Tag Archives: Privacy

RFC 6189: ZRTP er endelig en standard!

Endelig ZRTP er blevet tildelt en officiel RFC opgave, RFC6189 ZRTP: Medier Path Key Aftale om Unicast Secure RTP.

Det havde som en afhængighed af SRTP med AES nøgle størrelse 256bit, at nu er blevet defineret som RFC6188 .

Det er spændende at se RFC endelig frigivet, da det er en vigtig milepæl for at indstille ZRTP som den officielle standard for end-to-end kryptering meget gerne PGP har været for e-mails.

Nu enhver organisation i verden vil blive officielt stand til at gennemføre ZRTP til end-to-end protokol voice kryptering

I øjeblikket 3 forskellige offentlige implementeringer af ZRTP protokol eksisterer:

Hver af dem giver forskellige funktioner i protokollen, men vigtigst er kendt for at være interoperable.

En ny bølge kommer til voice kryptering verden, irrupting ind i et gråt område, hvor de fleste af de virksomheder, der gør telefonen krypteringssystemer har gennemført custom kryptering.

Nu er en standard er blevet setup, og der er kun få grunde tilbage til at gennemføre noget andet.

Hurra Mr. Zimmermann og alle samfund af virksomheder (som PrivateWave ) og personer (ligesom Werner Dittmann ), der arbejdede på det!

I dag er det en stor dag, denne form for teknologi er nu officiel, og også med flere eksisterende implementering!

Philip, du gjorde det igen, min kompliment til din ren ånd og beslutsomhed :-)

Del

Fremgang for GSM revner i Freiburg universitet

Den spændende verden af ​​mobile protokoller (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS osv.) hacking bliver officielle forskningsaktiviteter fra universiteter.

Den investering at gøre opensource kode udgivelser af revner software giver mulighed for at studerende på universitetet for at arbejde på det, forbedre det og gøre en stærk forskning.

The University of Freiburg netop udgivet papiret Praktisk øvelse på GSM kryptering A5 / 1 sammen med en gsmframencoder support værktøj til at forbedre den snuse, afkodning og krakningsproces.

Åbning hardware, åbne software, åbne protokol demonstrere svaghed af enhver form for proprietære metode eller proces at opbygge kommunikation og sikkerhed teknologier.

Det bør være målet for enhver videnskabsfolk at forsøge at åbne op og knæk enhver form for proprietære og lukkede teknologi til at tvinge industrien til at går på kun interoperable og åben tilgang samtidig med at designe telekommunikations protokoller.

Del

Min TOR exit node erfaring forsøger at bortfiltrere larmende trafik

Tidligt i år besluttede jeg, det er tid til at køre en TOR exit node, så jeg bragte en VPS hos hetzner.de (fordi de er opført som en god TOR ISP ) og opsætte exit-node med øgenavn privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch med en 100Mbit / s forbindelse for første 1TB af månedlige data, så 10Mbit / s flad.

Det er også køre TOR2WEB software på http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

Jeg setup exit-politikken som foreslået ved at køre exit-node med minimal chikane og udarbejdede en misbrug respons skabelon .

I den første dag jeg har kørt noden jeg modtog straks DMCA klager skyldes peer to peer trafik.

Så jeg besluttede at filtrere ud nogle P2P trafik ved hjælp af OpenDPI iptables modul og DMCA klager automatisk forsvundet:

iptables-A OUTPUT-m opendpi-eDonkey-gadugadu-FastTrack-Gnutella-directconnect-BitTorrent-WinMX-Soulseek-j AFVIS

Så fordi jeg er italiensk, besluttede jeg at undgå min TOR node for at oprette forbindelse til den italienske internetadresse rummet for at reducere sandsynligheden for at en dum anklager ville vække mig op på morgenen, fordi forstod ikke, at jeg kører en TOR node.

Jeg prøvede, med hjælp af hellais som skrev en script til at gøre Exit Policy afviser erklæring , at afvise alle italienske netblocks baseret på IOError s blockfinder men vi fandt, at de torrc konfigurationsfiler filer med 1000 linier gjorde TOR nedbrud.

Vi gik til at åbne en billet til at rapportere styrtet om vores forsøg på at blokere TOR exit politik efter land og fandt et lignende forsøg , hvor vi har bidraget, men det synes stadig at være en open-problem.

Konklusionen er, at det ikke er muligt at lave et land Exit politik for TOR exit node i en ren og høflig måde, så jeg besluttede at gå den beskidte måde ved hjælp af iptables / GeoIP . Efter kampene for at gøre det kompilere ordentligt, det var en linje af iptables til at blokere trafikken til Italien:

iptables-A OUTPUT-p tcp-m state-state NEW-m GeoIP-dst-cc IT-j AFVIS

Nu fra min exit-node ingen forbindelse til det italienske net vil ske, og jeg er sikker mod muligvis dumme anklagere ikke forståelse TOR (jeg har en undtagelse for alle TOR node ip-adresse anvendes før).

Efter nogle andre dage, jeg begyndte at modtage klager på grund portscan aktiviteter stammer fra mine tor noder.

Fra mit eget synspunkt jeg ønsker at støtte anonymitet netværk, ikke anonym hacking forsøg, og så jeg vil filtrere ud portscan og angreb fra stammer fra min node.That 's en kompliceret sag, der kræver nogle undersøgelse, så i mellemtiden har jeg installeret scanlogd og snort fordi jeg ønsker at vurdere, hvor mange angreb, hvilken slags angreb er at komme ud fra min TOR exit node.
Senere vil jeg forsøge at arrangere en form for filtrering for at være sikker på at være i stand til at filtrere store angreb.
For hvad er relateret til portscan ser det ud til, at der er ingen offentlige redskaber til at spore og filtrere udgående portscan men kun for at filtrere indkommende portscan så sandsynligvis bliver nødt til at skrive noget ad-hoc.
Jeg vil henvise hvordan det går, og om der vil være nogle god måde at implementere i en Lightwave måde fnys-inline selektivt filtrere ud større angreb forsøg stammer fra min exit-node.

Mit mål er at holde en exit node kører i langvarig (mindst 1 TB trafik per måned doneret til TOR), hvilket reducerer indsatsen i forbindelse med ISP klage og forsøge at gøre mit bedste for at køre exit-node med en rimelig forpligtelse.

Del

Zorg, nye C + + og Java ZRTP implementering offentlige udgivelse

Hej alle, i dag kl PrivateWave Italia SpA, italiensk selskab beskæftiger i udviklingslande teknologier til beskyttelse af privatlivets fred og informationssikkerheden i voice telekommunikation, hvor jeg CTO, vi frigiver Zorg en ny open source ZRTP protokolimplementering kan downloades fra http://www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] giver end-to-end nøgleudveksling med elliptisk kurve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit og AES-256 SRTP kryptering.

Zorg er oprindeligt udviklet og implementeret i PrivateWave s PrivateGSM stemme kryptering produkter tilgængelige til følgende platforme: Blackberry, Nokia og iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C + + er blevet integreret med PJSIP open source VoIP SDK [2] og det er tilvejebragt som integration patch mod PJSIP 1.8.5. Det er blevet testet på iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux og Mac OS X.

Zorg Java er blevet integreret i en brugerdefineret version af MJSIP [3] open source SDK på Blackberry platform, og det omfatter hukommelsesforbrug optimeringer der kræves for at reducere minimum skrald indsamler aktivitet.

Begge platforme har adskilt og modulopbygget kryptografisk back-enderne, så den kryptografiske algoritmer implementering let kunne byttes med andre dem.

. Zorg er licenseret under GNU AGPL og kildekoden er tilgængelig på github på https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Vi frigiver den under open source og i overensstemmelse med vores tilgang til sikkerhed [4], som vi virkelig håber, at det kan være nyttigt for open source økosystem til at skabe nye voice krypteringssystemer til støtte for ytringsfriheden.

Mere end 20 pjsip-baserede open source VoIP krypteringssoftware og flere skrevet i Java direkte kunne drage fordel af Zorg udgivelse.

Vi vil være glade for at modtage forslag om samarbejde, ny integration, ny kryptografisk back-ender, bug scouting og hvad nyttigt at forbedre og lad ZRTP bekræfter som stemme kryptering standard.

Zorg er tilgængelig fra http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] Sikkerhed tilgang: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Del

Krypteret mobiltelefon for at fastnet telefon opkald med Asterisk 1.8

Vi har lige udgivet en teknisk howto om , hvordan man opbygger Secured mobiltelefon for fastnet VoIP infrastruktur med:

I næste uge andre howto som denne vil komme ud ved hjælp af andre serverplatforme såsom FreeSWITCH, alle i en ånd af åbenhed og gearing af opensource sikkerhedsteknologier.

Del

PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia mobil voice kryptering med ZRTP eller SRTP / SDES

Jeg er helt undgå at bruge min egen personlige blog til at gøre fremme af enhver form for produkt.

Den tid, det er ikke anderledes, men jeg vil gerne fortælle dig fakta om produkter, jeg arbejder på uden fancy markedsføring, men opholder sig teknisk.

I dag ved PrivateWave hvor jeg CTO og medstifter , vi udgivet offentligt mobile VoIP krypteringsprodukter til Blackberry, iPhone og Nokia:

  • Den 1. nogensinde Blackberry krypteret VoIP med ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • Den 1. nogensinde iPhone krypteret VoIP med ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • Den 1. nogensinde Blackberry krypteret VoIP klient med SRTP med SDES nøgleudveksling løbet SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

logo-privatewave-colore.png

Hos PrivateWave bruger vi en anden tilgang hvad angår de fleste voice kryptering selskab derude, læse vores tilgang til sikkerhed .

Relevansen af ​​dette produkter i teknologien og industri landskab kan opsummeres som følger:

  • Det er den første stemme kryptering selskab kun bruger standarder sikkerhed protokoller (og vi forventer, at markedet vil reagere, da det er klart, at proprietære tech kommer fra arv CSD ikke kan give samme værdi)
  • Det er den første tilgang i stemmen kryptering til kun at bruge open source & standard kryptering motor
  • Det er den første stemme kryptering tilgang til at yde forskellige sikkerheds model ved hjælp af forskellige teknologier (ende-til-ende for ZRTP og end-to-site for SRTP )

De suite af Mobile Secure klienter, der er designet til professionel sikkerhed bruger kun bruger bedst telekommunikation og sikkerhed teknologier, giver en høj grad af beskyttelse, sammen med gode resultater også i dårlige netværk betingelser:

Ansøgningerne er:

icona-pgsm.png

De understøttede mobile enheder er:

Vedrørende ZRTP besluttede vi at understrege og strække al den sikkerhed og paranoide træk af protokollen med nogle lille tilføjelse:

Vores strenge adressebog integration går ud ZRTP RFC specifikation, der kunne være sårbare over for visse angreb, når de anvendes på mobiltelefoner på grund af brugerens adfærd ikke at se på mobil skærm.

Vores paranoy måde at bruge ZRTP afbøde sådanne betingelser, vil vi skrive om dette senere og / eller tilføjer specifikke detaljer for RFC integration.

Nogle ord om PrivateGSM Professional med end-to-end kryptering med ZRTP

Læs teknisk ark der!

At hente den klikke her og bare sætte dit telefonnummer

Det er resultatet af hårdt arbejde af al min meget dygtige personale (16 personer har arbejdet på dette 6 projekter til 3 forskellige platforme) på udfordrende teknologier (voice kryptering) i en vanskelig driftsmiljø (dirty mobilnet og beskidte mobile operativsystemer) for at få flere end 2 år.

Jeg er meget stolt af vores medarbejdere!

Hvad bliver det næste?

I næste uger vil du se frigivelse af store sæt dokumentationer såsom integration med asterisker, freeswitch og andre Security Aktiveret PBX, sammen med nogle spændende andre sikkerheds nyheder om teknologi, som jeg er sikker på vil blive bemærket ;)

Det har været en hårdt arbejde og mere skal gøres, men jeg er overbevist om, at sikkerhed og opensource samfund vil gerne sådanne produkter og vores transparent tilgang også med åbne vigtige udgivelser og open source integration, der gør en meget politisk neutral (bagdør gratis) teknologi .

Del

Et par dejlig VPN udbyder

Der er en masse af grunden man har brug for at få adgang til internettet via et VPN.

For eksempel, hvis du bor i et land blokerer visse indhold (som anti-kommunale hjemmeside, porno, osv.) og / eller protokoller (som Skype, VoIP) ville du sikkert ønsker at flytte din internetforbindelse uden de grimme blokerende landet ved hjælp af krypterede VPN tunneller.

Jeg vurderede flere hosted VPN-server og et par af dem lyder ganske godt blandt de udbredte udbud af sådanne tjenester:

SwissVPN

Udgang til internettet fra Schweiz.

Omkostninger 6 CHF / måneder

Valgfri offentlig fast IP-adresse

Nyttigt, hvis du har brug for:

  • Bare omgå lokale land filtre med god høj båndbredde
  • Expose offentlige tjenester lavpunkt VPN med den valgfrie faste offentlige IP-adresse.

Overplay

Udgang til internettet ved at vælge blandt 20 forskellige lande (hver gang du tilslutter).

Nyttigt, hvis du har brug for at gøre:

  • business intelligence på konkurrent (ser ud til at komme fra land X, når du tilslutter dem)
  • se film / Telefilm kun tilladt fra de nationale IP webhoteller
  • se google resultater mellem forskellige lande

Del

Fjernt opsnappe snom VoIP-telefoner

Jeg foreslår at læse eksternt trykke VoIP-telefoner "på VoIP Security Alliance Blog af Shawn Merdinger .

Et konkret eksempel på, hvordan den nuværende telefoni infrastruktur bliver mere sårbare over for cyber-angreb.

Del

Talekommunikation sikkerhed workshop

Hej,

Jeg lavede en snak om talekommunikation sikkerhedsteknologi på University of Trento efter en interessant informationsudveksling med Crypto Lab lykkedes Professor Massimiliano Sala .

Jeg foreslår interesserede folk at læse det, især den anden del, da der er en innovativ kategorisering af de forskellige voice krypteringsteknologi, der bliver anvendt i flere sektorer.

Jeg forsøgte at forklare og komme ud af dette almindeligt opsplittet teknologisk sektor ved at give et bredt overblik over teknologier, der normalt er absolut uafhængige én hver-anden, men praktisk talt de anvender til voice kryptering efter kategorisering:

  • Mobile TLC Industri stemme krypteringsstandarder
  • Regering og Militære stemme krypteringsstandarder
  • Offentlige sikkerhed stemme krypteringsstandarder
  • IETF stemme krypteringsstandarder
  • Misc proprietære stemme krypteringsteknologi

Det er en kæmpe slideware, 122 dias, vil jeg foreslå at gå læse 2. del springe aflytning teknologier overblik allerede er omfattet af min præsentation af 2009.

Talekommunikation sikkerhed

Især jeg kan lide begrebet chokolade kryptering, der ønsker at give nogle innovation på Snake Oil Encryption koncept.

Men jeg har brug for at få mere i dybden om Chocolate kryptering sammenhæng vil sandsynligvis gøre inden udgangen af året ved at give en anvendt kursus om forståelse og evaluere praktisk talt reel sikkerhed sammenhæng med forskellige voice krypteringsteknologi.

Del

GSM revner i penetrationsprøve metoder (OSSTMM)?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Del

Snake-olie sikkerhed hævder på crypto sikkerhedsprodukt

Sikkerhed markedet vokse, flere virksomheder går til markedet, men hvor mange af dem tager alvorligt, hvad de gør?

Du ved, laver sikkerheds teknologi betyder, at du er personligt ansvarlig for beskyttelsen af brugerens oplysninger. Du skal gøre dem bevidste om, hvad de har brug for, præcis, hvad din gør, og hvilken slags trusler model dit produkt beskytte.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

Så der er en masse virksomheder, der gør en ikke-så-etisk markedsføring af sikkerhedsfunktioner, der er baseret på de faktiske forhold, at ingen brugere vil være i stand til at evaluere den.

Den tidligere forklaret situationen bor i sikkerhed emnet Snake Oil kryptering, en udvikling i den videnskabelige kryptografiske miljø, lad os i dag bruger bedste af racen oplysninger teknologi til beskyttelse uden at skulle bekymre sig for meget om bagdøre eller usikkerhed.

Lad os tale om Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Kryptografi : I kryptografi , er slange olie et udtryk der bruges til at beskrive kommercielle kryptografiske metoder og produkter, der anses for falske eller svigagtig. Skelne sikker kryptografi fra usikker kryptografi kan være vanskeligt ud fra synspunktet af en bruger. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

Den mest omtalte krypto sikkerhed guru, Philip Zimmermann og Bruce Schneier, var 1st at tale om Snake Oil Kryptering:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

"Husk, krypto uden en trussel model er som cookies uden mælk. ..... Kryptering uden trusler model er som moderskabet uden æbletærte. Kan ikke sige det nok gange. Mere generelt, sikkerhed uden en trussel model er per definition vil mislykkes. "

Så hvordan at spotte slange olie sikkerhedsprodukter?

Kontroller en retningslinje for at spotte Snake Oil Kryptering Produkter: Snake Oil advarselsskilte Encryption software for at undgå med Matt Curtin .

Du kan se dette meget gode Kryptografiske Snake Oil Eksempler fra Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect på Linux Security), der forsøgte at gøre det klart eksempel på, hvordan at spotte kryptografisk Snake Oil.

Her repræsenterede den grundlæggende retningslinje fra Matt Curtin papir:


Ved at kontrollere, at point er det muligt at vurdere, hvor alvorlig en krypteringsteknologi eller produkt er.

Men alt i alt, hvordan du løser det uetisk sikkerhed tilgang?

Det er meget significative og det ville være virkelig nyttige for hver form for sikkerhed produktkategori at gøre nogle stærkt og uafhængig evaluering guideline (ligesom OSSTMM for Penetration test), for at gøre denne sikkerhed evalueringsproces virkelig i hænderne på brugeren.

Det ville også være meget rart at have nogen at gøre analyse og evaluering af sikkerheds produkt selskaber, offentliggør rapporter om Snake Oil skilte.

Del

Web2.0 privacy lækage i Mobile apps

Du ved, at web2.0 verden er det masser af lækage af enhver art (profilering, profilering profilering) relateret til Privacy, og brugerne begynder at blive bekymret over det.

Brugere kontinuerligt hente programmer uden at kende detaljerne i, hvad de gør, for eksempel iFart bare fordi er cool, er sjove og engang er nyttige.

thumb.php.jpg

På mobiltelefoner brugere installerer fra 1000% op til 10.000% flere ansøgninger end på en pc, og disse apps kan indeholde malware eller andre uventede funktionaliteter.

For nylig infobyte analyseret UberTwitter klient og opdagede, at klienten var utæt og sende til deres server mange personlige og følsomme data såsom:

- Blackberry PIN

- Telefonnummer

- E-mail-adresse

- Geografisk positionsoplysninger

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

Del

AES-algoritme udvalgt til anvendelse i rummet

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

Del

Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

bblock.jpg

Lad os fortsætter.

På den ene side Blackberry er det en platform masser af kryptering funktioner, sikkerhed funktioner overalt, enhed krypteret (med brugerdefinerede crypto), kommunikation krypterede (med brugerdefinerede proprietære protokoller såsom IOPP'er), meget god Avancerede sikkerhedsindstillinger, kryptering ramme fra Certicom ( nu ejet af RIM ).

På den anden side de ikke kun giver en enhed, men et overlay accessnettet kaldet BIS ( BlackBerry Internet Service ), der er en global verdensomspændende wide area network, hvor din blackberry ind, mens du surfer eller checkmail bruge blackberry.net AP.

Når du eller et program, skal du bruge blackberry.net APN er du ikke bare at forbinde til internettet med luftfartsselskabet internetforbindelse, men du indtaster inde i RIM netværk, der vil proxy og fungere som en gateway til at nå internettet.

Det samme sker, når du har en corporate brug: Både BB enheden og corporate BES forbindelse til RIM netværk, der fungerer som en slags vpn koncentration netværk .

Så dybest set alle de meddelelser krydser trough RIM tjeneste infrastruktur i krypteret format med et sæt proprietær kryptering og kommunikationsprotokoller.

Ligesom en meddelelse, tror, ​​at Google give gtalk løbet blackberry.net APN, lavet en aftale med henblik på at tilbyde service inden for BB netværket til BB brugere. Når du installerer gtalk du få tilføjet 3 service-bøger , der peger på GTALKNA01 det er navnet på GTalk gateway inde i RIM-netværket til at tillade intra-BIS kommunikation og fungere som en GTalk gateway til internettet.

Mobiloperatører normalt ikke engang lov til at inspicere trafikken mellem Blackberry enhed og BlackBerry Network.

Så RIM og Blackberry eller anden måde er unik for deres tilgang, som de giver en platform, et netværk og en tjeneste alle bundtet sammen, og du kan ikke bare "få enheden og softwaren", men brugeren og corporate er altid bundet og forbundet til tjenesten netværk.

Det er godt, og det er dårligt, fordi det betyder, at RIM giver særdeles god sikkerhed funktioner og muligheder for at beskytte oplysninger, enheden og adgang til oplysninger på forskellige niveau over tredjepart.

Men det er altid vanskeligt at vurdere truslen og risici relateret til RIM selv og der kunne lave politisk pres mod RIM.

Overvej venligst at jeg ikke siger "RIM ser på dine data", men en objektiv risikoanalyse: for, hvordan platformen er gjort RIM har autoritet på enheden, på oplysninger om-the-enheden og på de oplysninger, som krydser netværk. (Læs min mobil sikkerhed Slides ).

For eksempel lad os overveje det samme kontekst til Nokia-telefoner.

Når Nokia-enheden sælges, Nokia er derfor ikke have autoritet på enheden, heller ikke på de oplysninger, on-the-enheden heller ikke på de oplysninger, der krydser netværket. Men det er også sandt, at Nokia bare give enheden og giver ikke den merværdi tjenester såsom Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), BIS accessnettet og alle de lokale og eksterne sikkerhed klargjorte funktioner, Blackberry giver.

Så det er et spørgsmål om at overveje risikoen kontekst på den rigtige måde, når du vælger den platform, med et eksempel meget lig vælge Microsoft Exchange Server (på din egen tjeneste), eller om at få en SaaS tjeneste som Google Apps.

I begge tilfælde skal du have tillid til udbyder, men i første eksempel, du nødt til at stole Microsoft, der ikke sætter en bagdør på software, mens i 2. eksempel, du nødt til at stole Google, som en platform og udbyder, betyder det ikke få adgang dine oplysninger.

Så det er et andet paradigme, der skal evalueres afhængigt af din trussel model.

Hvis din trussel model lader du overveje RIM som en betroet tredjepart tjenesteudbyder (meget gerne google), end det er ok. Hvis du har en meget høj risiko sammenhæng som tophemmelige én, så lad os overveje og evaluere nøje, om det ikke er bedre at holde Blackberry-tjenester fuldt isoleret fra enheden eller bruge et andet system uden interaktion med producentens servere og tjenester.

Nu, lad os komme tilbage til nogle forskning og nogle fakta om brombær og brombær sikkerhed selv.

Først og fremmest flere regeringer måtte beskæftige sig med RIM for at tvinge dem til at give adgang til de oplysninger, der krydser deres servicenet, mens andre besluttede at direkte forbyde Blackberry brug for højtstående embedsmænd på grund af servere i England og USA, mens andre besluttede at installere deres egne bagdøre.

Der er en masse diskussion, når emnerne er RIM Blackberry og regeringer af forskellige årsager.

Nedenfor et sæt officielle Security relaterede oplysninger på RIM BlackBerry platform:

Og her et sæt uofficiel Sikkerhed og Hacking relaterede oplysninger på RIM Blackberry platform:

Fordi det er 23.32 (GMT +1), jeg er træt, jeg tror, ​​at dette indlæg vil ende her.

Jeg håber at have givet læseren et sæt af nyttige oplysninger og hensyn til at gå mere i dybden med at analysere og i betragtning af den samlede brombær sikkerhed (i det gode og i dårlige, er det altid afhænger af din trussel model!).

Skål

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps jeg styre sikkerheden teknologiudvikling (voice kryptering tech) på Blackberry-platformen, og jeg kan fortælle dig, at fra udvikling synspunkt er det absolut bedre end Nokia med hensyn til kompatibilitet og hastighed udvikling, men kun bruge RIMOS 5,0 +!

Del

Botnet til RSA revner?

Jeg læste en interessant artikel om at sætte 1.000.000 computere, får chancen for en seriøs botnet ejeren at få det, for at knække RSA.

Resultatet er, at i en sådan kontekst angribe en RSA 1024bit nøgle ville tage kun 28 år, sammenlignet med teoretiske 19 mia i år.

Læsning af denne artikel , er yderst interessant, fordi det giver vores meget vigtig overvejelse på kryptografi styrken hensyn til regnekraft der kræves for at fortsætte revner forsøg, sammen med industrien tilgang til "default security level".

Jeg vil sige en skal læse.

Del

Kina Kryptering forordninger

Hej alle,

Jeg fandt denne meget interessante papir på Kina Kryptering Import / Export / nationale bestemmelser udført af Baker & Mckenzie i USA.

Det er stærkt erhvervs-og lovgivningsområdet orienteret giver en meget godt klaret syn på, hvordan Kina reglerne fungerer, og hvordan det kan opføre sig i fremtiden.

Læs her Dekryptering China Kryptering regelsæt (formular Bakernet hjemmeside).

Del

Mobile Security tale på WHYMCA konference

Jeg vil gerne dele nogle lysbilleder jeg brugte til at tale om mobil sikkerhed på whymca mobile konference i Milano.

Læs her mine slides på mobil sikkerhed .

De slides giver en bred en grundig oversigt over mobil sikkerhed relaterede spørgsmål, skal jeg gøre nogle slidecast om det at sætte også lyd. Måske vil gøre, måske ikke, det afhænger af tid, der er altid en utilstrækkelig ressource.

Del

iPhone PIN: ubrugelig kryptering

Jeg har for nylig skiftede en af ​​mine mange mobiltelefoner med, som jeg går rundt til iPhone.

Jeg er især bekymret over databeskyttelse i tilfælde af tyveri, og så begyndt at have et kig rundt om iPhone ydede beskyttelse system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Del

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Del

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

Del

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Del

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

Del

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt svar på Infosecurityguard / Notrax sag: absolut urimeligt! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com er blevet deaktiveret. Notrax identitet blev kendt til flere fyre i stemmen sikkerhedsmæssige miljøer (kan ikke fortælle, men du kan forestille dig, jeg havde ret!) Og så vores venner besluttede at trow væk hjemmeside på grund af juridiske ansvar under UK og USA love.

UPDATE: Nice resumé af hele historien (jeg ved, det er lang og kompliceret at læse i 1st tid) SIPVicious VoIP sikkerhed blog ved Sandro Gauci .

Efter mine opdagelser, forsøgte Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chef exec, at i sidste ende forsvare deres handlinger, citerer helt urimelige undskyldninger til The Reg stedet for offentligt at undskylde for, hvad de har gjort: at skabe en falsk selvstændig sikkerhedsforskning til at fremme deres PhoneCrypt produkt .

Han forsøgte at overbevise os om, at personen bag IP 217.7.213.59, der anvendes af forfatteren af infosecurityguard.com og peger til deres kontor DSL-linje var dette hacker Notrax, ved hjælp af deres anonym surfing service og ikke en af deres medarbejdere på deres kontor:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, sagde han, må have været ved hjælp af hans firmas anonym browsing service, SurfSolo, til at producere de resultater rapporteret af Pietrosanti "

Lad os reflektere et øjeblik på denne sætning ... Ville virkelig en hacker søger anonymitet tilbringer 64 EUR til købe deres anonymitet surfing tjeneste kaldet surfsolo stedet for at bruge den gratis og meget mere sikker TOR (løg router) ? Så lad os reflektere over dette andet stykke oplysninger:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • De fremmer deres anonym proxy service for "Anonym p2p anvendelse" ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Hvem ville lade brugerne gøre p2p fra kontoret dsl linje, hvor de har installeret deres corporate VoIP PBX? Hvis du gør VoIP du kan ikke lade tredjepart oversvømmelse din linje w / p2p trafik, vil din telefon opkald blev tydeligvis upålidelige (Ja, ja, du kan gøre QoS, men du ville ikke placere en anonym navigation proxy på din virksomheds kontor DSL linje ...).
  • Hvilket selskab leverer en anonym navigation tjeneste nogensinde ville bruge deres eget kontor IP-adresse? Tænk på, hvor mange gange du ville have politiet banker på din dør og dine medarbejdere som de primære mistænkte. (I sidste jeg plejede at køre en TOR node, jeg kender risikoen ...). Også tænke på, hvor mange gange du vil finde dig selv blacklistet på google som en spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner siger også "vi har to millioner mennesker, der bruger dette produkt. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M brugere på en DSL-linje, virkelig?
  • Jeg bruger ikke Surfsolo service, men deres fuldmagter er formentlig disse dem:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistisk yderst vanskeligt, men ja, det er muligt. Mere eller mindre som "anonym proxy" historie fortalt af Mr. Hafner til at dække det faktum, at det er dem bag infosecurityguard.com falske "uafhængig sikkerheds anmeldelse".

Hey, jeg har ikke brug for noget andet at overbevise mig selv, eller at lade smart person har sine egne tanker om dette.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Hilsen,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps Jeg er i øjeblikket venter på nogle andre infos der vil mere præcist bekræfte, at Mr. Hafner siger ikke er korrekt sandt. Stay tuned.

Del

Bevis for, at infosecurityguard.com / notrax er SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt - En falsk uafhængig forskning på voice krypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Nu er det bekræftet, er det en falsk selvstændig hacker sikkerhedsforskning ved SecurStar GmbH, dens bare en markedsføringstilladelse trick!

Hvordan kan vi vide, at Infosecurityguard.com, den falske selvstændige sikkerhedsforskning, er et markedsførings trick fra SecurStar GmbH?

1) Jeg bogført på http://infosecurityguard.com en kommentarer til et indlæg med et link til min blog til denne artikel på israelian Forsvarsministeriet certificering

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010: 02:56:37 -0700] "GET / 20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works / HTTP/1.0" 200 5795 "http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0, GTB6.3;. NET CLR 1.1.4322;. NET CLR 2.0.50727,. NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152,. NET CLR 3.5.30729, InfoPath.2) "

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

Den SecurStar GmbH PBX er åben på internettet, det indeholder alle de navne deres medarbejder og bekræft os, at forfatteren af ​​http:/infosecurityguard.com er, at virksomheden og er den anonyme hacker kaldet Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. : ->

De målte deres markedsføring aktivitet

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. Det er rimeligt, hvis du investerer penge i en marketing kampagne, du ønsker at se resultater :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard + gold-lock

217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010: 02:22:42 -0700] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 31057 "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0, GTB6.3;. NET CLR 1.1.4322,. NET CLR 2.0.50727,. NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152,. NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2) "

217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010: 04:15:07 -0700] "GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0, GTB6.3;. NET CLR 1.1.4322,. NET CLR 2.0.50727,. NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152,. NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2) "


De domæneregistreringstjenester data
Domænet er registreret den 1. december 2009, kun to måneder til at begynde at forberede de uærlige marketing kampagne:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Justitssekretær: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Del

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Del

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

I en veltilrettelagt kryptografisk system, behøver kun nøglen til at være hemmelige, og der bør ikke være nogen hemmelighed i algoritmen.
Moderne kryptografer har taget dette princip, kalder noget andet "sikkerhed ved ubemærkethed."
Læs hvad Bruce Schneir, anerkendt ekspert og kryptograf i verden siger om dette
Enhver sikkerhedsekspert vil fortælle dig, det er rigtigt. Selv en novice universitetsstuderende vil fortælle dig, det er rigtigt. Simpelthen fordi det er den eneste måde at gøre kryptering.
Næsten alle produkt, der beskrives i gennemgangen af ​​SecurStar GmbH, omfatter PhoneCrypt, ikke give præcise oplysninger om deres kryptografiske teknologier.
Præcise oplysninger er:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Forudsat præcise detaljer betyder at have omfattende dokumentation med teoretiske og praktiske implikationer dokumenterer en enkelt måde, hvordan algoritmen fungerer, hvordan protokollen arbejder med nøjagtig specifikation at kopiere det for interoperabilitet test.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
Hvis vi ikke ved noget om det kryptografisk system i detaljer, hvordan kan vi vide, hvilke er svaghed og styrke point?

Mike Fratto, site redaktør af Network Computing, lavet en stor artikel om "at sige nej til proprietære kryptografiske systemer" .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

Under alle omstændigheder, og i enhver tilstand du gør kryptografi skal du være sikker på, at en anden vil tjekke, gennemgå, analysere, distruct og reconstract fra bunden din teknologi og give dem information gratis for offentligheden for åben diskussion.
Det er præcis, hvordan AES blev født, og som US National Institute of Standard gør krypto gør (med offentlig konkurrence med offentlig peer review, hvor kun de bedste evalueret vinder).
En offentlig diskussion med en offentlig konkurrence, hvor en masse af gennemgang af mest berømte og ekspert kryptograf i verden, hackere (med deres navn, efternavn og ansigt, ikke som Notrax) yde deres bidrag, fortælle, hvad de mener.
That's called “peer review”.

Hvis en kryptografisk teknologi har en udvidet og vigtig peer review, fordelt i verden, der kommer fra universiteter, private sikkerhedsfirmaer, militære institutioner, hackere og alle kommer fra forskellige dele af verden (fra USA til Europa til Rusland til Sydamerika til Mellemøsten til Kina) og alle af dem er enige om, at en bestemt teknologi er det sikkert ...
Tja, i dette tilfælde kan vi overveje teknologien sikker, fordi en masse af enheder med et godt omdømme og autoritet kommer fra en masse forskellige sted i verden offentligt har gennemgået, analyseret og bekræftede, at en teknologi, det er sikkert.

Hvordan en privat virksomhed kan selv mener at opfinde på sin egen en sikker kommunikationsprotokol, når det er videnskabeligt, at det ikke er muligt at gøre det på en "proprietær og lukket vej"?
IBM fortælle dig, at peer review er det nødvendigt for kryptering .
Bruce Schneier fortælle dig , at "Gode kryptografer ved, at intet kan erstatte en omfattende peer review og mange års analyse."
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c - Lukket kilde kryptografi virker ikke

Som du ved enhver form for "alvorlig", og med "gode omdømme" kryptografisk teknologi er implementeret i opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource krypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource krypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier fortælle dig, at kryptografi skal være opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

Når du gør sikre produkter, hvis de ikke er udført efter den korrekte fremgangsmåde folk kunne dø.
Det er absolut noget uansvarligt ikke at anvende den bedste praksis til at gøre krypto stuff.

For at opsummere så lad os gennemgå den infosecurityguard.com gennemgang fra et sikkerhedsmæssigt bedste pratice synspunkt.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Ja
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Cryptophone Transparency Begrænset offentlig gennemgang Public Ja
Guld-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Ja
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Sikker-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Zfone Transparency Public review
Åbent Ja
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Åbent Ja

* Grøn betyder, at det matcher grundlæggende forudsætning for en kryptografisk sikkert system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
Jeg tror, ​​jeg vil forberede et bredere kriterier for voice krypto-teknologier og voice krypto-produkter, så det ville være meget lettere og meget praktisk at have en fuld transparent sæt kriterier til at evaluere den.

Men de er virkelig basis af sikkerhed, der skal matches til en god voice kryptering system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

Sikkerheden begrebet anmeldelse er misvisende: enhver hacket enhed kan altid opfanget!

Jeg tror, ​​at de fyre helt gået glip af point: Enhver form for software på en kompromitteret operativsystemet kan blive opsnappet

Nu er de påpeger, at også Zfone fra Philip Zimmermann er brudt (en pc-software), bare fordi de installerer en trojansk på en pc som i en mobiltelefon?
Enhver sikkerhedssoftware påberåbe sig, at det underliggende operativsystem eller anden måde er tillid og bevare integriteten af ​​det miljø, hvor softwaren kører.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • Hvis du har en stemme krypteringssystem, men din mobiltelefon er inficeret med en trojan, er mobiltelefonen allerede kompromitteret.

Uanset hvilken software, du kører, i et sådant tilfælde sikkerheden på din driftsmiljøet er kompromitteret, og på en eller anden måde at alle de oplysninger, integritet og fortrolighed er kompromitteret.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

De eneste ting, der kan beskytte dig mod denne trussel kører i et lukket styresystem med Trust Computing kapacitet, gennemføre det ordentligt.
For sikker på enhver "Åbn" operativsystem os Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone eller Android er der ingen chance for virkelig at beskytte en software.
På vanskelige operativsystem som Symbian OS eller RimOS måske kører software kan være beskyttet (i det mindste delvist)

Det er grunden til, at sikkerheden koncept, fyre udnytte til at udøve deres marketing kampagne har ingen anelse.
Det er bare fordi de kontrollerer for miljøet, de kender Flexispy software og så de tilpasset deres software ikke at være interceptable når Flexispy er installeret.
Hvis du udvikler en trojan med de andre teknikker jeg beskrevet ovenfor vil du 100% skæringspunkt PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Hvorfor?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
Hvordan?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Derudover lad os se på det domæne ...
Domænet infosecurityguard.com er privatliv beskyttet af domainsbyproxy at forhindre forståelsen, der er ejeren.
Domænet er oprettet 2 måneder siden den 01-Dec-09 om godaddy.com registrator.

Hvad er også meget interessant at bemærke, at denne "ukendte hacker uden spor på google om ham, der dukkede op på December 2009 om net" er nævnt på SecurStar GmbH pressemeddelelse som en "An it-sikkerhed ekspert".

Måske de "kender personligt" hvem er denne anonyme notrax? :)

Følger jeg min egen sammensværgelse tænkning eller måske er der nogle rimelig tvivl om, at alt var arrangere i denne sjov måde bare for en marketing aktivitet?

Social overvejelse

Hvis du er et vagtselskab du job har også et sociale aspekter, bør du også arbejde for at gøre verden til et bedre sted (sikker på at gøre forretninger, men "ikke er onde"). Du kan ikke snyde de færdigheder af slutbrugerne i evalueringen sikkerheden gør falske vildledende oplysninger.

Du bør gøre bevidstheden om slutbrugere, for at gøre dem mere bevidste om sikkerhedsspørgsmål, give dem redskaber til at forstå og selv afgøre.

Håber du havde det sjovt at læse denne artikel, og du har lavet din egen overvejelse om dette.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Det er min personlige professionelle mening, så lad os tale om teknologi og sikkerhed, ikke markedsføring.
pps jeg er ikke så smart i web skriftligt, så ondt af, hvordan teksten er formateret, og hvordan strømmen af ​​artiklen er ustruktureret!

Del

Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Vær forsigtig.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

Del

Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

Del

Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? Yikes!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

Mike

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

Think about it…

Del

Disk encryption sometimes 'works'

I am one of the person convinced that a computer disk encryption system will not protect you from public authorities if they are convinced enough and the case is very important.

There are a lot of way to convince a person to release a password.

However there's a case in Australia where not revealing the disk password resulted in a successful way to avoid going in jail:

Secret code saves man who spied on flatmates

My opinion is just that spying flatmates is not a so relevant and particular crime and that law enforcement did not used 'convincing systems' to get the password of encrypted disk.

UPDATE 29.06.2010: It also worked for Daniel Dantas against FBI .

Del

Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Read more here .

Del

UAE government placing backdoors into Blackberry devices

Nice attempt to place backdoors inside Blackberry devices.

It seems that UAE government wanted to do something nasty placing backdoors trough software upgrades in Etilsat (local mobile operator) blackberry devices, obviously with the cooperation of the mobile operator itself.

Fortunately, the power of the security community discovered and unveiled the facts. Check it out.

Etisat patch designed for surveillance

Wired magazine: Blackberry spies

Security exists only with transparency.

Del

Voice encryption in government sectors

I will make some in depth articles about how voice encryption really works in government environments.

The open standards and open source still have to reach the military and government environments for what's related to secure speech.

To give you an idea of the complexity and kind of particular issues that exists, look at the USA 3G Wireless Security: A Government Perspective and the A Waveform Architecture to Support Security and Interoperability in Multi-National Wireless Networks for Tactical Communication .

They are using so-custom protocols like Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol that require the use of patented MELPe ultra-narrowband codec that there's not a real market of application and equipment using this. Only a small elite of government controlled companies from few countries manage this de-facto lobby.

Should we change this bringing open standards also to government sectors?

Del

Voice Security and Privacy slides

Below my slides on voice security and privacy from Security Summit 2009 .

mmm, yes i am working in this area from 2005, will write again about it.

sux

Del