Kategorya Archive: Privacy

RFC 6189: ZRTP ay sa wakas ng standard!

Panghuli ZRTP ay bibigyan ng isang opisyal na RFC pagtatalaga, RFC6189 ZRTP: Media Path Key Kasunduan para sa Unicast Secure RTP.

Ito ay may bilang isang dependency ang SRTP sa AES key laki ng mga 256bit na ngayon ay tinukoy bilang RFC6188 .

Ito ay nakapupukaw upang makita ang RFC sa wakas inilabas, dahil ito ay isang mahalagang milyahe upang itakda ang ZRTP bilang ang opisyal na pamantayan para sa mga end-to-end encryption tulad ng PGP ay para sa mga email.

Ngayon anumang organisasyon sa mundo ay opisyal na magagawang upang ipatupad ang ZRTP para sa end-to-end encryption protocol boses

Sa kasalukuyan 3 iba't-ibang pampublikong pagpapatupad ng ZRTP protocol umiiral:

Bawat isa sa kanila ay nagbibigay ng mga iba't ibang mga tampok ng protocol, ngunit pinaka mahalaga ay kilala upang maging interoperable.

Ang isang bagong alon ay darating sa mundo ng encryption ng boses, irrupting sa isang kulay-abo na lugar na kung saan karamihan ng mga kumpanya na paggawa ng mga telepono system encryption ay pagpapatupad ng mga pasadyang encryption.

Ngayon pamantayan ay setup at may mga ilang mga kadahilanan na iniwan sa pagpapatupad ng isang bagay na iba't-ibang.

Hurra Mr. Sa Zimmermann at ang lahat ng mga komunidad ng mga kumpanya (tulad PrivateWave ) at mga indibidwal (tulad ng ang Werner Dittmann ) na nagtrabaho ito!

Ngayon ay isang magandang araw, tulad ng uri ng teknolohiya na ngayon ang opisyal at din na may maramihang mga umiiral na pagpapatupad!

Philip, mo itong muli, ang aking mga papuri sa iyong dalisay na espiritu at pagpapasiya :-)

Ibahagi

Pag-unlad para sa GSM crack sa Freiburg unibersidad

Ang kapanapanabik na mundo ng mga mobile na mga protocol (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, atbp) pataga ay nakakakuha ng mga opisyal na gawain sa pananaliksik mula sa unibersidad.

Ang pamumuhunan upang gumawa ng mga opensource release ng code ng crack ng software ay nagbibigay ng pagkakataon sa mga mag-aaral ng unibersidad upang gumana ito, mapabuti ang mga ito at gawin ang malakas na pananaliksik.

Ang Unibersidad ng Freiburg lamang inilabas ang papel ng mga praktikal na pagsasakatuparan sa GSM Encryption a5 / 1 kasama sa isang gsmframencoder tool suporta upang mapabuti ang sniffing, pagkabasa at crack ng proseso.

Pagbukas hardware, ng pagbubukas software, pagbubukas protocol ipakita ang kahinaan ng anumang uri ng pagmamay-ari na paraan o proseso upang bumuo ng mga teknolohiya ng komunikasyon at seguridad.

Dapat ito ang layunin ng anumang mga siyentipiko upang subukang buksan-up at lumagutok ang anumang uri ng pagmamay-ari at closed na teknolohiya sa pilitin industriya na napupunta sa lamang sa interoperable at bukas na diskarte habang pagdisenyo ang protocol telekumunikasyon.

Ibahagi

Aking Tor exit node karanasan na sinusubukan upang salain ang mga maingay trapiko

Maaga sa taong ito i nagpasya na ang panahon upang magpatakbo ng isang Tor exit node upang i nagdala ng isang VPS sa hetzner.de (dahil sila ay nakalista bilang isang Magandang Tor ISP ) at setup sa exit node na may palayaw privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch sa isang 100Mbit / ng koneksyon para sa unang 1TB ng buwanang data, pagkatapos 10MBit / s flat.

Ito rin tumakbo ang software ng TOR2WEB sa http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

Ko setup ang exit-patakaran bilang iminungkahing sa pamamagitan ng pagpapatakbo ng exit-node na may kaunting panliligalig at handa ng isang tugon ng template ng pang-aabuso .

Sa unang araw ko na tumatakbo ang node na i natanggap agad DMCA magreklamo dahil sa peer sa peer trapiko.

Kaya ko nagpasya upang salain ang ilang P2P trapiko sa pamamagitan ng paggamit ng OpenDPI iptables module at DMCA magreklamo awtomatikong Naglaho:

iptables-A output-m opendpi-edonkey-gadugadu-fasttrack-gnutella-directconnect-bittorrent-winmx-soulseek-j Tanggihan

Pagkatapos, dahil i am italyano, i nagpasya upang maiwasan ang aking tugatog node upang kumonekta sa Italyano puwang internet address upang mabawasan ang pagkakataon na ang isang bobo na tagausig ay akong gisingin sa umaga dahil hindi maunawaan na i ako ng pagpapatakbo ng isang Tor node.

Sinubukan ko, sa tulong ng mga hellais na isinulat ng isang script sa Exit Patakaran tanggihan ang pahayag , upang tanggihan ang lahat mga Italyano netblocks batay sa ioerror ng blockfinder ngunit natagpuan namin na ang torrc configuration file sa 1000 linya ay gumagawa tugatog pag-crash.

Nagpunta kami upang buksan ang isang tiket upang iulat ang pag-crash tungkol sa aming pagtatangka upang harangan ang ang tugatog exit patakaran sa pamamagitan ng bansa at natagpuan ang isang katulad na pagtatangkang kung saan namin iniambag, ngunit ito pa rin tila sa isang bukas-isyu.

Ang konklusyon Ang na ito ay hindi posible na gumawa ng isang Bansa Patakaran Lumabas para sa tugatog exit node sa isang malinis at magalang na paraan upang i nagpasyang pumunta ang marumi na paraan sa pamamagitan ng paggamit ng iptables / geoip . Pagkatapos labanan ito maglista maayos, ito ay isang linya ng iptables upang harangan ang trapiko pagpunta sa Italya:

iptables-A output-p TCP-m estado-estado BAGONG-m geoip-dst-cc IT-j Tanggihan

Ngayon mula sa aking exit-node walang koneksyon sa italyano network ay tapos na at am i ligtas laban sa posibleng bobo prosecutors hindi-unawa ng Tor (Mayroon i isang exception para sa lahat ng Tor node ip address na inilapat bago).

Matapos ang ilang mga iba pang araw ko na sinimulan upang makatanggap ng mga complains dahil sa portscan mga gawain na nagmula mula sa aking tugatog nodes.

Mula sa aking sariling punto ng view ng gusto ko upang suportahan ang network ng pagkawala ng lagda, hindi anonymous taga pagtatangka at kaya gusto ko i-filter-out portscan at mga atake mula sa nanggagaling sa ng aking node.That ng isang kumplikadong bagay na nangangailangan ng ilang mga pag-aaral, kaya sa ngayon i-install scanlogd at suminghal dahil gusto ko upang suriin kung gaano karaming mga pag-atake, na uri ng mga pag-atake ay pagkuha mula sa aking tugatog exit node.
Mamaya ay i subukan upang ayusin ang ilang mga uri ng filter upang maging sigurado na magagawang i-filter ang mga pangunahing atake.
Para sa kung ano ay may kaugnayan sa portscan tila na walang mga pampublikong mga tool upang makita at salain palabas portscan ngunit lamang i-filter ang ang papasok portscan upang marahil ay kailangan upang magsulat ng isang bagay na ad-hoc.
Ako sumangguni kung paano ang mga bagay-bagay ay pumunta at kung magkakaroon ng ilang mga magandang paraan upang ipatupad sa isang na ng lightwave paraan isinghal-inline sa selectively-filter-out sa pangunahing atake pagtatangka na nanggagaling sa aking exit-node.

Ang aking layunin ay upang mapanatili ang isang exit node na tumatakbo sa pang-matagalang (hindi bababa sa 1TB ng trapiko sa bawat buwan donated sa tugatog), ang pagbabawas ng pagsisikap na may kaugnayan sa ISP magreklamo at sinusubukan na gawin ang aking pinakamahusay na upang tumakbo sa exit node sa isang makatwirang pananagutan.

Ibahagi

TETRA pataga ay darating: OsmocomTETRA

Ito ay masyadong nakapupukaw upang makita ang release ng OsmocomTETRA , ang unang opensource SDR ( Software Tinukoy Radio ) pagpapatupad ng TETRA demodulator, PHY at mas mababang MAC layer.

Ito ay ang ng TETRA bersyon ng GSM airprobe na-unlock ng access sa data at frame ng TETRA komunikasyon protocol, kaya nagbibigay ng mahusay na taga pagkakataon!

Ngayon na din TETRA teknolohiya ay nabuksan na dapat naming asahan, sa panahon na ito 2011, upang makita ang mga opensource sniffers TETRA at pinaka-malamang din encryption ng tsaa (ang Tetra Encryption algorithm) basag!

Na TETRA ay ginamit sa pamamagitan ng Pulisya, Serbisyo Emergency at Militaries bilang isang alternatibo mobile na network ng komunikasyon na maaaring gumagana kahit na walang kakayahang magamit ng network coverage (lamang mobile-to-mobile nang walang isang istasyon ng base) at magbigay ng ilang espesyal na mataas na serbisyo availability.

Sinulat ko tungkol sa ng TETRA sa aking slide Major ng Voice Review Security Protocol .

Sa OsmocomBB mga mailing list nagkaroon na talakayan tungkol sa ilang mga katayuan ng network ng TETRA:

  • Belgium Police TETRA Astrid network: unencrypted
  • Aleman pagsubok TETRA Police network sa Aachen: unencrypted
  • Ilang ang dating jugoslawia TETRA network: unencrypted
  • Ng Netherland C200 TETRA network: TEA2 Mga na-encrypt na may mga static na mga susi
  • United Kingdom Airwave TETRA network: TEA2 Mga encrypt na may TEA2

Ito ay talagang masaya upang makita na ang mga bagong Police at iligtas serbisyo taga babalik mula sa lumang analog edad sa mga bagong digital radios :-)

Ibahagi

ZORG, bagong C + + at Java ZRTP pagpapatupad pampublikong release

Hi lahat, ngayon sa PrivateWave Italia Spa, italyano kumpanya na nakatutok sa pagbuo ng mga teknolohiya para sa proteksyon ng privacy at seguridad ng impormasyon sa mga telekomunikasyon boses kung saan am i CTO, pakawalan namin ZORG, isang bagong open source ZRTP protocol pagpapatupad magagamit para sa pag-download mula sa http://www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] ay nagbibigay ng end-to-tapusin key palitan sa tambilugin curve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit at AES-256 SRTP encryption.

ZORG ay orihinal na binuo at ipinatupad sa PrivateWave ng PrivateGSM produkto boses encryption magagamit para sa sumusunod na mga platform: Blackberry, Nokia at iOS na na (iPhone).

Zorg C + + ay isinama sa PJSIP open source VoIP SDK [2] at ito ay ibinigay bilang pagsasama patch laban sa PJSIP 1.8.5. Ito ay nasubok sa iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux at Mac OS X.

Ang Zorg Java ay isinama sa loob ng isang pasadyang bersyon ng MJSIP [3] open source SDK sa Blackberry platform at ito ay kasama ang optimization sa paggamit ng memorya na kinakailangan upang mabawasan sa minimum na aktibidad basurero.

Ang parehong mga platform ay pinaghihiwalay at ang modular cryptographic back-nagtatapos sa gayon na ang cryptographic algorithm pagpapatupad ay maaaring madaling swapped sa iba pang mga.

. ZORG ay lisensiyado sa ilalim ng GNU AGPL at ang source code ay magagamit sa github sa https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Ay ilalabas namin ito sa ilalim ng open source at sa pagkakaugnay-ugnay sa aming mga diskarte sa seguridad [4] bilang namin talagang inaasahan na maaari itong maging kapaki-pakinabang para sa mga open ecosystem pinagmulan upang lumikha ng mga bagong tinig encryption system sa suporta ng kalayaan ng pagsasalita.

Higit sa 20 pjsip-based open source VoIP encryption software at ilang nakasulat sa Java ay maaaring direktang makinabang mula sa ZORG release.

Gusto naming masaya na makatanggap ng panukala ng pakikipagtulungan, bagong integration, bagong cryptographic back-dulo, bug pagmamanman at anumang kapaki-pakinabang upang mapabuti at hayaan ZRTP magpatibay bilang boses encryption standard.

Zorg ay magagamit mula http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] Security diskarte: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Ibahagi

Naka-encrypt na mobile sa landline tawag sa telepono na may asterisk 1.8

Lang namin inilabas ang isang teknikal na howto sa kung paano bumuo up Secured mobile sa landline VoIP imprastraktura na may:

Sa susunod iba howto linggo tulad ng isang ito ay darating sa pamamagitan ng paggamit ng iba pang mga platform server tulad ng FreeSWITCH, ang lahat sa diwa ng transparency at pagkilos ng opensource mga teknolohiya ng seguridad.

Ibahagi

PrivateGSM: sa Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia mobile voice na encryption may ZRTP o SRTP / SDES ay

Ako ganap na maiwasan na gamitin ang aking sariling mga personal na blog upang gumawa ng pagsulong ng anumang uri ng produkto.

Na oras na ito ay hindi ibang, ngunit nais ko upang sabihin sa iyo ng mga katotohanan tungkol sa mga produkto na gumagana i sa walang magarbong marketing, ngunit pananatiling teknikal.

Ngayon, sa PrivateWave kung saan am i CTO at co-founder , kami ay inilabas sa publiko mobile VoIP produkto ng encryption para sa Blackberry, iPhone at Nokia:

  • Ang 1st kailanman Blackberry naka-encrypt VoIP sa ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • Ang 1st kailanman iPhone naka-encrypt VoIP sa ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • Ang 1st kailanman Blackberry naka-encrypt VoIP client sa SRTP sa SDES key palitan sa paglipas ng paghigop / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

logo-privatewave-colore.png

Sa PrivateWave ginagamit namin ng isang iba't ibang mga diskarte ng paggalang sa pinaka-tinig encryption kumpanya out doon, basahin ang aming diskarte sa seguridad .

Ang kaugnayan ng ito produkto sa landscape teknolohiya at industriya ay maaaring summarized bilang sundin:

  • Ito ay ang unang kumpanya ng boses encryption gamit lamang pamantayan ng seguridad protocol (at inaasahan namin ang palengke ay reaksyon, tulad ng ito ay malinaw na ang pagmamay-tech na darating mula sa pamana ng CSD ay hindi maaaring magbigay ng parehong halaga)
  • Ito ay ang unang diskarte sa boses encryption upang gamitin lamang open source & standard encryption engine
  • Ito ay ang unang tinig encryption diskarte upang magbigay ng ibang seguridad modelo gamit ang iba't ibang teknolohiya (end-to-end para sa ZRTP at end-to-site para sa SRTP )

Mga suite ng Mobile Secure na mga Kliyente, na dinisenyo para sa mga propesyonal na seguridad ay gamitin lamang gamit ang pinakamahusay na telekumunikasyon at seguridad teknolohiya, magbigay ng isang mataas na antas ng proteksyon kasama na may mahusay na pagganap din sa masamang kondisyon ng network:

Ang application na ay:

icona-pgsm.png

Ang sinusuportahan na mga aparatong mobile ay ang mga:

Tungkol sa ZRTP napagpasyahan naming magbigay-diin at palakihin ang lahat ng seguridad at ng paranoyd tampok ng protocol sa ilang maliit na karagdagan:

Ang aming mahigpit na pagsasama-sama ng address book, napupunta lampas ZRTP RFC detalye, na maaaring maging mahina sa ilang mga pag-atake na kapag ginamit sa mga teleponong mobile dahil sa pag-uugali ng gumagamit na hindi tumingin sa mobile screen.

Ang aming paranoy paraan sa paggamit ng ZRTP pagaanin tulad kondisyon, namin isulat ang tungkol sa mamaya at / o magdagdag ng mga tiyak na detalye para sa RFC pagsasama.

Ang ilang mga salita sa PrivateGSM Professional sa end-to-end encryption sa ZRTP

Basahin ang mga teknikal na sheet doon!

Upang i-download ito mag-click dito at ilagay ang iyong numero ng telepono

Mga ay ang mga resulta ng mahirap na trabaho ng lahat ng aking mga bihasang kawani (16 taong nagtrabaho sa mga ito 6 mga proyekto para sa 3 iba't-ibang mga platform) sa mahirap na teknolohiya (encryption ng boses) sa isang mahirap operating kapaligiran (mga marumi mobile network at marumi mobile na mga operating system) para sa karagdagang kaysa sa 2 taon.

Ako ay lubhang ipinagmamalaki ng aming kawani!

Ano ang susunod?

Sa susunod na linggo makikita mo na ilalabas ng mga pangunahing hanay ng mga mga mga documentations tulad ng pagsasama sa asterisk, freeswitch at iba pang Security Enabled PBX, kasama ng ilang mga nakapupukaw iba pang mga teknolohiya ng seguridad ng balita na i am sigurado ay napansin ;)

Ito ay isang mahirap na gawain at higit pa upang gawin ngunit am i tiwala na ang seguridad at opensource komunidad ay gusto ng mga tulad ng mga produkto at ang aming mga transparent diskarte din may bukas mahalagang release at integration ng open source na gumawa ng isang napaka pamulitka neutral (backdoor libreng) teknolohiya .

Ibahagi

Ang isang pares ng mga magandang VPN provider

Mayroong maraming mga dahilan kung bakit ang isa ay kailangan upang ma-access ang internet labangan isang VPN.

Halimbawa kung nakatira ka sa isang bansa pagharang ng ilang mga nilalaman (tulad ng anti-lokal na pamahalaan porn website,, atbp) at / o mga protocol (tulad ng Skype, voip) ay marahil gusto mong ilipat ang iyong koneksyon sa internet sa labas ang masasamang pagharang bansa sa pamamagitan ng paggamit naka-encrypt VPN tunnels.

Ko susuriin ang ilang host ng VPN server at ilang sa kanila iyan pa magandang sa mga kalat na kalat na nag-aalok ng mga serbisyo tulad ng:

SwissVPN

Lumabas sa internet mula sa Switzerland.

Halaga 6 CHF / buwan

Opsyonal pampublikong fixed IP address

Kapaki-pakinabang na kung kailangan mo:

  • Laktawan lamang ang mga lokal na mga filter ng bansa na may mahusay na mataas na bandwidth
  • Ilantad ang pampublikong serbisyo ng labangan ng VPN gamit ang opsyonal na fixed na pampublikong IP address.

Overplay

Lumabas sa internet sa pamamagitan ng pagpili sa mga 20 iba't ibang mga bansa (sa bawat oras na kumonekta ka).

Kapaki-pakinabang na kung kailangan mong gawin:

  • negosyo katalinuhan sa katunggali (lumilitaw na dumating mula sa X bansa kapag pagkonekta sa kanila)
  • makita ang film / pelikula pinapayagan lamang mula sa pambansang IP puwang ng web
  • makita ang mga resulta ng google sa mga iba't ibang mga bansa

Ibahagi

Hindi bawat tambilugin curve ay ang parehong: labangan sa ECC seguridad

 Ang aking sariling seguridad sa ECC curve at pagtatasa ng pagpili

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Karamihan sa modernong ng crypto paggamit patambilog Ang curve Cryptographic (ECC) na, na may isang mas maliit na sukat ng key at bawasan ang ang pagtutuos kapangyarihan, magbigay ng katumbas na seguridad lakas ng tradisyonal na sistema ng crypto na kilala bilang DH (Diffie-Hellman) o RSA (Rivest, Shamir at Adleman).

Hindi lahat ay alam na ang ang ECC encryption ay pinili para sa anumang hinaharap na mga aplikasyon ng encryption at na kahit na TLS / SSL (encryption na ginamit para sa secure ng web) ay lumipat sa ECC.

May nakita akong maraming ng mga kaya tinatawag na "pagmamay-ari na mga produkto ng encryption" na inabandunang RSA at DH sa napupunta sa ECC alternatibo, na malamang sa di-makatwirang paggamit ng ECC sukat bit key nang walang kahit na tumutukoy kung aling uri ng ECC crypto masanay.

Subalit mayroong isang pulutong ng pagkalito sa paligid ng mga patambilog Curves, na may maraming iba't ibang mga pangalan at key laki ng paggawa ng mahirap para sa isang non-cryptographically-nakaranas-user upang gawin ang iyong sariling numero kapag pagsusuri ng ilang mga crypto bagay-bagay.

Dahil kaya diffused pagkalito i nagpasya na gumawa ng aking sariling pagsusuri upang malaman kung saan ang pinakamahusay na ECC encryption curves at kanang ECC key laki gamitin.

Pagtatasa na ito ay nais na magbigay ng isang industriya ng seguridad na nakabatay sa pagpili sa mga iba't-ibang curves at mga key na laki, Aalis ang matematika at crypto analytical pagsasaalang-alang na na nagawa sa panahon ng taon, lagom ng iba't-ibang mga pagpipilian na kinuha sa ilang mga pamantayan at mga protocol ng seguridad.

Una ang konklusyon.

Mula sa aking pagsusuri lamang ang mga sumusunod na ECC curves upang maisaalang-alang para sa paggamit sa mga sistema ng encryption dahil ang isa lamang na pinili sa mga iba't-ibang awtoridad (ANSI, NSA, lundo, NIST, ang ECC BrainPool), ibang seguridad protocol pamantayan (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) at ang isa lamang na tumutugma sa NSA Suite B seguridad kinakailangan (de-facto standard din para sa NATO militar kapaligiran):

  • Tambilugin curve Prime 256 bit - P-256
  • Tambilugin curve Prime 384 bit - P-384

na may opsyonal, para lamang sa talagang paranoyd na nais upang makakuha ng mas key laki bit, hindi pa rin itinuturing na kapaki-pakinabang:

  • Tambilugin curve Prime 521 bit - P-521

Gusto kong sabihin na ang Koblitz curves ay dapat na iwasan, sa anumang key laki (163/283/409/571) bilang sila ay hindi magkaroon ng sapat na warranty sa crypto analitiko aktibidad at epektibo ang mga ito ay:

  • Hindi bahagi ng NSA Suite-B cryptography pagpili
  • Hindi bahagi ng ECC Brainpool pagpili
  • Hindi bahagi ng ANSI X9.62 pagpili
  • Hindi bahagi ng OpenPGP ECC extension pagpili
  • Hindi bahagi ng ang Kerberos extension para sa ECC curve pagpili

Ako mag-imbita ang mga mambabasa na sundin ang labangan ang aking pagsusuri upang maunawaan ang mga fundamentals na maintindihan kahit na walang malalim na teknikal background ngunit hindi bababa sa isang magandang teknolohiko background ng ilang mga pangunahing bit ng cryptography.

 Narito kami pumunta sa pagtatasa
 

Ang aking layunin ay upang gumawa ng isang pagtatasa sa kung ano / paano ang bukas na pang-agham at seguridad ng komunidad pumili na ECC crypto sistema para sa paggamit sa mga protocol ng seguridad at pamantayan na tinukoy sa pamamagitan ng IETF RFC (ang mga na tukuyin ang mga Pamantayan ng Internet sa isang bukas at peer-susuriin paraan).

Nasa ibaba ang isang hanay ng RFC Ipinakikilala ECC sa umiiral na sistema na makapag-nasuri upang maunawaan kung ano ang mas mahusay na gamitin at kung ano ang mas mahusay na upang ibukod:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool na Standard Curves & curve Pagbuo ng
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B Cryptographic Suites para sa IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B profile para sa Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : ng NSA Suite B in sa Secure / para sa lahat na layunin Internet Mail Extensions (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Pagtukoy ng mga lakas Para sa mga Pampublikong Keys Ginamit Para sa pakikipagpalitan ng mga simetriko Keys
  • RFC5349 : tambilugin curve Cryptography (ECC) Suporta para sa Pampublikong Key na Cryptography para Paunang Authentication sa Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : tambilugin curve Cryptography (ECC) mga sero Suites para sa Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP boses encryption sa pamamagitan ng Philip Zimmermann ECC curve
  • ECC sa OpenPGP (draft d sa magbalsa-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 )
  • ECC Curves na pinili sa pamamagitan ng Microsoft para sa Smartcard Kerberos login

Gagamitin namin ang mga pagpipilian na ginawa sa pamamagitan ng siyentipiko pagtukoy sa mga protocol ng Internet Security na bahagi ng aming pagsusuri.
Bukod dito ito dapat ay naiintindihan na ang pagpili ng curve ay mula sa iba't ibang mga awtoridad na ginawa ng kanilang sariling mga pagpili ng Curves upang sabihin sa industriya kung ano ang gamitin at kung ano ang upang laktawan:

Gagamitin namin ang mga pagpipilian na ginawa sa pamamagitan ng siyentipiko sa pagtukoy sa mga kinakailangan sa seguridad sa standardisasyon ng ahensya upang gawing bahagi ng aming pagsusuri.
Bilang karagdagan, ang isang bagay na Karamihan sa mga tao ay hindi alam, ngunit ito ay lubos na may kaugnayan sa aming pagtatasa, na may iba't ibang uri ng ECC curve cryptography at kanilang "laki" naiiba depende sa uri ng curve:

  • Mga ECC Curves sa paglipas ng Punong Field (madalas na tinutukoy bilang tambilugin curve at kinakatawan sa pamamagitan ng P-keysize)
  • Mga ECC Curves sa paglipas ng Patlang ng binary (madalas na tinutukoy bilang Koblitz curve at kinakatawan ng K-keysize)

Ibinigay ng isang seguridad lakas pagkapareho tambilugin curve at ang Kobliz curve ay may iba't-ibang key na laki, halimbawa kapag basahin namin ECC 571 namin ay nagre-refer sa Koblitz curve sa isang katumbas na lakas sa ECC 521 Punong curve.

Isang paghahambing ng lakas sa pagitan ng mga patambilog Curves at Kotbliz Curves ay iniulat sa ibaba (mula sa ng Mikey ECC internet Draft ):

 | Koblitz | sa ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15,360

Nasa ibaba ang isang paghahambing ng lahat ng napiling mga curves sa pamamagitan ng lahat ng mga iba't-ibang mga entidad at ang kani-kanilang mga pangalan (mula sa IETF RFC4492 para sa ang ECC paggamit para sa TLS ):

 Mga curve pangalan na pinili ng iba't-ibang organisasyon pamantayan
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

Ano ang agad lumitaw na may lamang dalawang curves na pinili sa pamamagitan ng lahat ng mga awtoridad, at na may ay isang pangkalahatang paglalaglag ng mga curves koblitz sa pamamagitan ng ANSI.The lamang karaniwang sumang-ayon sa mga 3 awtoridad ay ang mga sumusunod na dalawang ECC curve:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Ng mga pagpipilian ng mga ECC curve para sa TLS ang RFC5430 nilaktawan ganap mga curves koblitz at pinili para sa paggamit lamang:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Ang Ang ECC Brainpool ay nilaktawan ganap mga curves Koblitz at pinili para sa paggamit sa sumusunod na mga ECC Curves:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (na kung ang lamang partikular dahil ito ay hindi P-521 pero P-512, ang lamang key-laki tinutukoy sa pamamagitan ng sa ECC brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons mula sa Athena SCS )

Ang draft OpenPGP internet para sa ang ECC paggamit sa PGP d balsa-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 nilaktawan ganap mga curves Koblitz at pinili ang mga sumusunod na ECC curves

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Ang Kerberos protocol extension para sa ang ECC paggamit, natukoy sa RFC5349 at tinukoy sa pamamagitan ng Microsoft para sa smartcard logon nilaktawan ganap mga curves Koblitz at pinili ang mga sumusunod na curves ECC:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Kaya, iyan ang malinaw na ang tamang pagpili ng ECC ay para sa P-256, P-384 at P-521 habang ang Koblitz ng curve ay nilaktawan para sa sa Nangungunang Lihim paggamit at para sa seguridad ng anumang sensitibong protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS).

Bakit ko ginawa ito sa pagtatasa?

Tapos ko na ang pagtatasa na ito pagsunod sa isang talakayan na ako ay tungkol sa tiyak na mga produkto ng boses encryption, ang lahat batay sa mga pasadyang at proprietary protocol, na lahat ng gumagamit ng tambilugin curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH na 571/571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits.
Lahat ng mga ito ay gumagamit ng K-571 na, tulad ng inilarawan sa bago, ay inalis mula sa lahat ng seguridad ng kapaligiran sensitibo at mga protocol at pagiging sa aking sarili ng isang taga-disenyo ng boses encryption bagay-bagay na sa tingin ko na ang kanilang cryptographic pinili ay ganap na hindi ang pinakamahusay na pagpipilian ng seguridad.
Marahil ito ay ginawa lamang para sa marketing na layunin, dahil K-571 (Koblitz curve) Mukhang mas malakas kaysa sa P-521 (patambilog curve na batay sa Punong numero). Kung mayroon kang "mas kaunti" ang iyong mga guys marketing ay maaaring tubusin sa "mas ligtas". Koblitz tambilugin curve ay mas mabilis kaysa sa mga tuktok na lihim na pinagana kalakasan tambilugin curve at upang bigyan ang produkto manager ng isang pagkakataon na magbigay ng "higit bit" sa ito ay sariling produkto habang pinapanatili ang key na palitan ng mabilis.

Ito ay isang bagay ng pagpili ng pilosopiko.

Mas gusto kong sundin ang mga kalakaran ng pang-agham na komunidad na may kapakumbabaan ng hindi isinasaalang-alang ang aking sarili ng isang ng cryptographic dalubhasa, knowledgable higit pa kaysa sa pangkalahatang seguridad at pang-agham komunidad mismo.

Mas gusto ko sa halip na gamitin lamang ang algorithm na ay naaprubahan para sa paggamit sa mga mataas na sensitibong kapaligiran (itaas lihim na pag-uuri), na ay napili sa pamamagitan ng lahat ng mga awtoridad at nagtatrabaho group na pagsusuri ng mga algorithm ng encryption umiiral sa labas doon at na kumakatawan sa pagpili ng halos lahat ng mga karaniwang seguridad protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS, atbp).
Mas gusto kong bilangin ang halaga ng talino na nagtatrabaho sa ang crypto gamitin ko, na ang tseke na ay talagang ligtas, na suriin kung ang ilang mga kahinaan.

Ang bilang ng mga brais na nagtatrabaho sa Crypto malawak diffused ng order ng magnitude higit pa kaysa sa bilang ng mga mga talino nagtatrabaho sa crypto na ginagamit ng mga lamang ang ilang mga tao (tulad ng Koblitz curve).
Kaya am hindi ako demonizing na gamitin ECDH 571 gamit Koblitz curve, ngunit para bang i magpatibay na hindi sila ay kinuha ang pinakamahusay na pagpipilian sa mga tuntunin ng seguridad at na ang anumang mga propesyonal sa seguridad na paggawa ng benchmarking ng seguridad ay isaalang-alang ang katotohanan na tambilugin curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit tapos may Koblitz curve ay hindi malawak diffused, ito ay dumped mula sa standard na mga protocol ng seguridad at hindi ito ay sertipikadong para sa mga tuktok na lihim na paggamit.

Ibahagi

ESSOR, European Secure Software na Tinukoy ng Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

At ng maraming higit protocol at mga teknolohiya sa paghahatid.

Na uri ng mga bagong diskarte sa Radio Pagkakahawa System ay destinated upang baguhin ang sistema ng paraan ng radyo ay ipinatupad, na nagbibigay sa mga bagong kakayahan tulad ng upang i-upgrade ang "protocol radio mismo" sa software upang magbigay ng mga "radio protocol" pagpapabuti.

Sa maikling tuntunin din na nakita namin ang malakas na seguridad pananaliksik paggamit ng mga teknolohiya ng na SDR tulad ng salamin na ang GSM at Bluetooth Sniffing .

Maaari naming asahan na ang iba pang mga teknolohiya, mahina sa pamamagitan ng disenyo ngunit protektado ng ang paghihigpit sa mga aparato ng hardware na Hack ang mababang antas ng protocol, ay madaling makapag-hack. Sa unang listahan ay i talagang nais na makita ang taga ng TETRA, ang isang teknolohiya na ipinanganak na may closed na mindset at lihim na algorithm ng encryption, isang bagay na talagang i mamuhi ;-)

Ibahagi

Malayo intercepting snom VoIP telepono

I suggest reading remotely tapping VoIp phones ” on VoIP Security Alliance Blog by Shawn Merdinger .

A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Ibahagi

Voice communication security workshop

Kumusta,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

Ibahagi

27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

Dumating kami sa kapayapaan

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

Ibahagi

GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Ibahagi

Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

Ibahagi

Web2.0 privacy leak in Mobile apps

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

thumb.php.jpg

On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

Ibahagi

AES algorithm selected for use in space

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

Ibahagi

Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

bblock.jpg

Let's goes on.

On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).

On the other side they does not provide only a device but an overlay access network, called BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), that's a global worldwide wide area network where your blackberry enter while you browse or checkmail using blackberry.net AP.

When you, or an application, use the blackberry.net APN you are not just connecting to the internet with the carrier internet connection, but you are entering inside the RIM network that will proxy and act as a gateway to reach the internet.

The very same happen when you have a corporate use: Both the BB device and the corporate BES connect to the RIM network that act as a sort of vpn concentration network .

So basically all the communications cross trough RIM service infrastructure in encrypted format with a set proprietary encryption and communication protocols.

Just as a notice, think that google to provide gtalk over blackberry.net APN, made an agreement in order to offer service inside the BB network to the BB users. When you install gtalk you get added 3 service books that point to GTALKNA01 that's the name of GTALK gateway inside the RIM network to allow intra-BIS communication and act as a GTALK gateway to the internet.

The mobile operators usually are not even allowed to inspect the traffic between the Blackberry device and the Blackberry Network.

So RIM and Blackberry are somehow unique for their approach as they provide a platform, a network and a service all bundled together and you cannot just “get the device and the software” but the user and the corporate are always bound and connected to the service network.

That's good and that's bad, because it means that RIM provide extremely good security features and capabilities to protect information, device and access to information at various level against third party .

But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Tagay

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

Ibahagi

Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

Ibahagi

Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

Ibahagi

China Encryption Regulations

Hi lahat,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

Ibahagi

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Ibahagi

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

Ibahagi

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

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For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Ibahagi

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Ibahagi

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

Ibahagi

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

Ibahagi

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

Ibahagi

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Regards,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.

Ibahagi

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Ibahagi

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Ibahagi

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Oo
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Oo
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Oo
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Oo
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Oo
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Oo

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Bakit?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

Ibahagi

Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

Ibahagi

O3B Networks: a new satellite broadband approach

That's something amazing, “other 3 billion” broadband coverage not trough fiber but trough satellite.

A project where also google is one of the shareholder, covering 3 billion persons trough low orbit, low latency broadband (10GBit) satellite network.

Check here technical infrastructure details on ITU website.

Ibahagi

Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

Ibahagi

Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? Yikes!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

Mayk

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

Isipin ito ...

Ibahagi

Disk encryption sometimes 'works'

I am one of the person convinced that a computer disk encryption system will not protect you from public authorities if they are convinced enough and the case is very important.

There are a lot of way to convince a person to release a password.

However there's a case in Australia where not revealing the disk password resulted in a successful way to avoid going in jail:

Secret code saves man who spied on flatmates

My opinion is just that spying flatmates is not a so relevant and particular crime and that law enforcement did not used 'convincing systems' to get the password of encrypted disk.

UPDATE 29.06.2010: It also worked for Daniel Dantas against FBI .

Ibahagi

Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Read more here .

Ibahagi

Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

Ibahagi

This is big business, this is the American way

43 years old “UFO eccentric” hacker Gary McKinnon just loses appeal against his extradition to the States for computer crimes he committed 7 years ago.

If you've lived under a rock during the last few years what this dude did was basically break into .gov computers looking for UFO related material.

Probably the last case of recreational hacking I've heard about.

So his case is obviously going to be a classical “Strike one to educate one hundred” kind of message to every hacker attacking american computer systems: we can reach you everywhere you live and have you extradited to our country where we will sentence you to life in prison.

Unless you are a multi millionaire cyber criminal living in Russia or a chinese spy, of course.

Ibahagi