RFC 6189: ZRTP este în cele din urmă un standard!

În cele din urmă ZRTP a fost atribuit o misiune RFC oficial, RFC6189 ZRTP: Media Calea acord cheie pentru Unicast Secure RTP.

Aceasta a avut ca dependență SRTP cu o dimensiune cheie AES pe 256 biți de care acum a fost definit ca RFC6188 .

Este interesant să vezi RFC eliberat în cele din urmă, așa cum este o etapa extrem de importanta pentru a seta ZRTP ca standard oficial de criptare end-to-end la fel ca PGP a fost de e-mailuri.

Acum, orice organizație din lume va fi oficial în măsură să pună în aplicare ZRTP pentru criptare voce protocol end-to-end

În prezent, 3 implementari publice diferite de protocol ZRTP există:

Fiecare dintre acestea oferă caracteristici diferite ale protocolului, dar cel mai important sunt cunoscute a fi interoperabile.

Un nou val de se apropie de lumea de criptare voce, irrupting într-o zonă gri în care cele mai multe dintre companiile care fac sistemele de criptare telefon a fost de punere în aplicare de criptare personalizat.

Acum, un standard a fost de configurare și există câteva motive ramase la punerea în aplicare a ceva diferit.

Hurra Dl. Zimmermann și toate comunitatea de companii (cum ar fi PrivateWave ) și persoanele fizice (cum ar fi Werner Dittmann ), care a lucrat pe ea!

Astăzi este o zi mare, un astfel de tehnologie este acum oficial și, de asemenea, cu punerea în aplicare existent multe!

Filip, ai făcut-o din nou, complimentele mele spiritul pur și determinare:-)

Progres pentru GSM cracare în Freiburg universitate

Fascinanta lume a protocoalelor mobile (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, etc) hacking este asistent activități oficiale de cercetare la universități.

Investiția a face versiuni de cod open source de cracare software dă posibilitatea studenților de învățământ pentru a lucra pe el, l îmbunătățească și de a face cercetare puternic.

Universitatea din Freiburg tocmai a lansat hârtie exercițiul practic pe GSM Criptare A5 / 1 , împreună cu un gsmframencoder instrument de sprijin pentru a îmbunătăți sniffing, decodare și procesul de cracare.

Deschiderea hardware, software de deschidere, protocol de deschidere demonstrează slăbiciunea de orice fel de metodă de proprietate sau proces de a construi-up tehnologii de comunicare și de securitate.

Ar trebui să fie obiectivul de orice oameni de stiinta pentru a încerca să deschidă-up si sparge orice fel de tehnologie proprietara și închis pentru a forța industria de continuă doar cu abordarea interoperabil și deschis în timp ce proiectarea protocoalelor de telecomunicații.

Experiența mea TOR nod de ieșire încearcă pentru a filtra traficul zgomotos

La inceputul acestui an am decis ca e timpul pentru a rula un nod TOR ieșire, așa că am adus un VPS la hetzner.de (deoarece acestea sunt enumerate ca un bun TOR ISP ) și de configurare exit-nodul cu nickname privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch cu un 100Mbit / s conectare pentru prima 1TB de date lunare, apoi 10Mbit / s plat.

Acesta rula, de asemenea TOR2WEB software pe http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

I configurare politica ieșire după cum a sugerat rularea exit-nod cu hărțuirea minim și a pregătit un șablon răspuns abuz .

În prima zi l-am fost difuzate nodul am primit imediat DMCA se plâng din cauza la egal la egal trafic.

Asa ca am decis pentru a filtra-unele trafic P2P, cu ajutorul OpenDPI modul iptables și DMCA plâng dispărut în mod automat:

iptables -A OUTPUT -m opendpi -edonkey -gadugadu -fasttrack -gnutella -directconnect -bittorrent -winmx -soulseek -j REJECT

Apoi, pentru că eu sunt italian, am decis pentru a evita nod mea RPT pentru a se conecta la spațiul de adrese de internet italian pentru a reduce posibilitatea ca un procuror prost m-ar trezi la dimineata, deoarece nu au înțeles că i-am execută un nod TOR.

Am încercat, cu ajutorul hellais care au scris un scenariu pentru a face politica Exit respinge declarație , pentru a respinge toate netblocks italiene bazate pe IOError lui blockfinder dar am constatat că torrc de configurare fișierele cu 1000 linii făcea TOR accident.

Ne-am dus pentru a deschide un bilet pentru a raporta accidentul cu privire la încercarea noastră de a bloca politica de ieșire a RPT în funcție de țară și a găsit o încercare similară în care am contribuit, dar încă pare a fi o problemă-deschis.

Concluzia este că nu este posibil să se facă o Ieșire Politica de țară pentru TOR nod de ieșire într-un mod curat și politicos, așa că am decis să meargă pe calea murdar folosind iptables / GeoIP . După lupte pentru a face compila în mod corespunzător, a fost o linie de iptables pentru a bloca traficul de gând să Italia:

iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp stat -m -state NEW GeoIP -m -dst-cc -j REJECT IT

Acum, de la ieșirea mea-nod nici o legătură cu rețelele de italieni se va face și eu sunt sigur împotriva procurorilor eventual prost nu înțelege TOR (eu am o excepție de toți adresă IP nod TOR aplica înainte).

După alte câteva zile, am început să primească plânge din cauza activităților portscan provenit de la nodurile mele TOR.

Din punctul meu de vedere, vreau să accepte rețeaua anonimat, nu anonim încercare de hacking și așa vreau să filtreze-out portscan și atacuri din originare din node.That mea este o chestiune complexă, care necesită unele studiu, astfel încât în timp am instalat scanlogd și snort pentru că vreau să evalueze cât de multe atacuri, ce fel de atacuri sunt obtinerea de la nodul meu TOR ieșire.
Mai târziu, i se va încerca să aranjeze un fel de filtrare pentru a fi sigur de a fi în măsură să filtreze atacuri majore.
Pentru ce se referă la portscan se pare că nu există instrumente publice pentru a detecta și a filtra de ieșire portscan ci doar pentru a filtra de intrare portscan astfel, probabil, va trebui să scrie ceva ad-hoc.
Ma voi referi cum merg lucrurile și în cazul în care va exista un fel frumos de a pune în aplicare într-un mod LightWave sforăit-inline pentru a filtra-out selectiv această încercare de atac major care provine de la meu exit-nod.

Scopul meu este de a menține un nod de ieșire execută în termen lung (cel puțin 1 TB de trafic pe luni donate TOR), reducerea efortului legat de ISP plânge și încearcă să facă tot ce pot pentru a rula ieșire nodul cu o datorie rezonabil.

TETRA hacking vine: OsmocomTETRA

Este foarte interesant pentru a vedea eliberarea OsmocomTETRA , primul DST open source ( Software Defined Radio ) punerea în aplicare a TETRA demodulator, PHY și straturi MAC mai mici.

Este versiunea TETRA a GSM airprobe care debloca accesul la datele și cadrul protocolului de comunicație TETRA, oferind astfel o mare oportunitate de hacking!

Acum, că, de asemenea, tehnologia TETRA a fost deschis ar trebui să ne așteptăm, în timpul acestei 2011, pentru a vedea OpenSource sniffer TETRA și cel mai probabil, de asemenea, de criptare TEA (Tetra Encryption Algorithm) cracare!

TETRA este utilizat de poliție, serviciile de urgență și Militarii ca o rețea de alternativă de comunicații mobile, care poate funcționează chiar și fără disponibilitatea de acoperire a rețelei (numai mobil-mobil, fără o stație de bază) unor servicii și oferă speciale de disponibilitate înaltă.

Am scris despre TETRA în diapozitiv mea Major voce Securitate protocol opinie .

În listele de discuții OsmocomBB exista deja discutii despre un statut de rețea TETRA:

  • Belgia Poliția TETRA rețea ASTRID: necriptate
  • Poliția germană încercare rețea TETRA în Aachen: necriptate
  • Unele ex-jugoslawia TETRA rețea: necriptate
  • Olanda C200 TETRA rețea: TEA2 criptate cu chei statice
  • Rețea UK Airwave TETRA: TEA2 criptate cu TEA2

Acesta va fi foarte distractiv sa vezi ca noi de Poliție și servicii de salvare hacking întoarce de la vârste analogice vechi la noile radio digitale:-)

Guvern 2.0, WikiLeaks Deschideți date și

Conceptele din spatele WikiLeaks, OpenLeaks, GlobalLeaks, BalkanLeaks este mult mai mult decât dezvăluie secretele pentru public.

Este parte a unei revoluții care vine în guvernul lui organizare, transparență și cooperare cu așa-numitele "2.0 / wiki-uri" sisteme de colaborare.

Uitati-va la cei Guvernului 2.0 - Introducere de Anke Domscheit Berg, Programul de guvernare inovatoare de afaceri a Microsoft Germania și soția lui Daniel Berg, co-fondator al WikiLeaks și acum fondator de OpenLeaks .

Uitati-va la Open Data guvern 2.0 inițiativă a pune în aplicare a transparenței guvernamentale, reducerea corupției și îmbunătățirea performanțelor de organizare guvern.

Asta revoluție e doar mai mult decât un grup de baieti funky,-anarco liberală care doresc să creeze haos prin răspândirea secrete, e doar începutul graba de a realiza nou model de organizare a guvernelor de pârghie transparență totală și o cooperare strânsă cu cetățenii.

ZORG, noul C ++ si Java ZRTP punere în aplicare eliberare publice

Bună tuturor, azi la PrivateWave Italia SpA, societate italiana angajat în dezvoltarea tehnologiilor de protecție a vieții private și de securitate a informațiilor în telecomunicații vocale în cazul în care eu sunt CTO, am lansat ZORG, un nou protocol de punere în aplicare ZRTP open source disponibil pentru descărcare de la http: // www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] prevede end-to-end schimb cheie cu eliptice Curve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit și criptare AES-256 SRTP.

ZORG a fost dezvoltat inițial și puse în aplicare în produse de criptare voce PrivateGSM PrivateWave disponibile pentru următoarele platforme: Blackberry, Nokia și iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C ++ a fost integrat cu PJSIP open source VoIP SDK [2] și este prevăzut ca patch-uri de integrare împotriva PJSIP 1.8.5. Acesta a fost testat pe iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux și Mac OS X.

Zorg Java a fost integrată într-o versiune personalizată a MJSIP [3] SDK open source pe platforma Blackberry și include optimizări de utilizare de memorie necesare pentru a reduce la minimum activitatea gunoier.

Ambele platforme au separat și modulare criptografice spate-end, astfel încât punerea în aplicare algoritmii de criptare ar putea fi ușor schimbate cu altele.

. ZORG este licențiat sub GNU AGPL și codul sursă este disponibil pe github la https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Suntem o eliberare sub open source și în coerență cu demersul nostru de securitate [4], astfel cum am chiar sper că poate fi util pentru ecosistemul open source pentru a crea noi sisteme de criptare voce în susținerea libertății de exprimare.

Mai mult de 20 pe bază de pjsip open source software de criptare VoIP și câteva scris în Java ar putea beneficia direct de eliberare ZORG.

Ne-ar fi fericiți să primească propuneri de cooperare, noi integrare, noi criptografice spate-end, scouting bug-uri și orice util pentru a îmbunătăți și permite ZRTP afirma ca standard de criptare voce.

Zorg este disponibil de la http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] abordare de securitate: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Mobil criptat pentru apelurile de telefonie fixă cu Asterisk 1.8

Tocmai am lansat un ghid tehnic cu privire la modul de a construi mobil securizat la infrastructura VoIP fixe cu:

În următorii săptămâni alții ghid ca acesta va ieși prin utilizarea altor platforme de server, cum ar fi FreeSWITCH, toate în spiritul transparenței și de pârghie de tehnologii de securitate open source.

Opt Nerespectarea Epic de reglare Criptografie

Un articol foarte luminoase pe opt Nerespectarea epic de reglare criptografie și neînțelegere comun de reglementare de stat care nu are o vedere largă pe modul în care funcționează tehnologia.

Autoritățile de reglementare de stat ignoranți nu înțelege că regulament strict ar avea următoarele dezavantaje:

  1. Se va crea risc de securitate
  2. Acesta nu se va opri baietii rai
  3. Aceasta va afecta inovare
  4. Aceasta va afecta de afaceri din SUA
  5. Acesta va costa consumatorilor
  6. Acesta va fi neconstituțională
  7. Acesta va fi un mare cheltuieli de dolari fiscale

PrivateGSM: criptare Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia mobile de voce cu ZRTP sau SRTP / DSSE

Am absolut evita să folosească propriul meu blog personal pentru a face promovarea de orice fel de produs.

De data aceasta nu e diferit, dar vreau să vă spun fapte despre produsele lucrez pe piață fără fantezie, dar stau tehnic.

Astazi, la PrivateWave unde mă aflu CTO și co-fondator , am lansat produse de telefonie mobilă publice de criptare VoIP pentru Blackberry, iPhone și Nokia:

  • 1 vreodată Blackberry criptat VoIP cu ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP profesionala
  • 1 vreodată iPhone criptat VoIP cu ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP profesionala
  • 1 vreodată Blackberry criptate client VoIP cu SRTP cu DSSE schimb cheie pe SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

logo-privatewave-colore.png

La PrivateWave vom folosi o abordare diferită a ceea ce mai companie de criptare voce acolo, citiți abordare a securității .

Relevanța aceste produse în peisajul tehnologic și industrial pot fi rezumate după cum urmează:

  • Este prima companie de criptare voce folosind doar protocoalelor de securitate standarde (și ne așteptăm ca piața va reacționa, așa cum este clar că de proprietate tehnologie care vine din moștenirea de CSD nu poate oferi aceeași valoare)
  • Este prima abordare în criptare voce pentru a utiliza doar open source si motor de criptare standard de
  • Este prima abordare de criptare voce pentru a oferi un model de securitate diferite, folosind diferite tehnologii (end-to-end pentru ZRTP și -end pentru site-ul pentru SRTP )

Cei suită de mobile Clienti sigure, destinate a fi utilizate profesionale de securitate numai folosind cele mai bune tehnologii de telecomunicații și de securitate, asigura un grad ridicat de protecție, împreună cu performanțe bune, de asemenea, în condiții de rețea proaste:

Aplicatiile sunt:

icona-pgsm.png

Dispozitivele mobile acceptate sunt:

În ceea ce privește ZRTP am decis să subliniem și întinde tot securitatea și caracteristica paranoic a protocolului cu unele mic adaos:

Integrarea noastră agendă strictă, trece dincolo de ZRTP RFC caietul de sarcini, care ar putea fi vulnerabile la anumite atacuri atunci când sunt utilizate pe telefoanele mobile din cauza comportamentului de utilizare a nu se uite la ecran mobil.

Paranoy Modul nostru de a folosi ZRTP atenua aceste condiții, vom scrie despre asta mai târziu și / sau va adăuga detalii specifice pentru includerea CFR.

Câteva cuvinte despre PrivateGSM profesionala cu criptare end-to-end cu ZRTP

Citește fisa tehnica acolo!

Pentru a descărca click aici și pune doar numarul tau de telefon

Acestea sunt rezultatele de munca grea de tot personalul meu foarte priceput (16 persoane au lucrat la acest 6 proiecte pentru 3 platforme diferite) pe tehnologii provocatoare (criptare voce), într-un mediu de operare dificil (rețele de telefonie mobilă murdare și sisteme de operare mobile murdare) pentru mai multe de 2 ani.

Sunt foarte mândru de personalul nostru!

Ce urmează?

In urmatoarele saptamani, veți vedea eliberarea de set mare de documentatii cum ar fi integrarea cu asterisc, freeswitch și alte Securitate Enabled PBX, împreună cu un alt ordine de idei interesante tehnologie de securitate care eu sunt sigur că va fi observat;)

A fost o munca grea și mai au de făcut, dar eu sunt convins că comunitatea de securitate și open source va dori astfel de produse și abordarea noastră transparentă, de asemenea, cu versiuni importante deschise și integrare open source care fac o tehnologie foarte neutru politic (backdoor gratuit) .

Un cuplu de furnizor VPN frumos

Există o mulțime de motive de ce ar avea nevoie pentru a accesa internet jgheab un VPN.

De exemplu, dacă locuiți într-o țară de blocare a anumitor conținuturi (cum ar fi site-ul anti-locale-guvern, porno, etc) și / sau protocoale (cum ar fi Skype, VoIP), probabil, v-ar dori să se mute conexiunea la internet în afara țării de blocare urât cu ajutorul tunele VPN criptate.

Am evaluat mai multe găzduit de server VPN și câteva dintre ele suna destul de bine printre ofranda pe scară largă a acestor servicii:

SwissVPN

Ieșire la internet din Elveția.

Cost 6 CHF / luna

Opțional adresă IP fixă ​​publică

Util dacă aveți nevoie de:

  • Doar trece de filtrele de țară locale cu bine în bandă largă
  • Expunere servicii publice printr-VPN cu opțional adresa IP publică fixă.

Overplay

Ieșire la internet prin alegerea între 20 de țări diferite (de fiecare dată când vă conectați).

Util dacă aveți nevoie să faceți:

  • Business Intelligence pe concurent (care pare a veni de la țară X cand le conectați)
  • vezi filmul / Telefilm permis numai din spații web naționale IP
  • vezi rezultatele Google între diferite țări

Nu orice curbe eliptice este același: jgheabul de securitate ECC

 Propria mea analiză securitate curba ECC și selecție

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Cele mai multe utilizare cripto moderne eliptice Curve criptografic (ECC), care, cu o dimensiune cheie mai mică și reduce puterea de calcul, da tărie securitate echivalent de sistem cripto tradițional cunoscut ca DH (Diffie-Hellman) sau RSA (Rivest, Shamir și Adleman).

Nu toată lumea știe că de criptare ECC este selectat pentru orice aplicații de criptare viitoare și care chiar TLS / SSL (criptare utilizate pentru securizarea web) se deplasează la ECC.

Am găsit o mulțime de așa numitele "produse de criptare de proprietate", care au abandonat RSA și DH a merge cu alternative ECC, care tind să dimensiune cheie arbitrară utilizare ECC pic fără măcar a specifica ce fel de ECC Crypto te obișnuiești.

Cu toate acestea există o mulțime de confuzie în jurul curbelor eliptice, cu o mulțime de nume diferite și dimensiuni cheie a face dificil pentru un non-criptografic-experienta-utilizator pentru a face propria figura în evaluarea niște chestii cripto.

Din cauza confuzie, astfel difuză am decis să fac propria mea analiză pentru a afla care sunt cele mai bune curbele de criptare ECC și ECC dreapta dimensiune cheie a utiliza.

Această analiză ar dori să ofere o alegere în funcție industria de securitate între diferite curbe și dimensiuni cheie, lăsând considerațiile analitice matematice și cripto care a fost deja efectuate în cursul anilor, rezumând diferitele alegeri adoptate în mai multe standarde și protocoale de securitate.

Prima concluzie.

Din analiza mea, numai următoarele curbele ECC vor fi luate în considerare pentru a fi utilizate în sistemele de criptare, deoarece sunt singurul selectat dintre autorități diferite (ANSI, ANS, SAG, NIST, ECC Brainpool), standarde diferite de protocol de securitate (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) și singurul care indeplinesc cerintele de securitate NSA Suite B (standard de facto, de asemenea, pentru mediu militar al NATO):

  • Prim-eliptice Curve 256 bit - P-256
  • Prim-eliptice Curve 384 bit - P-384

cu opțional, doar pentru adevărat paranoic care doriți să obțineți mai mult de biți cheie dimensiune, încă nu a considerat util:

  • Prim-eliptice Curve 521 bit - P-521

Aș dori să afirm că curbele Köblitz trebuie evitată, în orice dimensiune tastă (163/283/409/571), deoarece nu are suficient garanție la cripto activitate analitică și eficient sunt:

  • Nu face parte din NSA Suite-B selecție criptografie
  • Nu face parte din selecție ECC Brainpool
  • Nu face parte din selecție ANSI X9.62
  • Nu face parte din selecție prelungire OpenPGP ECC
  • Nu face parte din extindere Kerberos pentru selecție curba ECC

Invit cititorul să urmărească printr-o analiză mea de a înțelege fundamentele care ar putea fi înțelese chiar și fără fundal tehnic în adâncime, dar cel puțin cu un fundal tehnologic bun un pic unele bază de criptografie.

 Aici vom merge cu analiza
 

Scopul meu este de a face o analiză cu privire la ceea ce / cum comunitatea științifică și de securitate deschis alege sistem cripto ECC pentru utilizare în protocoale de securitate și standardele definite de IETF RFC (cei care definesc standardele Internet într-un mod deschis și peer-revizuite).

Mai jos o serie de RFC introducerea ECC în sistemul existent care sa analizat pentru a înțelege ceea ce este mai bine să utilizați și ceea ce este mai bine pentru a exclude:

  • RFC5639 : Curbe ECC Brainpool Standard & Curve Generation
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B criptografic Suites pentru IPsec
  • RFC5430 : profil B NSA Suite pentru Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : ANS Suite B în Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Determinarea Forță pentru chei publice utilizat pentru schimbul de chei simetrice
  • RFC5349 : Curve criptografie (ECC) Sprijin eliptice pentru public cheie criptografiei pentru autentificare inițială în Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : eliptice Criptografie Curve (ECC) Cipher Suites pentru Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • Criptare voce ZRTP de curba Philip Zimmermann ECC
  • ECC în OpenPGP (proiect d pluta-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 )
  • Curbe ECC selectate de Microsoft pentru autentificare smartcard Kerberos

Vom folosi alegerea făcută de om de știință definirea Internet Security Protocoale pentru a face parte din evaluarea noastră.
În plus, trebuie să se înțeleagă că selecția Curve provine din mai multe autorități care au făcut propria lor selecție de curbe, în scopul de a spune pentru industria ce se utilizează și la ce să săriți:

We will use the choice made by scientist defining security requirements in the standardization agencies to make part of our evaluation.
Additionally, something that most people does not know, but that it's extremely relevant to our analysis, is that there are different kind of ECC curve cryptography and their “size” it's different depending on the kind of curve:

  • ECC Curves over Prime Field (often referred as Elliptic Curve and represented by P-keysize )
  • ECC Curves over Binary Field (often referred as Koblitz Curve and represented by K-keysize )

Given a security strength equivalence the Elliptic Curve and the Kobliz Curve have different key size, for example when we read ECC 571 we are referring to Koblitz Curve with an equivalent strength to ECC 521 Prime curve.

A comparison of strength between Elliptic Curves and Kotbliz Curves is reported below (from Mikey ECC internet Draft ):

| Koblitz | ECC | DH/DSA/RSA
| 163 | 192 | 1024
| 283 | 256 | 3072
| 409 | 384 | 7680
| 571 | 521 | 15360

Below there's a comparison of all selected curves by all the various entities and their respective name (from IETF RFC4492 for ECC usage for TLS ) :

Curve names chosen by different standards organizations
------------+---------------+-------------
SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
------------+---------------+-------------
sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
sect163r1 | |
sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
sect193r1 | |
sect193r2 | |
sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
sect239k1 | |
sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
secp160k1 | |
secp160r1 | |
secp160r2 | |
secp192k1 | |
secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
secp224k1 | |
secp224r1 | | NIST P-224
secp256k1 | |
secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
------------+---------------+-------------

What immediately appear is that there are only two curves selected by all authorities, and that there is a general dumping of koblitz curves by ANSI.The only commonly agreed among the 3 authorities are the following two ECC curve:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Of those selection of ECC curve for TLS the RFC5430 skipped completely koblitz curves and selected for usage only:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The ECC Brainpool skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected for usage the following ECC Curves:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 ( that's the only particular because it's not P-521 but P-512, the only key-size referred by ECC brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons from Athena SCS )

The OpenPGP internet draft for ECC usage in PGP d raft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The Kerberos protocol extension for ECC use, defined in RFC5349 and defined by Microsoft for smartcard logon skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

So, sounds clear that the right selection of ECC is for P-256, P-384 and P-521 while the Koblitz curve have been skipped for Top Secret use and for any security sensitive protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS).

Why i made this analysis?

I have done this analysis following a discussion i had regarding certain voice encryption products, all based on custom and proprietary protocols, that are all using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571 / 571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits .
All them are using the K-571 that, as described before, has been removed from all security sensitive environment and protocols and being myself a designer of voice encryption stuff i think that their cryptographic choice is absolutely not the best security choice.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz elliptic curve are faster than the top secret enabled prime elliptic curve and so give the product manager a chance to provide “more bit” in it's own product while keeping the key exchange fast.

It's a matter of philosophical choice.

I prefer to follow the trend of scientific community with the humility of not to considering myself a cryptographic expert, knowledgable more than the overall security and scientific community itself.

I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
I prefer to count the amount of brains working on the crypto i use, that check that's really secure, that evaluate whether there's some weakness.

The number of brais working on Crypto widely diffused are of order of magnitude more than the number of brains working on crypto used by just few people (like Koblitz curve).
So i am not demonizing who use ECDH 571 using Koblitz Curve, but for sure i can affirm that they did not taken the best choice in terms of security and that any security professionals doing a security benchmarking would consider the fact that Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit done with Koblitz Curve is not widely diffused, it's dumped from standard security protocols and it's not certified for top secret use.

ESSOR, European Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Practic în loc de ardere cip hardware care să pună în aplicare cele mai multe dintre protocoalele de frecvență radio și tehnici, ele sunt împinse în "software" pentru hardware de radio de specialitate care se poate lucra pe un lot de frecvență diferită, în calitate de interfață radio pentru o mulțime de diferite protocoale de radio.

De exemplu USRP (Universal Software-ul Radio periferic) de la Ettus de cercetare care a costat 1000-2000USD complet încărcat, printr-OpenSource GnuRadio cadru, au văzut implementare open source a:

Si mult mai protocoale și tehnologii de transmisie.

Acest tip de noi abordări pentru Radio sisteme de transport este destinat pentru a schimba sistemul fel de radio sunt puse în aplicare, oferind noi competențe, cum ar fi pentru a face upgrade "protocolul de radio sine" în software, în scopul de a asigura "protocol de radio" îmbunătățiri.

În termen scurt am văzut, de asemenea, cercetarea în domeniul securității, foarte puternic folosind tehnologii DST, cum ar fi GSM cracare și sniffing Bluetooth .

Ne putem aștepta ca alte tehnologii, slabe de design, dar protejate prin limitarea la dispozitive hardware pentru hack protocoalele de nivel scăzut, vor fi primi în curând hacked. În prima listă i-ar place foarte mult să vadă hacking de TETRA, o tehnologie nascut cu stare de spirit închis și algoritmi de criptare secrete, ceva ce într-adevăr place;)-

Management de produs și organizare

A trebuit să înțeleagă mai bine conceptele, rolurile și atribuțiile legate de managementul produsului și managementul marketingului de produse în companii de software, de ce este nevoie de, care sunt diferențele și modul în care acestea se potrivesc în interiorul unei structuri de organizare.

Cele mai multe persoane știu niciodată interesat în acest domeniu specific de activitate, dar când vrei să fii o companie de produse (și nu o companie de consultanta sau soluție), va începe cu diferite produse pe diferite platforme pentru clienți diferiți tinta vândut canale minime diferite, cu diferite de stabilire a prețurilor cu o instalare / proces diferit de livrare și că complexitate trebuie să fie gestionate în mod corespunzător.

Îți dai seama că, pentru a permite companiei să crească produs în direcția cea bună aveți nevoie pentru a organiza activități de management de produs în mod oficial, nu de închidere mintea ta în roluri de organizare rigide, cum ar fi marketing, vânzări, cercetare și dezvoltare.

Când vorbim despre Product Management i recomanda citirea de iluminare rolul strategic al Product Management (Cum accent determinate de piață conduce companii de a construi produse de oameni doresc să cumpere), care clarifica o mulțime de lucruri, chiar dacă perspectivele de separare netă de roluri în management de produs, ceva t pălărie prea greu pentru o companie mică ca un startup.

Încă se asigura o diferențiere a sarcinilor între Product Management și Product Marketing.

O bună înțelegere a managementului de produs legate de punerea în funcțiune i s dat în articol Crearea de Product Management la pornire apar diferit caz referitoare la rolurile vizionar produs in cadrul companiei.

Acesta introduce CEO termeni de produs, în sensul că taxele de administrare produs sări în jurul în funcția de organizare diferite prin furnizarea de focalizare și efort acolo unde este nevoie, independent de faptul că funcția internă necesită mai mult efort este de dezvoltare, de marketing, de vânzări sau Comunicare. Asta înseamnă creșterea practic viziunea produs așa cum este necesar în toate funcțiile majore legate de produse care fac viziunea la nivelul întregii companii coerent.

O bună reprezentare a activităților de management de produs și de comercializare de produse este bine descrisă cu diferențierea între strategica, sector tehnic și Marketing și nu este în mod clar separate între Management, Marketing (și de vânzări) și R & D:

Triad.jpg

Am citit acest context manager de produs și cunoștințe sunt diferite, în funcție de compania focalizarea ( în cazul în care nu management de produs aparține în organizație? ):

  • B2C -> experienta de Marketing
  • B2B -> experiență tehnică

O iluminare (pentru mine) și diferențiere foarte important în ceea ce privește taxele de administrare produs este diferențierea între:

  • Product Management
  • Product Marketing

Taxele specifice aparținând Product Marketing vs administrație sunt explicate foarte mult în Definiții rol Product Management si Marketing Product care am sugera pentru a citi, permițându-vă să se definească mai bine sarcinile și responsabilitățile în cadrul organizației dumneavoastră. Acesta oferă, de asemenea o definiție bună a cerințelor de locuri de muncă dacă aveți nevoie să caute această cifră!

At the same time it's important to understand what's NOT product management, effectively Product management is not just feature prioritization .

At the same time it's important to understand which professional figure is NOT itself a product manager:

  • Manager de produs nu este un manager de marketing - în timp ce management de produs este de obicei văzută ca o disciplină de marketing, de marketing se concentreaza pe planul de marketing și, de obicei, nu sunt de conducere direcția generală de produse. În acest context, ar putea fi totuși găsite director de marketing de produs care este bratele pe piață a produsului, în special în organizații de dimensiuni reduse.
  • Product manager is not a sales manager – sales manager are about finding out how to sell a product, following which sales methodology, technique and channels and they could drive the company from a market oriented company ( product) to a customer oriented company (solution and consulting)
  • Product manager is not a developer – Developers are focused on the technology and not the overall product. Some great product managers are former developers, but it is difficult to do both at once. There is a natural tension between developers and product managers that should be maintained to create a balanced product.
  • Manager de produs nu este un manager de software - managerul software-ul este un manager funcțional și, de obicei, nu se concentrează pe produs sau clienților.
  • Product manager is not a project manager – project managers are about how and when, while the product manager is about what. Project managers work closely with product managers to ensure successful completion of different phases in the product life cycle.

The typical product management activities could be in extreme synthesis summarized as follow:

  • Strategie: Planificarea unei strategii de produs
  • Tehnice: crearea de produse de top
  • Marketing: furnizarea de produse și de conținut tehnic
  • Sales: provide pre sales support and work effectively with sales

Product management so it's not precisely development, is not precisely marketing, it's not precisely sales, so typically it's difficult to identify “where it should stay” inside the organization structure (it's even difficult to understand that's needed)?

The Silicon Valley Product Group provide a nice insight on Product Organization Structure by pointing out which are the advantages and risks of several choices. Still the Cranky Product Manager say that It doesn't matter where the product manager live in the organization .

It's relevant to be careful not to have persons that are too much technical or too much sales oriented in order to fill the gap among different organization. Prea mult fragmentare a drepturilor alocate în întreaga organizație poate duce la birocrație, prea taxe mult, într-o persoană poate duce la punerea în aplicare ineficientă a sarcinilor necesare în unele zone și la un respect percepție concurs intern pentru rolurile tradiționale.

Check there a very nice Resume of a professional with practical experience in product management (it's an half techie/half marketing guys).

Ah! Un alt neînțelegere foarte comun este acela de a confunda pe piață cu comunicarea în cazul în care ai găsit o definiție atât de bun de marketing pe care îmi place foarte mult și să înțeleagă de strictă relație cu Product Management:

Marketing este cunoscut pe piață atât de bine încât produsul în sine a vinde

But what happen when you don't handle a product management and product marketing management process in a defined way?

A nice story is shown as example in The strategic role of Product Management :

Your founder, a brilliant technician, started the company years ago when he quit his day job to market his idea full time. He created a product that he just knew other people needed. And he was right. Destul de curând a rostit destul de produs și a angajat cel mai bun prieten al lui de la colegiu ca VP de vânzări. And the company grew. But before long, the VP of Sales complained, “We're an engineering-led company. We need to become customer-driven.” And that sounded fine. Except… every new contract seemed to require custom work. You signed a dozen clients in a dozen market segments and the latest customer's voice always dominated the product plans. You concluded that “customer-driven” meant “driven by the latest customer” and that couldn't be right.

If you want to be a product company it's relevant to precisely follow a strategy driven by product marketing and management and not by sales.

Confuzie între atribuțiile de management de produs / de marketing și vânzări ar putea duce la firma produs în pretenții care nu sunt în măsură să procedeze în strategia lor, pur și simplu pentru că ei asistent oportunități care conduce activitatea out-of-domeniul de aplicare.

A product company must invest in it's own product development and marketing in order to let sales activity stay focused and guarantee that the organization is every day more effective on the market.

After this reading, my understanding is that it's relevant to identify how to create a set of flexible business process on how to handle various product management and product marketing duties separating them from sales.

Interceptarea de la distanță telefoane VoIP snom

I suggest reading remotely tapping VoIp phones ” on VoIP Security Alliance Blog by Shawn Merdinger .

A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Voice communication security workshop

Salut,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

We come in peace

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

Știi, fac tehnologie de securitate înseamnă că ești personal responsabil pentru protecția informațiilor utilizatorului. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Criptografie : În criptografie , ulei de sarpe este un termen folosit pentru a descrie metode criptografice comerciale și produsele care sunt considerate false sau frauduloase. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : . Mai multe companii de produse de securitate ulei de șarpe nu explică și nu sunt clare cu privire la modelul de amenințare în care se aplică produsul Foarte celebru este sentința de Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

Deci, cum să fața locului, produse de securitate ulei de șarpe?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Aici a reprezentat orientarea de bază de la Matt Curtin hârtie:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

Dar toate în toate cum să o rezolvi această abordare de securitate lipsit de etică?

Este foarte semnificativ și ar fi foarte util pentru fiecare tip de categorie de produse de securitate pentru a face unele de evaluare orientare puternic și independent (cum ar fi OSSTMM pentru testare de penetrare), pentru a face acest proces de evaluare de securitate într-adevăr în mâinile utilizatorului.

Ar fi, de asemenea, foarte frumos de a avea o analiză cineva face și o evaluare a companiilor de produse de securitate, publicarea de rapoarte despre semne Snake Oil.

Web2.0 privacy leak in Mobile apps

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

Algoritmul AES selectat pentru utilizare în spațiu

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

bblock.jpg

Let's goes on.

Pe de o parte Blackberry este o multime platformă de caracteristici de criptare, caracteristici de securitate peste tot, dispozitiv criptat (cu cripto personalizate), comunicații criptate (cu personalizate protocoale proprietare , cum ar fi PPPI), foarte bun Setări securitate avansată, cadru de criptare de la Certicom ( deținute acum de RIM ).

Pe de altă parte ele nu oferă numai un dispozitiv, ci o rețea de acces acoperire, denumit BIS ( BlackBerry Internet Service ), care este o rețea globală la nivel mondial la nivel zona în care BlackBerry introduce în timp ce navigați sau CheckMail folosind blackberry.net AP.

Când, sau o aplicație, utilizați blackberry.net APN nu sunt doar conectarea la internet cu conexiune la internet purtător, dar se intră în interiorul rețelei RIM care va proxy și să acționeze ca o poarta de acces pentru a ajunge la internet.

Foarte Același lucru se întâmplă atunci când aveți o utilizare corporativ: Atât aparatul BB și BES corporative conecta la rețea RIM care acționează ca un fel de rețea VPN concentrare .

Deci, practic toate comunicările centrare a infrastructurii de servicii minime RIM în format criptat cu un set protocoale de criptare și de comunicare de proprietate.

La fel ca un aviz, cred că Google a oferi GTalk peste blackberry.net APN, a făcut un acord, în scopul de a oferi servicii de interiorul rețelei BB utilizatorilor BB. Când instalați GTalk te-a adăugat 3 cărți de serviciu care indică GTALKNA01 că e numele gateway-GTalk în interiorul rețelei RIM pentru a permite intra-BIS comunicare și acționează ca o poarta de acces Gtalk la internet.

Operatorii de telefonie mobilă, de obicei, nu sunt nici măcar voie să inspecteze traficul între dispozitivul BlackBerry și Rețeaua Blackberry.

Deci, RIM si Blackberry sunt oarecum unic pentru abordarea lor ca acestea să ofere o platformă, o rețea și un serviciu de toate grupate împreună și tu nu poți să "obține dispozitivul și software-ului" dar utilizatorul și corporative sunt întotdeauna legat și conectat la serviciul rețea.

Asta e bine și că e de rău, pentru că înseamnă că RIM oferă caracteristici extrem de bune de securitate și capabilități pentru a proteja informațiile, de dispozitiv și accesul la informație la nivel diferit față de terțe părți.

Dar este întotdeauna dificil de estimat amenințarea și riscul legat de RIM sine și care ar putea face presiuni politice împotriva RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Noroc

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

Celebrating “Hackers” after 25 years

A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

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It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.

http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html 
Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.
O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.

Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

China Encryption Regulations

Hi all,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

IOScat – a Port of Netcat to Cisco IOS

A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Cu respect,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Da
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Da
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Da
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Da
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Da
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Da

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!