RFC 6189: ZRTP è finalmente uno standard!

Infine ZRTP è stato assegnato un incarico ufficiale RFC, RFC6189 ZRTP: percorso di media accordo chiave per Unicast RTP sicuro.

Aveva come dipendenza del SRTP con AES dimensione della chiave di 256 bit, che ora è stato definito come RFC6188 .

E 'emozionante vedere la RFC finalmente rilasciato, in quanto si tratta di una tappa importante per impostare ZRTP come standard ufficiale per la crittografia end-to-end molto simile a PGP è stato per le email.

Ora, qualsiasi organizzazione al mondo sarà ufficialmente in grado di implementare ZRTP per la cifratura di voce protocollo end-to-end

Attualmente 3 diverse implementazioni pubbliche del protocollo ZRTP esiste:

Ognuno di loro offrono diverse caratteristiche del protocollo, ma più importanti sono noti per essere interoperabili.

Una nuova ondata è venuta al mondo crittografia della voce, irruenta in una zona grigia in cui la maggior parte delle aziende che fanno i sistemi di cifratura telefono sta attuando crittografia personalizzato.

Ora una norma è stata messa a punto e ci sono pochi motivi sinistra per attuare qualcosa di diverso.

Hurra Mr. Zimmermann e tutta la comunità di imprese (come PrivateWave ) e singoli (come Werner Dittmann ) che ha lavorato su di essa!

Oggi è un grande giorno, questo tipo di tecnologia è ormai ufficiale e anche con più implementazione esistente!

Filippo, hai fatto di nuovo, i miei complimenti a vostro spirito puro e determinazione:-)

Progressi per GSM fessurazione in Freiburg università

Il mondo emozionante di protocolli mobili (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, ecc) l'hacking è sempre attività ufficiali di ricerca dalle università.

L'investimento per rendere rilasci di codice opensource di screpolature software dà la possibilità agli studenti di università per lavorare su di esso, migliorare e fare ricerca forte.

L'Università di Friburgo ha appena rilasciato la carta esercitazione pratica sul GSM crittografia A5 / 1 con un gsmframencoder strumento di supporto per migliorare la sniffing, decodifica e processo di cracking.

Apertura hardware, aprendo software, protocollo apertura dimostrano la debolezza di qualsiasi tipo di metodo o di un processo di accumulo tecnologie di comunicazione e di sicurezza proprietarie.

Dovrebbe essere l'obiettivo di tutti i ricercatori a cercare di aprire-up e crack ogni tipo di tecnologia proprietaria e chiuso per costringere l'industria a prosegue solo con approccio interoperabile e aperto, mentre la progettazione di protocolli di telecomunicazione.

La mia esperienza exit node TOR cercando di filtrare il traffico rumoroso

All'inizio di quest'anno ho deciso che è il momento di eseguire un exit node TOR così ho portato un VPS a hetzner.de (perché sono elencati come una buona TOR ISP ) e impostare l'uscita-nodo con nick privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch con 100Mbit / Collegamento s per il primo 1 TB di dati mensili, quindi 10 Mbit / s piatta.

Inoltre esegue Tor2web software http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

I ha installato l' uscita politica , come suggerito eseguendo uscita nodi con molestie minimo e ha redatto una modello di risposta abuso .

Nel primo giorno sono stato in esecuzione il nodo ho ricevuto immediatamente DMCA lamentano a causa di peer to peer il traffico.

Così ho deciso di filtrare-out parte del traffico P2P usando OpenDPI modulo iptables e DMCA lamentano scomparso automaticamente:

iptables -A OUTPUT -m opendpi -edonkey -gadugadu -fasttrack -gnutella -directconnect -bittorrent -winmx -soulseek -j REJECT

Allora, perché io sono italiano, ho deciso di evitare il mio nodo TOR per la connessione a spazio di indirizzi internet italiano al fine di ridurre la probabilità che un procuratore stupida mi svegliava al mattino, perché non capisco che sto facendo funzionare un nodo TOR.

Ho provato, con l'aiuto di hellais che hanno scritto una sceneggiatura per fare politica Exit rifiutare dichiarazione per respingere tutti netblocks italiano in base di ioerror blockfinder ma abbiamo trovato che le configurazione torrc file con 1000 linee stava facendo TOR crash.

Siamo andati ad aprire un ticket per segnalare il crollo del nostro tentativo di bloccare politica di uscita TOR per paese e trovato un tentativo simile in cui abbiamo contribuito, ma sembra ancora essere un open-problema.

La conclusione è che non è possibile fare una politica di uscita Paese per il nodo di uscita TOR in modo pulito ed educato così ho deciso di andare il modo sporco utilizzando iptables / geoip . Dopo aver combattuto per farlo compilare correttamente, era una linea di iptables per bloccare il traffico andare in Italia:

iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -m state -state NEW geoip -m -dst-cc IT -j REJECT

Ora dalla mia uscita nodo alcuna connessione alle reti italiane sarà fatto e io sono sicuro contro i pubblici ministeri forse stupide non capire TOR (ho un'eccezione per tutti gli indirizzi IP del nodo TOR applicata prima).

Dopo alcuni altri giorni ho iniziato a ricevere lamentele a causa di attività portscan originati dai miei nodi Tor.

Dal mio punto di vista voglio sostenere rete anonimato, tentativo di hacking non anonimo e così voglio filtrare-out portscan e attacchi da provenienti dal mio node.That di una questione complessa che richiede un po 'di studio, così nel frattempo ho installato scanlogd e sniffare perché voglio valutare come molti attacchi, che tipo di attacchi sono sempre fuori dal mio exit node TOR.
Più tardi cercherò di organizzare una sorta di filtraggio per essere sicuri di essere in grado di filtrare i principali attacchi.
Per ciò che è correlato al PortScan sembra che non ci sono strumenti pubblici per rilevare e filtrare in uscita portscan ma solo per filtrare in arrivo portscan quindi probabilmente dovranno scrivere qualcosa ad-hoc.
Farò riferimento come vanno le cose e se ci sarà qualche bel modo per implementare in modo Lightwave sbuffo-inline per selettivamente tentativo di attacco maggiore filtrare-out proveniente da mia uscita-nodo.

Il mio obiettivo è quello di mantenere un nodo di uscita in esecuzione in-lungo termine (almeno 1 TB di traffico al mese donati al TOR), riducendo lo sforzo relative a ISP lamentarsi e cercando di fare del mio meglio per eseguire l'uscita nodi con una passività ragionevole.

TETRA pirateria sta arrivando: OsmocomTETRA

E 'molto emozionante vedere il rilascio della OsmocomTETRA , la prima SDR opensource ( Software Defined Radio ) l'attuazione di TETRA demodulatore, PHY e bassi livelli MAC.

E 'la versione TETRA di GSM AirProbe che sbloccare l'accesso ai dati e la struttura del protocollo di comunicazione TETRA, dando così grande opportunità di hacking!

Ora che anche la tecnologia TETRA è stato aperto dovremmo aspettarci, in questo 2011, per vedere opensource TETRA sniffer e molto probabilmente anche la crittografia TEA (la Tetra Encryption Algorithm) rotto!

TETRA viene utilizzato dalla polizia, servizi di emergenza e Militari come una rete alternativa di comunicazione mobile che può funziona anche senza la disponibilità di copertura di rete (solo telefonia mobile-to-mobile senza una stazione base) alcuni servizi ad alta disponibilità e di fornire particolari.

Ho scritto su TETRA nel mio diapositiva Maggiore Security Protocol Review Voice .

In OsmocomBB mailing list si è già un po 'di discussione su stato della rete TETRA:

  • Rete ASTRID Belgio Polizia TETRA: in chiaro
  • German Police test di rete TETRA in Aachen: in chiaro
  • Alcuni rete TETRA ex jugoslawia: in chiaro
  • Netherland C200 TETRA rete: TEA2 cifrati con chiavi statiche
  • Rete UK Airwave TETRA: TEA2 crittografato con TEA2

Sarà davvero divertente vedere che le nuove polizia e servizio di salvataggio di hacking di ritorno da vecchi secoli analogico alle nuove radio digitali:-)

Governo 2.0, Open Data e WikiLeaks

I concetti alla base di WikiLeaks, OpenLeaks, GlobalLeaks, BalkanLeaks è molto più di rivelare i segreti al pubblico.

Fa parte di una rivoluzione che sta arrivando nel governo dell'organizzazione, la trasparenza e la cooperazione con i cosiddetti '2.0 / wiki web sistemi collaborativi.

Date un'occhiata a quelle Governo 2.0 - Introduzione da Anke Berg, innovativo programma di governo Leads di Microsoft Germania e moglie di Daniel Berg, co-fondatore di Wikileaks e ora fondatore di OpenLeaks .

Date un'occhiata a Open Data governo 2.0 iniziativa per far rispettare la trasparenza del governo, ridurre la corruzione e migliorare le prestazioni di organizzazione governativa.

Che la rivoluzione è solo più di un gruppo di anarco-libertario ragazzi funky che vogliono creare il caos diffondendo segreti, è solo l'inizio della corsa per raggiungere nuovo modello organizzativo di governi, sfruttando la massima trasparenza e una forte cooperazione con i cittadini.

ZORG, nuovo C ++ e l'attuazione rilascio pubblico Java ZRTP

Ciao a tutti, oggi a PrivateWave Italia SpA, azienda italiana impegnata nello sviluppo di tecnologie per la protezione della privacy e sicurezza delle informazioni nel settore delle telecomunicazioni vocali dove sono CTO, rilasciamo ZORG, una nuova implementazione del protocollo ZRTP open source disponibile per il download da http: // www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] prevede scambio di chiavi end-to-end con Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit e la crittografia SRTP AES-256.

ZORG è stato originariamente sviluppato e implementato in prodotti di cifratura voce PrivateGSM di PrivateWave disponibili per le seguenti piattaforme: Blackberry, Nokia e iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C ++ è stato integrato con PJSIP open source VoIP [2] SDK ed è fornito come patch di integrazione contro PJSIP 1.8.5. E 'stato testato su iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux e Mac OS X.

Zorg Java è stato integrato all'interno di una versione personalizzata di MJSIP [3] open source SDK su piattaforma Blackberry e include ottimizzazioni di utilizzo di memoria necessarie per ridurre al minimo l'attività garbage collector.

Entrambe le piattaforme hanno separato e modulari di crittografia di back-end in modo che l'implementazione di algoritmi di crittografia potrebbe essere facilmente scambiato con altri.

. ZORG è sotto licenza GNU AGPL e il codice sorgente è disponibile su GitHub a https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Stiamo rilasciando sotto open source e in linea con il nostro approccio alla sicurezza [4], come speriamo davvero che possa essere utile per l'ecosistema open source per la creazione di nuovi sistemi di cifratura voce a sostegno della libertà di parola.

Più di 20 open source software di crittografia VoIP basati PJSIP e diverse scritte in Java potrebbero beneficiare direttamente dalla versione ZORG.

Saremo lieti di ricevere la proposta di cooperazione, nuova integrazione, nuove crittografici di back-end, bug scouting e quant'altro utile per migliorare e far ZRTP affermare come standard di cifratura di voce.

Zorg è disponibile da http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] approccio di sicurezza: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Cellulare crittografato per chiamate fisso con Asterisk 1.8

Abbiamo appena rilasciato un howto tecnica su come costruire mobili Secured a telefono fisso infrastruttura VoIP con:

Nelle prossime settimane altri howto come questo verrà fuori utilizzando altre piattaforme server quali FreeSWITCH, tutto in uno spirito di trasparenza e di leva finanziaria di tecnologie di sicurezza opensource.

Otto fallimento epico di regolazione Cryptography

Un articolo molto illuminante su Otto fallimento epico di regolazione Crittografia e malinteso comune di regolamentazione del governo che non ha una visione ampia su come funziona la tecnologia.

Regolatori di governo ignoranti non capito che una rigorosa regolamentazione avrebbe i seguenti inconvenienti:

  1. Si creerà rischi per la sicurezza
  2. Non si fermerà i cattivi
  3. Sarà danneggiare l'innovazione
  4. Sarà danneggiare affari US
  5. Costerà consumatori
  6. Sarà incostituzionale
  7. Sarà un enorme esborso di dollari di tasse

PrivateGSM: / iPhone / cellulare Nokia crittografia Blackberry voce con ZRTP o SRTP / SDES

Sono assolutamente evitare di usare il mio blog personale per fare la promozione di qualsiasi tipo di prodotto.

Quella volta non è diverso, ma voglio dirvi fatti circa i prodotti che lavoro senza commercializzazione di fantasia, ma stare tecnico.

Oggi, a PrivateWave dove io sono CTO e co-fondatore , abbiamo rilasciato prodotti di cifratura VoIP mobili pubblicamente per Blackberry, iPhone e Nokia:

  • Il 1 ° mai Blackberry cifrato VoIP con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP professionale
  • Il 1 ° mai iPhone cifrato VoIP con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP professionale
  • Il 1 ° mai Blackberry crittografato client VoIP con SRTP con SDES scambio di chiavi su SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

logo-PrivateWave-colore.png

A PrivateWave usiamo un approccio diverso rispetto alla maggior parte società crittografia della voce là fuori, leggere la nostra approccio alla sicurezza .

La rilevanza di questo prodotto nella tecnologia e l'industria del paesaggio può essere riassunta come segue:

  • E 'la prima azienda di crittografia vocale utilizzando solo protocolli di sicurezza standard (e ci aspettiamo che il mercato reagirà, come è chiaro che tecnologia proprietaria provenienti dal patrimonio del CSD non può fornire lo stesso valore)
  • E 'il primo approccio in crittografia della voce di utilizzare solo open source e motore di crittografia standard
  • E 'il primo approccio di crittografia vocale per fornire modello di protezione diverso utilizzando tecnologie diverse (end-to-end per ZRTP e end-to-site per SRTP )

Quelli suite di Mobile Client sicure, progettate per l'uso professionale di sicurezza solo usando le migliori tecnologie di telecomunicazione e di sicurezza, di fornire un elevato livello di protezione con buone prestazioni anche in condizioni di rete cattive:

Le applicazioni sono:

icona-pgsm.png

I dispositivi mobili supportati sono:

Per quanto riguarda ZRTP abbiamo deciso di sottolineare e allungare tutta la sicurezza e la funzionalità paranoico del protocollo con qualche piccola aggiunta:

La nostra stretta integrazione della rubrica, va al di là RFC ZRTP specifica, che potrebbe essere vulnerabile a certi attacchi, se utilizzato con i telefoni cellulari a causa del comportamento degli utenti di non guardare lo schermo del cellulare.

Il nostro modo di usare paranoy ZRTP mitigare tali condizioni, si scriverà su questo più tardi e / o aggiungerà dettagli specifici per RFC inclusione.

Alcune parole su PrivateGSM Professional con la crittografia end-to-end con ZRTP

Leggi la scheda tecnica lì!

Per scaricarlo clicca qui e appena messo il tuo numero di telefono

Questi sono i risultati del duro lavoro di tutto il mio staff molto qualificato (16 persone hanno lavorato su questo 6 progetti per 3 piattaforme diverse) sulle tecnologie impegnative (crittografia vocale) in un contesto operativo difficile (reti mobili sporchi e sistemi operativi mobili sporche) per più di 2 anni.

Sono molto orgoglioso del nostro staff!

Qual è il prossimo?

Nelle prossime settimane si vedrà il rilascio di grandi serie di documentazioni come l'integrazione con asterischi, FreeSWITCH e altri protezione abilitata PBX, insieme a qualche altra notizia entusiasmante tecnologia di sicurezza che sono sicuro sarà notato;)

E 'stato un lavoro duro e più hanno da fare, ma sono fiducioso che la comunità della sicurezza e opensource piacerà tali prodotti e il nostro approccio trasparente anche con le versioni importanti aperte e di integrazione open source che fanno una tecnologia molto politicamente neutrale (backdoor gratuito) .

Un paio di belle fornitore VPN

There are a lot of reason why one would need to access internet trough a VPN.

Ad esempio, se si vive in un paese bloccando alcuni contenuti (come il sito anti-governo locale, porno, etc) e / o protocolli (come skype, voip) si sarebbe probabilmente desidera spostare la connettività a Internet al di fuori del paese di blocco brutto utilizzando tunnel VPN crittografati.

Ho valutato diversi server VPN ospitato e un paio di loro suona abbastanza bene tra la diffusa offerta di tali servizi:

SwissVPN

Exit to the internet from Switzerland.

Costo 6 CHF / mesi

Indirizzo opzionale pubblica fissa IP

Useful if you need:

  • Basta superare i filtri di campagna locali con una buona larghezza di banda elevata
  • Esporre i servizi pubblici attraverso gli VPN con l'indirizzo IP pubblico fisso opzionale.

Overplay

Uscita sul internet, scegliendo fra 20 diversi paesi (ad ogni connessione).

Useful if you need to do:

  • business intelligence on competitor (appearing to come from country X when connecting them)
  • vedi pellicola / telefilm consentito solo da spazi web IP nazionali
  • see google results among different countries

Not every elliptic curve is the same: trough on ECC security

My own ECC curve security and selection analysis

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Most modern crypto use Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) that, with a smaller key size and reduce computation power, give equivalent security strength of traditional crypto system known as DH (Diffie-Hellman) or RSA ( Rivest, Shamir and Adleman ) .

Not everyone knows that ECC encryption is selected for any future encryption applications and that even TLS/SSL (encryption used for securing the web) is moving to ECC.

I found plenty of so called “proprietary encryption products” which abandoned RSA and DH to goes with ECC alternatives, that tend to arbitrary use ECC bit key size without even specifying which kind of ECC crypto get used.

However there is a lot of confusion around Elliptic Curves, with a lot of different names and key size making difficult for a non-cryptographically-experienced-user to make your own figure when evaluating some crypto stuff.

Because of so diffused confusion i decided to make my own analysis to find out which are the best ECC encryption curves and right ECC key size to use.

This analysis would like to provide a security industry based choice among various curves and key sizes, leaving the mathematical and crypto analytical considerations that has been already been done during the years, summarizing the various choices taken in several standards and security protocols.

First the conclusion.

From my analysis only the following ECC curves are to be considered for use in encryption systems because are the only one selected among different authorities (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC BrainPool), different security protocol standards (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS) and the only one matching NSA Suite B security requirements (de-facto standard also for NATO military environment):

  • Elliptic Prime Curve 256 bit – P-256
  • Elliptic Prime Curve 384 bit – P-384

with optional, just for really paranoid that want to get more key size bit, still not considered useful:

  • Elliptic Prime Curve 521 bit – P-521

I would like to state that Koblitz curves should be avoided , in any key size (163 / 283 / 409 / 571) as they does not have enough warranty on crypto analytic activity and effectively they are:

  • Not part of NSA Suite-B cryptography selection
  • Not part of ECC Brainpool selection
  • Not part of ANSI X9.62 selection
  • Not part of OpenPGP ECC extension selection
  • Not part of Kerberos extension for ECC curve selection

I invite the reader to follow trough my analysis to understand the fundamentals that could be understood even without deep technical background but at least with a good technological background a some basic bit of cryptography.

Here we go with the analysis
 

My goal is to make an analysis on what/how the open scientific and security community choose ECC crypto system for usage in security protocols and standards defined by IETF RFC (the ones who define Internet Standards in a open and peer-reviewed way).

Below a set of RFC introducing ECC into existing system that get analyzed to understand what's better to use and what's better to exclude:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Standard Curves & Curve Generation
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B in in Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Determining Strengths For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys
  • RFC5349 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Support for Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP voice encryption by Philip Zimmermann ECC curve
  • ECC in OpenPGP (draft d raft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 )
  • ECC Curves selected by Microsoft for Smartcard Kerberos login

We will use the choice made by scientist defining Internet Security Protocols to make part of our evaluation.
Additionally it must be understood that the Curve selection comes from different authorities that made their own selection of Curves in order to tell to the industry what to use and what to skip:

We will use the choice made by scientist defining security requirements in the standardization agencies to make part of our evaluation.
Additionally, something that most people does not know, but that it's extremely relevant to our analysis, is that there are different kind of ECC curve cryptography and their “size” it's different depending on the kind of curve:

  • ECC Curves over Prime Field (often referred as Elliptic Curve and represented by P-keysize )
  • ECC Curves over Binary Field (often referred as Koblitz Curve and represented by K-keysize )

Given a security strength equivalence the Elliptic Curve and the Kobliz Curve have different key size, for example when we read ECC 571 we are referring to Koblitz Curve with an equivalent strength to ECC 521 Prime curve.

A comparison of strength between Elliptic Curves and Kotbliz Curves is reported below (from Mikey ECC internet Draft ):

| Koblitz | ECC | DH/DSA/RSA
| 163 | 192 | 1024
| 283 | 256 | 3072
| 409 | 384 | 7680
| 571 | 521 | 15360

Below there's a comparison of all selected curves by all the various entities and their respective name (from IETF RFC4492 for ECC usage for TLS ) :

Curve names chosen by different standards organizations
------------+---------------+-------------
SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
------------+---------------+-------------
sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
sect163r1 | |
sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
sect193r1 | |
sect193r2 | |
sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
sect239k1 | |
sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
secp160k1 | |
secp160r1 | |
secp160r2 | |
secp192k1 | |
secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
secp224k1 | |
secp224r1 | | NIST P-224
secp256k1 | |
secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
------------+---------------+-------------

What immediately appear is that there are only two curves selected by all authorities, and that there is a general dumping of koblitz curves by ANSI.The only commonly agreed among the 3 authorities are the following two ECC curve:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Of those selection of ECC curve for TLS the RFC5430 skipped completely koblitz curves and selected for usage only:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The ECC Brainpool skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected for usage the following ECC Curves:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 ( that's the only particular because it's not P-521 but P-512, the only key-size referred by ECC brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons from Athena SCS )

The OpenPGP internet draft for ECC usage in PGP d raft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The Kerberos protocol extension for ECC use, defined in RFC5349 and defined by Microsoft for smartcard logon skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

So, sounds clear that the right selection of ECC is for P-256, P-384 and P-521 while the Koblitz curve have been skipped for Top Secret use and for any security sensitive protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS).

Why i made this analysis?

I have done this analysis following a discussion i had regarding certain voice encryption products, all based on custom and proprietary protocols, that are all using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571 / 571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits .
All them are using the K-571 that, as described before, has been removed from all security sensitive environment and protocols and being myself a designer of voice encryption stuff i think that their cryptographic choice is absolutely not the best security choice.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz elliptic curve are faster than the top secret enabled prime elliptic curve and so give the product manager a chance to provide “more bit” in it's own product while keeping the key exchange fast.

It's a matter of philosophical choice.

I prefer to follow the trend of scientific community with the humility of not to considering myself a cryptographic expert, knowledgable more than the overall security and scientific community itself.

I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
I prefer to count the amount of brains working on the crypto i use, that check that's really secure, that evaluate whether there's some weakness.

The number of brais working on Crypto widely diffused are of order of magnitude more than the number of brains working on crypto used by just few people (like Koblitz curve).
So i am not demonizing who use ECDH 571 using Koblitz Curve, but for sure i can affirm that they did not taken the best choice in terms of security and that any security professionals doing a security benchmarking would consider the fact that Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit done with Koblitz Curve is not widely diffused, it's dumped from standard security protocols and it's not certified for top secret use.

ESSOR, European Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Fondamentalmente invece di bruciare chip hardware che implementa la maggior parte dei protocolli e tecniche di radio frequenza, vengono spinti in "software" per l'hardware della radio specializzate in grado di lavorare su un sacco di frequenza diversa, in qualità di interfaccia radio per un sacco di protocolli radio differenti.

Per esempio il USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) da Ettus ricerca che è costata 1000-2000USD pieno carico, attraverso la opensource gnuradio quadro, visto implementazione opensource di:

E molto di più protocolli e tecnologie di trasmissione.

Questo tipo di approccio nuovo a Radio sistema di trasmissione è destinata ai cambiare il sistema radio modo sono attuate, dando nuova funzionalità tale da aggiornare il "protocollo radio stessa" nel software per fornire "protocollo radio" miglioramenti.

Nel breve abbiamo visto anche molto forte ricerca sulla sicurezza utilizzando tecnologie DSP come il GSM di cracking e la Sniffing Bluetooth .

Possiamo aspettarci che altre tecnologie, deboli da disegno, ma protette dalla limitazione di dispositivi hardware per hackerare i protocolli di basso livello, saranno presto vengono violati. Nel primo elenco mi piacerebbe davvero vedere l'hacking di TETRA, una tecnologia nata con mentalità chiusa e algoritmi di crittografia segrete, qualcosa che veramente piace;-)

Gestione e organizzazione del prodotto

Dovevo capire meglio i concetti, i ruoli e compiti relativi alla gestione del prodotto e di gestione del marketing di prodotto in aziende di software, perché sono necessari, che sono le differenze e come si inseriscono all'interno di una struttura organizzativa.

La maggior persona che conosco mai interessato in questo specifico settore di lavoro, ma quando si vuole essere una società prodotto (e non una società di consulenza o una soluzione), si iniziano ad avere prodotti diversi su piattaforme diverse per i diversi target di clientela venduti diversi canali di valle con diversi pricing con un'installazione / processo di consegna diverso e che la complessità deve essere gestita in modo corretto.

Ti rendi conto che, al fine di consentire alla società prodotto crescere nella giusta direzione per organizzare le attività di gestione del prodotto formalmente, non chiudere la tua mente in ruoli organizzativi rigidi come Marketing, Vendite, R & D.

Quando si parla di Product Management vi consiglio la lettura illuminante Il ruolo strategico della gestione del prodotto (come un focus orientato al mercato porta le aziende a costruire prodotti la gente vuole comprare) che chiarire un sacco di cose, anche se outlook netta separazione di ruoli nella gestione del prodotto, qualcosa t cappello è troppo pesante per una piccola azienda come una startup.

Ancora fornire una differenziazione delle funzioni tra Product Management e Product Marketing.

Una buona comprensione della gestione relative ai prodotti per l'avvio i s data nell'articolo Creazione di Product Management di avvio mostrando caso diverso in relazione ai ruoli del visionario prodotto in azienda.

Si introducono i termini ceo del prodotto, nel senso che le funzioni di gestione del prodotto saltare intorno alla varie funzioni dell'organizzazione fornendo attenzione e lo sforzo in cui è necessario, indipendentemente dal fatto che la funzione interna che richiede uno sforzo maggiore è lo sviluppo, marketing, vendite o Comunicazione. Questo è praticamente significa migliorare la visione del prodotto come è necessario in tutte le principali funzioni relative ai prodotti che fanno la visione aziendale a livello coerente.

Una buona rappresentazione delle attività di gestione del prodotto e di marketing prodotto è ben descritto con la differenziazione tra Strategico, il settore tecnico e di marketing e non è chiaramente separata tra Management, Marketing (e vendite) e R & D:

Triad.jpg

Ho letto che sfondo product manager e la conoscenza sono diversi a seconda della società concentrarsi ( dove viene gestione del prodotto appartiene nell'organizzazione? ):

  • B2C -> esperienza Marketing
  • B2B -> L'esperienza tecnica

Un illuminante (per me) e la differenziazione molto importante per quanto riguarda compiti di gestione del prodotto è la differenziazione tra:

  • Product Management
  • Product Marketing

I compiti specifici appartenenti al Product Marketing vs gestione sono notevolmente spiegati in Definizioni ruolo per la gestione del prodotto e marketing di prodotto che vi suggerisco di leggere, che ti permette di definire meglio i compiti e le responsabilità all'interno dell'organizzazione. E 'anche fornire una buona definizione di requisiti professionali, se avete bisogno di guardare per quella cifra!

Allo stesso tempo, è importante capire che cosa non è la gestione del prodotto, in modo efficace la gestione del prodotto non è solo caratteristica priorità .

Allo stesso tempo, è importante capire quali figura professionale non è di per sé un product manager:

  • Product manager non è un marketing manager - mentre la gestione del prodotto è generalmente visto come una disciplina di marketing, marketing sono concentrati sul piano di marketing e di solito non guidando la direzione generale del prodotto. In tale contesto, potrebbero tuttavia essere trovato responsabile marketing di prodotto che è le braccia della commercializzazione del prodotto, in particolare in piccola organizzazione.
  • Product manager non è un direttore vendite - direttore vendite sono di trovare il modo di vendere un prodotto, a seguito della quale metodologia di vendita, tecnica e canali e potrebbero guidare l'azienda da un mercato orientato società (prodotto) ad una società orientata al cliente (soluzione e consulting)
  • Product manager non è uno sviluppatore - Gli sviluppatori sono concentrati sulla tecnologia e non il prodotto globale. Alcuni grandi responsabili di prodotto sono ex sviluppatori, ma è difficile fare entrambe le cose contemporaneamente. C'è una tensione naturale tra gli sviluppatori e responsabili di prodotto che devono essere mantenute per creare un prodotto equilibrato.
  • Product manager non è un manager software - il gestore del software è un manager funzionale e di solito non è concentrato sul prodotto o dei clienti.
  • Product manager non è un project manager - responsabili di progetto sono circa come e quando, mentre il product manager è su ciò. I project manager lavorano a stretto contatto con i responsabili di prodotto per garantire il completamento di diverse fasi del ciclo di vita del prodotto.

Le attività di gestione del prodotto tipico potrebbe essere in estrema sintesi riassumere come segue:

  • Strategia: Pianificazione di una strategia di prodotto
  • Tecniche: sviluppi principali prodotti
  • Marketing: fornitura di prodotti e contenuti tecnici
  • Vendite: forniscono supporto alle vendite pre e lavorare in modo efficace con le vendite

Gestione del prodotto quindi non è proprio lo sviluppo, non è proprio il marketing, non è precisamente le vendite, così tipicamente è difficile individuare "dove dovrebbe stare" dentro la struttura organizzativa (è anche difficile capire ciò che serve)?

The Silicon Valley Product Group provide a nice insight on Product Organization Structure by pointing out which are the advantages and risks of several choices. Still the Cranky Product Manager say that It doesn't matter where the product manager live in the organization .

It's relevant to be careful not to have persons that are too much technical or too much sales oriented in order to fill the gap among different organization. Too much fragmentation of assigned duties across the organization may lead to bureaucracy, too much duties on one person may lead to ineffective implementation of needed tasks in some area and to a internal competition perception respect to the traditional roles.

Check there a very nice Resume of a professional with practical experience in product management (it's an half techie/half marketing guys).

Ah! Another very common misunderstanding is to confuse marketing with communication where ai found a so good definition of Marketing that i really like and understand for strict relationship with Product Management:

Marketing is know the market so well that the product sell itself

But what happen when you don't handle a product management and product marketing management process in a defined way?

A nice story is shown as example in The strategic role of Product Management :

Your founder, a brilliant technician, started the company years ago when he quit his day job to market his idea full time. He created a product that he just knew other people needed. E aveva ragione. Pretty soon he delivered enough of the product and hired his best friend from college as VP of Sales. And the company grew. But before long, the VP of Sales complained, “We're an engineering-led company. We need to become customer-driven.” And that sounded fine. Except… every new contract seemed to require custom work. You signed a dozen clients in a dozen market segments and the latest customer's voice always dominated the product plans. You concluded that “customer-driven” meant “driven by the latest customer” and that couldn't be right.

If you want to be a product company it's relevant to precisely follow a strategy driven by product marketing and management and not by sales.

Confusion between duties of product management/marketing and sales could lead to unsuccessful product company that are not able to proceed within their strategy, simply because they getting opportunities that drive the business out-of-scope.

A product company must invest in it's own product development and marketing in order to let sales activity stay focused and guarantee that the organization is every day more effective on the market.

After this reading, my understanding is that it's relevant to identify how to create a set of flexible business process on how to handle various product management and product marketing duties separating them from sales.

Remoto intercettando i telefoni VoIP snom

I suggest reading remotely tapping VoIp phones ” on VoIP Security Alliance Blog by Shawn Merdinger .

A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Laboratorio di sicurezza La comunicazione vocale

Ciao,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

We come in peace

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We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

GSM fessurazione in metodologie di test di penetrazione (OSSTMM)?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Crediti di sicurezza Snake-olio su prodotti di sicurezza crittografica

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

Web2.0 privacy perdita Apps Mobile

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

AES selezionato per l'uso nello spazio

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

bblock.jpg

Let's goes on.

Da un lato Blackberry è un sacco piattaforma di funzioni di crittografia, funzioni di sicurezza in tutto il mondo, dispositivo criptato (con crypto personalizzato), la comunicazione crittografata (con personalizzati protocolli proprietari come i PPPI), molto buono Impostazioni avanzate di protezione, di crittografia da Certicom ( ora di proprietà di RIM ).

D'altra parte che non fornisce solo uno strumento, ma una rete di accesso overlay, chiamato BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), che è globale in tutto il mondo un'ampia area di rete in cui il tuo blackberry entrare mentre si naviga o checkmail tramite blackberry.net AP.

Quando, o un'applicazione, utilizzare il blackberry.net APN non sono solo connette a internet con la connessione internet del vettore, ma si sta entrando all'interno della rete di RIM che si procura e agire come un gateway per raggiungere Internet.

Lo stesso accade quando si ha un uso aziendale: Sia il dispositivo di BB e le BES aziendale si connettono alla rete RIM che agiscono come una sorta di rete di concentrazione vpn .

Quindi, in pratica tutte le comunicazioni croce attraverso RIM infrastrutture di servizio in formato crittografato con una serie di protocolli di crittografia e di comunicazione proprietari.

Proprio come un avviso, pensare che a Google di fornire gtalk su blackberry.net APN, fatto un accordo al fine di offrire un servizio all'interno della rete BB agli utenti BB. Quando si installa gtalk vieni aggiunto 3 libri servizi che puntano a GTALKNA01 questo è il nome della porta GTALK all'interno della rete RIM per consentire intra-BIS comunicazione e agire come un gateway GTALK a Internet.

Gli operatori di telefonia mobile in genere non sono nemmeno permesso di ispezionare il traffico tra il dispositivo BlackBerry e la rete Blackberry.

Così RIM e Blackberry sono in qualche modo unico per il loro approccio in quanto forniscono una piattaforma, una rete e un servizio tutto impacchettato insieme e non si può solo "ottenere il dispositivo e il software", ma l'utente e l'impresa sono sempre legati e collegati al servizio rete.

Questo è un bene e questo è male, perché significa che RIM fornisce estremamente buone caratteristiche e funzionalità di sicurezza per proteggere le informazioni, il dispositivo e l'accesso alle informazioni a vari livelli contro terzi.

Ma è sempre difficile valutare la minaccia e rischio connesso alle RIM se stessa e che potrebbe fare pressione politica contro RIM.

Si prega di considerare che io non sto dicendo "RIM sta guardando i dati", ma facendo un'analisi obiettiva del rischio: per come RIM la piattaforma è fatto avere autorità sul dispositivo, sulle informazioni on-the-dispositivo e sulle informazioni che attraversano la rete. (Leggi il mio Slides Mobile Security ).

Per esempio prendiamo in considerazione lo stesso contesto per telefoni Nokia.

Una volta che il dispositivo Nokia viene venduto, Nokia non ha autorità sul dispositivo, né sulle informazioni on-the-dispositivo, né sulle informazioni che attraversano la rete. Ma è anche vero che Nokia si limita a fornire il dispositivo e non fornisce i servizi a valore aggiunto quali l'integrazione Enterprise (Il tunnel VPN RIM), la rete di accesso BRI e tutte le caratteristiche di sicurezza provisioning locali e remoti che forniscono Blackberry.

Quindi è una questione di considerare il contesto di rischio in modo corretto al momento di scegliere la piattaforma, con un esempio molto simile alla scelta di Microsoft Exchange Server (sul proprio servizio) o se ottenere un servizio SaaS come Google Apps.

In entrambi i casi è necessario fidarsi del fornitore, ma in primo esempio avete bisogno di fiducia Microsoft che non mette una backdoor sul software, mentre nel 2 ° esempio avete bisogno di fidarsi di Google, come fornitore di piattaforme e di servizi, che non fa l'accesso i tuoi dati.

Quindi è un paradigma diverso da valutare a seconda del modello di minaccia.

Se il modello di minaccia lasciato si considera RIM come terzo fornitore di servizi grande (molto simile a google) che è ok. Se si dispone di un contesto di rischio molto alto, come un top-secret, quindi prendiamo in considerazione e valutare attentamente se non è meglio mantenere i servizi Blackberry completamente isolati dal dispositivo o utilizzare un altro sistema senza interazione con i server e servizi produttore.

Ora, torniamo ad alcune ricerche e alcuni fatti circa la mora e la sicurezza mora stessa.

Prima di tutto diversi governi avuto a che fare con RIM per costringerli a fornire l'accesso alle informazioni che attraversano le loro reti di servizio, mentre altri hanno deciso di vietare l'utilizzo direttamente Blackberry per alti funzionari a causa di server che si trovano nel Regno Unito e Stati Uniti, mentre altri hanno deciso di installare i propri backdoor.

C'è un sacco di discussioni in cui i temi sono RIM Blackberry e governi, per vari motivi.

Qui di seguito una serie di informazioni ufficiali Related Security su piattaforma BlackBerry RIM:

E qui un insieme di sicurezza ufficiali e Hacking informazioni relative alla piattaforma RIM Blackberry:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Cin cin

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

Celebrating “Hackers” after 25 years

A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

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It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.

http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html 
Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.
O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.

Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

China Encryption Regulations

Ciao a tutti,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

IOScat – a Port of Netcat to Cisco IOS

A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

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That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Saluti,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Rimanete sintonizzati.

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Zfone Transparency Public review
Aperto
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Aperto

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
Come?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!