Tag Archives: voicesecurity

RFC 6189: ZRTP akhirnya standard!

Akhirnya ZRTP telah diberikan tugasan RFC rasmi, RFC6189 ZRTP: Media jalan Perjanjian Utama untuk unicast Selamat RTP.

Ia mempunyai sebagai pergantungan SRTP dengan AES saiz utama 256bit yang kini telah ditakrifkan sebagai RFC6188 .

Ia adalah menarik untuk melihat RFC akhirnya dibebaskan, kerana ia merupakan satu peristiwa penting untuk menetapkan ZRTP sebagai standard rasmi untuk penyulitan hujung-ke-akhir banyak seperti PGP telah untuk e-mel.

Sekarang mana-mana organisasi di dunia akan secara rasmi dapat melaksanakan ZRTP untuk akhir-ke-akhir protokol penyulitan suara

Pada masa 3 pelaksanaan awam berbeza ZRTP protokol wujud:

Setiap daripada mereka memberikan ciri-ciri yang berlainan protokol, tetapi yang paling penting dikenali sebagai saling.

Satu gelombang baru akan datang ke dunia penyulitan suara, irrupting ke kawasan kelabu di mana kebanyakan syarikat yang menjalankan sistem penyulitan telefon telah melaksanakan penyulitan adat.

Sekarang standard yang telah persediaan dan terdapat beberapa sebab-sebab yang tinggal untuk melaksanakan sesuatu yang berbeza.

Hurra Encik Zimmermann dan semua masyarakat syarikat (seperti PrivateWave ) dan individu (seperti Werner Dittmann ) yang bekerja di atasnya!

Hari ini adalah hari yang besar, apa-apa teknologi yang kini rasmi dan juga dengan pelbagai pelaksanaan yang sedia ada!

Philip, anda pula sekali lagi, pujian saya kepada semangat tulen dan penentuan :-)

Kongsi

Kemajuan untuk GSM keretakan di Freiburg universiti

Dunia menarik protokol mudah alih (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, dan lain-lain) hacking semakin aktiviti penyelidikan rasmi daripada universiti.

Pelaburan untuk membuat siaran kod opensource perisian retak memberi peluang kepada pelajar-pelajar universiti untuk bekerja di atasnya, meningkatkan dan melakukan penyelidikan yang kuat.

Universiti Freiburg hanya mengeluarkan kertas latihan praktikal di GSM Penyulitan A5 / 1 bersama-sama dengan gsmframencoder alat sokongan untuk memperbaiki proses menghidu, menyahkod dan retak.

Membuka perkakasan, membuka perisian, protokol membuka menunjukkan kelemahan apa-apa kaedah atau proses proprietari untuk membina-up teknologi komunikasi dan keselamatan.

Ia sepatutnya menjadi matlamat mana-mana saintis cuba untuk membuka-up dan retak sebarang teknologi proprietari dan tertutup untuk memaksa industri untuk terus hanya dengan pendekatan kendali dan terbuka semasa mereka bentuk protokol telekomunikasi.

Kongsi

TETRA hacking akan datang: OsmocomTETRA

Ia amat menarik untuk melihat pembebasan OsmocomTETRA itu, SDR opensource pertama ( Perisian Radio wajib ) pelaksanaan TETRA penyahmodulat, PHY dan bawah lapisan MAC.

Ia adalah versi TETRA daripada GSM airprobe yang membuka akses kepada data dan kerangka protokol komunikasi TETRA, sekali gus memberi peluang hacking hebat!

Sekarang juga TETRA teknologi telah membuka kita harus mengharapkan, sepanjang 2011 ini, untuk melihat opensource TETRA sniffers dan yang paling mungkin juga penyulitan TEA (yang Penyulitan Algoritma Tetra) retak!

TETRA digunakan oleh Polis, Perkhidmatan Kecemasan dan tentera sebagai rangkaian komunikasi mudah alih alternatif yang boleh berfungsi walaupun tanpa adanya liputan rangkaian (hanya mudah alih ke mudah alih tanpa stesen pangkalan) dan menyediakan beberapa perkhidmatan khas ketersediaan tinggi.

Saya menulis tentang TETRA dalam slaid saya Suara Major Keselamatan Protokol Kajian .

Dalam senarai mel OsmocomBB sudah ada perbincangan tentang beberapa status rangkaian TETRA:

  • Belgium Polis TETRA Astrid rangkaian: tanpa enkrip
  • German Polis TETRA ujian rangkaian di Aachen: tanpa enkrip
  • Beberapa bekas jugoslawia TETRA rangkaian: tanpa enkrip
  • Belanda C200 TETRA rangkaian: TEA2 disulitkan dengan kunci statik
  • UK Airwave TETRA rangkaian: TEA2 disulitkan dengan TEA2

Ia akan menjadi benar-benar menyeronokkan untuk melihat bahawa Polis baru dan menyelamat perkhidmatan hacking kembali datang dari zaman analog lama kepada radio digital yang baru :-)

Kongsi

ZORG, baru C + + dan Java ZRTP pelaksanaan siaran awam

Hi semua, hari ini pada PrivateWave Italia SpA, syarikat Itali yang terlibat dalam membangunkan teknologi untuk melindungi maklumat sulit dan keselamatan maklumat dalam telekomunikasi suara di mana i am CTO, kita melepaskan ZORG, sumber terbuka ZRTP pelaksanaan protokol baru yang tersedia untuk dimuat turun dari http://www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] menyediakan hujung-ke-hujung pertukaran utama dengan Curve Elips Diffie-Hellmann 384bit dan AES-256 SRTP penyulitan.

ZORG telah asalnya dibangunkan dan dilaksanakan di PrivateGSM produk penyulitan suara PrivateWave sedia untuk platform berikut: Blackberry, Nokia dan IOS (iPhone).

Zorg C + + telah bersepadu dengan PJSIP sumber terbuka VoIP SDK [2] dan ia disediakan sebagai tampalan integrasi terhadap PJSIP 1.8.5. Ia telah diuji pada iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux dan Mac OS X.

Zorg Jawa telah bersepadu dalam versi adat MJSIP [3] sumber terbuka SDK pada platform Blackberry dan ia termasuk pengoptimuman penggunaan memori yang diperlukan untuk mengurangkan pada aktiviti pemungut sampah minimum.

Kedua-dua platform telah dipisahkan dan kriptografi modular back-berakhir supaya pelaksanaan algoritma kriptografi boleh dengan mudah ditukar dengan yang lain.

. ZORG dilesenkan di bawah GNU AGPL dan kod sumber boleh didapati di github di https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Kami melepaskan ia di bawah sumber terbuka dan kepaduan dengan pendekatan kami untuk keselamatan [4] seperti yang kita benar-benar berharap bahawa ia boleh menjadi berguna untuk ekosistem sumber terbuka untuk mencipta sistem penyulitan suara baru bagi menyokong kebebasan bersuara.

Lebih daripada 20 pjsip berasaskan sumber terbuka VoIP penyulitan dan beberapa ditulis dalam Java secara langsung boleh mendapat manfaat daripada pelepasan ZORG.

Kami akan gembira untuk menerima cadangan kerjasama, integrasi baru, kriptografi baru back-hujung, bug pengakap dan apa sahaja yang berguna untuk meningkatkan dan membiarkan ZRTP mengesahkan sebagai standard penyulitan suara.

Zorg boleh didapati daripada http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] pendekatan Keselamatan: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Kongsi

Disulitkan mudah alih untuk panggilan telefon talian darat dengan Asterisk 1.8

Kami hanya mengeluarkan satu howto teknikal mengenai bagaimana untuk membina Bercagar mudah alih untuk infrastruktur VoIP talian tetap dengan:

Dalam beberapa minggu akan datang lain howto seperti ini akan keluar dengan menggunakan platform pelayan lain seperti FreeSWITCH, semua dalam semangat ketelusan dan memanfaatkan teknologi keselamatan opensource.

Kongsi

PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia penyulitan suara mudah alih dengan ZRTP atau SRTP / SDES

Saya benar-benar mengelakkan untuk menggunakan blog peribadi saya untuk membuat promosi apa-apa jenis produk.

Masa ia tidak berbeza, tetapi saya ingin memberitahu anda fakta tentang produk i bekerja tanpa pemasaran mewah, tetapi tinggal teknikal.

Hari ini, pada PrivateWave mana i am CTO dan pengasas bersama , kita dikeluarkan kepada umum Produk mudah alih penyulitan VoIP untuk Blackberry, iPhone dan Nokia:

logo-privatewave-colore.png

Pada PrivateWave kita menggunakan pendekatan yang berbeza berkenaan dengan kebanyakan syarikat penyulitan suara di luar sana, membaca kami pendekatan untuk keselamatan .

Kaitan produk ini dalam teknologi dan industri landskap boleh dirumuskan seperti berikut:

  • Ia pertama syarikat penyulitan suara menggunakan protokol keselamatan standard sahaja (dan kami menjangkakan pasaran akan bertindak balas, kerana ia adalah jelas bahawa teknologi proprietari yang datang dari warisan CSD tidak boleh memberi nilai yang sama)
  • Ia adalah pendekatan pertama dalam penyulitan suara untuk hanya menggunakan sumber terbuka & enjin standard penyulitan
  • Ia merupakan satu pendekatan penyulitan suara untuk menyediakan model keselamatan yang berbeza menggunakan teknologi yang berbeza (akhir-ke-akhir untuk ZRTP dan akhir-ke-tapak untuk SRTP )

Mereka suite Pelanggan Secure Mobile, yang direka untuk keselamatan profesional menggunakan hanya menggunakan telekomunikasi terbaik dan teknologi keselamatan, menyediakan tahap perlindungan yang tinggi bersama-sama dengan prestasi yang baik juga dalam keadaan rangkaian yang buruk:

Aplikasi adalah:

icona-pgsm.png

Peranti mudah alih yang disokong adalah:

Mengenai ZRTP kami mengambil keputusan untuk tekanan dan menghulurkan semua keselamatan dan ciri paranoid protokol dengan beberapa tambahan sedikit:

  • Gunakan hanya Elips Curve Diffie Hellmann (ECDH) 384bit yang merupakan sebahagian daripada NSA Suite-B ( No Koblitz ECDH-571 keluk! )
  • Gunakan AES256 dalam mod CTR
  • Adakah pengesahan cache dan kesinambungan utama
  • Integrasi alamat ketat diberikan berkenaan dengan RFC dengan pemeriksaan paranoid tambahan
  • Semua amaran keselamatan dan kesilapan keselamatan menyebabkan panggilan untuk tamatkan panggilan, cache dibersihkan dan pengguna amaran untuk menyemak semula ZRTP keselamatan
  • Gunakan Nombor Rawak Generator dalam pematuhan ketat dengan keperluan keselamatan FIPS dengan menggunakan Source fisik Entropi (Mikrofon)

Integrasi buku alamat yang ketat kami, melampaui ZRTP RFC spesifikasi, yang boleh terdedah kepada serangan tertentu apabila digunakan pada telefon bimbit kerana tingkah laku pengguna tidak melihat skrin telefon bimbit.

Cara paranoy kami menggunakan ZRTP mengurangkan apa-apa syarat, kita akan menulis tentang ini kemudian dan / atau akan menambah butiran khusus untuk RFC dimasukkan.

Beberapa kata-kata di PrivateGSM Profesional dengan hujung-ke-akhir penyulitan dengan ZRTP

Baca lembaran teknikal di sana!

Untuk memuat turun klik di sini dan hanya meletakkan nombor telefon anda

Mereka adalah hasil kerja keras semua kakitangan sangat mahir saya (16 orang bekerja di projek-projek ini 6 selama 3 platform yang berbeza) kepada teknologi mencabar (penyulitan suara) dalam persekitaran operasi yang sukar (rangkaian mudah alih yang kotor dan sistem operasi mudah alih kotor) selama lebih daripada 2 tahun.

Saya amat berbangga dengan kakitangan kami!

Apa lagi?

Dalam beberapa minggu akan datang anda akan melihat melepaskan set utama dokumen seperti integrasi dengan asterisk, freeswitch dan Keselamatan lain Enabled PBX, bersama-sama dengan beberapa yang menarik keselamatan lain berita teknologi yang saya pasti akan perasan ;)

Ia telah bekerja keras dan banyak lagi perlu dilakukan tetapi saya yakin bahawa keselamatan dan masyarakat opensource akan suka produk itu dan pendekatan telus kami juga dengan kenyataan terbuka yang penting dan integrasi sumber terbuka yang membuat teknologi yang sangat politik neutral (backdoor percuma) .

Kongsi

Bukan semua keluk eliptik adalah sama: bekas di ECC keselamatan

 ECC keselamatan keluk saya sendiri dan analisis pilihan

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Yang moden kripto penggunaan Elips kriptografi Curve (ECC) bahawa, dengan saiz yang lebih kecil dan mengurangkan kuasa pengiraan, memberi kekuatan keselamatan setara sistem kripto tradisional dikenali sebagai DH (Diffie-Hellman) atau RSA (Rivest, Shamir dan Adleman).

Tidak semua orang tahu bahawa penyulitan ECC dipilih untuk mana-mana aplikasi penyulitan masa depan dan bahawa walaupun TLS / SSL (penyulitan yang digunakan untuk mendapatkan web) bergerak ke ECC.

Saya dapati banyak yang dipanggil "produk penyulitan proprietari" yang ditinggalkan RSA dan DH untuk pergi dengan alternatif ECC, yang cenderung kepada penggunaan sewenang-wenangnya ECC bit saiz utama tanpa menyatakan yang jenis ECC kripto membiasakan.

Walau bagaimanapun terdapat banyak kekeliruan di seluruh Keluk Elips, dengan banyak nama yang berbeza dan saiz yang utama membuat sukar untuk bukan kriptografi berpengalaman pengguna untuk membuat angka anda sendiri apabila menilai beberapa barangan kripto.

Kerana kekeliruan supaya disebarkan i memutuskan untuk membuat analisis saya sendiri untuk mengetahui yang mana adalah yang terbaik keluk penyulitan ECC dan kanan ECC saiz utama untuk digunakan.

Analisis ini ingin memberikan satu industri pilihan berasaskan kepada keselamatan di kalangan pelbagai keluk dan saiz utama, meninggalkan matematik dan kripto pertimbangan analisis yang telah telah dilakukan pada tahun-tahun, ringkasan pelbagai pilihan yang diambil di beberapa piawaian dan protokol keselamatan.

Pertama kesimpulan.

Daripada analisis saya hanya keluk ECC berikut perlu dipertimbangkan untuk digunakan dalam sistem penyulitan kerana adalah satu-satunya dipilih antara pihak berkuasa yang berbeza (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC BrainPool), keselamatan standard protokol yang berlainan (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) dan satu-satunya yang sepadan NSA Suite B keperluan keselamatan (de-facto standard juga untuk persekitaran tentera NATO):

  • Elips Perdana Curve 256 bit - P-256
  • Elips Perdana Curve 384 bit - P-384

dengan pilihan, hanya untuk benar-benar paranoid yang ingin mendapatkan sedikit saiz lebih utama, masih tidak dianggap berguna:

  • Elips Perdana Curve 521 bit - P-521

Saya ingin menyatakan bahawa keluk Koblitz harus dielakkan, dalam mana-mana saiz kunci (163/283/409/571) kerana mereka tidak mempunyai jaminan yang cukup pada kripto aktiviti analisis dan berkesan mereka adalah:

  • Bukan sebahagian NSA Suite-B pemilihan kriptografi
  • Bukan sebahagian ECC pemilihan Brainpool
  • Bukan sebahagian ANSI X9.62 pemilihan
  • Bukan sebahagian OpenPGP ECC pilihan lanjutan
  • Bukan sebahagian lanjutan Kerberos untuk pemilihan keluk ECC

Saya menjemput pembaca untuk mengikuti bekas analisis saya untuk memahami asas-asas yang boleh difahami walaupun tanpa latar belakang teknikal yang mendalam tetapi sekurang-kurangnya dengan latar belakang teknologi yang baik, sesetengah sedikit asas kriptografi.

 Di sini kita pergi dengan analisis
 

Matlamat saya adalah untuk membuat analisis mengenai apa / bagaimana saintifik terbuka dan keselamatan masyarakat Pilih ECC sistem kripto untuk kegunaan dalam protokol keselamatan dan standard yang ditakrifkan oleh IETF RFC (orang-orang yang menentukan Standard Internet dengan cara yang terbuka dan rakan-semula).

Di bawah satu set RFC Memperkenalkan ECC ke dalam sistem yang sedia ada yang dapat dianalisis untuk memahami apa yang lebih baik untuk digunakan dan apa yang lebih baik untuk tidak termasuk:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Standard Keluk & Generasi Curve
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B kriptografi Suites untuk IPSec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite profil B Pengangkutan Lapisan Keselamatan (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B di dalam selamat / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Menentukan Kekuatan Untuk Kunci Awam Digunakan Untuk Bertukar Kunci Simetri
  • RFC5349 : Curve Kriptografi Elips (ECC) Sokongan untuk Kriptografi Kunci Awam untuk pengesahan awal di Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : Elips Curve Kriptografi (ECC) Cipher Suites Pengangkutan Lapisan Keselamatan (TLS)
  • ZRTP penyulitan suara oleh Philip Zimmermann ECC keluk
  • ECC dalam OpenPGP (draf d rakit-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 )
  • ECC Keluk dipilih oleh Microsoft untuk Smartcard Kerberos login

Kami akan menggunakan pilihan yang dibuat oleh saintis menentukan Protokol Internet Security untuk membuat sebahagian daripada penilaian kami.
Selain itu ia perlu difahami bahawa pemilihan Curve itu datang daripada pihak berkuasa yang berbeza yang membuat pilihan mereka sendiri Keluk untuk memberitahu kepada industri apa untuk digunakan dan apa yang melangkau:

Kami akan menggunakan pilihan yang dibuat oleh saintis menentukan keperluan keselamatan di agensi-agensi piawaian untuk membuat sebahagian daripada penilaian kami.
Selain itu, sesuatu yang kebanyakan orang tidak tahu, tetapi ia amat berkaitan dengan analisis kami, adalah bahawa terdapat pelbagai jenis lengkung ECC kriptografi dan "saiz" mereka, ia adalah berbeza bergantung kepada jenis keluk:

  • ECC Keluk atas Perdana Field (sering dirujuk sebagai Curve Elips dan diwakili oleh P-keysize)
  • ECC Keluk lebih Field Perduaan (sering dirujuk sebagai Curve Koblitz dan diwakili oleh K-keysize)

Memandangkan kekuatan keselamatan kesetaraan Curve Elips dan Curve Kobliz mempunyai saiz kunci yang berbeza, sebagai contoh apabila kita membaca ECC 571 kita merujuk kepada Curve Koblitz dengan kekuatan bersamaan dengan ECC 521 Perdana lengkung.

Satu perbandingan kekuatan antara Keluk Elips dan Keluk Kotbliz dilaporkan di bawah (dari Mikey ECC internet Draf ):

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15360

Di bawah terdapat perbandingan semua keluk dipilih oleh semua pelbagai entiti dan nama masing-masing (dari IETF RFC4492 untuk kegunaan ECC untuk TLS ):

 Nama Curve dipilih oleh organisasi piawaian yang berbeza
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

Apa yang segera muncul adalah bahawa terdapat hanya dua keluk dipilih oleh semua pihak berkuasa, dan bahawa terdapat lambakan umum keluk koblitz oleh ANSI.The hanya biasanya bersetuju di kalangan pihak berkuasa 3 adalah seperti berikut dua keluk ECC ini:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Pemilihan mereka keluk ECC untuk TLS yang RFC5430 dilangkau sepenuhnya keluk koblitz dan dipilih untuk kegunaan sahaja:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The ECC Brainpool dilangkau sepenuhnya keluk Koblitz dan dipilih untuk penggunaan berikut Keluk ECC:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (itulah satu-satunya tertentu kerana ia tidak P-521 tetapi P-512, satu-satunya utama saiz yang dirujuk oleh ECC brainpool. TNX Ian Simons dari Athena SCS )

The OpenPGP draf internet untuk kegunaan ECC di PGP d rakit-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 dilangkau sepenuhnya keluk Koblitz dan memilih ECC keluk berikut

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The Kerberos protokol lanjutan untuk kegunaan ECC, yang ditakrifkan dalam RFC5349 dan ditakrifkan oleh Microsoft untuk log masuk kad pintar dilangkau sepenuhnya keluk Koblitz dan dipilih keluk ECC berikut:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Jadi, bunyi yang jelas bahawa pemilihan kanan ECC adalah untuk P-256, P-384 dan P-521 manakala keluk Koblitz telah dilangkau untuk kegunaan Rahsia dan bagi mana-mana protokol keselamatan yang sensitif (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS).

Mengapa saya membuat analisis ini?

Saya telah melakukan analisis ini berikutan perbincangan saya telah mengenai produk penyulitan suara tertentu, semua berdasarkan protokol adat dan hak milik, yang semua menggunakan Curve Elips Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571/571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bit.
Semua mereka menggunakan K-571 itu, seperti yang dinyatakan sebelum ini, telah dikeluarkan dari persekitaran sensitif keselamatan dan protokol dan menjadi diri saya seorang pereka barangan penyulitan suara saya berfikir bahawa pilihan kriptografi mereka adalah benar-benar bukan pilihan keselamatan yang terbaik.
Mungkin ia telah dilakukan hanya untuk tujuan pemasaran, kerana K-571 (Koblitz keluk) seolah-olah lebih kuat daripada P-521 (lengkung Elips berdasarkan bilangan Perdana). Jika anda mempunyai "lebih sedikit" guys pemasaran anda boleh membuat tuntutan untuk menjadi "lebih selamat". Koblitz keluk eliptik lebih cepat daripada rahsia membolehkan keluk Perdana atas eliptik dan sebagainya memberikan pengurus produk peluang untuk menyediakan "lebih sedikit" dalam produk itu sendiri sambil puasa pertukaran utama.

Ia adalah satu perkara pilihan falsafah.

Saya lebih suka mengikut trend masyarakat saintifik dengan rendah hati tidak untuk mempertimbangkan diri pakar kriptografi, knowledgable lebih daripada keselamatan keseluruhan dan komuniti saintifik sendiri.

Saya lebih suka dan bukannya hanya menggunakan algoritma yang telah diluluskan untuk digunakan dalam persekitaran yang sangat sensitif (klasifikasi rahsia), yang telah dipilih oleh semua pihak berkuasa dan kumpulan kerja menganalisis algoritma penyulitan yang sedia ada di luar sana dan yang mewakili pilihan hampir semua standard keselamatan protokol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS, dll).
Saya lebih suka untuk mengira jumlah otak bekerja di kripto i digunakan, yang cek itu benar-benar selamat, yang menilai sama ada terdapat beberapa kelemahan.

Bilangan brais bekerja di Crypto meluas disebarkan adalah perintah magnitud lebih daripada bilangan otak bekerja di kripto yang digunakan oleh hanya beberapa orang (seperti keluk Koblitz).
Jadi saya tidak pagi demonizing yang menggunakan ECDH 571 menggunakan Curve Koblitz, tetapi yang pasti saya boleh mengesahkan bahawa mereka tidak mengambil pilihan yang terbaik dari segi keselamatan dan bahawa mana-mana profesional keselamatan melakukan tanda aras keselamatan akan mempertimbangkan fakta bahawa Curve Elips Diffie Hellman 571 sedikit dilakukan dengan Koblitz Curve tidak disebarkan secara meluas, ia dibuang dari protokol keselamatan standard dan ia tidak disahkan untuk kegunaan rahsia.

Kongsi

Jauh memintas SNOM VoIP telefon

Saya cadangkan membaca jauh menoreh telefon VoIP "pada VoIP Keselamatan Alliance Blog oleh Shawn Merdinger .

Satu contoh yang konkrit tentang bagaimana infrastruktur telefoni semasa semakin terdedah kepada serangan siber.

Kongsi

Suara komunikasi keselamatan bengkel

Hi,

i membuat bercakap tentang suara komunikasi keselamatan teknologi di University of Trento berikutan pertukaran maklumat menarik dengan Crypto Lab berjaya Profesor Massimiliano Sala .

Saya cadangkan orang yang berminat untuk membaca, terutama bahagian kedua, kerana terdapat kategori inovatif pelbagai teknologi penyulitan suara yang dapat digunakan dalam beberapa sektor.

Saya cuba untuk menerangkan dan keluar daripada sektor teknologi ini secara meluas berpecah-belah dengan menyediakan gambaran yang luas mengenai teknologi yang biasanya benar-benar tidak berkaitan satu sama-lain tetapi praktikal mereka semua memohon kepada penyulitan menyuarakan mengikuti kategori yang:

  • Mobile TLC Industri standard penyulitan suara
  • Piawaian penyulitan suara kerajaan dan Tentera
  • Piawaian penyulitan suara keselamatan awam
  • Piawaian penyulitan suara IETF
  • Other proprietari teknologi penyulitan suara

Ia adalah satu slideware besar, 122 slaid, saya cadangkan untuk pergi membaca bahagian 2 ponteng teknologi pemintasan gambaran telah dilindungi oleh persembahan saya tahun 2009.

Suara komunikasi keselamatan


Lihat lebih banyak persembahan dari Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

Kongsi

GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Kongsi

Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Pasaran keselamatan berkembang, lebih banyak syarikat pergi ke pasaran, tetapi berapa ramai daripada mereka mengambil serius apa yang mereka lakukan?

Anda tahu, melakukan teknologi keselamatan yang bermakna bahawa anda bertanggungjawab untuk melindungi maklumat pengguna. Anda mesti membuat mereka sedar apa yang mereka perlukan, apa yang anda lakukan dan yang jenis model ancaman produk anda melindungi.

Satu masalah biasa ciri-ciri keselamatan produk diwakili oleh ketidakupayaan pengguna untuk menilai tuntutan keselamatan produk itu sendiri.

Jadi ada banyak syarikat-syarikat yang melakukan pemasaran yang tidak-begitu-etika ciri-ciri keselamatan, berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang tidak ada pengguna akan dapat menilai.

Keadaan dijelaskan sebelum ini tinggal di topik keselamatan Ular Penyulitan Minyak, satu evolusi dalam persekitaran kriptografi saintifik yang membolehkan kita pada hari ini menggunakan terbaik teknologi perlindungan maklumat baka tanpa perlu bimbang terlalu banyak tentang backdoors atau rasa tidak yakin.

Mari kita bercakap tentang ular Penyulitan Minyak

Ular Kriptografi Minyak : Dalam kriptografi , minyak ular adalah satu istilah yang digunakan untuk menggambarkan kaedah kriptografi komersil dan produk yang dianggap palsu atau penipuan. Membezakan kriptografi selamat dari kriptografi tidak selamat boleh menjadi sukar dari sudut pandangan pengguna. Ramai cryptographers, seperti Bruce Schneier dan Phil Zimmermann , berjanji untuk mendidik orang ramai dalam cara yang selamat kriptografi dilakukan, serta menonjolkan pemasaran mengelirukan sesetengah produk kriptografi.

Yang paling dirujuk kripto keselamatan guru, Philip Zimmermann dan Bruce Schneier, adalah 1 hingga bercakap tentang ular Penyulitan Minyak:

Minyak Ular oleh Philip Zimmermann

Minyak Ular oleh Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telekomunikasi dan Teknologi Kajian Undang-undang juga membuat analisis yang sangat baik yang berkaitan dengan Ciri-ciri Keselamatan Produk Keselamatan, KESELAMATAN SNAKE-MINYAK TUNTUTAN "THE GAMBARAN sistematik KESELAMATAN PRODUK . Mereka menerangkan tentang helah pemasaran jahat digunakan untuk tweak ketidakupayaan pengguna untuk menilai ciri-ciri keselamatan, termasuk ekonomi dan undang-undang implikasi tanggungjawab.

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : Beberapa syarikat-syarikat produk ular minyak keselamatan tidak menjelaskan dan tidak jelas tentang model ancaman kepada mana produk memohon Sangat terkenal adalah hukuman. Russ Nelson :

"Ingat, kripto tanpa model ancaman seperti cookies tanpa susu. ..... Kriptografi tanpa model ancaman adalah seperti ibu tanpa pai epal. Tidak boleh mengatakan bahawa masa yang cukup. Lebih umumnya, keselamatan tanpa model ancaman adalah dengan definisi akan gagal. "

Jadi, bagaimana untuk melihat ular produk keselamatan minyak?

Menyemak garis panduan untuk melihat ular Produk Penyulitan Minyak: Ular Tanda-tanda Amaran Minyak, perisian Penyulitan Elakkan oleh Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

Kongsi

China Encryption Regulations

Hi all,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

Kongsi

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Kongsi

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

Kongsi

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Kongsi

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Kongsi

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Kongsi

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

Kongsi

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Regards,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Tunggu.

Kongsi

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog https://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Kongsi

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Kongsi

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Ya
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Ya
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Ya
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ya
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Ya
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Ya

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Merah / cara Broken bahawa ia tidak sepadan dengan keperluan asas untuk sistem kriptografi selamat
Itu analisis saya menggunakan kaedah penilaian berdasarkan kriptografi dan parameter keselamatan tidak termasuk konteks kompromi tempatan bahawa saya menganggap sia-sia.

Walau bagaimanapun, untuk menjadi jelas, orang-orang yang hanya parameter asas yang akan digunakan apabila mempertimbangkan produk penyulitan suara (hanya untuk mengelakkan berada di dalam keadaan yang kelihatan seperti i am mempromosikan produk yang lain). Jadi ia boleh benar-benar mungkin bahawa produk dengan kripto baik (ketelusan, rakan sebaya dikaji semula dan opensource) adalah benar-benar produk yang tidak selamat kerana apa-apa sebab (buruk bertulis, tidak boleh digunakan menyebabkan pengguna tidak menggunakan dan menggunakan panggilan cleartext, dikompromi politik, dan lain-lain , dll).
Saya fikir saya akan menyediakan kriteria yang lebih luas untuk suara kripto teknologi dan produk kripto suara, jadi ia akan menjadi lebih mudah dan lebih praktikal untuk mempunyai satu set telus penuh dengan kriteria untuk menilai.

Tetapi orang-orang yang benar-benar asas keselamatan untuk dipadankan untuk baik sistem penyulitan suara!
Membaca beberapa slaid berguna lalu di protokol keselamatan yang digunakan dalam sistem penyulitan suara (2 bahagian).

Sekarang membaca di bawah beberapa keraguan yang lebih praktikal tentang penyelidikan mereka.

Konsep keselamatan kajian mengelirukan: mana-mana peranti digodam boleh sentiasa dipintas!

Saya berfikir bahawa lelaki itu benar-benar terlepas titik: APA-APA JENIS PERISIAN RUNNING ON SISTEM OPERASI dikompromi BOLEH dipintas

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Mengapa?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

– SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
– rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Maklum balas positif Pemasaran
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

Kongsi

Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.

It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

Kongsi

Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? Yikes!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

Mike

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

Think about it…

Kongsi

Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Read more here .

Kongsi

Voice encryption in government sectors

I will make some in depth articles about how voice encryption really works in government environments.

The open standards and open source still have to reach the military and government environments for what's related to secure speech.

To give you an idea of the complexity and kind of particular issues that exists, look at the USA 3G Wireless Security: A Government Perspective and the A Waveform Architecture to Support Security and Interoperability in Multi-National Wireless Networks for Tactical Communication .

They are using so-custom protocols like Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol that require the use of patented MELPe ultra-narrowband codec that there's not a real market of application and equipment using this. Only a small elite of government controlled companies from few countries manage this de-facto lobby.

Should we change this bringing open standards also to government sectors?

Kongsi

How the various audio compression codec sounds?

You know, we would not be able to use VoIP and have cheap international phone calls without audio compression codecs.

It's plenty of them, some royalty free, some patented by telco's lobby (think that some patented and royalty-based codec it's also a standard, where all market player have to pay the most aggressive one that acquired the patent while defining the standards).

However, there is a nice collection from vocal , to understand how they sounds.

Kongsi