RFC 6189:ZRTPがついに標準です!

最後ZRTPは公式RFCの割り当て、割り当てられているRFC6189ユニセキュアRTPのメディアパス·キー契約:ZRTPを。

これは、依存関係として持っていたSRTP今として定義されている256ビットのAESキーサイズはRFC6188 。

それは非常にのようなエンドツーエンドの暗号化のための公式の標準としてZRTPを設定するための重要なマイルストーンだとして、RFCがついにリリース見てエキサイティングだPGPは電子メールをしている。

現在、世界のどの組織が正式なエンド·ツー·エンドの音声プロトコルの暗号化ZRTPを実現することができるであろう

ZRTPプロトコルの現在3種類の公共の実装が存在します:

それらの各々はプロトコルの異なる機能を提供するが、最も重要な相互運用可能であることが知られている。

新しい波は、携帯電話の暗号化システムを行う企業のほとんどは、カスタムの暗号化を実施している灰色の領域にirrupting、音声の暗号化の世界に来ています。

今、標準ではセットアップされていて、別の何かを実装に委ねいくつかの理由があります。

Hurra 氏 ツィンマーマンとすべての企業のコミュニティ(のようなPrivateWave )と個人(のようなヴェルナーDittmannそれで働いていた)!

今日は素晴らしい一日、このような技術の一種で、複数の既存の実装との公式ともありです!

フィリップは、あなたの純粋な精神と決意:-)に、再び私の賛辞をそれをやった

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フライブルク大学の割れGSMの進捗

携帯電話のプロトコル(GSM、GSM-R、TETRA、UMTSなど)のエキサイティングな世界がハッキングは、大学からの公式な研究活動を得ている。

クラッキングソフトのオープンソースコードのリリースを行うための投資は、それに取り組む、それを改善し、強力な研究を行うために、大学の学生に機会を与えている。

フライブルク大学は紙解放だけGSM暗号A5 / 1の実践運動を一緒にgsmframencoderのスニッフィング、デコードと分解プロセスを改善するための支援ツール。

ソフトウェアを開いて、ハードウェアを開く、開くプロトコルは独自の方法またはプロセスへのビルドアップコミュニケーションとセキュリティ技術のいかなる種類の弱さを示しています。

それは、開くと通信プロトコルを設計しながら、業界が相互運用性とオープンなアプローチでのみ点灯するように強制するために、独自の技術とクローズのいずれかの種類をクラックしようとする任意の科学者の目標でなければなりません。

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騒々しいトラフィックをフィルタリングしようとしている私のTORの出口ノードの経験

今年初めに私がでVPSをもたらしたように、TORの出口ノードを実行する時が来たと判断しhetzner.de (それらは以下のように記載されていますので、 良いTOR ISPを )とニックネームと出口ノードをセットアップprivacyresearch.infosecurity.ch 100Mbitの/でその後、10Mビット/秒フラット、毎月のデータの最初の1TBのための接続。

また、実行TOR2WEBの上でソフトウェアをhttp://tor.infosecurity.ch 。

私は設定出口政策を実行することによって示唆されるように、最小限の嫌がらせと出口ノードと準備虐待応答テンプレートを 。

最初の日に私はDMCAがトラフィックをピアツーピアによる文句私はすぐに受信ノードを実行してきた。

だから私は使用して一部のP2Pトラフィックを除外することを決めたOpenDPI iptablesのモジュールとDMCAを自動的に消えて文句:

iptablesの-OUTPUT-M opendpi-eDonkeyの-gadugadu-FastTrackインタ-グヌーテラ-のDirectConnect-ビットトレント- WinMXの-soulseek-J REJECT

その後、私はイタリア語ですので、私はTORノードを実行していることを理解していなかったので、愚かな検察官が朝で私を目覚めさせるというチャンスを減らすために、イタリアのインターネットアドレス空間に接続するために私のTORノードを回避することを決めた。

私の助けを借りて、試したhellais書い終了ポリシー声明を拒否するためのスクリプトをに基づいて、すべてのイタリアのネットブロック拒否する、 例外IOErrorの blockfinderを私たちは、ことがわかったtorrc設定 +1000ラインを持つファイルはTORクラッシュを作っていた。

我々は国によってTORの出口政策を阻止する私たちの試みについてのクラッシュを報告するようにチケットを開くために行って、 同じような試みが見つかりました私たちは貢献したが、それはまだオープンな問題であると思われる。

結論は、私が使用して汚れた道を行くことに決めたので、それは清潔で丁寧なやり方でTOR出口ノードの国の出口政策を行うことが可能ではないということですのiptables / geoipのを 。 それは正しくコンパイルするために戦った後、それはイタリアに行くトラフィックをブロックするiptablesの1行だった:

iptablesの- OUTPUT-Pのtcp-mの状態-状態NEW-MのGeoIP-DST-CC IT-jは、REJECT

今私の出口ノードからイタリア語ネットワークへの接続は行われませんと私はTOR(私は前に適用されたすべてのTORノードIPアドレスの例外を持って)理解していない可能性が愚か検察官に対して安全です。

他のいくつかの日後、私は私のTorノードから発信ポートスキャン活動のために文句を受信し始めた。

ビューの私自身の観点から、私は匿名のネットワークではなく、匿名のハッキングの試みを支援したいので、私はポートスキャンといくつかの研究を必要とする私のnode.Thatの複雑な問題を起点からの攻撃を除外したいので、その間に私がインストールscanlogdと鼻を鳴らす私はどのように多くの攻撃を評価したいので、私のTORの出口ノードから出るされる攻撃の種類、。
後、私は主要な攻撃をフィルタリングすることができることが確認するためのフィルタリングのいくつかの種類を整理しようとします。
ポートスキャンに関連しているものにとっては、発信ポートスキャンを検出し、フィルタリングする公的なツールが存在しないと思われるだけの着信ポートスキャンをフィルタリングするように、おそらく何かアドホックを記述する必要があります。
私は物事が起こっているどのように参照しますと光波の方法で実装するためのいくつかの素晴らしい方法があるかどう鼻息インライン私の出口ノードを起点に選択的にフィルタリングアウト大規模な攻撃の試み。

私の目標は、長期的に実行して、出口ノードを維持する(数ヶ月ごとにトラフィックの1TB少なくともTORに寄贈)、文句をISPに関連する労力を削減し、合理的な責任と出口ノードを実行するために最善をしようとしている。

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TETRAのハッキングが来ている:OsmocomTETRA

それはのリリースを参照することは非常にエキサイティングだOsmocomTETRA 、最初のオープンソースSDR( ソフトウェア無線 )TETRA復調器、PHYおよび下位のMAC層の実装を。

それはTETRAバージョンだGSM airprobeこうして偉大なハッキングの機会を与え、TETRA通信プロトコルのデータおよびフレームへのアクセスのロックを解除!

またTETRA技術は、我々はオープンソースTETRAスニファを表示するには、この2011年に、期待すべき開かれていると、おそらくまたTEAの暗号化は、(テトラ暗号化アルゴリズム)割れ今すぐに!

TETRAは、ネットワーク·カバレッジの可用性(のみ基地局なしで携帯電話からモバイル)がなくても動作し、いくつかの特別な高可用性サービスを提供することができます別の移動体通信網として警察、緊急サービスとミリタリーで使用されます。

私はスライドでTETRAについて書いた主な音声セキュリティプロトコルレビュー 。

OsmocomBBメーリング·リストでは、いくつかのTETRAネットワークの状態に関する議論がすでにありました:

  • ベルギー警察TETRA ASTRIDネットワーク:暗号化されていない
  • アーヘンのドイツ警察テストTETRAネットワーク:暗号化されていない
  • 一部のEX-jugoslawia TETRAネットワーク:暗号化されていない
  • オランダC200 TETRAネットワーク:TEA2静的鍵で暗号化
  • 英国エアウェイブTETRAネットワーク:TEA2 TEA2で暗号化

これは、新しいデジタルラジオ:-)、古いアナログの年齢から戻ってくる、新しい警察とレスキューサービスハッキングを見て本当に楽しいであろう

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政府は2.0、オープンデータとウィキリークス

ウィキリークス、OpenLeaks、GlobalLeaks、BalkanLeaks背後にある概念は、単に国民に秘密を明らかにするよりもはるかに多くのです。

それはとても 'ウェブ2.0 / wikiの'共同システムと呼ばれ、政府の組織、透明性と協力して来るの革命の一部です。

それらを見ている政府2.0 -はじめアンケDomscheitベルクによっては、革新的な政府プログラムは、マイクロソフトのドイツとダニエルベルク、の共同創設者の妻のリードウィキリークスと今の創設OpenLeaks 。

見ているオープンデータ政府2.0政府の透明性、汚職を減らし、政府機関の性能向上を強制するためのイニシアチブを。

それが拡散秘密によって混乱を作成したいanarco-リバタリアンファンキーみんなのグループよりちょうどより多くのだ革命、それだけで完全な透明性と市民との強い協力関係を活用することで、政府の新たな組織モデルを実現するためにラッシュの始まりだ。

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ZORG、新しいC + +とJava ZRTP実装公共リリース

こんにちはすべて、PrivateWaveイタリアの鉱泉、 私はCTO午前音声通信におけるプライバシー保護と情報セキュリティのための技術開発に従事する イタリアの会社では今日 、我々 は からダウンロードできます新しいオープンソースZRTPプロトコル実装、Zorgの放します。http://www。 zrtp.org 。

ZRTP [1]楕円曲線ディフィー·ヘルマン384bitとAES-256のSRTP暗号化をエンドツーエンドの鍵交換を提供します。

ブラックベリー、ノキアとiOS(iPhone):ZORGは、もともと次のプラットフォームで使用可能なPrivateWaveのPrivateGSM音声暗号化製品で開発され、実装されています。

ZorgのC + + PJSIPオープンソースVoIPのSDKに統合されている[2]、それはPJSIP 1.8.5に対する統合パッチとして提供されている。 これは、Windows、Linux、およびMac OS Xには、Symbian、iPhone上でテストされています

ZorgのJavaはMJSIPのカスタムバージョン内[3]ブラックベリーのプラットフォーム上でオープンソースのSDKを統合し、それが最小のガベージコレクタの活動で削減するのに必要なメモリ使用量の最適化が含まれています。

両方のプラットフォームを分離しており、モジュラー暗号は、暗号アルゴリズムの実装が簡単に他のものと交換することができるようにバックエンド。

. ZORGは、GNU AGPLの下でライセンスされ、ソースコードはgithubの上で利用可能です https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG 。

私たちは本当にそれが言論の自由を支持して新しいボイス暗号化システムを作成するためのオープンソースのエコシステムに有用であることができることを願ってのように我々はオープンソースの下やセキュリティへのアプローチと一貫性で[4]、それを発表している。

Javaで書かれた20以上のPJSIPベースのオープンソースのVoIP暗号化ソフトウェアといくつかは直接ZORGリリースから利益を得ることができる。

我々は協力の提案、新しい統合、新しい暗号化のバックエンド、スカウトバグと改善しZRTP、音声の暗号化規格として断言せて何でも便利を受信するために幸せになる。

Zorgのから入手可能ですhttp://www.zrtp.org 。

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4]セキュリティアプローチ: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

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アスタリスク1.8と固定電話への暗号化された携帯電話

私たちは、上の技術的な手引きを発表ただ固定電話のVoIPインフラストラクチャへのセキュアなモバイルを構築する方法で:

次の週の他にこのようなHOWTOは全て透明性とオープンソースのセキュリティ技術の活用の精神で、そのようなFreeSWITCHなど、他のサーバー·プラットフォームを使用することによって出てくるだろう。

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暗号を規制の8エピック失敗

非常に照明の記事暗号規制の八叙事詩失敗や技術がどのように機能するかについての広い視野を持っていない政府の規制当局によって共通の誤解を。

無知な政府の規制当局は厳しい規制は、次の欠点があることが理解されていません。

  1. これは、セキュリティ上のリスクが作成されます
  2. これは、悪者を停止することはありません
  3. これは、技術革新に悪影響を与える
  4. これは、米国のビジネスに悪影響を与える
  5. それは、消費者の費用がかかります
  6. それは違憲になります
  7. それは税金の巨大な支出となります

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PrivateGSM:ZRTPまたはSRTP / SDESとブラックベリー/ iPhone /ノキアの携帯音声の暗号化

私は絶対に、製品のいかなる種類のプロモーションを行うために私自身の個人的なブログを使用することは避けてください。

その時、それは変わらないですが、私は派手なマーケティングせずに動作しますが、技術的な滞在あなたの製品についての事実をお伝えしたいと思います。

今日でPrivateWave私はCTOと共同創設者 、私たちは、ブラックベリー、iPhoneとNokiaのために公にモバイルVoIPの暗号化製品をリリースしました:

  • と第一これまでブラックベリーのVoIP暗号ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIPのプロフェッショナル
  • と第一これまでiPhoneのVoIP暗号ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIPのプロフェッショナル
  • と第一これまでブラックベリー暗号VoIPクライアントSIP / TLS上SDES鍵交換とSRTP - PrivateGSMのVoIPエンタープライズ

ロゴprivatewave-colore.png

PrivateWaveで我々はそこにほとんどの音声暗号化会社への異なるアプローチを尊重を使用し、私たちの読んでセキュリティへのアプローチを 。

技術と産業の風景の中に、この製品の関連は次のように要約することができます。

  • それだけで標準のセキュリティプロトコルを(そして、それはCSDの遺産から来プロプライエタリ技術が同じ値を提供することができないことは明らかだとして、我々は、市場が反応することを期待)を使用して、最初の音声暗号化会社の
  • それが唯一のオープンソース&標準の暗号化エンジンを使用する音声の暗号化の最初のアプローチだ
  • これは、異なる技術を使用して、異なるセキュリティモデルを提供するために、最初の音声暗号化アプローチ(たとえば、エンド·ツー·エンドのZRTPとエンド·ツー·サイト用SRTP )

プロのセキュリティのために設計モバイルセキュアクライアント、のそれらスイートは最高の通信とセキュリティ技術を使用してのみ使用し、不正なネットワーク条件下でも優れた性能とともに保護の高い学位を提供します。

アプリケーションは以下のとおりです。

icona-pgsm.png

サポートされているモバイルデバイスは、次のとおりです。

に関するZRTPを我々は、すべてのセキュリティといくつかの小さなを加えてプロトコルの偏執的特徴を強調してストレッチすることを決めた:

当社の厳格なアドレス帳の統合、超えZRTP RFC携帯電話の画面を見ているためではないのユーザーの行動の携帯電話で使用する場合、特定の攻撃を受ける可能性がありますことを、 仕様 。

このような状況を緩和ZRTPを使用当社のparanoy方法は、我々はこの後、および/またはRFCの包含​​のための特定の詳細を追加しますについて書きます。

ZRTPとエンドツーエンドの暗号化をPrivateGSM Professional でいくつかの単語

リードテクニカルシートをそこに!

するためにそれをダウンロードし 、ここをクリックして、ちょうどあなたの電話番号を入れ

それらはより多くのための困難な動作環境(汚いモバイルネットワークと汚れたモバイルオペレーティングシステム)での挑戦技術(音声暗号化)上のすべての私の非常に熟練したスタッフのハードワーク(3つの異なるプラットフォームに対して、この6つのプロジェクトに取り組んで16名)の結果である2年以上。

私は、スタッフの非常に誇りに思います!

次は何だ?

次の数週間で、あなたがそのようなアスタリスク、freeswitchと私は確信しているいくつかのエキサイティングな他のセキュリティ技術のニュースと一緒に、PBXを有効に他のセキュリティとの統合などのドキュメンテーションの主要な一連の解除が表示されますが注目されます;)

それはハードワークしていると、よりが行われなければならないが、私はセキュリティとオープンソースコミュニティは非常に政治的に中立(無料バックドア)技術を作るオープン重要なリリースと、オープンソースの統合にもこのような製品と私たちの透明なアプローチを好きになると確信しています。

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素敵なVPNプロバイダのカップル

一つは、インターネットトラフVPNにアクセスする必要がある理由がたくさんあり​​ます。

あなたが特定の内容(抗ローカル政府のウェブサイト、ポルノ、などなど)、および/またはプロトコル(Skypeのような、VoIP)のブロッキング国に住んでいる場合たとえば、あなたはおそらく使用して厄介なブロッキング国外であなたのインターネット接続を移動したいと思う暗号化されたVPNトンネル。

私はいくつかのホスティングされたVPNサーバーを評価し、それらのいくつかは、このようなサービスの普及公募間でかなりいいですね:

SwissVPN

スイスからのインターネットへの出口。

6 CHF /ヶ月を要した

オプション公衆固定IPアドレス

あなたが必要な場合に便利:

  • ちょうど良い高帯域幅を持つ他の国でのフィルタをバイパスする
  • オプションの固定のパブリックIPアドレスを使用して公共サービスのトラフVPNを公開します。

大げさな演技をする

20の異なる国(あなたが接続するたびに)の間で選択することにより、インターネットへの出口。

:あなたがする必要がある場合に便利

  • 競合他社にビジネス·インテリジェンス(それらを接続するときに国のXから来たように見える)
  • フィルム/テレビ映画では唯一の国家IPのWebスペースから許可された見
  • 異なる国の間でGoogleの検索結果を表示

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すべての楕円曲線は同じではありません:ECCセキュリティ上のトラフ

 私自身のECC曲線のセキュリティと選択分析

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

DH(のDiffie-Hellman)またはRSA(Rivest氏、シャミールおよびエーデルマン )としても知られる伝統的な暗号システムの同等のセキュリティ強度を与え、より小さいキーサイズで、計算力を削減し、最も近代的な暗号化を使用する楕円曲線暗号(ECC)。

誰もが、ECC暗号化が将来の暗号化アプリケーションのための、さらにはTLS / SSLは(暗号化は、Webを確保するために使用される)ECCに移行されている選択されていることを知っています。

私はたくさんあっても慣れるECC暗号化の種類を指定することなく、任意の使用のECCビットのキーサイズに傾向がECCの選択肢で行くにRSAおよびDHを放棄した、いわゆる "独自の暗号化製品"のを発見した。

しかしそこにある楕円曲線の周りに多くの混乱は、いくつかの暗号のものを評価する際に、自分の姿を確認するために、非暗号経験のあるユーザのために困難に異なる名前とキーサイズの多くの。

そう拡散混乱するので、私は使用するための最良のECC暗号化曲線と右のECCキーサイズであるかを調べるために私自身の分析を行うことにしました。

この分析は、すでにいくつかの規格とセキュリティプロトコルで撮影さまざまな選択肢をまとめ、年間に行われている数学と暗号分析の考慮事項を残し、さまざまな曲線とキーサイズのうち、セキュリティ業界ベースの選択肢を提供したいと思います。

最初の結論。

私の分析からのみ次のECC曲線が異なる当局から選ばつだけ(ANSI、NSA、SAG、NIST、ECC BrainPool)、異なるセキュリティプロトコル規格(IPSecの、OpenPGPの、ZRTP、あるため、暗号化システムで使用するために考慮されるべきであるケルベロス、SSL / TLS)、唯一のマッチングNSAスイートBセキュリティ要件(事実上のNATO軍の環境のためにも、標準):

  • 楕円総理曲線256ビット- P-256
  • 楕円総理曲線384ビット- P-384

オプションで、ちょうどより多くのキーサイズのビットを取得したいことは本当に被害妄想のために、依然として有用であると考えていない:

  • 楕円総理曲線521ビット- P-521

私は、彼らが暗号解析的活性に十分な保証を持っていないと効果的にそのまま(283分の163/571分の409) 防御法曲線を任意のキーサイズは、 避けるべきであることを明記したいと思います:

  • Not part of NSA Suite-B cryptography selection
  • Not part of ECC Brainpool selection
  • Not part of ANSI X9.62 selection
  • Not part of OpenPGP ECC extension selection
  • Not part of Kerberos extension for ECC curve selection

I invite the reader to follow trough my analysis to understand the fundamentals that could be understood even without deep technical background but at least with a good technological background a some basic bit of cryptography.

Here we go with the analysis
 

My goal is to make an analysis on what/how the open scientific and security community choose ECC crypto system for usage in security protocols and standards defined by IETF RFC (the ones who define Internet Standards in a open and peer-reviewed way).

Below a set of RFC introducing ECC into existing system that get analyzed to understand what's better to use and what's better to exclude:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Standard Curves & Curve Generation
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B in in Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Determining Strengths For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys
  • RFC5349 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Support for Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP voice encryption by Philip Zimmermann ECC curve
  • ECC in OpenPGP (draft d raft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 )
  • は、Microsoftによって選択されたECC曲線スマートケルベロスログイン

私達は私達の評価の一部を行うために、インターネットセキュリティプロトコルを定義する科学者によって行われた選択肢を使用します。
さらに、それはカーブ選択はスキップするものを使用するとどのような産業に伝えるために、カーブの独自の選択をした別の当局から来ていることを理解する必要があります。

私達は私達の評価の一部を行うために標準化機関におけるセキュリティ要件を定義する科学者によって行われた選択肢を使用します。
さらに、ほとんどの人が何かを知らないが、それは我々の分析に非常に関連性のあること、ECC曲線暗号、それはカーブの種類によって異なっている彼らの "サイズ"の異なる種類があるということです。

  • 素体上のECC曲線(しばしば楕円曲線と呼ばれており、P-キーサイズで表されている)
  • バイナリフィールド上のECC曲線(しばしば防御法カーブと呼ばれ、K-キーサイズで表されている)

我々はECC 521総理曲線と同等の強度と防御法カーブを参照しているECC 571を読んだとき同等のセキュリティ強度を考えると楕円曲線とKoblizカーブは、例えば、異なるキーサイズを持っている。

楕円曲線とKotbliz曲線間の強度の比較は(から以下に報告されるマイキーECCインターネットドラフト ):

 |防御法| ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521​​ | 15360

以下のすべての様々な主体とそれぞれの名前(904によって選択されたすべての曲線の比較はありTLSのECCの使用のためにIETF RFC4492 ):

別の標準化団体によって選ばれた曲線名
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 ​​| | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

何がすぐに表示すると、すべての権限が選択した2つだけの曲線があることであり、唯一の一般3当局間で合意ANSI.Theによって防御法曲線の投棄一般があることは、次の2つのECC曲線以下のとおりです。

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

TLSのECC曲線のものの選択のRFC5430は完全に防御法曲線をスキップしてのみ使用するために選択:

  • P-256、P-384、P-521

ECC Brainpoolは完全に防御法曲線をスキップして、次の使用ECC曲線に対して選択:

  • P-160、P-192、P-224、P-256、P-320、P-384、P-512( それはP-521が、P-512、によって参照キーサイズだけではないので、特定のだからECC brainpool。TNXイアン·シモンズアテナSCS )

PGP DでECCを使用するためのOpenPGPインターネットドラフトラフトjivsov-のOpenPGP-ECC-06は完全に防御法曲線をスキップして、次のECC曲線を選択

  • P-256、P-384、P-521

The Kerberos protocol extension for ECC use, defined in RFC5349 and defined by Microsoft for smartcard logon skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

So, sounds clear that the right selection of ECC is for P-256, P-384 and P-521 while the Koblitz curve have been skipped for Top Secret use and for any security sensitive protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS).

Why i made this analysis?

I have done this analysis following a discussion i had regarding certain voice encryption products, all based on custom and proprietary protocols, that are all using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571 / 571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits .
All them are using the K-571 that, as described before, has been removed from all security sensitive environment and protocols and being myself a designer of voice encryption stuff i think that their cryptographic choice is absolutely not the best security choice.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz elliptic curve are faster than the top secret enabled prime elliptic curve and so give the product manager a chance to provide “more bit” in it's own product while keeping the key exchange fast.

It's a matter of philosophical choice.

I prefer to follow the trend of scientific community with the humility of not to considering myself a cryptographic expert, knowledgable more than the overall security and scientific community itself.

I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
I prefer to count the amount of brains working on the crypto i use, that check that's really secure, that evaluate whether there's some weakness.

The number of brais working on Crypto widely diffused are of order of magnitude more than the number of brains working on crypto used by just few people (like Koblitz curve).
So i am not demonizing who use ECDH 571 using Koblitz Curve, but for sure i can affirm that they did not taken the best choice in terms of security and that any security professionals doing a security benchmarking would consider the fact that Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit done with Koblitz Curve is not widely diffused, it's dumped from standard security protocols and it's not certified for top secret use.

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ESSOR, European Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.

That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.

In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .

We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)

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Product management and organization

I had to better understand the concepts, roles and duties related to Product management and Product marketing management in software companies, why are needed, which are the differences and how they fit inside an organization structure.

Most person i know never interested into this specific area of work, but when you want to be a product company (and not a consulting or solution company), you start having different products on different platforms for different target customers sold trough different channels with different pricing with a installation/different delivery process and that complexity must be managed in the proper way.

You realize that in order to let the product company grow in the right direction you need to organize product management activities formally, not closing your mind in rigid organization roles such as Marketing, Sales, R&D.

When we speak about Product Management i recommend the reading of the illuminating The strategic role of Product Management (How a market-driven focus leads companies to build products people want to buy) that clarify a lot of things, even if it outlook net separation of roles in product management, something t hat’s too heavy for a small company like a startup .

Still it provide a differentiation of duties between Product Management and Product Marketing .

A good understanding of the product management related to startup i s given in the article Creating Product Management at Startup showing up different case related to the roles of the product visionary into the company.

It introduce the terms ceo of the product in the sense that the product management duties jump around into the various organization function by providing focus and effort where it's needed, independently from the fact that the internal function requiring more effort is Development, Marketing, Sales or Communication. That's means practically enhancing the product vision as it's needed across all major product-related functions making the vision corporate-wide coherent.

A good representation of product management and product marketing activities is well described with the differentiation of between Strategical, Technical and Marketing sector and is not clearly separated between Management, Marketing(and Sales) and R&D :

Triad.jpg

I read that product manager background and knowledge are different depending on the company focus ( where does product management belong in the organization? ):

  • B2C -> Marketing experience
  • B2B -> Technical experience

An illuminating (for me) and very important differentiation regarding product management duties is the differentiation between:

  • Product Management
  • Product Marketing

The specific duties belonging to Product Marketing vs Management are greatly explained in Role Definitions For Product Management and Product Marketing that i suggest to read, letting you to better define tasks and responsibilities across your organization. It also provide a good definition of job requirements if you need to look for that figure!

At the same time it's important to understand what's NOT product management, effectively Product management is not just feature prioritization .

At the same time it's important to understand which professional figure is NOT itself a product manager:

  • Product manager is not a marketing manager – while product management is usually seen as a marketing discipline, marketers are focused on the marketing plan and are usually not driving the overall product direction. In that context could however be found Product marketing manager that's the arms of the marketing of the product, especially in small organization.
  • Product manager is not a sales manager – sales manager are about finding out how to sell a product, following which sales methodology, technique and channels and they could drive the company from a market oriented company ( product) to a customer oriented company (solution and consulting)
  • Product manager is not a developer – Developers are focused on the technology and not the overall product. Some great product managers are former developers, but it is difficult to do both at once. There is a natural tension between developers and product managers that should be maintained to create a balanced product.
  • Product manager is not a software manager – the software manager is a functional manager and usually not focused on the product or the customers.
  • Product manager is not a project manager – project managers are about how and when, while the product manager is about what. Project managers work closely with product managers to ensure successful completion of different phases in the product life cycle.

The typical product management activities could be in extreme synthesis summarized as follow:

  • Strategy: Planning a product strategy
  • Technical: leading product developments
  • Marketing: providing product and technical content
  • Sales: provide pre sales support and work effectively with sales

Product management so it's not precisely development, is not precisely marketing, it's not precisely sales, so typically it's difficult to identify “where it should stay” inside the organization structure (it's even difficult to understand that's needed)?

The Silicon Valley Product Group provide a nice insight on Product Organization Structure by pointing out which are the advantages and risks of several choices. Still the Cranky Product Manager say that It doesn't matter where the product manager live in the organization .

It's relevant to be careful not to have persons that are too much technical or too much sales oriented in order to fill the gap among different organization. Too much fragmentation of assigned duties across the organization may lead to bureaucracy, too much duties on one person may lead to ineffective implementation of needed tasks in some area and to a internal competition perception respect to the traditional roles.

Check there a very nice Resume of a professional with practical experience in product management (it's an half techie/half marketing guys).

ああ! Another very common misunderstanding is to confuse marketing with communication where ai found a so good definition of Marketing that i really like and understand for strict relationship with Product Management:

Marketing is know the market so well that the product sell itself

But what happen when you don't handle a product management and product marketing management process in a defined way?

A nice story is shown as example in The strategic role of Product Management :

Your founder, a brilliant technician, started the company years ago when he quit his day job to market his idea full time. He created a product that he just knew other people needed. そして、彼は正しかった。 Pretty soon he delivered enough of the product and hired his best friend from college as VP of Sales. And the company grew. But before long, the VP of Sales complained, “We're an engineering-led company. We need to become customer-driven.” And that sounded fine. Except… every new contract seemed to require custom work. You signed a dozen clients in a dozen market segments and the latest customer's voice always dominated the product plans. You concluded that “customer-driven” meant “driven by the latest customer” and that couldn't be right.

If you want to be a product company it's relevant to precisely follow a strategy driven by product marketing and management and not by sales.

Confusion between duties of product management/marketing and sales could lead to unsuccessful product company that are not able to proceed within their strategy, simply because they getting opportunities that drive the business out-of-scope.

A product company must invest in it's own product development and marketing in order to let sales activity stay focused and guarantee that the organization is every day more effective on the market.

After this reading, my understanding is that it's relevant to identify how to create a set of flexible business process on how to handle various product management and product marketing duties separating them from sales.

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リモートSNOM VoIP電話を傍受

私は読書を示唆リモートVoIP電話をタップで" VoIPセキュリティアライアンスによってブログショーンMerdinger 。

現在のテレフォニーインフラストラクチャは、サイバー攻撃を受けやすくなっている方法についての具体的な例。

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音声通信のセキュリティワークショップ

こんにちは、

私はとの興味深い情報交換後にトレント大学の音声通信のセキュリティ技術についての話をした暗号ラボ教授管理マッシサラを 。

いくつかの分野で慣れる様々な音声の暗号化技術の革新的な分類があるように私は、興味を持った人がそれを読むことを示唆している、特に第二部。

私はその分類は、次の暗号化を表明することは通常一各-他の絶対に無関係であるが、実質的に、彼らはすべて適用される技術に関する広範な概要を提供することで、説明し、この断片化され、広く技術セクターから外に出てみました:

  • モバイルTLC産業音声暗号化標準
  • 政府と軍の音声暗号化標準
  • 公共の安全音声暗号化標準
  • IETF音声暗号化標準
  • その他、独自の音声暗号化技術

それは巨大slideware、122スライドだが、私はすでに、2009年の私のプレゼンテーションでカバー傍受技術の概要をスキップ2番目の部分を読んで行くことを示唆している。

音声通信のセキュリティ

特に私はスネークオイル暗号コンセプトに、いくつかの技術革新を提供したいチョコレートグレードの暗号化の概念が好きです。

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

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27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

We come in peace

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

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GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

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Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

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Web2.0 privacy leak in Mobile apps

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! OK! 私も同感! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

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AES algorithm selected for use in space

私はそれが最高の宇宙船や機器によって宇宙での使用に適していた暗号化アルゴリズムの分析及び検討に関する素敵な紙が発生しました。

論文はによって行われてきたスペース·データ·システムのための諮問委員会その累積処理以上の周りのすべての宇宙機関のコンソーシアムの空間に400ミッション 。

topban.jpg

紙読む暗号化アルゴリズム貿易調査 、それが別の暗号化アルゴリズムの間に興味深い考察と比較を与えるように。

明らかに、最後に選択されたアルゴリズムであるAES KASUMIは(UMTSネットワークで使用される)を回避しながら、。

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ブラックベリーのセキュリティと暗号化:悪魔か天使?

ブラックベリーは、あなたがそれを見てどの角度から応じ、彼のセキュリティ機能に関して、良い面と悪い評判を持っている。

それがはるかにRIMとBlackberryなどのポジションを取ることなく、読者にGET絵をできるように情報のセットをまとめているこのポストは非常に安全なプラットフォームまたは極めて危険な1、ビューのポイントに応じて、考えることができます。

bblock.jpg

レッツに載っている。

片側ブラックベリー上では暗号化機能、どこでもセキュリティ機能は、暗号化されたデバイス(カスタム暗号付き)、暗号化通信(とのプラットフォームのたくさんのカスタム独自のプロトコルなどIPPPなど)は、非常に優れたセキュリティの詳細設定から暗号化フレームワークのCerticom ( 今が所有RIM )。

反対側では、それらはBIS(と呼ばれる唯一のデバイスが、オーバーレイアクセスネットワーク、提供していないブラックベリーインターネットサービスを閲覧またはblackberry.net APを使用してcheckmailながらあなたのブラックベリーが入るグローバル世界的な広域ネットワークです)、。

あなた、またはアプリケーションの場合は、あなただけのキャリアのインターネット接続でインターネットに接続していないが、あなたがそのようにするプロキシと行為RIMのネットワーク内に入っているblackberry.netの APN使ってインターネットに到達するためのゲートウェイを。

BBデバイスと企業がBESの一種とし ​​て機能するRIMのネットワークに接続する両方:あなたは企業の利用がある場合に非常に同じことが起こるのVPN濃度ネットワークを 。

だから、基本的にすべての通信は、セット独自の暗号化および通信プロトコルで暗号化された形式でトラフRIMサービスインフラストラクチャを渡ります。

Just as a notice, think that google to provide gtalk over blackberry.net APN, made an agreement in order to offer service inside the BB network to the BB users. When you install gtalk you get added 3 service books that point to GTALKNA01 that's the name of GTALK gateway inside the RIM network to allow intra-BIS communication and act as a GTALK gateway to the internet.

The mobile operators usually are not even allowed to inspect the traffic between the Blackberry device and the Blackberry Network.

So RIM and Blackberry are somehow unique for their approach as they provide a platform, a network and a service all bundled together and you cannot just “get the device and the software” but the user and the corporate are always bound and connected to the service network.

That's good and that's bad, because it means that RIM provide extremely good security features and capabilities to protect information, device and access to information at various level against third party .

But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

乾杯

ファビオPietrosanti(ナイーフ)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

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Celebrating “Hackers” after 25 years

A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

201007010924.jpg

It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.

http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html 
Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.
O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.
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Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

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Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

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China Encryption Regulations

こんにちはすべて、

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

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IOScat – a Port of Netcat to Cisco IOS

A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

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The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

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Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

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Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

ここに私の読むモバイルセキュリティにスライド 。

スライドがモバイルセキュリティ関連事項の広い綿密な概要を提供し、私はそれがオーディオにも置くことについていくつかのSlideCastのをやるべき。 多分多分、ありませんでしょう、それは常に不足して、リソースの時間に依存します。

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iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

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Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

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Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

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FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

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great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

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Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

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SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).

  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:
  • surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

    surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

    Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

    How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

    It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

    Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

    Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

    I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

    よろしく、

    Fabio Pietrosanti

    ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. お楽しみに。

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    Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

    Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

    I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

    今度はそれを確認、それはSecurStar GmbH社の偽の独立したハッカーのセキュリティ研究、そのちょうどマーケティングのトリックです!

    どのように我々はInfosecurityguard.com、偽の独立したセキュリティ研究は、Se​​curStar GmbH社からマーケティングのトリックであることを知っていますか?

    1)私は上のその記事に私のブログへのリンクがhttp://infosecurityguard.comに投稿するためにコメントを投稿しました防衛認証israelian省庁

    2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog https://infosecurity.ch

    3)私のブログに到達する彼は217.7.213.59を (私はちょうどWordPressの統計インタフェースからクリックした場所)に来ていた、そこからIPアドレスを漏洩

    4) はhttp:// 217.7.213.59/panelでSecurStar社企業PBXのIP PBXインターフェイス(公然到達トラフインターネット!)がある

    5)内部PBXの名前は、それがSecurStar社だということは100%を確認してください。

    6)http://infosecurityguard.comの匿名のハッカーがSecurStar GmbH社からのものであることを100%の証拠がある

    Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

    Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

    The http referral tricks

    あなたは、ウェブサイトから誰かが別のウェブページに行くされているページからあなたを伝えるHTTPプロトコルヘッダ、 "紹介"は、そこにある別のに行くのリンクを読んだとき。

    The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

    それは、ログエントリです:

    217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

    The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

    The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

    ここSecurStar社の連中がしている彼らのフォーラム投稿があり一緒にIPCOPfirewall&アスタリスクをデバッグする IP 217.7.213.59がある場合には(そう、我々は、彼らが使用しているもののことも詳細を参照のこと)。

    SecurStarproof.png

    それはまた、本当に楽しいです!

    They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

    I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. : - >

    They measured their marketing activity

    Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. それはあなたのマーケティングキャンペーンにお金を投資する場合は、結果が:-)を見たいと思って、合理的だ

    彼らは、私のブログに到達し、私は彼らの検索をログに記録:

    infosecurityguard+cryptophone

    infosecurityguard +ゴールドロック

    217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010:2時22分42秒-0700] 200 31057 "HTTP/1.0 GET /" “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

    217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010:4時15分07秒-0700] "GET HTTP/1.0 "200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


    The domain registration data

    ドメインは不誠実マーケティングキャンペーンを準備を開始するためにわずか2ヶ月、2009年12月1日に登録されている:

    ドメイン名:INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

    Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

    更新日:01-DEC-2009

    作成日:01-DEC-2009

    ドメインは、プライバシー保護トラフのwhoisプライバシーサービスを匿名でされています。

    管理者連絡先: プライベート、登録INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM @ domainsbyproxy.com、プロキシによってドメイン株式会社DomainsByProxy.com

    Notraxハッカーは、Google上に存在しません
    As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
    彼らが考えるように私たちを望んでいた偽のハッカーが独立したブログを書いていたことはGoogleで任意のトレースを持っていない。 Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
    Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

    The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

    Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

    あなたが想像できるように、独立した製品評価のいずれかの種類では、すべての製品の商品と悪い点があります。 No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

    They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

    彼らは完全に製品の暗号とセキュリティについて話すことを避けた。

    彼らは、誰もが彼らがPhoneCryptを構築における基本的なセキュリティ·ルールに従っていないことを見てみましょうしないために、products.Thatさんのようなものでなければならない基本的なセキュリティ機能を評価されていません。
    技術は、ソース、アルゴリズムとプロトコルにない透明性を閉じている、ないピアは私の新しい比較を(ビューの基本的な暗号化要件の観点から)review.Readない音声の暗号分析(基準、エラーと異なる結果)について 。
    結果は彼らのものより何とか異なります。

    UPDATE:ウィルフリードハフナー(SecurStar創設者)は誰ですか?

    I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

    彼はされたテレフォニー関連の詐欺のために1997年に逮捕された 115万USDのローカル電話会社トラフblueboxingに損害を引き起こしテレフォニー詐欺254.000 USDから収益(Phrack第2回の記事を確認してください)。

    彼はフリーキングや他のハッカーとの接続の喜びのために "Blueboxing"をやっていませんでしたが、お金を稼ぐために。

    1997年の利益のためにハッキング(とは楽しみのために)...ブルブルッ.... No hacker's ethic at all!

    All in all, is that lawful?

    Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
    Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. の例では英国広告における開業医の英国の研究所 -に準拠した不公正取引規制から消費者保護には -との判決を下した:

    "虚偽の主張やトレーダーは彼の貿易、ビジネス、技術や職業に関連する目的のために行動し、あるいは消費者として誤って自分自身を表現されていないという印象作成" 犯罪です 。

    We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

    IANAL、誰かが刑事告訴を提起したり、SecurStar GmbH社に対する不当な競争のために民事訴訟を開始した場合、私は苺されないであろう。
    Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

    、紳士を試して...しかし、次回は、ちょうど(彼らのためかどうか、 "右"や"正直な方法で、"私は、彼らが選択できるようになる"ファッションに巻き込まれるべきではない"という意味) "右のそれを行うニース

    ファビオPietrosanti(ナイーフ)

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    Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

    I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

    SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

    It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

    It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

    It's unfair competition in the security market.

    Let's make some more important consideration on this.

    Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

    When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

    If you do bad crypto people could die.

    If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

    You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

    Security research need reference and transparency

    Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
    Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

    Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

    Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

    If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

    If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

    Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

    Consideration on the authority of the information online

    That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

    However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

    What they have done is already illegal in UK

    SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

    ファビオPietrosanti(ナイーフ)

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    About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

    This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
    This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
    Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

    Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
    Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

    But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
    - it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
    - they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
    - they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

    However a lot of important website reported it:

    This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

    I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

    The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

    Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
    Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

    Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
    But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
    Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

    a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

    A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

    In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
    Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
    Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
    Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
    Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
    Precise details are:
    • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
    • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
    • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

    Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
    It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
    If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

    Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
    Cerias Purdue University tell this .

    b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

    In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
    That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
    A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
    That's called “peer review”.

    If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
    Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

    How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
    IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
    Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
    Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

    c – Closed source cryptography does not work

    As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
    There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
    Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

    Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

    Google release opensource crypto toolkit
    Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
    Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

    Another cryptographic point of view

    I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

    When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
    It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

    To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

    Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
    Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed はい
    CellCrypt Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public はい
    Gold-Lock Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    Illix Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    No1.BC Obscurity No public review
    Closed
    はい
    PhoneCrypt Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    Rode&Swarz Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    Secure-Voice Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    SecuSmart Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    SecVoice Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    SegureGSM Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    SnapCell Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    Tripleton Obscurity
    No public review
    Closed
    はい
    Zfone Transparency Public review
    Open はい
    ZRTP Transparency Public review
    Open はい

    *Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

    * Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
    That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

    However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
    I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

    But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
    Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

    Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

    The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

    I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

    Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
    Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

    • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
    • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
    • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

    No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

    Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

    The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
    For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
    On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

    That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
    It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
    If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

    On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

    The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

    PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
    なぜですか?
    Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
    Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
    The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
    どう ​​やって?
    I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

    a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
    In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
    What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
    It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
    Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
    That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
    They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
    b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
    In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
    What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
    Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
    Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
    The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
    They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
    Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

    Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

    I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
    The only “software version” in competition with:

    – SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
    – rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

    Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

    Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

    アプリケーション Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
    PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
    CellCrypt 0 2 0
    GoldLock 1 2 0

    It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

    Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

    But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
    If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

    Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

    アプリケーション Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
    PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
    CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
    GoldLock 9 0 8 1

    Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
    Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
    From their website Positive Marketing feedback
    Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
    Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
    PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
    Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
    Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
    A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
    UI Positive Marketing feedback
    Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
    Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
    Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
    From their website Negative Marketing feedback
    Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
    Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
    16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
    DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
    Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
    Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
    Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
    Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
    Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
    Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
    From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
    A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
    Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
    Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
    Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
    Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
    My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
    Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
    Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
    Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
    Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
    Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
    The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

    Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
    No single good point. Strange?
    All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

    Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

    SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
    Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

    They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
    Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

    They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

    The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

    “This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

    Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
    It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

    Who is the hacker notrax?

    It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
    Read about his bio:

    ¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

    There are no information about this guy on google.
    Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
    For notrax, nothing is available.

    Additionally let's look at the domain…
    The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
    The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

    What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

    Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

    Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

    Social consideration

    If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

    You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

    Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

    ファビオPietrosanti(ナイーフ)

    ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
    pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

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