flad.

Det kører også TOR2WEB software på http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

Jeg setup exit-politik som foreslået ved at køre exit-node med minimal chikane og forberedt et misbrug reaktion skabelon .

I den første dag jeg har kørt node jeg straks modtaget DMCA klager skyldes peer to peer trafik.

Så jeg besluttede at filtrere ud nogle P2P trafik ved hjælp OpenDPI iptables modul og DMCA klager automatisk forsvundet:

iptables -A OUTPUT -m opendpi -edonkey -gadugadu -fasttrack -gnutella -directconnect -bittorrent -winmx -soulseek -j AFVIST

Så fordi jeg er italiensk, besluttede jeg at undgå min TOR node til at oprette forbindelse til den italienske internetadresse plads for at mindske risikoen for, at en dum anklager ville vække mig op på morgenen, fordi forstod ikke, at jeg kører en TOR node.

Jeg forsøgte, med hjælp fra hellais der skrev et script til at gøre desinvesteringsplan afvise erklæring , at afvise alle italienske netblocks baseret på IOError s blockfinder men vi fandt, at torrc konfigurationsfiler filer med 1000 linier var at gøre TOR styrt.

Vi gik til at åbne en billet til at rapportere styrtet om vores forsøg på at blokere TOR desinvesteringsplan efter land og fandt et lignende forsøg , hvor vi har bidraget, men det synes stadig at være et åbent spørgsmål.

Konklusionen er, at det ikke er muligt at lave et land desinvesteringsplan for TOR exit node i en ren og høflig måde, så jeg besluttede at gå den beskidte vej ved hjælp af iptables / GeoIP . Efter kampene for at gøre det kompilere ordentligt, det var en linje af iptables at blokere trafik går til Italien:

iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -m state -vælg NEW -m GeoIP -dst-cc IT -j AFVIST

Nu fra min exit-node ingen forbindelse til det italienske net vil ske, og jeg er sikker mod muligvis dumme anklagere ikke forståelse TOR (jeg har en undtagelse for alle TOR node ip-adresse anvendes før).

Efter nogle andre dage begyndte jeg at modtage klager skyldes portscan aktiviteter stammer fra mine tor noder.

Fra mit eget synspunkt, jeg ønsker at støtte anonymitet netværk, ikke anonym hacking forsøg, og så jeg vil filtrere ud portscan og angreb fra stammer fra min node.That er en kompliceret sag, som kræver en vis undersøgelse, så i mellemtiden jeg installerede scanlogd og sniffer fordi jeg ønsker at vurdere, hvor mange angreb, hvilken type angreb er at komme ud fra min TOR exit node.
Senere vil jeg forsøge at arrangere en slags filtrering for at være sikker på at være i stand til at filtrere store angreb.
For hvad er relateret til portscan det forekommer, at der er ingen offentlige redskaber til at spore og filtrere udgående portscan men kun at filtrere indkommende portscan så sandsynligvis bliver nødt til at skrive noget ad-hoc.
Jeg vil henvise, hvordan det går, og om der vil være nogle nice måde at gennemføre i en lysbølger måde fnys-inline til selektivt at filtrere-out større angreb forsøg stammer fra min exit-node.

Mit mål er at holde en exit node kører i lang sigt (mindst 1TB trafik per måned doneret til TOR), hvilket reducerer indsatsen i forbindelse med ISP klage og forsøger at gøre mit bedste for at køre exit-node med en rimelig forpligtelse.

TETRA hacking kommer: OsmocomTETRA

Det er meget spændende at se udgivelsen af OsmocomTETRA , den første opensource SDR ( Software Defined Radio ) gennemførelse af TETRA demodulator, PHY og lavere MAC lag.

Det er TETRA-version af GSM airprobe at låse adgangen til data og stel af TETRA kommunikationsprotokol, hvilket giver stor hacking mulighed!

Nu, også TETRA-teknologien har været åbnet vi skal forvente, i løbet af denne 2011, for at se opensource TETRA sniffere og sandsynligvis også TEA kryptering (Tetra Encryption Algorithm) revnet!

TETRA bruges af politiet, nødhjælp og militærfolk som et alternativ mobil kommunikation netværk, der kan fungerer selv uden tilgængeligheden af ​​netværksdækning (kun mobil-til-mobil uden en base station) og give nogle særlige høj tilgængelighed tjenester.

Jeg skrev om TETRA i mit slide Major Voice Security Protocol anmeldelse .

I OsmocomBB postlister der allerede var diskussion om nogle TETRA-netværk status:

  • Belgien Politi TETRA ASTRID netværk: ukrypteret
  • Tysk politi test TETRA-netværk i Aachen: ukrypteret
  • Nogle ex-jugoslawia TETRA-netværk: ukrypteret
  • Netherland C200 TETRA-netværk: TEA2 krypteret med statiske nøgler
  • UK Airwave TETRA-netværk: TEA2 krypteret med TEA2

Det vil være virkelig sjovt at se, at nye Politi og redningstjeneste hacking kommer tilbage fra de gamle analoge aldre til de nye digitale radioer:-)

Regering 2.0, Open Data- og WikiLeaks

Begreberne bag WikiLeaks, OpenLeaks, GlobalLeaks, BalkanLeaks er meget mere end blot at afsløre hemmeligheder til offentligheden.

Det er en del af en revolution, der kommer i regeringen organisation, gennemsigtighed og samarbejde med såkaldte web 2.0 / wiki 'kollaborative systemer.

Tag et kig på dem, regeringen 2.0 - Indledning af Anke Domscheit Berg, Innovative regering programmet fører af Microsoft Tyskland og hustru til Daniel Berg, medstifter af WikiLeaks , og nu grundlægger af OpenLeaks .

Tag et kig på åbne data regering 2,0 initiativ til at håndhæve regeringens gennemsigtighed, bekæmpelse af korruption og forbedring af resultaterne af regeringens organisation.

Denne revolution er det bare mere end en gruppe af anarco-anarkistisk funky fyre, der ønsker at skabe kaos ved at sprede hemmeligheder, det er bare starten på hastværket med at opnå ny organisationsmodel regeringer ved at udnytte fuldstændig gennemsigtighed og stærkt samarbejde med borgerne.

Zorg, nye C ++ og Java ZRTP implementering offentlig udgivelse

Hej alle, i dag på PrivateWave Italia SpA, italiensk selskab beskæftiger sig med udvikling af teknologier til beskyttelse af privatlivets fred og informationssikkerheden i taletelefoni, hvor jeg er CTO, vi frigiver Zorg, en ny open source ZRTP protokolimplementering hentes fra http: // www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] giver ende-til-ende nøgle udveksling med elliptisk kurve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit og AES-256 SRTP kryptering.

Zorg er oprindeligt udviklet og implementeret i PrivateWave s PrivateGSM voice kryptering produkter tilgængelige til følgende platforme: Blackberry, Nokia og iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C ++ er blevet integreret med PJSIP open source VoIP SDK [2], og det er tilvejebragt som integration patch mod PJSIP 1.8.5. Det er blevet testet på iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux og Mac OS X.

Zorg Java er blevet integreret i en brugerdefineret version af MJSIP [3] open source SDK på Blackberry platform og det omfatter hukommelsesforbrug optimeringer der kræves for at reducere på minimum affaldsindsamling aktivitet.

Begge platforme har adskilt og modulære kryptografiske back-ender, således at den kryptografiske algoritmer gennemførelsen let kunne byttes med andre.

. Zorg er licenseret under GNU AGPL og kildekode er tilgængelig på GitHub på https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Vi frigiver det under open source og i overensstemmelse med vores tilgang til sikkerhed [4], som vi håber virkelig, at det kan være nyttigt for open source økosystem til at skabe nye stemme krypteringssystemer til støtte for ytringsfriheden.

Mere end 20 pjsip-baserede open source VoIP krypteringssoftware og flere skrevet i Java direkte kunne drage fordel af Zorg udgivelse.

Vi ville være glade for at modtage forslag om samarbejde, ny integration, nye kryptografiske back-ends, bug scouting og hvad nyttigt at forbedre og lad ZRTP bekræfte som voice kryptering standard.

Zorg er tilgængelig fra http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] Sikkerhed tilgang: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Krypteret mobil til fastnet telefonopkald med Asterisk 1.8

Vi har lige udgivet en teknisk howto om hvordan man kan opbygge Secured mobil til fastnet VoIP infrastruktur med:

I næste uger andre HOWTO som denne vil komme ud ved hjælp af andre serverplatforme såsom FreeSWITCH, alle i en ånd af åbenhed og gearing af opensource sikkerhedsteknologier.

Otte Epic Svigt i Regulering Kryptografi

En meget oplysende artikel om Otte Epic Svigt i Regulering Kryptografi og fælles misforståelse af offentlige myndigheder, der ikke har en bred opfattelse af, hvordan teknologien fungerer.

Uvidende regeringen lovgivere ikke forstået, at en stram regulering ville have følgende ulemper:

  1. Det vil skabe sikkerhedsrisiko
  2. Det vil ikke stoppe de onde
  3. Det vil skade innovation
  4. Det vil skade os forretning
  5. Det vil koste forbrugerne
  6. Det vil være i strid med forfatningen
  7. Det vil være en enorm udlæg af skattekroner

PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia mobil voice kryptering med ZRTP eller SRTP / SDES

Jeg er helt undgå at bruge min egen personlige blog til at gøre fremme af enhver form for produkt.

Denne gang er det ikke anderledes, men jeg vil gerne fortælle dig fakta om produkter, jeg arbejder på uden fancy markedsføring, men opholder sig teknisk.

I dag, på PrivateWave hvor jeg er CTO og medstifter , vi udgivet offentligt mobile VoIP kryptering produkter til Blackberry, iPhone og Nokia:

  • 1st nogensinde Blackberry krypteret VoIP med ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • 1st nogensinde iPhone krypteret VoIP med ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • 1st nogensinde Blackberry krypteret VoIP klient med SRTP med SDES nøgleudveksling løbet SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

logo-privatewave-colore.png

Hos PrivateWave bruger vi en anden tilgang i forhold til de fleste stemme kryptering selskab derude, læse vores tilgang til sikkerhed .

Relevansen af ​​dette produkter i teknologi og industri landskab kan opsummeres som følger:

  • It's the first voice encryption company using only standards security protocols (and we expect the market will react, as it's clear that proprietary tech coming from the heritage of CSD cannot provide same value)
  • It's the first approach in voice encryption to use only open source & standard encryption engine
  • It's the first voice encryption approach to provide different security model using different technologies (end-to-end for ZRTP and end-to-site for SRTP )

Those suite of Mobile Secure Clients, designed for professional security use only using best telecommunication and security technologies, provide a high degree of protection along with good performance also in bad network conditions:

Ansøgningerne er:

icona-pgsm.png

De understøttede mobile enheder er:

Vedrørende ZRTP besluttede vi at understrege og strække al den sikkerhed og paranoide træk ved protokol med nogle lidt tilføjelse:

Vores strenge adressebog integration, går ud ZRTP RFC -specifikationen, som kunne være sårbare over for visse angreb, når de anvendes på mobiltelefoner på grund af brugerens adfærd ikke at se på mobil skærm.

Vores paranoy måde at bruge ZRTP afbøde sådanne betingelser, vil vi skrive om dette senere og / eller tilføjer specifikke detaljer for RFC integration.

Nogle ord om PrivateGSM Professional med end-to-end kryptering med ZRTP

Læs teknisk ark der!

At hente det her og bare sætte dit telefonnummer

Det er resultatet af hårdt arbejde af alle mine meget dygtige medarbejdere (16 personer arbejdede på dette 6 projekter i 3 forskellige platforme) på udfordrende teknologier (voice kryptering) i en vanskelig driftsmiljø (dirty mobilnet og beskidte mobile operativsystemer) for mere end 2 år.

Jeg er meget stolt af vores medarbejdere!

Hvad bliver det næste?

I næste uger vil du se at slippe af større sæt af dokumentationer såsom integration med asterisk, freeswitch og andre sikkerhed aktiveret PBX, sammen med nogle spændende anden sikkerhed teknologi nyheder, jeg er sikker på vil blive bemærket;)

Det har været et hårdt arbejde og mere skal gøres, men jeg er overbevist om, at sikkerhed og opensource samfund vil gerne sådanne produkter og vores gennemsigtig fremgangsmåde også med åbne vigtige udgivelser og open source integration, der gør en meget politisk neutral (bagdør gratis) teknologi .

Et par nice VPN-udbyder

Der er en masse af fornuft, hvorfor man skulle få adgang til internettet igennem en VPN.

For eksempel hvis du bor i et land blokerer visse indhold (som anti-kommunernes hjemmeside, porno, etc) og / eller protokoller (som Skype, VoIP) vil du sandsynligvis ønsker at flytte din internetforbindelse uden nasty blokering land ved hjælp af krypterede VPN-tunneler.

Jeg vurderede flere hosted VPN-server og et par af dem lyder ganske godt blandt den udbredte udbud af sådanne tjenester:

SwissVPN

Udgang til internettet fra Schweiz.

Omkostninger 6 CHF / måneder

Valgfri offentlig fast IP-adresse

Nyttigt, hvis du har brug for:

  • Bare omgå lokale land filtre med god høj båndbredde
  • Expose offentlige tjenester lavpunkt VPN med den valgfri faste offentlige IP-adresse.

Overspiller

Udgang til internettet ved at vælge blandt 20 forskellige lande (hver gang du tilslutter).

Nyttigt, hvis du skal gøre:

  • business intelligence på konkurrent (ser ud til at komme fra land X, når du forbinder dem)
  • se film / telefilm kun tilladt fra de nationale IP webhoteller
  • se Google resultater blandt forskellige lande

Ikke alle elliptisk kurve er den samme: trug på ECC sikkerhed

 Min egen ECC kurve sikkerhed og udvælgelse analyse

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Det meste moderne krypto brug elliptisk kurve kryptografiske (ECC), der med en mindre central størrelse og reducere beregning magt, giver tilsvarende sikkerhed styrken af traditionelle kryptosystem kendt som DH (Diffie-Hellman) eller RSA (Rivest, Shamir og Adleman).

Ikke alle ved, at ECC-kryptering er valgt for eventuelle fremtidige krypterings-programmer, og at selv TLS / SSL (kryptering anvendes til fastgørelse på internettet) flytter til ECC.

Jeg har fundet masser af såkaldte "proprietære kryptering produkter", som forladte RSA og DH til går med ECC alternativer, der har tendens til vilkårlig brug ECC bit nøgle størrelse uden selv at angive hvilken slags ECC krypto vænne.

Men der er en masse forvirring omkring elliptiske kurver, med en masse forskellige navne og nøgle størrelse gør det vanskeligt for en ikke-kryptografisk erfarne bruger at lave din egen figur, når de evaluerer nogle krypto ting.

På grund af så diffust forvirring jeg besluttede at gøre min egen analyse for at finde ud af, hvilke er de bedste ECC krypterings kurver og højre ECC nøgle størrelse til at bruge.

Denne analyse vil gerne give en sikkerhed industri baseret valg blandt forskellige kurver og nøglestørrelser, efterlader de matematiske og krypto analytiske overvejelser, der allerede er blevet foretaget i løbet af de år, der opsummerer de forskellige valg, der er truffet i flere standarder og sikkerhed protokoller.

Først konklusionen.

Fra min analyse kun følgende ECC kurver er at komme i betragtning til brug i krypteringssystemer fordi er den eneste valgt blandt forskellige myndigheder (ANSI, NSA, Sag, NIST, ECC BrainPool), forskellige sikkerhed protokolstandarder (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) og den eneste matchende NSA Suite B sikkerhedskrav (de-facto standard også for NATO militær miljø):

  • Elliptisk Prime Curve 256 bit - P-256
  • Elliptisk Prime Curve 384 bit - P-384

med valgfri, bare for virkelig paranoid der ønsker at få mere central størrelse bit, stadig ikke anset for hensigtsmæssigt:

  • Elliptisk Prime Curve 521 bit - P-521

Jeg vil gerne sige, at Koblitz kurver bør undgås, i en hvilken som helst tast størrelse (163/283/409/571), da de ikke har nok garanti på krypto analytisk aktivitet og effektivt de er:

  • Ikke en del af NSA Suite-B kryptografi udvælgelse
  • Ikke en del af ECC Brainpool udvælgelse
  • Ikke en del af ANSI X9.62 udvælgelse
  • Ikke en del af OpenPGP ECC extension udvælgelse
  • Ikke en del af Kerberos udvidelse til ECC kurve udvælgelse

Jeg vil opfordre læseren til at følge lavpunkt min analyse til at forstå de grundlæggende principper, der kan misforstås, selv uden dyb teknisk baggrund, men i det mindste med en god teknologisk baggrund en nogle grundlæggende smule kryptering.

 Her går vi med analysen
 

Mit mål er at foretage en analyse af, hvad / hvordan den åbne videnskabelige og sikkerhed samfund vælge ECC krypto-system til brug i sikkerhed protokoller og standarder, der er defineret af IETF RFC (dem, der definerer Internet-standarder i en åben og peer-reviewed måde).

Herunder et sæt af RFC indføre ECC i eksisterende system, som bliver analyseret for at forstå, hvad der er bedre at bruge, og hvad er bedre at udelukke:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Standardkurver & Curve Generation
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B-profil for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B i i Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Bestemmelse Styrker For offentlige nøgler bruges til at udveksle symmetriske nøgler
  • RFC5349 : elliptisk kurve Cryptography (ECC) Støtte til offentlig nøgle kryptografi for indledende autentificering i Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : elliptisk kurve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP voice kryptering af Philip Zimmermann ECC kurven
  • ECC i OpenPGP (udkast d tømmerflåde-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 )
  • ECC Curves udvalgt af Microsoft til chipkort Kerberos login

Vi vil bruge det valg, som videnskabsmand definerer Internet Security protokoller til at gøre en del af vores evaluering.
Derudover skal det forstås, at udvælgelsen Curve kommer fra forskellige myndigheder, der gjorde deres eget udvalg af kurver for at fortælle til industrien, hvad de skal bruge, og hvad man skal springe:

Vi vil bruge det valg, som videnskabsmand definerer sikkerhedskrav i standardiseringsorganerne agenturer til at gøre en del af vores evaluering.
Derudover noget som de fleste mennesker ikke kender, men at det er yderst relevant for vores analyse, at der er forskellige slags ECC kurvekryptografi og deres "størrelse" det er forskellig afhængig af den form for kurve:

  • ECC Curves end Prime Field (ofte betegnet som elliptisk kurve og repræsenteret ved P-keysize)
  • ECC Curves end Binary Field (ofte betegnet som Koblitz Curve og repræsenteret af K-keysize)

Givet en sikkerhed styrke ækvivalens elliptisk kurve og Kobliz Curve har forskellig nøgle størrelse, for eksempel når vi læser ECC 571 vi taler Koblitz Curve med en tilsvarende styrke som ECC 521 Prime kurve.

En sammenligning af styrken mellem elliptiske kurver og Kotbliz Curves er rapporteret nedenfor (fra Mikey ECC internet Udkast ):

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15360

Nedenfor er der en sammenligning af alle de udvalgte kurver fra alle de forskellige enheder og deres respektive navn (fra IETF RFC4492 for ECC brug for TLS ):

 Curve navne valgt af forskellige standardiseringsorganer
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SecG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

Hvad straks vises, er, at der kun er to kurver udvalgt af alle myndigheder, og at der er en generel dumping af Koblitz kurver ved ANSI.The kun fællesskab aftalte blandt de 3 myndigheder er følgende to ECC kurve:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Af dem udvalg af ECC-kurven for TLS den RFC5430 sprunget helt Koblitz kurver og udvalgt til kun brug:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Den ECC Brainpool sprunget helt Koblitz kurver og udvalgt til brug følgende ECC Curves:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (det er den eneste navnlig fordi det ikke er P-521, men P-512, den eneste nøgle-size henvist af ECC brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons fra Athena SCS )

Den OpenPGP internet udkast til ECC brug i PGP d tømmerflåde-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 sprunget helt Koblitz kurver og udvalgt følgende ECC kurver

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Kerberos-protokollen udvidelse til ECC brug, er defineret i RFC5349 og defineret af Microsoft til chipkort logon sprunget helt Koblitz kurver og udvalgt følgende ECC kurver:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Så lyder klart, at retten udvælgelsen af ​​ECC er for P-256, P-384 og P-521, mens Koblitz kurven er blevet sprunget over for Top Secret bruge og for nogen form for sikkerhed følsom protokol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS).

Hvorfor jeg lavede denne analyse?

Jeg har gjort denne analyse efter en diskussion jeg havde for visse voice kryptering produkter, alle baseret på tilpassede og proprietære protokoller, der alle anvender elliptisk kurve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571/571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits.
Alle dem bruger K-571, der, som beskrevet før, er blevet fjernet fra alle sikkerhed følsomme miljø og protokoller og være mig en designer af stemmen kryptering ting jeg tror, ​​at deres kryptografiske valg er absolut ikke den bedste sikkerhed valg.
Sandsynligvis er det blevet gjort lige til markedsføring formål, fordi K-571 (Koblitz kurve) synes stærkere end P-521 (elliptisk kurve baseret på Prime nummer). Hvis du har "flere bit" din markedsføring fyrene kan hævde at være "mere sikker". Koblitz elliptisk kurve er hurtigere end den tophemmelige aktiveret prime elliptisk kurve og så give produktet leder en chance for at give "mere bit" i det eget produkt og samtidig holde nøglen udveksling hurtigt.

Det er et spørgsmål om filosofisk valg.

Jeg foretrækker at følge udviklingen i den videnskabelige samfund med ydmyghed ikke at overveje mig en kryptografisk ekspert, knowledgable mere end den generelle sikkerhed og videnskabelige samfund selv.

Jeg foretrækker i stedet kun at bruge algoritmer, der er godkendt til anvendelse i meget følsomme omgivelser (top secret klassificering), der er blevet udvalgt af alle de myndigheder og arbejdsgruppen analysere krypteringsalgoritmer eksisterende out-der, og at repræsentere valget af næsten alle standard sikkerhed protokoller (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS, etc).
Jeg foretrækker at tælle mængden af ​​hjerner arbejder på krypto jeg bruger, at check det er virkelig sikker, at vurdere, om der er nogle svagheder.

Antallet af Brais arbejder på Crypto vidt udbredt, er af størrelsesorden mere end antallet af hjerner arbejder på krypto bruges af blot få mennesker (som Koblitz kurve).
Så jeg er ikke dæmonisere der bruger ECDH 571 hjælp Koblitz Curve, men sikker kan jeg bekræfte, at de ikke havde taget det bedste valg med hensyn til sikkerhed, og at eventuelle sikkerhed fagfolk gør en sikkerhed benchmarking ville overveje det faktum, at elliptisk kurve Diffie Hellman 571 bit gøres med Koblitz kurven ikke er vidt udbredt, er det dumpet fra standard sikkerheds protokoller og det er ikke certificeret til tophemmelige brug.

ESSOR, europæisk Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.

That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.

In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .

We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)

Product management and organization

I had to better understand the concepts, roles and duties related to Product management and Product marketing management in software companies, why are needed, which are the differences and how they fit inside an organization structure.

Most person i know never interested into this specific area of work, but when you want to be a product company (and not a consulting or solution company), you start having different products on different platforms for different target customers sold trough different channels with different pricing with a installation/different delivery process and that complexity must be managed in the proper way.

You realize that in order to let the product company grow in the right direction you need to organize product management activities formally, not closing your mind in rigid organization roles such as Marketing, Sales, R&D.

When we speak about Product Management i recommend the reading of the illuminating The strategic role of Product Management (How a market-driven focus leads companies to build products people want to buy) that clarify a lot of things, even if it outlook net separation of roles in product management, something t hat’s too heavy for a small company like a startup .

Still it provide a differentiation of duties between Product Management and Product Marketing .

A good understanding of the product management related to startup i s given in the article Creating Product Management at Startup showing up different case related to the roles of the product visionary into the company.

It introduce the terms ceo of the product in the sense that the product management duties jump around into the various organization function by providing focus and effort where it's needed, independently from the fact that the internal function requiring more effort is Development, Marketing, Sales or Communication. That's means practically enhancing the product vision as it's needed across all major product-related functions making the vision corporate-wide coherent.

A good representation of product management and product marketing activities is well described with the differentiation of between Strategical, Technical and Marketing sector and is not clearly separated between Management, Marketing(and Sales) and R&D :

Triad.jpg

I read that product manager background and knowledge are different depending on the company focus ( where does product management belong in the organization? ):

  • B2C -> Marketing experience
  • B2B -> Technical experience

An illuminating (for me) and very important differentiation regarding product management duties is the differentiation between:

  • Product Management
  • Product Marketing

The specific duties belonging to Product Marketing vs Management are greatly explained in Role Definitions For Product Management and Product Marketing that i suggest to read, letting you to better define tasks and responsibilities across your organization. It also provide a good definition of job requirements if you need to look for that figure!

At the same time it's important to understand what's NOT product management, effectively Product management is not just feature prioritization .

At the same time it's important to understand which professional figure is NOT itself a product manager:

  • Product manager is not a marketing manager – while product management is usually seen as a marketing discipline, marketers are focused on the marketing plan and are usually not driving the overall product direction. In that context could however be found Product marketing manager that's the arms of the marketing of the product, especially in small organization.
  • Product manager is not a sales manager – sales manager are about finding out how to sell a product, following which sales methodology, technique and channels and they could drive the company from a market oriented company ( product) to a customer oriented company (solution and consulting)
  • Product manager is not a developer – Developers are focused on the technology and not the overall product. Some great product managers are former developers, but it is difficult to do both at once. There is a natural tension between developers and product managers that should be maintained to create a balanced product.
  • Product manager is not a software manager – the software manager is a functional manager and usually not focused on the product or the customers.
  • Product manager is not a project manager – project managers are about how and when, while the product manager is about what. Project managers work closely with product managers to ensure successful completion of different phases in the product life cycle.

The typical product management activities could be in extreme synthesis summarized as follow:

  • Strategy: Planning a product strategy
  • Technical: leading product developments
  • Marketing: providing product and technical content
  • Sales: provide pre sales support and work effectively with sales

Product management so it's not precisely development, is not precisely marketing, it's not precisely sales, so typically it's difficult to identify “where it should stay” inside the organization structure (it's even difficult to understand that's needed)?

The Silicon Valley Product Group provide a nice insight on Product Organization Structure by pointing out which are the advantages and risks of several choices. Still the Cranky Product Manager say that It doesn't matter where the product manager live in the organization .

It's relevant to be careful not to have persons that are too much technical or too much sales oriented in order to fill the gap among different organization. Too much fragmentation of assigned duties across the organization may lead to bureaucracy, too much duties on one person may lead to ineffective implementation of needed tasks in some area and to a internal competition perception respect to the traditional roles.

Check there a very nice Resume of a professional with practical experience in product management (it's an half techie/half marketing guys).

Ah! Another very common misunderstanding is to confuse marketing with communication where ai found a so good definition of Marketing that i really like and understand for strict relationship with Product Management:

Marketing is know the market so well that the product sell itself

But what happen when you don't handle a product management and product marketing management process in a defined way?

A nice story is shown as example in The strategic role of Product Management :

Your founder, a brilliant technician, started the company years ago when he quit his day job to market his idea full time. He created a product that he just knew other people needed. Og han havde ret. Pretty soon he delivered enough of the product and hired his best friend from college as VP of Sales. And the company grew. But before long, the VP of Sales complained, “We're an engineering-led company. We need to become customer-driven.” And that sounded fine. Except… every new contract seemed to require custom work. You signed a dozen clients in a dozen market segments and the latest customer's voice always dominated the product plans. You concluded that “customer-driven” meant “driven by the latest customer” and that couldn't be right.

If you want to be a product company it's relevant to precisely follow a strategy driven by product marketing and management and not by sales.

Confusion between duties of product management/marketing and sales could lead to unsuccessful product company that are not able to proceed within their strategy, simply because they getting opportunities that drive the business out-of-scope.

A product company must invest in it's own product development and marketing in order to let sales activity stay focused and guarantee that the organization is every day more effective on the market.

After this reading, my understanding is that it's relevant to identify how to create a set of flexible business process on how to handle various product management and product marketing duties separating them from sales.

Remotely intercepting snom VoIP phones

I suggest reading remotely tapping VoIp phones ” on VoIP Security Alliance Blog by Shawn Merdinger .

A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Voice communication security workshop

Hej,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

We come in peace

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

Web2.0 privacy leak in Mobile apps

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! Jeg er enig! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

AES algorithm selected for use in space

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

Men det er altid vanskeligt at vurdere truslen og risici relateret til RIM selv og som kunne gøre politisk pres mod RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Skål

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

Celebrating “Hackers” after 25 years

A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

201007010924.jpg

It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.

http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html 
Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.
O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.

Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

China Encryption Regulations

Hi all,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

IOScat – a Port of Netcat to Cisco IOS

En portering af berømte netcat til Cisco IOS router operativsystem: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Hilsen,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Ja
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Ja
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Ja
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Ja
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Ja

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Hvorfor?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!