标记档案: 隐私

RFC 6189:ZRTP是最后一个标准!

最后ZRTP已经分配的官方RFC分配, RFC6189 ZRTP:单播安全RTP媒体路径的关键协议。

它作为依赖与AES密钥大小为256位,现在已经被定义为RFC6188 SRTP

请参阅RFC终于发布了,这是令人兴奋,因为它是一个重要的里程碑,作为官方标准的终端到终端加密很像PGP已经电子邮件设置ZRTP 。

现在,任何组织将正式在世界上能够实现终端到终端的协议的语音加密ZRTP

目前有3种不同的公共实现ZRTP协议存在:

他们每个人都提供了不同的功能的协议,但最重要的是已知的可互操作的。

新一波即将进入一个灰色地带,其中大部分公司做手机加密系统已实现自定义加密语音加密的世界,irrupting。

现在标准已经建立和留下来实施不同的东西,有几个原因。

自由一台先生 齐默尔曼和所有社区公司(如PrivateWave )和个人(如维尔纳·迪特曼 )工作!

今天,它是伟大的一天,这种技术现在是官方,也与现有的多个实施!

菲利普,你做一遍,我赞美你纯粹的精神和决心:-)

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在弗赖堡大学为GSM进展开裂

移动协议(GSM,GSM-R,TETRA,UMTS等)的精彩世界黑客得到官方的大学研究活动。

开源代码发布破解软件的投资,使大学学生工作,提高做强大的科研机会。

弗赖堡大学刚刚发布了随着一个支持gsmframencoder工具的GSM A5 / 1加密实战演练 ,以提高嗅探,解码和开裂的过程。

打开硬件,开放软件,开放协议表现出什么样的的专有方法或工艺打造通信和安全技术的弱点。

尝试打开和打击任何形式的专有和封闭的技术,迫使该行业仅在设计电信协议的互操作和开放的态度,而它的目标应该是任何科学家。

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我的TOR出口节点试图过滤掉嘈杂的交通经验

今年年初,我决定,运行TOR出口节点,所以我带来了VPS在hetzner.de (因为他们被列为一个好TOR ISP )设置一个每秒100Mbit /出口节点与昵称privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch的首款1TB的月度数据,然后10兆/秒平的连接。

它也可以运行TOR2WEB软件在http://tor.infosecurity.ch

我所建议的运行出口节点以最小的骚扰,并准备了一个滥用响应模板设置退出政策

在第一天,我一直在运行的节点i立即收到DMCA抱怨由于点对点交通。

所以我决定来过滤一些P2P流量使用OpenDPI的iptables模块和DMCA抱怨自动消失:

的iptables-A OUTPUT-M opendpi电驴gadugadu FastTrack网络GNUTELLA的DirectConnect,BitTorrent的WinMX的Soulseek的-J拒绝

然后,因为我是意大利人,我决定,以避免我的Tor节点连接到意大利的互联网地址空间,以减少的机会,一个愚蠢的检察官会醒来我在早晨,因为不明白,我运行一个Tor节点。

我试过了,的帮助的hellais写了一个脚本来使退出政策拒绝声明 ,拒绝上引发IOError blockfinder的所有意大利保留的网段,但是我们发现的torrc配置文件与+1000线的TOR崩溃。

我们去开出罚单报告关于我们国家试图阻止TOR出口政策坠毁,并发现了类似的尝试 ,我们贡献,但它似乎仍然是一个开放的问题。

得出的结论是,这是不可能的,使在清洁和礼貌的方式,所以我决定去肮脏的方式,通过使用iptables的/ geoip的国家退出政策TOR出口节点。 战斗后,使其正确编译,这是一行iptables来阻止意大利流量:

的iptables-A OUTPUT-P tcp-M的态-态NEW-M geoip的DST-CC-J REJECT

现在从我的退出节点意大利网络没有连接完成,我是安全的反对可能是愚蠢的检察官不理解职责范围(TOR节点的所有IP地址申请前我有一个例外)。

其他一些天之后,我开始接收抱怨由于源于我的Tor节点的端口扫描活动。

我想从我自己的角度来看,支持匿名的网络,而不是匿名黑客企图,所以我要过滤的端口扫描和攻击源于我node.That一个复杂的问题,需要一定的研究,所以在此期间,我安装scanlogd的嗤之以鼻,因为我想评估多少攻击,这样的攻击都从我TOR出口节点。
后,我会尽量安排某种过滤,以确保能够筛选出主要攻击。
对于什么相关的端口扫描,似乎有没有公开的的传出端口扫描工具来检测和过滤,但过滤传入端口扫描,所以可能会需要写的东西特设。
我会把事情进展如何,是否会有一些不错的snort的直列光波的方式选择性地过滤出主要攻击企图从我的退出节点的方式来实现。

我的目标是保持出口节点运行在长期(至少1TB的流量,每个月捐献给TOR)涉及到ISP的努力,减少抱怨,并试图尽我所能,合理的负债运行的退出节点。

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卓格,新的C + +和Java ZRTP实现公开发行

大家好,今天, 我在哪里首席技术官语音通信的隐私保护和信息安全技术开发 公司,主要 从事 意大利Italia SpA的PrivateWave, 我们 释放卓格,ZRTP一个新的开源协议的实施可从http://www下载。 zrtp.org

ZRTP [1]提供端至结束椭圆曲线Diffie-384Bit的赫尔曼和AES-256 SRTP加密与密钥交换。

卓格原本已经制定并实施PrivateWave的PrivateGSM语音加密产品可用于下列平台:黑莓,诺基亚和iOS(iPhone)。

卓格C + +已经集成了PJSIP的开源VoIP的SDK [2]和它的提供一体化对PJSIP 1.8.5补丁。 它已经过测试在iPhone,塞班,Windows,Linux和Mac OS X的

卓格Java已经被集成的一个定制版本MJSIP内[3]在黑莓平台上的开源的SDK,它包括内存使用需要优化,以减少在最低的垃圾收集活动。

这两个平台已分离和模块化的加密后端加密算法实现的,可以很容易地与其他的交换。

. 卓格授权下的GNU AGPL上github上 https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG的 源代码是可用。

我们发布在开源和我们的安全方法的一致性[4]我们真的希望它可以是有用的开源生态系统,创建新的语音加密系统,以支持言论自由。

超过20个基于PJSIP开源的VoIP加密软件和一些Java编写的,可以直接受益于卓格释放。

我们将很高兴收到合作的建议,新的整合,新的加密后端,错误侦察和任何有用的改善,让ZRTP肯定语音加密标准。

卓格有http://www.zrtp.org

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org的
[4]安全的方法: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

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加密移动座机电话与Asterisk 1.8

我们刚刚发布了一份技术HOWTO 如何建立抵押移动座机VoIP基础设施

像这样的会在未来几周别人HOWTO使用其他服务器平台,如FreeSWITCH的透明度,并充分利用开源安全技术的所有的精神。

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PrivateGSM:黑莓/ iPhone /诺基亚移动语音加密ZRTP或SRTP / SDES

我绝对避免用我自己的个人博客,使任何一种产品的推广。

那个时候,它是没有什么不同,但我想告诉你,我的工作没有花哨的营销产品的事实,但坚持技术。

今天,我在哪里, 首席技术官和共同创始人 PrivateWave ,我们公开发布的黑莓,iPhone和诺基亚手机的VoIP加密的产品:

  • 有史以来第一次黑莓加密的VoIP ZRTP -的PrivateGSM VoIP专业
  • 有史以来第一次iPhone的加密VoIP ZRTP -的PrivateGSM VoIP专业
  • 有史以来第一次黑莓加密VoIP客户端与SRTP SDES密钥交换通过SIP / TLS -的 PrivateGSM VoIP企业

标志privatewave colore.png的

在PrivateWave我们使用了不同的方法对于大多数语音加密公司,在那里,阅读我们的方法的安全性

此产品的相关技术和产业景观可概括如下:

  • 它是第一款语音加密公司只使用标准安全协议(我们预计市场将作出反应,因为它清楚专有的高科技,来自惩教署的遗产不能提供相同的值)
  • 语音加密功能,这是第一种方法只使用开源的标准加密引擎
  • 它是第一款语音加密的方法来使用不同的技术,提供不同的安全模式(终端到终端的ZRTP结束到站点SRTP

这些移动安全客户端套件,专为专业的安全使用,只使用最好的电信和安全技术,以及在恶劣的网络条件下也具有良好的性能,提供了高程度的保护:

这些应用程序是:

ICONA pgsm.png的

支持的移动设备有:

关于ZRTP我们决定压力和伸展的一些小的补充协议与所有安全和偏执的功能:

我们严格的地址簿集成,超越ZRTP RFC 规范这可能是手机,因为用户的行为不看手机屏幕上使用时容易受到某些攻击。

ZRTP减轻这种条件我们paranoy的方式,我们会写和/或将添加RFC列入具体细节。

有些话在 PrivateGSM专业终端到终端加密与ZRTP

阅读技术表

下载请点击这里,只是把你的电话号码

这些更多的结果,我非常熟练的工作人员(16人曾在这6个项目3个不同的平台)上辛勤工作在艰难的经营环境(肮脏的移动网络和肮脏的移动操作系统)的具有挑战性的技术(语音加密)超过2年。

我感到非常自豪,我们的工作人员!

接下来是什么?

在接下来的几个星期,你会看到释放重大一套单证,如整合FreeSWITCH的星号,并启用其他安全交换机,以及其他一些令人兴奋的安全技术新闻,我相信会注意到;)

它一直是一个艰苦的工作和更多有许多工作要做,但我深信,此类产品的安全性和开源社区会喜欢和透明的做法,也与开放的重要发布和开放源码的集成,使一个非常政治中立的(后门)技术。

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一对夫妇很好的VPN供应商

有很多的原因,为什么人会需要访问互联网低谷的VPN。

例如,如果你生活在一个国家阻止某些内容(如抗地方政府网站,色情等)和/或协议(如SKYPE,VOIP),你可能会想使用移动互联网连接之外讨厌阻断国加密的VPN隧道。

我评估了几种托管的VPN服务器,听起来相当不错的一对夫妇,他们之间的广泛发行等服务:

SwissVPN

退出从瑞士到互联网。

成本6 CHF /月

可选公众固定的IP地址

有用的,如果你需要:

  • 只要绕过当地国家过滤器具有良好的带宽
  • 公开公共服务,通过VPN与可选的固定公网IP地址。

表演过火

退出到互联网20个不同国家(每次连接时)之间进行选择。

有用的,如果你需要做的:

  • 对竞争对手的商业智能(出现连接时,它们来自X国)
  • 看电影/电视片只允许从国家知识产权web空间
  • 不同国家之间,看到谷歌的结果

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远程拦截SNOM VoIP电话

我建议读远程窃听VoIP电话VoIP安全联盟博客肖恩Merdinger的

一个具体的例子,对当前的电话基础设施的网络攻击变得更加脆弱。

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语音通信安全研讨会

您好!

特伦托大学,我做了一个语音通信的安全技术谈一个有趣的信息交换与加密实验室管理Massimiliano撒拉族的教授。

我建议有兴趣的人读它,尤其是第二部分,因为习惯在几个部门的各种语音加密技术是一种创新的分类。

我试图解释,并从这种广泛分散的技术部门提供广泛的技术通常是完全没有关系的每个其他的,但实际上它们都适用于语音加密后的分类概述:

  • 手机的TLC产业语音加密标准
  • 政府和军方的语音加密标准
  • 公共安全语音加密标准
  • IETF语音加密标准
  • 杂项专有的语音加密技术

这是一个巨大的slideware,122张幻灯片,我建议去阅读第二部分跳跃拦截技术已经涵盖了2009年我的介绍概述。

语音通信的安全性

尤其是我喜欢巧克力级加密的概念,希望提供一些的蛇油加密概念的创新。

但我需要得到更深入的巧克力级别的加密上下文,今年年底前可能会做,通过提供应用课程的理解和评价几乎各种语音加密技术的安全上下文

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GSM开裂的渗透测试方法(OSSTMM)的,?

由于大部分这个博客的读者已经知道,在过去几年中有了很多GSM审计和开裂的公共研究相关 ​​的活动。

然而,当巨大媒体覆盖GSM开裂研究成果, 使开裂工具是真正的早期阶段,仍然非常低效。

现在, 弗兰克·史蒂文森 ,挪威密码分析,已经打破了内容加扰系统的DVD视频光盘,参与A51裂解项目开始卡斯滕·诺尔 ,释放海妖 ,一个新的改进版的A51裂解系统。

这很有趣注意到,无线开裂也有类似的故事,作为第一无线WEP破解的发现是相当缓慢,在较早的技术,但后来Korek,一个黑客破解代码工作,提高攻击系统drammatically的。

安全研究合作的故事,这是你开始研究,有人跟踪它,完善它,其他一些遵循它,提高它,并在年底,你得到的结果。

阅读海妖GSM破解软件发布

敬请关注下周在Blackhat会议卡斯滕诺尔解释所需的硬件设置的细节和详细的说明,该怎么办呢 :-)

我真的想与的OSSTMM方法执行测试的的GSM拦截和男人在中间:-)看到这些工具纳入渗透测试的Linux发行走回头路

如果事情继续这样Ettus研究 (用于低成本GSM信号接收的的USRP2软件无线电生产)将不被取下来,我们仍然可以看到这一点。

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蛇油安全要求加密安全产品

安防市场的增长,越来越多的企业进入市场,但有多少人认真考虑他们做了什么?

你知道吗,这样做安全技术是什么意思, 你是亲自负责保护用户的信息。 你必须让他们知道他们需要什么,你究竟在做什么,哪种威胁模型产品保护。

用户无法评估安全要求产品本身所代表的产品的安全功能的一个典型的问题。

所以有很多公司做一个不那么道德营销的安全功能,基于的事实,任何用户都将能够评估它。

先前解释的情况下驻留在安全的的蛇油加密 ,在科学的加密环境的演变,今天就让我们用最好的品种信息保护技术,无需过分担心后门或不安全感的话题。

让讲蛇油加密

蛇油加密加密蛇油是一个术语,用来形容这被认为是假的或有欺诈成分的商用密码的方法和产品。 辨不安全的加密技术的安全加密从用户的观点出发,可以是困难的。 ,如布鲁斯菲尔齐默尔曼的 ,许多密码学家,承担教育公众如何做安全加密,以及突出的误导销售的一些加密产品。

最有参考价值的加密安全大师,菲利普·齐默尔曼和布鲁斯,是第一次谈论蛇油加密:

由菲利普·齐默尔曼 蛇油

蛇油由Bruce Schneier

密歇根电信和科技法律评论“也取得了很好的分析有关安全产品的安全特性, 蛇油安全声称“产品安全系统的误传他们解释讨厌的营销技巧用来调整用户无法评估安全功能,包括经济和法律责任的含义。

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : 几种蛇油的安全产品公司不解释,不清除的威胁模型产品适用。非常有名的是一句拉斯尼尔森

“请记住,密码没有威胁模型是不加奶像饼干。 ..... 加密没有威胁模型就像是母亲没有苹果派。 不能说足够的时间。 更一般地,安全无威胁模型是通过定义要失败的。“

那么,如何发现蛇油的安全产品呢?

检查发现蛇油加密产品: 蛇油警告标志,加密软件,以避免马特·柯廷的指导方针。

由Emility拉特利夫(IBM Linux安全架构师),试图使如何识别加密蛇油明显的例子,你可以看到这个非常好的加密蛇油范例

在这里代表马特·柯廷纸的基本方针:


通过检查点,它可能以评估加密技术或产品是多么严重。

但所有的一切,不道德的安全方法如何解决?

这是非常有意义的,这将是非常有益的各种安全产品类别做出一些强烈的独立评估指引(如渗透测试OSSTMM ),使这个安全评价过程中,真正的用户手中。

这将是也很不错,已经有人作出分析和评估安全产品的公司,发布报告蛇油的迹象。

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Web2.0的移动应用程序的隐私泄露

你知道web2.0的世界,它是大量泄漏任何形式(剖析,分析,剖析)有关隐私和用户开始关注它。

用户持续下载应用程序不知道的细节,只是因为他们做了什么,例如IFART是很酷,很有趣,有时是有用的。

thumb.php.jpg

用户在手机上安装从1000%到10.000%以上的应用比在PC上,这些应用程序可能包含恶意软件或其他意想不到的功能。

最近infobyte分析ubertwitter的客户 ,发现客户端漏水,发送到他们的服务器许多个人和敏感数据,比如:

- 黑莓PIN

- 电话号码

- 电子邮件地址

- 地理定位信息

了解UbertTwitter '间谍'功能发现这里infoByte

这是大量私人和敏感信息泄露的应用程序,但只是没有人来看看它。

强制性数据保留和隐私政策应该成为应用开发和移动应用的提交方针的一部分?

恕我直言,一个用户必须不仅被警告有关应用程序的功能和API的使用,但同时会做什么样的信息要处理手机里面。

能力是指授权使用某个功能的应用程序,例如使用地理定位API,但应用程序会做什么,谁提供此类信息,一旦用户授权?

这是一个安全分析级别,手机制造商不提供,他们应该的,因为它关注的信息,而不是在应用设备功能的使用授权/许可。

PS:是的! ok了! 我同意! 这种后需要3-4页长的讨论的话题是热的,相当明确的,但它是星期六早上,我得走了!

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AES算法选择用于空间

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

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Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

黑莓有好有坏的声誉,对他的安全能力,这取决于你从哪个角度看它。

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

bblock.jpg

Let's goes on.

On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).

On the other side they does not provide only a device but an overlay access network, called BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), that's a global worldwide wide area network where your blackberry enter while you browse or checkmail using blackberry.net AP.

当您或应用程序时,使用blackberry.net APN,你不只是连接到与承运人互联网连接的互联网,但你进入里面的RIM网络将代理作为一个网关到达互联网。

The very same happen when you have a corporate use: Both the BB device and the corporate BES connect to the RIM network that act as a sort of vpn concentration network .

所以基本上所有的通信跨越槽RIM服务基础设施,以加密格式了一套专有的加密和通信协议。

正如通知,认为谷歌提供的gtalk超过blackberry.net APN,为了达成了协议,里面的BB网络的BB用户提供服务。 当你安装的gtalk得到补充服务的书籍这一点GTALKNA01的 GTALK网关内部的RIM网络,让国际清算银行内部的沟通和行为作为GTALK到互联网网关的名称。

移动运营商通常甚至没有允许检查黑莓设备之间的流量和黑莓网络。

So RIM and Blackberry are somehow unique for their approach as they provide a platform, a network and a service all bundled together and you cannot just “get the device and the software” but the user and the corporate are always bound and connected to the service network.

这是很好的,这是很糟糕,因为这意味着,RIM提供了极其良好的安全特性和功能来保护信息,设备和访问在不同层面对第三方的信息。

But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.

请考虑,我不是说“RIM正在寻找你的数据”,但一个客观的风险分析:该平台是如何做RIM有权在设备上,设备上的信息和信息跨越网络。 (阅读我的移动安全幻灯片 )。

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

所以这是一个问题的选择平台时考虑的风险范围内以适当的方式,用一个例子非常相似,选择Microsoft Exchange服务器(在自己的服务),或得到一个SaaS服务是否像谷歌应用程序。

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

所以这是一个不同的模式进行评估取决于您的威胁模型。

如果您的威胁模型让你认为RIM作为一个值得信赖的第三方服务提供商(就像谷歌)比它的确定。 If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

现在,让我们回到关于黑莓和黑莓的安全性本身的一些研究和一些事实。

几个国家的政府首先不得不处理与RIM,以迫使他们提供访问信息,交叉的服务网络,而其他直接决定禁止黑莓使用的高级官员,因为位于英国和美国的服务器,而其他决定自己安装的后门。

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

下面一组官方RIM黑莓平台的安全性相关的信息:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

因为它是23.32(GMT +1),我累了,我认为,这一职位将在这里结束了。

我希望读者提供了一组有用的信息和考虑去更深入的分析,并考虑到黑莓整体安全性(在好和坏,它总是依赖于你的威胁模型!)。

干杯

:法比奥Pietrosanti(纳伊夫)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

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Botnet for RSA cracking?

我读到一篇有趣的文章,关于把1.000.000电脑,一个严重的僵尸网络的所有者有机会得到它,破解RSA。

其结果是,在这样的背景下攻击的RSA 1024bit的密钥只有28岁,比理论19亿年。

这篇文章 ,是非常有趣的,因为它给了我们非常重要的考虑因素,随着行业的方法来“默认安全级别”上的加密强度方面的计算能力,需要进行破解尝试。

我会说一定要读

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中国加密条例

大家好,

我发现这非常有趣的文章,对中国加密导入/导出/贝克•麦坚时国际律师事务所在美国通过国内法规

这是强烈的业务和监管导向给中国法规如何工作以及如何它的行为可能在未来一个做得很好的观点。

读到这里解密加密的的条例 (形式Bakernet网站)。

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移动安全谈话在WHYMCA会议

我想分享我用一些幻灯片谈手机安全在whymca手机发布会在米兰。

读到这里我的幻灯片上的移动安全

幻灯片提供了一个广泛的深入概述了移动安全的相关事宜,我应该做的一些slidecast把音频。 也许会,也许不会,这取决于时间,始终是一个资源不足。

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iPhone PIN:无用的加密

我最近更换了我多我绕到iPhone手机之一。

我特别关注关于盗窃案件的数据保护,并所以开始看看周围约的iPhone保护系统。

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

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Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

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great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

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Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

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Securstar公司的联系有PhoneCrypt答案:绝对不合理上Infosecurityguard / Notrax的情况下! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. 的身份出名Notrax语音安全环境(不能告诉几个小伙子,但你能想象,我是正确的!),所以我们的朋友决定特罗的网站,因为英国和美国法律下的法律责任。

更新尼斯总结整个故事(我知道,这是漫长而复杂的,在第一时间阅读)在VoIP安全SIPVicious博客桑德罗慈

Hafner先生,我发现,Securstar公司首席执行,试图最终捍卫自己的行动, 理由是绝对不合理的借口,而不是公开道歉为他们做了什么的REG:创建一个假的独立安全研究,以促进他们有PhoneCrypt产品

他试图说服我们,IP 217.7.213.59,后面的人所使用的作者infosecurityguard.com和指着其办公室DSL线路,这个的黑客Notrax,使用匿名冲浪服务,而不是他们的员工在他们的办公室之一:

“首席执行维尔弗雷德·哈夫纳Securstar公司否认任何接触Notrax。” Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

让我们反映了这句话的时刻...请问真的找一位不愿透露姓名的黑客花64欧元购买,而不是使用的自由和更安全的TOR(洋葱路由器) ?然后让另一块的反映他们不愿透露姓名的冲浪服务称为surfsolo的信息:

  • IP 217.7.213.59是GmbH公司Securstar公司的办公室DSL线路
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • 他们推销自己的“匿名使用P2P”( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php )的匿名代理服务。 Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? 如果你的VoIP,你不能让第三方洪水线/ P2P流量,你的电话会变得明显不可靠的(是的,是的,你可以做的QoS,但你不会把一个匿名导航代理贵公司的办公用的DSL行了......)。
  • 哪家公司提供的是匿名的导航服务将永远使用自己的办公室的IP地址? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. 或者他可能是我们的一个老客户的“。 2M用户DSL线路上,真的吗?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net - 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com - 69.16.211.133

老实说,我可以很容易地理解,哈夫纳先生正在做什么,他可以保护他的公司丑闻,但至少是可疑的“匿名代理”的借口。

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

这有可能是地球将得到来自外太空的攻击,那将摧毁我们的生活吗?

统计学上极为困难,而且是可能的。 或多或少像“匿名代理”的故事告诉Hafner先生支付的事实,他们是那些背后的infosecurityguard.com假冒“独立安全评论”。

嘿,我并不需要别的说服自己或让聪明的人有自己的想法。

我只是觉得,Securstar公司摆脱这个烂摊子的最佳方式很可能是黑客社区提供公共借口滥用名称真正的独立安全研究和声誉,为了一个营销噱头。

的问候,

法比奥Pietrosanti的

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. 敬请关注。

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Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

下面制成由匿名黑客http://infosecurityguard.com的是安全审查的证据表明,在事实一个不诚实的营销策划由Securstar公司联系 ,以促进他们的语音加密产品。

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

现在,它的确认,这是一个假独立黑客安全研究由Securstar公司GmbH,它只是一种营销把戏!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1),我贴http://infosecurityguard.com一个意见后,链接到我的博客, 国防认证的israelian部上的文章

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3)达到我的博客,他泄露了他未来217.7.213.59(我刚刚在点击从WordPress的统计数字接口的IP地址)

4) http:// 217.7.213.59/panel的是IP PBX接口的的企业PBX Securstar公司联系(通过互联网公开可达!)

5)内部PBX的名称确认,它是100%Securstar公司联系:

6) 有100%的证据表明,匿名黑客http://infosecurityguard.com是从Securstar公司联系

下面,让我们发现,它的所有,但一个不诚实的营销技巧,而不是一个独立的安全研究数据和参考。

荣誉,以利玛窦花都它的支持,他的文章中揭穿Infosecurityguard身份

HTTP转诊技巧

当你阅读的链接,从一个网站到另一个有一个HTTP协议头,“推荐”,告诉您从哪个页面有人去到另一个网页。

转诊证明,作者http://infosecurityguard.com的看了我的帖子,因为它是来自的http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php,您使用的网页作为一个WordPress撰文/编辑批准/拒绝评论。 这里是链接。

这是日志条目:

217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010:2时56分37秒-0700]“GET / 20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works / HTTP/1.0”200 5795“http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php”“Mozilla/4.0(兼容; MSIE 8.0;的Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3;。NET CLR 1.1.4322。 NET CLR 2.0.50727; NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152。NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)“

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

联系PBX Securstar公司是开在互联网上,它包含了所有的名字,他们的雇员,确认我们作者http:/infosecurityguard.com的是,公司是匿名黑客称为Notrax的。

这里是他们的论坛上发帖联系家伙Securstar公司, 调试IPCOPfirewall与Asterisk的 (所以我们也看到他们所使用的细节)那里是IP 217.7.213.59。

SecurStarproof.png

这也是真的很好玩!

他们卖安全的电话,但他们公司的电话系统是在互联网上公开的脆弱 :-)

我想打电话给CEO,哈夫纳在其内部桌面PBX地宣布,我们发现了他的把戏,通过SIP .. :->

他们测量他们的营销活动

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. 这是合理的,如果你投资的钱在你想要的营销活动,看到的结果:-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010:2点22分42秒-0700]“GET / HTTP/1.0”200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0(兼容; MSIE 8.0;的Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3;。NET CLR 1.1.4322。NET CLR 2.0.50727;。NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152。NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)“

217.7.213.59 - [30/Jan/2010:4时15分07秒-0700]“GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0(兼容; MSIE 8.0;的Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3;。NET CLR 1.1.4322。NET CLR 2.0.50727;。NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152。NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)“


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

注册商:GODADDY.COM,INC。

更新日期:2009年12月01日

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

行政联系人:Private,注册INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM @ domainsbyproxy.com,域名代理公司DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax黑客对谷歌不存在
正如你所知道的任何黑客得到公众的通常有它的活动对谷歌的存在,出席邮件列表,论坛,网页,过去的研究中,参与会议,等等,等等。
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. 只有一些命中大约一个匿名的浏览器名为Notrax的 ,但没有有关该黑客。
也许当Securstar公司提供了自己的营销机构,不愿透露姓名的工具,以帮助他们保护不愿透露姓名的假的研究,为他们提供市场营销的家伙想用这个假黑客的绰号是什么?Notrax匿名浏览器notrax.So的 :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

各种评论不的有PhoneCrypt的评论是积极的和惊人的良好的反馈,而其他都是唯一不好的反馈,并没有单一的好点。

正如你可以想像,在任何一种独立的产品评价,对所有产品有货差了点。 在这其中,有唯一的产品,是好,是坏的产品号。

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

他们完全避免谈论的加密和安全的产品。

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
比他们的一个结果有些不同。

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

他没有做“蓝盒子”,与其他黑客盗用电话线路和连接的乐趣,但挣钱。

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. 没有黑客的道德可言!

All in all, is that lawful?

唱衰的竞争对手不正当竞争的做法在大多数地区,因此它是值得商榷的(至少可以这样说),Securstar公司是一个法律健全的地面上。
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. 例如,在英国,英国广告从业人员研究所 -在遵守保护消费者免受不公平贸易法规 -裁定:

“冒领或创造交易者的印象是,不采取行动,他的贸易,商业,工艺或行业,或虚假地表示自己作为一个消费者” 是刑事罪行有关的用途。

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
这是否将是刑事和/或民事法庭或没有的事并不重要。 然而,这是很清楚的,联系Securstar公司出现至少是道德问题,不值得信任。

不错的尝试,先生们......但是,下一次只是做它的权利(不论是否为他们的“权利”的意思是“一个诚实的方式”或“在时装不被抓住”我将让他们选择“)

:法比奥Pietrosanti(纳伊夫)

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不诚实的安全:SecurStart的联系有PhoneCrypt案

我想提供道德的概念,证券公司应当尊重用户,媒体和安全环境 ​​的考虑。

联系Securstar公司做了非常糟糕的事情,infosecuriguard.com假的自主研发。

这是不公平的做法对于黑客社区。

这是不公平的营销给最终用户。 他们不应该欺骗通过创建假独立审查。

在安全市场的竞争,这是不公平的。

让我们做一些更重要的考虑。

Must be serious on cryptographic products. 他们不是玩具

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

如果你不遵守基本的安全规则的透明度和安全性的加密,你是把人的生命处于危险之中。

你正在服用的责任。 (我想在晚上睡觉,不要认为Securstar公司CEO / CTO护理的有关...)

安全研究需要参考和透明度

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
安全研究不应仪器用于应该做营销purpose.Security研究的意识和成长的全球安全环境的知识。

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

黑客被认为是中性的,书呆子,做什么,他们做他们的快乐和激情。

如果你工作在安全市场,你的工作与黑客。

如果您使用自己的营销目的的黑客和黑客的环境,你非常讨厌的东西。

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

这件事情,造成严重的代价的权威信息online.An匿名黑客,网上没有参考,做了一个看起来像是一个独立的产品安全审查。 我不得不说,假检讨是非常充分的准备,它总是以间接的方式带来了好/坏的东西。 它没有出现,我在第一时间像假的。 But going deeply i found what's going on.

然而,记者,新闻媒体和博客去的陷阱,他们的假研究检讨。 TheRegister,NetworkWorld的博客了很多报道。 即使是完全匿名的。

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

:法比奥Pietrosanti(纳伊夫)

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About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

是的,这是真的,大部分由Securstar公司在匿名的营销网站中描述的产品称为http://infosecurityguard.com的有一些弱点。
但相关的弱点是他人和有PhoneCrypt的不幸的是,大部分所描述的产品一样患上这种。
让我们回顾一下哪些特点是需要基本的加密技术和安全要求(最佳实践的基础和基本!)

- 安全海槽朦胧不起作用

加密卡梅斯从1883年由奥古斯特Kerckhoffs的一个基本原则:

在一个精心设计的加密系统,唯一的关键需求是秘密;算法应该没有保密。
现代密码学家已经接受了这一原则,要求任何东西“含糊的安全性。”
读什么布鲁斯Schneir说,在世界公认的专家和密码破译
任何安全专家会告诉你,这是事实。 即使是新手的大学生会告诉你,这是事实。 很简单,因为这是唯一的方式做加密。
几乎所有的产品描述在审查Securstar公司联系,包括有PhoneCrypt,不提供准确详细了解他们的加密技术。
精确的细节是:
  • (这不只是说:“我们使用AES “加密算法)的详细规范
  • 加密协议(这不只是说:“我们使用的Diffie Hellman的 “)的详细规范
  • 测量加密实力(这不只是说:“我们有10000000位密钥大小 “)的详细规范

提供精确的细节,意味着有大量的文档记录的算法是如何工作的,任何单一的方式协议如何工作的精确规格复制它的互操作性测试的理论和实际意义。
这意味着,科学界应该能够玩的是技术,审计它,砍它。
如果我们不知道任何关于密码系统的详细信息,我们怎么能知道哪些是弱点和力量点?

迈克·弗拉托,网站编辑,网络计算,做出了很大的文章“说不专有加密系统”
CERIAS普渡大学讲这个

B - 非同行评议的和非科学的批准加密不起作用

在任何情况下,在任何情况下,你做你需要的加密技术,以确保别人会检查,审查,分析,distruct和reconstract从头您的技术,并免费向公众提供这些信息进行公开讨论。
这究竟是如何AES出生,像美国国家标准学会做加密 (公共同行评审,只有最好的评估双赢公益大赛)。
公共讨论与公共的比赛,其中有很多在世界上最有名的密码学家和专家审查,黑客(他们的名字,姓氏和脸,不喜欢Notrax)提供他们的贡献,告诉他们认为。
这就是所谓的“同行评审”。

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

产品名称 Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review 关闭
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
关闭
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
关闭
Illix Obscurity
No public review
关闭
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
关闭
有PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
关闭
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
关闭
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
关闭
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
关闭
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
关闭
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
关闭
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
关闭
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
关闭
Zfone Transparency Public review
打开
ZRTP Transparency Public review
打开

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
为什么呢?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
这些都是仅有2快速的想法,更可能可以做。

听起来很像一个营销活动 - 不是一个安全的研究。

我要告诉你。 我非常仔细地分析问题,在大多数方面。 这一切的东西话音加密analisys的声音对我来说像一个营销竞选的Securstar公司联系到出售有PhoneCrypt的赢得口碑。 来吸引媒体说,以间接的方式,欺骗媒体,有PhoneCrypt是唯一一个安全良好的阐述和充分的准备运动。 看到新闻稿Securstar公司的“安全研究员告诉,有PhoneCrypt是唯一的安全产品”的Notrax Securstar公司有PhoneCrypt的匿名黑客的“Notrax”认为是安全的“软件解决方案”是唯一的产品。
在同行业竞争的唯一的“软件版本”:

- SnapCell -没有人可以买它。 保安公司甚至没有过了一个网页。 该公司几乎不存在了。
- 罗德schawarz的 -一个公司有他的列表价格和过时的硬件安全手机 没有人会买它,它不属使用好。

这听起来很奇怪,只有那些其他的产品被认为是安全的以及有PhoneCrypt。

...让我们看看什么样的多媒体内容在黄金锁 Cellcrypt有PhoneCrypt的的不同的评论,以了解多少按下有PhoneCrypt审查最有吸引力的营销人员:

应用 应用截图 与示范截取视频 网络演示
有PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

很明显,有PhoneCrypt明确显示更多的功能和主要的安全功能比其他产品说明审查。

它们之间的差别太大,我们应该怀疑它是一种营销技巧?

但其他奇怪的事情再次有人做过分析的方式...
如果这是“公正和中立的评论”我们应该看到所有产品的好和坏的东西?

好吧,请参阅下面的表格在每个段落黄金锁,CellCrypt和有PhoneCrypt的的不同的评论表示认为(是唯一可用的),看是否是正面或负面的。

应用 段数 正段落 负段落 中性段落
有PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
苹果iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. 不是的。 Positive Marketing feedback
良好的思维! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

此外,让我们来看看在域...
域infosecurityguard.com隐私保护domainsbypr​​oxy的防止理解的所有者是谁。
域已创建2个月前的12月01日09 godaddy.com过户登记。

什么也很有趣的发现,这个“未知的黑客没有一丝他对谷歌于2009年12月出现净Securstar公司联系新闻稿 “被称为“IT安全专家”。

也许他们“认识的人”谁是这个匿名notrax的吗? :)

我按照我自己的阴谋思维或者有一些合理的怀疑,一切都只是一个营销活动,有趣的方式安排?

社会代价

如果你是一个安全公司,你工作也有社会方面的,你也应该努力使世界变得更美好的地方(务必使业务,但“不被邪恶”)。 你不能欺骗最终用户的技能,在评估安全制假误导性的信息。

你应该这样做对最终用户的意识,使他们更加意识到安全问题,给他们的工具来了解,并自行决定。

希望你有乐趣,看完这篇文章,你做你自己的思考。

:法比奥Pietrosanti(纳伊夫)

PS这些都是我个人的专业意见,让我们来谈谈技术和安全性,而不是营销。
PPS我不是智能网络写作,太对不起如何格式化文本以及如何流动的文章是非结构化的!

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Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

要小心。

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

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Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

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Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? 哎呀!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

麦克风

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

想想吧......

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Disk encryption sometimes 'works'

I am one of the person convinced that a computer disk encryption system will not protect you from public authorities if they are convinced enough and the case is very important.

There are a lot of way to convince a person to release a password.

However there's a case in Australia where not revealing the disk password resulted in a successful way to avoid going in jail:

Secret code saves man who spied on flatmates

My opinion is just that spying flatmates is not a so relevant and particular crime and that law enforcement did not used 'convincing systems' to get the password of encrypted disk.

UPDATE 29.06.2010: It also worked for Daniel Dantas against FBI .

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Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Read more here .

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UAE government placing backdoors into Blackberry devices

Nice attempt to place backdoors inside Blackberry devices.

It seems that UAE government wanted to do something nasty placing backdoors trough software upgrades in Etilsat (local mobile operator) blackberry devices, obviously with the cooperation of the mobile operator itself.

Fortunately, the power of the security community discovered and unveiled the facts. 检查出来。

Etisat patch designed for surveillance

Wired magazine: Blackberry spies

Security exists only with transparency.

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Voice encryption in government sectors

I will make some in depth articles about how voice encryption really works in government environments.

The open standards and open source still have to reach the military and government environments for what's related to secure speech.

To give you an idea of the complexity and kind of particular issues that exists, look at the USA 3G Wireless Security: A Government Perspective and the A Waveform Architecture to Support Security and Interoperability in Multi-National Wireless Networks for Tactical Communication .

They are using so-custom protocols like Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol that require the use of patented MELPe ultra-narrowband codec that there's not a real market of application and equipment using this. Only a small elite of government controlled companies from few countries manage this de-facto lobby.

Should we change this bringing open standards also to government sectors?

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Voice Security and Privacy slides

Below my slides on voice security and privacy from Security Summit 2009 .

mmm, yes i am working in this area from 2005, will write again about it.

sux

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