分類存檔: 隱私

RFC 6189:ZRTP是最後一個標準!

最後ZRTP已經分配的官方RFC分配, RFC6189 ZRTP:單播安全RTP媒體路徑的關鍵協議。

它作為依賴與AES密鑰大小為256位,現在已經被定義為RFC6188 SRTP

請參閱RFC終於發布了,這是令人興奮,因為它是一個重要的里程碑,作為官方標準的終端到終端加密很像PGP已經電子郵件設置ZRTP 。

現在,任何組織將正式在世界上能夠實現終端到終端的協議的語音加密ZRTP

目前有3種不同的公共實現ZRTP協議存在:

他們每個人都提供了不同的功能的協議,但最重要的是已知的可互操作的。

新一波即將進入一個灰色地帶,其中大部分公司做手機加密系統已實現自定義加密語音加密的世界,irrupting。

現在標準已經建立和留下來實施不同的東西,有幾個原因。

自由一台先生 齊默爾曼和所有社區公司(如PrivateWave )和個人(如維爾納·迪特曼 )工作!

今天,它是偉大的一天,這種技術現在是官方,也與現有的多個實施!

菲利普,你做一遍,我讚美你純粹的精神和決心:-)

共享

在弗賴堡大學為GSM進展開裂

移動協議(GSM,GSM-R,TETRA,UMTS等)的精彩世界黑客得到官方的大學研究活動。

開源代碼發布破解軟件的投資,使大學學生工作,提高做強大的科研機會。

弗賴堡大學剛剛發布了隨著一個支持gsmframencoder工具的GSM A5 / 1加密實戰演練 ,以提高嗅探,解碼和開裂的過程。

打開硬件,開放軟件,開放協議表現出什麼樣的的專有方法或工藝打造通信和安全技術的弱點。

嘗試打開和打擊任何形式的專有和封閉的技術,迫使該行業僅在設計電信協議的互操作和開放的態度,而它的目標應該是任何科學家。

共享

我的TOR出口節點試圖過濾掉嘈雜的交通經驗

今年年初,我決定,運行TOR出口節點,所以我帶來了VPS在hetzner.de (因為他們被列為一個好TOR ISP )設置一個每秒100Mbit /出口節點與暱稱privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch的首款1TB的月度數據,然後10兆/秒平的連接。

它也可以運行TOR2WEB軟件在http://tor.infosecurity.ch

我所建議的運行出口節點以最小的騷擾,並準備了一個濫用響應模板設置退出政策

在第一天,我一直在運行的節點i立即收到DMCA抱怨由於點對點交通。

所以我決定來過濾一些P2P流量使用OpenDPI的iptables模塊和DMCA抱怨自動消失:

的iptables-A OUTPUT-M opendpi電驢gadugadu FastTrack網絡GNUTELLA的DirectConnect,BitTorrent的WinMX的Soulseek的-J拒絕

然後,因為我是意大利人,我決定,以避免我的Tor節點連接到意大利的互聯網地址空間,以減少的機會,一個愚蠢的檢察官會醒來我在早晨,因為不明白,我運行一個Tor節點。

我試過了,的幫助的hellais寫了一個腳本來使退出政策拒絕聲明 ,拒絕上引發IOError blockfinder的所有意大利保留的網段,但是我們發現的torrc配置文件與+1000線的TOR崩潰。

我們去開出罰單報告關於我們國家試圖阻止TOR出口政策墜毀,並發現了類似的嘗試 ,我們貢獻,但它似乎仍然是一個開放的問題。

得出的結論是,這是不可能的,使在清潔和禮貌的方式,所以我決定去骯髒的方式,通過使用iptables的/ geoip的國家退出政策TOR出口節點。 戰鬥後,使其正確編譯,這是一行iptables來阻止意大利流量:

的iptables-A OUTPUT-P tcp-M的態-態NEW-M geoip的DST-CC-J REJECT

現在從我的退出節點意大利網絡沒有連接完成,我是安全的反對可能是愚蠢的檢察官不理解職責範圍(TOR節點的所有IP地址申請前我有一個例外)。

其他一些天之後,我開始接收抱怨由於源於我的Tor節點的端口掃描活動。

我想從我自己的角度來看,支持匿名的網絡,而不是匿名黑客企圖,所以我要過濾的端口掃描和攻擊源於我node.That一個複雜的問題,需要一定的研究,所以在此期間,我安裝scanlogd的嗤之以鼻,因為我想評估多少攻擊,這樣的攻擊都從我TOR出口節點。
後,我會盡量安排某種過濾,以確保能夠篩選出主要攻擊。
對於什麼相關的端口掃描,似乎有沒有公開的的傳出端口掃描工具來檢測和過濾,但過濾傳入​​端口掃描,所以可能會需要寫的東西特設。
我會把事情進展如何,是否會有一些不錯的snort的直列光波的方式選擇性地過濾出主要攻擊企圖從我的退出節點的方式來實現。

我的目標是保持出​​口節點運行在長期(至少1TB的流量,每個月捐獻給TOR)涉及到ISP的努力,減少抱怨,並試圖盡我所能,合理的負債運行的退出節點。

共享

TETRA黑客:OsmocomTETRA

這是非常令人興奮地看到釋放的OsmocomTETRA ,第一開源SDR( 軟件定義無線電 )實現TETRA解調器,PHY和MAC層較低。

這是TETRA版本,解鎖訪問的TETRA通信協議的數據幀的GSM airprobe的 ,從而使偉大的黑客攻擊的機會!

TETRA技術現在也已經開了,我們應該想到,在這個2011年,看到開源TETRA嗅探器,並最有可能TEA加密(利加密算法)破獲!

TETRA是由警察,應急服務和軍隊作為一種替代的移動通信網絡,可以工作,即使沒有網絡覆蓋(僅移動手機沒有基站)的可用性,並提供了一些特殊的高可用性服務。

我寫的關於TETRA在我的幻燈片主要語音安全協議的審查

在OsmocomBB郵件列表中有已經討論一些TETRA網絡狀態:

  • 比利時阿斯特麗德警方TETRA網絡:加密的
  • 德國警方測試TETRA網絡在亞琛:未加密
  • 一些前TETRA網絡:加密的jugoslawia
  • 荷蘭C200 TETRA網絡:TEA2靜態密鑰加密
  • 英國Airwave的TETRA網絡:TEA2與TEA2加密

這將是很有趣地看到,新的警察和救援服務的黑客回來從舊的模擬時代到新的數字無線電:-)

共享

卓格,新的C + +和Java ZRTP實現公開發行

大家好,今天, 我在哪裡首席技術官語音通信的隱私保護和信息安全技術開發 公司,主要 從事 意大利Italia SpA的PrivateWave, 我們 釋放卓格,ZRTP一個新的開源協議的實施可從http://www下載。 zrtp.org

ZRTP [1]提供端至結束橢圓曲線Diffie-384Bit的赫爾曼和AES-256 SRTP加密與密鑰交換。

卓格原本已經制定並實施PrivateWave的PrivateGSM語音加密產品可用於下列平台:黑莓,諾基亞和iOS(iPhone)。

卓格C + +已經集成了PJSIP的開源VoIP的SDK [2]和它的提供一體 ​​化對PJSIP 1.8.5補丁。 它已經過測試在iPhone,塞班,Windows,Linux和Mac OS X的

卓格Java已經被集成的一個定制版本MJSIP內[3]在黑莓平台上的開源的SDK,它包括內存使用需要優化,以減少在最低的垃圾收集活動。

這兩個平台已分離和模塊化的加密後端加密算法實現的,可以很容易地與其他的交換。

. 卓格授權下的GNU AGPL上github上 https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG的 源代碼是可用。

我們發布在開源和我們的安全方法的一致性[4]我們真的希望它可以是有用的開源生態系統,創建新的語音加密系統,以支持言論自由。

超過20個基於PJSIP開源的VoIP加密軟件和一些Java編寫的,可以直接受益於卓格釋放。

我們將很高興收到合作的建議,新的整合,新的加密後端,錯誤偵察和任何有用的改善,讓ZRTP肯定語音加密標準。

卓格有http://www.zrtp.org

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org的
[4]安全的方法: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

共享

加密移動座機電話與Asterisk 1.8

我們剛剛發布了一份技術HOWTO 如何建立抵押移動座機VoIP基礎設施

像這樣的會在未來幾週別人HOWTO使用其他服務器平台,如FreeSWITCH的透明度,並充分利用開源安全技術的所有的精神。

共享

PrivateGSM:黑莓/ iPhone /諾基亞移動語音加密ZRTP或SRTP / SDES

我絕對避免用我自己的個人博客,使任何一種產品的推廣。

那個時候,它是沒有什麼不同,但我想告訴你,我的工作沒有花哨的營銷產品的事實,但堅持技術。

今天,我在哪裡, 首席技術官和共同創始人 PrivateWave ,我們公開發布的黑莓,iPhone和諾基亞手機的VoIP加密的產品:

  • 有史以來第一次黑莓加密的VoIP ZRTP -的PrivateGSM VoIP專業
  • 有史以來第一次iPhone的加密VoIP ZRTP -的PrivateGSM VoIP專業
  • 有史以來第一次黑莓加密VoIP客戶端與SRTP SDES密鑰交換通過SIP / TLS -的 PrivateGSM VoIP企業

標誌privatewave colore.png的

在PrivateWave我們使用了不同的方法對於大多數語音加密公司,在那裡,閱讀我們的方法的安全性

此產品的相關技術和產業景觀可概括如下:

  • 它是第一款語音加密公司只使用標準安全協議(我們預計市場將作出反應,因為它清楚專有的高科技,來自懲教署的遺產不能提供相同的值)
  • 語音加密功能,這是第一種方法只使用開源的標準加密引擎
  • 它是第一款語音加密的方法來使用不同的技術,提供不同的安全模式(終端到終端的ZRTP結束到站點SRTP

這些移動安全客戶端套件,專為專業的安全使用,只使用最好的電信和安全技術,以及在惡劣的網絡條件下也具有良好的性能,提供了高程度的保護:

這些應用程序是:

ICONA pgsm.png的

支持的移動設備有:

關於ZRTP我們決定壓力和伸展的一些小的補充協議與所有安全和偏執的功能:

我們嚴格的地址簿集成,超越ZRTP RFC 規範這可能是手機,因為用戶的行為不看手機屏幕上使用時容易受到某些攻擊。

ZRTP減輕這種條件我們paranoy的方式,我們會寫和/或將添加RFC列入具體細節。

有些話在 PrivateGSM專業終端到終端加密與ZRTP

閱讀技術表

下載請點擊這裡,只是把你的電話號碼

這些更多的結果,我非常熟練的工作人員(16人曾在這6個項目3個不同的平台)上辛勤工作在艱難的經營環境(骯髒的移動網絡和骯髒的移動操作系統)的具有挑戰性的技術(語音加密)超過2年。

我感到非常自豪,我們的工作人員!

接下來是什麼?

在接下來的幾個星期,你會看到釋放重大一套單證,如整合FreeSWITCH的星號,並啟用其他安全交換機,以及其他一些令人興奮的安全技術新聞,我相信會注意到;)

它一直是一個艱苦的工作和更多有許多工作要做,但我深信,此類產品的安全性和開源社區會喜歡和透明的做法,也與開放的重要發布和開放源碼的集成,使一個非常政治中立的(後門)技術。

共享

一對夫婦很好的VPN供應商

有很多的原因,為什麼人會需要訪問互聯網低谷的VPN。

例如,如果你生活在一個國家阻止某些內容(如抗地方政府網站,色情等)和/或協議(如SKYPE,VOIP),你可能會想使用移動互聯網連接之外討厭阻斷國加密的VPN隧道。

我評估了幾種託管的VPN服務器,聽起來相當不錯的一對夫婦,他們之間的廣泛發行等服​​務:

SwissVPN

退出從瑞士到互聯網。

成本6 CHF /月

可選公眾固定的IP地址

有用的,如果你需要:

  • 只要繞過當地國家過濾器具有良好的帶寬
  • 公開公共服務,通過VPN與可選的固定公網IP地址。

表演過火

退出到互聯網20個不同國家(每次連接時)之間進行選擇。

有用的,如果你需要做的:

  • 對競爭對手的商業智能(出現連接時,它們來自X國)
  • 看電影/電視片只允許從國家知識產權web空間
  • 不同國家之間,看到谷歌的結果

共享

並不是每一個橢圓曲線ECC的安全性是一樣的:低谷

 我自己的的ECC曲線的安全性和選擇分析

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

大多數現代加密使用橢圓曲線加密(ECC),一個較小的密鑰大小並降低計算能力,傳統的密碼系統被稱為DH(的Diffie-Hellman)或RSA(Rivest,Shamir和艾德曼 )給予同等安全強度。

不是每個人都知道,未來任何應用程序的加密和TLS / SSL(加密用於固定網絡),即使是移動ECC ECC加密被選中。

我發現很多所謂的“專有加密產品”放棄了RSA和DH帶ECC的替代品,甚至沒有指定哪一種ECC加密習慣,往往會隨心所欲地使用ECC位密鑰大小。

不過有一個很多圍繞橢圓曲線的混亂,有很多不同的名稱和密鑰大小非加密有經驗的用戶很難使自己的數字進行評估時,一些加密的東西。

由於擴散混亂,我決定把我自己的分析,找出哪些是最好的ECC加密曲線和使用正確的ECC密鑰大小。

這種分析想提供安全行業選擇,在各種曲線和密鑰大小,離開數學和密碼分析的考慮,已年期間已經完成,總結在一些標準和安全協議採取的各種選擇。

首先的結論。

從我分析只有以下的的ECC曲線是在加密系統中使用,因為要考慮的唯一一個選擇在不同的部門(ANSI,NSA,凹陷,NIST,ECC BrainPool),不同的安全協議標準(IPSEC,OpenPGP的,ZRTP Kerberos驗證,SSL / TLS)和唯一一個匹配NSA Suite B的安全要求(事實上的標準也為北約的軍事環境):

  • 橢圓總理曲線256位- P-256
  • 的橢圓總理曲線384位- P-384

與可選的,就真的偏執,想要得到更多的密鑰大小位,仍然不認為是有用的:

  • 橢圓總理曲線521位- P-521

我想聲明Koblitz曲線應該是可以避免的 ,在任何關鍵尺寸(163/283/409/571),因為他們不具備足夠的保修加密分析活動,有效地:

  • 不屬於NSA套件B加密選擇
  • 不屬於ECC的Brainpool選擇
  • 不屬於ANSI X9.62選擇
  • 不屬於OpenPGP的ECC擴展選擇
  • 不屬於的Kerberos擴展ECC曲線選擇

我請讀者跟隨槽我的分析的基礎知識,是可以理解的,即使沒有深厚的技術背景,但至少具有良好的技術背景的一些基本位加密。

 在這裡,我們一起去分析
 

我的目標是什麼/如何分析公開的科學和安全社區選擇ECC加密系統使用安全協議和IETF RFC定義的標準(在一個開放和同行評審的方式定義互聯網標準)。

下面一組RFC引入ECC到現有系統得到分析,以了解什麼是更好地使用,什麼是更好的排除:

  • RFC5639 :ECC Brainpool標準曲線和曲線生成
  • RFC4869 :NSA的Suite B加密的IPsec套房
  • RFC5430 :NSA Suite B的配置文件傳輸層安全(TLS)
  • RFC5008 :NSA Suite B的安全/多用途Internet郵件擴展(S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 :確定公共密鑰用於交換對稱密鑰的優勢
  • RFC5349 :橢圓曲線加密(ECC)支持公共密鑰加密Kerberos初始驗證(PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 :橢圓曲線加密(ECC)的密碼套件傳輸層安全(TLS)
  • 由菲利普·齊 ​​默爾曼ECC曲線 ZRTP語音加密
  • ECC的OpenPGP(吃水d 筏jivsov的OpenPGP的ECC-06
  • ECC曲線選擇微軟為智能卡Kerberos登錄

由科學家定義互聯網安全協議,以使我們的評估的一部分,我們將使用選擇。
此外,它必須被理解, 曲線選擇來自不同的主管部門 ,作出自己的選擇曲線,以告訴跳過使用什麼什麼行業:

由科學家定義安全要求的標準化機構,使我們的評估的一部分,我們將使用選擇。
此外,大多數人不知道,但我們的分析,這是非常相關的東西,是有別樣的ECC曲線加密算法和他們的“大小”是不同的,這取決於什麼樣的曲線上:

  • ECC曲線超過首相場(通常被稱為橢圓曲線代表的P-密鑰長度
  • ECC曲線的二進制字段(Koblitz曲線 ,通常被稱為K-密鑰長度為代表)

由於安全強度等價的橢圓曲線和Kobliz曲線有不同的密鑰大小,例如,當我們讀到ECC 571 Koblitz曲線是指具有同等的強度,521 ECC總理曲線。

強度,之間橢圓曲線和Kotbliz的曲線的比較報導如下(從米奇ECC互聯網草案 ):

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521​​ | 15360

下面有一個所有的各種實體和它們各自的名字( IETF RFC4492 ECC用法為TLS )的所有選定的曲線比較:

不同的標準組織所選擇的曲線名稱
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | | NIST ANSI X9.62
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST的K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST的K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST的K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST的K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST的K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 ​​| | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

立即出現的是,有所有當局只選擇兩條曲線,並且有傾倒的koblitz曲線之間的3個部門共同商定由ANSI.The一般有以下兩個ECC曲線:

  • secp192r1號/ prime192v1 / NIST的P-192
  • secp256r1號/ prime256v1 / NIST的P-256

這些選擇的ECC曲線TLS RFC5430完全跳過koblitz的,曲線和選擇僅供用法:

  • P-256,P-384,P-521

,ECC Brainpool完全跳過Koblitz曲線,並選擇使用以下的ECC曲線:

  • P-160,P-192,P-224,P-256,P-320,P-384,P-512( 即是唯一的尤其是因為它是不是P-521,但P-512,簡稱的唯一密鑰大小ECC brainpool。TNX伊恩·西蒙斯從雅典娜SCS

OpenPGP的互聯網ECC用法草案PGPð 筏jivsov的OpenPGP-ECC-06完全跳過了Koblitz曲線和選擇了以下ECC曲線

  • P-256,P-384,P-521

ECC使用Kerberos協議的擴展定義在RFC5349和由Microsoft定義的智能卡登錄 ,完全跳過了Koblitz曲線和選擇了以下ECC曲線:

  • P-256,P-384,P-521

因此,聲音清晰,正確的選擇ECC Koblitz曲線是P-256,P-384,P-521,而被跳過絕密使用任何安全敏感的協議(IPSEC,SSL,Kerberos身份,OpenPGP的,ZRTP / TLS)。

為什麼我做了這個分析?

我已經做了這種分析後討論我一定的語音加密產品,全部基於自定義協議和專有協議,都使用571位的橢圓曲線Diffie Hellman的/ ECDH 571的/的ECDH 571-位/的Koblitz 571位。
所有這些正在使用的K-571,如前所述,已刪除所有安全敏感的環境和協議,和自己的設計師語音加密的東西,我認為這絕對不是他們的加密選擇最佳的安全選擇。
也許,它已經做到了營銷的目的,因為K-571(Koblitz曲線)比P-521(橢圓曲線素數的基礎上)似乎更強。 如果你有“位”營銷人員可以算得上是“更安全”的。 Koblitz橢圓曲線速度比絕密啟用黃金橢圓曲線,所以給產品經理有機會向“位”在它自己的產品,同時保持密鑰交換快。

這是一個哲學的選擇問題。

我寧願科學界的謙卑不是跟風,要考慮自己的加密專家,見地超過整體安全性和科學界本身。

相反,我更喜歡使用唯一被批准的算法,在高度敏感的環境中使用(絕密的分類),已選定的所有當局和工作組的加密算法分析現有有幾乎所有標準的安全性,代表的選擇協議(IPSEC,OpenPGP的,ZRTP的Kerberos,SSL / TLS等)。
我喜歡動腦筋加密我所用,這是真正的安全,檢查,評估是否有一些弱點算量。

數的工作brais加密廣泛傳播的比動腦筋加密使用的只是少數人(如Koblitz曲線)的數量級以上。
所以我沒有妖魔化誰使用ECDH 571使用Koblitz曲線,但是可以肯定的,我可以肯定,他們沒有在安全性方面的最佳選擇,任何安全專業人員會考慮做一個安全標杆的事實,橢圓曲線Diffie Hellman的571位Koblitz曲線是沒有得到廣泛的擴散,它的標準安全協議傾倒,它不是絕密使用認證。

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ESSOR,歐洲安全軟件定義無線電(SDR)

我有一個看看在歐洲防務局網站,發現的ESSOR項目,一個工作項目為歐元106mln發展戰略國防通信產品的基礎上新的軟件定義無線電的方法資助。

SDR的做法是一個革命性的系統,完全改變了科學家和行業的做法,任何一種無線技術。

基本上,而不是燃燒硬件芯片實現大部分的射頻協議和技術,他們都推在“軟件”專門的無線電硬件,可以工作在很多不同頻率,充當了很多不同的無線協議的無線接口。

例如USRP(通用軟件無線電外設)從Ettus研究成本1000-2000USD滿載,波谷開源GnuRadio框架,已經看到了開源的實施:

和更大量的協議和傳輸技術。

這一種新的方法來無線傳輸系統destinated方式的轉變,無線電系統的實施,提供了新的能力,如“無線協議本身”軟件升級,以提供“無線協議”的改進。

在短期內,我們也看到了非常強的安全性研究,採用SDR技術,如GSM開裂藍牙嗅探

我們可以預期弱等技術,設計,但受硬件設備的限制,破解的低級別的協議,將很快得到破解。 在第一個列表,我真的想看到黑客的TETRA技術出生的封閉心態和秘密的加密算法,我真的不喜歡的東西;-)

共享

遠程攔截SNOM VoIP電話

我建議讀遠程竊聽VoIP電話VoIP安全聯盟博客肖恩Merdinger的

一個具體的例子,對當前的電話基礎設施的網絡攻擊變得更加脆弱。

共享

語音通信安全研討會

您好!

特倫托大學,我做了一個語音通信的安全技術談一個有趣的信息交換與加密實驗室管理Massimiliano撒拉族的教授。

我建議有興趣的人讀它,尤其是第二部分,因為習慣在幾個部門的各種語音加密技術是一種創新的分類。

我試圖解釋,並從這種廣泛分散的技術部門提供廣泛的技術通常是完全沒有關係的每個其他的,但實際上它們都適用於語音加密後的分類概述:

  • 手機的TLC產業語音加密標準
  • 政府和軍方的語音加密標準
  • 公共安全語音加密標準
  • IETF語音加密標準
  • 雜項專有的語音加密技術

這是一個巨大的slideware,122張幻燈片,我建議去閱讀第二部分跳躍攔截技術已經涵蓋了2009年我的介紹概述。

語音通信的安全性

尤其是我喜歡巧克力級加密的概念,希望提供一些的蛇油加密概念的創新。

但我需要得到更深入的巧克力級別的加密上下文,今年年底前可能會做,通過提供應用課程的理解和評價幾乎各種語音加密技術的安全上下文

共享

27C3 - CCC國會CFP:我們為和平而來

我們為和平而來

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

我們為和平而來,說新的世界的征服者。

我們為和平而來,這是政府說的,當它涉及到定植,規範,和軍事化的新的數字世界。

我們為和平而來,說的民族國家已經設置的中小型公司,淨獲利鏈的用戶,他們閃亮的新設備。

我們為和平而來,我們說的黑客,怪才,書呆子,當我們對現實世界和試圖去改變它,因為它已經侵入我們的自然棲息地,網絡空間......

徵集論文參加到27C3 CCC大會是開放的,我從來沒有見過這麼令人興奮的收穫:-)

您於12月30日在柏林!

共享

GSM開裂的滲透測試方法(OSSTMM)的,?

由於大部分這個博客的讀者已經知道,在過去幾年中有了很多GSM審計和開裂的公共研究相關的活動。

然而,當巨大媒體覆蓋GSM開裂研究成果, 使開裂工具是真正的早期階段,仍然非常低效。

現在, 弗蘭克·史蒂文森 ,挪威密碼分析,已經打破了內容加擾系統的DVD視頻光盤,參與A51裂解項目開始卡斯滕·諾爾 ,釋放海妖 ,一個新的改進版的A51裂解系統。

這很有趣注意到,無線開裂也有類似的故事,作為第一無線WEP破解的發現是相當緩慢,在較早的技術,但後來Korek,一個黑客破解代碼工作,提高攻擊系統drammatically的。

安全研究合作的故事,這是你開始研究,有人跟踪它,完善它,其他一些遵循它,提高它,並在年底,你得到的結果。

閱讀海妖GSM破解軟件發布

敬請關注下週在​​Blackhat會議卡斯滕諾爾解釋所需的硬件設置的細節和詳細的說明,該怎麼辦呢 :-)

我真的想與的OSSTMM方法執行測試的的GSM攔截和男人在中間:-)看到這些工具納入滲透測試的Linux發行走回頭路

如果事情繼續這樣Ettus研究 (用於低成本GSM信號接收的的USRP2軟件無線電生產)將不被取下來,我們仍然可以看到這一點。

共享

蛇油安全要求加密安全產品

安防市場的增長,越來越多的企業進入市場,但有多少人認真考慮他們做了什麼?

你知道嗎,這樣做安全技術是什麼意思, 你是親自負責保護用戶的信息。 你必須讓他們知道他們需要什麼,你究竟在做什麼,哪種威脅模型產品保護。

用戶無法評估安全要求產品本身所代表的產品的安全功能的一個典型的問題。

所以有很多公司做一個不那麼道德營銷的安全功能,基於的事實,任何用戶都將能夠評估它。

先前解釋的情況下駐留在安全的的蛇油加密 ,在科學的加密環境的演變,今天就讓我們用最好的品種信息保護技術,無需過分擔心後門或不安全感的話題。

讓講蛇油加密

蛇油加密加密蛇油是一個術語,用來形容這被認為是假的或有欺詐成分的商用密碼的方法和產品。 辨不安全的加密技術的安全加密從用戶的觀點出發,可以是困難的。 ,如布魯斯菲爾齊默爾曼的 ,許多密碼學家,承擔教育公眾如何做安全加密,以及突出的誤導銷售的一些加密產品。

最有參考價值的加密安全大師,菲利普·齊 ​​默爾曼和布魯斯,是第一次談論蛇油加密:

由菲利普·齊 ​​默爾曼 蛇油

蛇油由Bruce Schneier

密歇根電信和科技法律評論“也取得了很好的分析有關安全產品的安全特性, 蛇油安全聲稱“產品安全系統的誤傳他們解釋討厭的營銷技巧用來調整用戶無法評估安全功能,包括經濟和法律責任的含義。

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : 幾種蛇油的安全產品公司不解釋,不清除的威脅模型產品適用。非常有名的是一句拉斯尼爾森

“請記住,密碼沒有威脅模型是不加奶像餅乾。 ..... 加密沒有威脅模型就像是母親沒有蘋果派。 不能說足夠的時間。 更一般地,安全無威脅模型是通過定義要失敗的。“

那麼,如何發現蛇油的安全產品呢?

檢查發現蛇油加密產品: 蛇油警告標誌,加密軟件,以避免馬特·柯廷的指導方針。

由Emility拉特利夫(IBM Linux安全架構師),試圖使如何識別加密蛇油明顯的例子,你可以看到這個非常好的加密蛇油範例

在這裡代表馬特·柯廷紙的基本方針:


通過檢查點,它可能以評估加密技術或產品是多麼嚴重。

但所有的一切,不道德的安全方法如何解決?

這是非常有意義的,這將是非常有益的各種安全產品類別做出一些強烈的獨立評估指引(如滲透測試OSSTMM ),使這個安全評價過程中,真正的用戶手中。

這將是也很不錯,已經有人作出分析和評估安全產品的公司,發布報告蛇油的跡象。

共享

Web2.0的移動應用程序的隱私洩露

你知道web2.0的世界,它是大量洩漏任何形式(剖析,分析,剖析)有關隱私和用戶開始關注它。

用戶持續下載應用程序不知道的細節,只是因為他們做了什麼,例如IFART是很酷,很有趣,有時是有用的。

thumb.php.jpg

用戶在手機上安裝從1000%到10.000%以上的應用比在PC上,這些應用程序可能包含惡意軟件或其他意想不到的功能。

最近infobyte分析ubertwitter的客戶 ,發現客戶端漏水,發送到他們的服務器許多個人和敏感數據,比如:

- 黑莓PIN

- 電話號碼

- 電子郵件地址

- 地理定位信息

了解UbertTwitter '間諜'功能發現這裡infoByte

這是大量私人和敏感信息洩露的應用程序,但只是沒有人來看看它。

強制性數據保留和隱私政策應該成為應用開發和移動應用的提交方針的一部分?

恕我直言,一個用戶必須不僅被警告有關應用程序的功能和API的使用,但同時會做什麼樣的信息要處理手機裡面。

能力是指授權使用某個功能的應用程序,例如使用地理定位API,但應用程序會做什麼,誰提供此類信息,一旦用戶授權?

這是一個安全分析級別,手機製造商不提供,他們應該的,因為它關注的信息,而不是在應用設備功能的使用授權/許可。

PS:是的! ok了! 我同意! 這種後需要3-4頁長的討論的話題是熱的,相當明確的,但它是星期六早上,我得走了!

共享

AES算法選擇用於空間

我遇到了一個很好的文件,加密算法,它最適合使用在空間飛船和設備有關的分析和考慮。

紙張已經通過空間數據系統諮詢委員會周圍所有空間機構組成的財團,累計處理了超過400太空之

topban.jpg

讀取文件加密算法,因為它提供了有趣的考慮和比較不同的加密算法之間的貿易調查

顯然,最終選擇算法是AES KASUMI(UMTS網絡中使用),同時避免了。

共享

黑莓的安全和加密:魔鬼還是天使?

黑莓有好有壞的聲譽,對他的安全能力,這取決於你從哪個角度看它。

這篇文章的匯總信息,讓讀者獲取的圖片,而不採取多RIM和黑莓的位置,可以認為,這取決於上來看,一個非常安全的平台或一個極其危險的

bblock.jpg

讓我們繼續下去。

一個側黑莓在它的加密功能,安全功能無處不在,設備加密(使用自定義密碼),通信加密(如IPPP 定制的專有協議 ),很不錯的高級安全設置,從Certicom的加密框架( 現在所擁有的一個平台,大量RIM )。

在另一邊,他們不提供設備,但覆蓋接入網絡,BIS( 黑莓互聯網服務 ),這是一個全球性的全球廣域網,在那裡你的黑莓輸入,而您瀏覽或使用blackberry.net AP checkmail,。

當您或應用程序時,使用blackberry.net APN,你不只是連接到與承運人互聯網連接的互聯網,但你進入裡面的RIM網絡將代理作為一個網關到達互聯網。

非常相同的發生,當你有一個企業使用的的BB設備和企業BES連接到RIM網絡作為一種VPN集中網絡

所以基本上所有的通信跨越槽RIM服務基礎設施,以加密格式了一套專有的加密和通信協議。

正如通知,認為谷歌提供的gtalk超過blackberry.net APN,為了達成了協議,裡面的BB網絡的BB用戶提供服務。 當你安裝的gtalk得到補充服務的書籍這一點GTALKNA01的 GTALK網關內部的RIM網絡,讓國際清算銀行內部的溝通和行為作為GTALK到互聯網網關的名稱。

移動運營商通常甚至沒有允許檢查黑莓設備之間的流量和黑莓網絡。

因此,RIM和黑莓不知何故他們的做法唯一的為他們提供一個平台,網絡和所有捆綁在一起的服務和你可以不只是“得到設備和軟件”,但用戶和企業都始終約束和連接到服務網絡。

這是很好的,這是很糟糕,因為這意味著,RIM提供了極其良好的安全特性和功能來保護信息,設備和訪問在不同層面對第三方的信息。

但它總是很難估計RIM本身可以使政治壓力反對RIM相關的威脅和風險。

請考慮,我不是說“RIM正在尋找你的數據”,但一個客觀的風險分析:該平台是如何做RIM有權在設備上,設備上的信息和信息跨越網絡。 (閱讀我的移動安全幻燈片 )。

例如,讓我們考慮一下諾基亞手機非常相同的背景。

一旦諾基亞設備被出售,諾基亞不會有權力在設備上,也不在設備上的信息,也沒有跨網絡的信息。 但它也是真實的,諾基亞只是提供設備,不提供增值服務,如企業集成(RIM VPN隧道),BIS接入網絡和所有的本地和遠程安全配置的功能,黑莓提供。

所以這是一個問題的選擇平台時考慮的風險範圍內以適當的方式,用一個例子非常相似,選擇Microsoft Exchange服務器(在自己的服務),或得到一個SaaS服務是否像谷歌應用程序。

在這兩種情況下,你需要信任的供應商,但在第一個例子中,你需要相信微軟不把後門的軟件,而在第二個例子中,你需要信任作為一個平台和服務提供商,谷歌,不訪問您的信息。

所以這是一個不同的模式進行評估取決於您的威脅模型。

如果您的威脅模型讓你認為RIM作為一個值得信賴的第三方服務提供商(就像谷歌)比它的確定。 如果你有一個非常高風險的背景下,像絕密的,接下來就讓我們仔細考慮和評估,不管它是不是更好地保持黑莓服務完全隔離的設備或使用另一個製造商的服務器和服務的交互系統,無需。

現在,讓我們回到關於黑莓和黑莓的安全性本身的一些研究和一些事實。

幾個國家的政府首先不得不處理與RIM,以迫使他們提供訪問信息,交叉的服務網絡,而其他直接決定禁止黑莓使用的高級官員,因為位於英國和美國的服務器,而其他決定自己安裝的後門。

有很多討論的主題是RIM黑莓和政​​府的各種原因。

下面一組官方RIM黑莓平台的安全性相關的信息:

這裡的一套RIM黑莓平台的的非官方安全和黑客有關的信息:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

乾杯

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

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Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

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Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

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China Encryption Regulations

大家好,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

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(舊)的Crypto AG情況和一些思考

在'90,封閉源代碼和專有加密統治世界。

這之前,開源和科學認可的加密技術作為最佳實踐做加密的東西出去。

我想提醒的時候,在1992年,美國與以色列,與瑞士一起,向伊朗政府提供後門(專有和密碼)的技術,以挖掘他們的通信,欺騙他們認為所使用的解決方案是安全的 ,也有一些今天這個2010年的代價。

caq63crypto.t.jpg

這就是所謂的Crypto AG案件 ,涉及美國國家安全局的歷史事實,以及信號情報處以色列國防部強烈懷疑加密技術生產與瑞士的Crypto AG公司已經簽署了一個協議。

基本上這些實體放置一個後門,在安全加密設備,他們向伊朗提供攔截伊朗通信。

他們的加密的Crypto AG開發,並最終定制伊朗政府的秘密和專有加密算法的基礎上。

你可以閱讀一些其他事實有關的Crypto AG借殼相關的問題:

全球電信安全的消亡

美國國家安全局的Crypto AG刺痛

斷碼: BBC 一個不可能完成的任務?

明鏡的Crypto AG(德國)文章

現在,在2010年,我們都知道和​​理解,秘密和專有加密不起作用。

只是一些參考全球頂級加密專家:

保密,安全,默默無聞布魯斯·施奈爾

只是說沒有專有加密算法的網絡計算(邁克·弗拉托)

通過隱藏的安全鈰普渡大學

解鎖的秘密加密:加密技術,加密與密碼由賽門鐵克解釋

時間改變事物的方式接近。

我非常喜歡在著名的菲利普·齊 ​​默爾曼斷言:

“密碼學是一個不起眼的科學,很少日常生活相關。 從歷史上看,它總是有一個特殊的角色在軍事和外交通訊。 但在信息時代,密碼學是關於政治權力,特別是政府和人民之間的權力關係。 它是關於隱私的權利,言論自由,政治結社自由,新聞自由,自由免受不合理的搜查和扣押,被單獨留在家中的自由。“

今天任何科學家接受和批准Kerckhoffs的原則 ,在1883年的軍事密碼學“的紙說:

密碼系統的安全性不應該依賴於保持算法的秘密,但只保留數字鍵的秘密。

這是絕對清楚的最佳做法做加密的今天obbly任何認真的人,做開放的加密,供公眾審查和後續Kerckhoff原則。

所以,我們應該想想閉源,專有的加密技術的基礎上安全槽默默無聞概念?

我感到非常驚訝,當今天,在2010年,在信息社會時代,我看了一些文件上的Crypto AG網站。

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

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Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

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iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

在此期間免費TrueCrypt的是可能的磁盤加密的首選,事實上,它是很難信任的Drivecrypt, PGP已經收購了賽門鐵克 ,並有非常糟糕的謠言有關信任,人們有在賽門鐵克和不會有太多的廣泛使用的替代品。

有傳聞稱,也有PhoneCrypt二進制文件的分析和專有加密系統可以揭示一些有趣的東西......

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量子密碼破

量子密碼學的東西很有挑戰性,利用法律phisycs安全通信光纖線路的加密方法。

過分簡化本系統是基於這樣的事實,如果有人切纖維,把自來水在中間,和聯合在一起的另一側的纖維的量的“錯誤”,將在通信路徑將高於20%。

所以,如果QBER(量子比特誤碼率)20%以上,那麼就認為它被截獲,該系統。

多倫多大學的研究員能夠欺騙系統與停留在20%以下,為19.7% ,從而調整系統所使用的門檻,考慮通信信道的安全與妥協。

該產品發現有漏洞被稱為二層Cerberis及生產的瑞士ID Quantique

某些不可能性的方法,來檢測攻擊已被提供,但可能機率,這種系統沒有被認為是100%可靠,直到該技術將不夠成熟。

傳統的加密一起使用,直到幾年,最終是否適用的量子加密捆綁在一起。

當我們將看到一個量子加密系統ZRTPPGPSSL上的RFC像我們所看到的?

納伊夫

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巨大的角度來看

由於安全性的加密系統,它不是一個問題“我用多少位”,但使用正確的方法做正確的事,最平衡的方式,以減輕中定義的安全風險。

security.png

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加密勿擾:是知道加擾!

我們大多數人都知道語音擾頻器,可用於在幾乎任何種類的語音通信技術。

極其靈活的方法:適用於一切

極高的性能:極低的延遲

但不幸的是...

極度虛弱:擾不能被認為是安全的。

只有加密可以被認為是安全在Kerckoff的原則下。

所以請甚至不考慮任何形式的模擬加擾器,如果你需要真正的安全。

深入閱讀紙實現的實時語音加密系統 “由Markus Brandau,尤其是密碼分析段。

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Securstar公司的聯繫有PhoneCrypt答案:絕對不合理上Infosecurityguard / Notrax的情況下! :-)

更新20.04.2010:已被禁用http://infosecurityguard.com。 的身份出名Notrax語音安全環境(不能告訴幾個小伙子,但你能想像,我是正確的!),所以我們的朋友決定特羅的網站,因為英國和美國法律下的法律責任。

更新尼斯總結整個故事(我知道,這是漫長而複雜的,在第一時間閱讀)在VoIP安全SIPVicious博客桑德羅慈

Hafner先生,我發現,Securstar公司首席執行,試圖最終捍衛自己的行動, 理由是絕對不合理的藉口,而不是公開道歉為他們做了什麼的REG:創建一個假的獨立安全研究,以促進他們有PhoneCrypt產品

他試圖說服我們,IP 217.7.213.59,後面的人所使用的作者infosecurityguard.com和指著其辦公室DSL線路,這個的黑客Notrax,使用匿名衝浪服務,而不是他們的員工在他們的辦公室之一:

“首席執行維爾弗雷德·哈夫納Securstar公司否認任何接觸Notrax。” 他說,必須Notrax已經用他堅定的匿名瀏覽的服務,SurfSolo,到產生結果由Pietrosanti報告“

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

的問候,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. 敬請關注。

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Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

他們賣安全的電話,但他們公司的電話系統是在互聯網上公開的脆弱 :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. : - >

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

註冊商:GODADDY.COM,INC。

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

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Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

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About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review 關閉
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
關閉
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
關閉
Illix Obscurity
No public review
關閉
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
關閉
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
關閉
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
關閉
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
關閉
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
關閉
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
關閉
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
關閉
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
關閉
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
關閉
Zfone Transparency Public review
打開
ZRTP Transparency Public review
打開

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
為什麼呢?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
怎麼樣?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

應用 Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

應用 Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

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Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

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O3B Networks: a new satellite broadband approach

That's something amazing, “other 3 billion” broadband coverage not trough fiber but trough satellite.

A project where also google is one of the shareholder, covering 3 billion persons trough low orbit, low latency broadband (10GBit) satellite network.

Check here technical infrastructure details on ITU website.

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Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

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Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? 哎呀!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

麥克風

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

想想吧......

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Disk encryption sometimes 'works'

I am one of the person convinced that a computer disk encryption system will not protect you from public authorities if they are convinced enough and the case is very important.

There are a lot of way to convince a person to release a password.

However there's a case in Australia where not revealing the disk password resulted in a successful way to avoid going in jail:

Secret code saves man who spied on flatmates

My opinion is just that spying flatmates is not a so relevant and particular crime and that law enforcement did not used 'convincing systems' to get the password of encrypted disk.

UPDATE 29.06.2010: It also worked for Daniel Dantas against FBI .

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Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Read more here .

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Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

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This is big business, this is the American way

43 years old “UFO eccentric” hacker Gary McKinnon just loses appeal against his extradition to the States for computer crimes he committed 7 years ago.

If you've lived under a rock during the last few years what this dude did was basically break into .gov computers looking for UFO related material.

Probably the last case of recreational hacking I've heard about.

So his case is obviously going to be a classical “Strike one to educate one hundred” kind of message to every hacker attacking american computer systems: we can reach you everywhere you live and have you extradited to our country where we will sentence you to life in prison.

Unless you are a multi millionaire cyber criminal living in Russia or a chinese spy, of course.

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