Kategorija Archyvas: technologija

RFC 6189: ZRTP galiausiai standartas!

Galiausiai ZRTP oficialų RFC užduotį, RFC6189 ZRTP: Media Kelias raktas sutartis Unicast Secure RTP televizijai buvo paskirtas .

Jis turėjo kaip priklausomybę SRTP, su AES 256bit, kad dabar buvo apibrėžtos kaip RFC6188 rakto dydis .

Tai įdomu pamatyti, RFC pagaliau išleido, kaip tai svarbus įvykis nustatyti ZRTP kaip oficialus end-to-end, panašiai kaip PGP buvo už laiškų šifravimo standarto .

Dabar bet kurioje pasaulio organizacija bus oficialiai galėtų įgyvendinti ZRTP end-to-end protokolo balso šifravimo

Šiuo metu 3 skirtingi viešieji ZRTP protokolo realizacijos yra:

Kiekvienas iš jų teikia įvairias funkcijas, protokolą, tačiau svarbiausia yra žinoma, kad būtų užtikrinama sąveika.

Nauja banga ateina į balso šifravimo pasaulyje, irrupting į pilkąją zoną, kur labiausiai veikiančių bendrovių telefonų šifravimo sistemas įgyvendinimo pasirinktinę šifravimą.

Dabar standartas buvo setup ir ten yra keletas priežasčių, liko įgyvendinti ką nors kitą.

Hurra p. Zimmermann ir visi kompanijų bendruomenė (kaip PrivateWave ) ir asmenys kaip Werner Dittmann ), kurie dirbo ant jo!

Šiandien tai puiki diena, tokia technologija, dabar yra oficialus, taip pat su daugialype galiojančių įgyvendinimui!

Pilypas, jūs tai padarė vėl, mano komplimentus savo grynos dvasios ir ryžto :-)

Dalis

Mano TNI išeiti mazgas patirtis bando filtruoti triukšmingo eismo

Šių metų pradžioje aš nusprendžiau, kad atėjo laikas paleisti TOR išėjimo mazgas, todėl aš davė ne VPS hetzner.de straipsnio, nes jie pateikiami kaip geros TOR IPT ) ir setup exit-mazgas su nick'as privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch su 100Mbit / jungtis mėnuo mėnesiniams duomenims ir pirmasis 1TB, tada 10mbit / s butas.

Ji taip pat paleisti TOR2WEB programinę įrangą dėl http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

Man sukonfigūruoti išėjimo politiką , kaip siūlė veikia išėjimo mazgas su minimaliomis priekabiavimo ir parengė piktnaudžiavimą atsako šabloną .

Į pirmą dieną aš veikia mazgas gavau nedelsiant, DMCA skundžiasi dėl to peer to peer srautą.

Taigi, aš nusprendžiau filtruoti šiek tiek P2P srautus naudojant OpenDPI iptables modulis ir DMCA skundžiasi automatiškai dingo:

iptables-IŠĖJIMO m opendpi-eDonkey-GaduGadu-FastTrack-Gnutella.-directconnect-bittorrent-winmx-Soulseek-j Atmesti

Tada, nes aš esu italų, aš nusprendžiau, kad būtų išvengta savo TOR mazgas prisijungti prie Italijos interneto adresų erdvę siekiant sumažinti galimybę kad kvailas prokuroras Wake Me ne ryte, nes nesuprato, kad aš einu Tor mazgą.

Aš bandžiau, su pagalbos hellais kad parašė scenarijų sustabdymo politika atmesti pareiškimą ,, atmesti visų Italijos netblocks, remiantis IOError " blockfinder, bet mes nustatėme, kad torrc konfigūracijos failai su +1000 linijų buvo TOR avariją.

Mes nuėjo atidaryti bilietą pranešti apie avariją, apie mūsų siekiant blokuoti TOR išėjimo šalies politiką ir rasti panašų bandymą, kur mes prisidėjo, bet ji vis dar atrodo, būti atviras klausimas.

Išvada, kad tai neįmanoma padaryti Šalis Exit politiką TOR išėjimo mazgo švariu ir mandagūs, todėl aš nusprendė eiti purviną kelią naudojant iptables (arba) geoip . Po kovos, kad ji tinkamai sudaryti, ji buvo viena eilutė iš iptables blokuoti eismas vyksta į Italiją:

iptables-A IŠĖJIMO-p tcp-m valstybė-state NEW-m, geoip-dst-CC IT-j Atmesti

Dabar iš mano pasitraukimo mazgas Italijos tinklų nesusijungimo bus padaryta, ir aš esu saugus prieš galbūt kvailas prokurorai ne suprasti TOR (turiu išimtis taikoma prieš visų TOR mazgo IP adresą).

Po kai kurių kitų dienų aš pradėjau gauti skundus dėl portscan veiklos, kilęs iš mano Tor mazgų.

Nuo mano požiūriu, aš noriu remti anonimiškumo tinklą, o ne anonimiški įsilaužimo ir todėl aš noriu filtruoti iš kilmės iš mano node.That sudėtingu klausimu, reikalingas tam tikrą tyrimą portscan ir išpuoliais, todėl per tą laiką įdiegta scanlogd ir purkštelėti, nes aš noriu įvertinti, kiek išpuolių, atakų natūra gauti iš mano TOR išėjimo mazgo.
Vėliau i bandys organizuoti kai filtravimo tikrai bus galima filtruoti didelių atakas natūra.
Nes tai, kas susiję su portscan atrodo, kad nėra valstybinės priemonės, aptikti ir filtruoti išeinančiam portscan, tačiau tik filtruoti gaunamus portscan, todėl tikriausiai reikia parašyti kažką skelbimas-hoc.
Aš vadinsiu kaip viskas vyksta ir, jei bus šiek tiek puikus būdas įgyvendinti, Lightwave būdu snort-inline pasirinktinai filtruoti-pagrindinė ataka bandymas kilmės iš mano pasitraukimo mazgas.

Mano tikslas yra išlaikyti išėjimo mazgas veikia ilgalaikis (mažiausiai 1TB eismo per mėn paaukoti TNI), sumažinti pastangų, susijusių su IPT skundžiasi ir bando darysiu viską, kad paleisti išėjimo mazgą su pagrįstą atsakomybės.

Dalis

Užšifruota mobiliojo į fiksuoto ryšio telefono skambučius 1.8 su žvaigždute

Mes ką tik išleido techninį Howto apie tai, kaip sukurti Saugus mobili fiksuotojo ryšio VoIP infrastruktūra :

Ateinančias savaites kitiems howto kaip šis išeis naudojant kitų serverių platformas, pavyzdžiui, FreeSWITCH, visų opensource saugumo technologijų skaidrumo ir sverto dvasia.

Dalis

PrivateGSM: BlackBerry / "iPhone" / "Nokia" mobilusis balso šifravimo su ZRTP ar SRTP SDL

Aš visiškai išvengti naudoti savo asmeninį dienoraštį skatinti bet kokio produkto rūšies.

Kad laikas tai nesiskiria, bet aš noriu pasakyti jums faktus apie produktus, dirbu be išgalvotas rinkodaros, bet būna techninis.

Šiandien, esant PrivateWave kur aš esu CTO ir įkūrėjų , mes išleidome viešai Mobile VoIP šifravimo Blackberry, iPhone "ir" Nokia "produktus:

  • 1-oji kada nors BlackBerry saugiame VoIP ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • 1 kada nors "iPhone" šifruojamas VoIP ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • 1-oji kada nors BlackBerry saugiame VoIP klientas SRTP SDL pagrindinių mainų virš SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Įmonės

"logotipo privatewave-colore.png

Į PrivateWave mes naudoti kitą metodą pagarbą labiausiai balso šifravimo bendrovės ten, perskaitykite mūsų požiūrį į saugumą .

Šios technologijų ir pramonės kraštovaizdžio produktų tinkamumas gali būti apibendrinti taip:

  • Tai pirmasis balsas, naudojant šifravimo bendrovė tik standartizacijos saugumo protokolus ir mes tikimės, kad rinka reaguos, kaip dabar jau aišku, kad nuosavybės technologijų iš CVPD paveldo gali teikti tokią pačią vertę)
  • Tai pirmasis požiūris balso šifravimo naudoti tik atvirojo kodo ir standartinį šifravimo variklis
  • Tai pirmasis balsas, šifravimo metodas kitokį saugumo modelį, naudojant įvairias technologijas (end-to-už ZRTP ir end-to-svetainėje SRTP pabaiga )

Tie Mobilieji Secure Klientai, rinkinys, skirtas profesionaliam saugumo naudoti tik naudojant geriausią telekomunikacijų ir saugumo technologijas, suteikti aukšto lygio apsaugą, kartu su geros veiklos, taip pat blogų tinklo sąlygų:

Paraiškos yra:

Ikona-pgsm.png

Palaikomi mobilieji įrenginiai yra:

Dėl ZRTP nusprendė pabrėžti ir ištempti visą su kai kuriomis mažai to protokolo saugumą ir paranojiškas funkcija:

Mūsų griežtos adresas knyga integracija, peržengia ZRTP RFC specifikaciją, kad galėtų būti pažeidžiama tam tikrų atakų, naudojamų mobiliųjų telefonų, nes vartotojo elgsenos nežiūrėti į mobiliojo telefono ekrane.

Mūsų paranoy būdas naudojant ZRTP sušvelninti tokias sąlygas, mes rašyti apie tai vėliau ir / arba pridėti RFC įtraukti konkrečius duomenis.

Žodžiai Kai dėl PrivateGSM Professional su end-to-end šifravimas su ZRTP

Skaityti techninę lapą !

Norėdami atsisiųsti spauskite čia ir tiesiog įdėti savo telefono numerį

Tai yra sunkaus darbo, visos mano labai kvalifikuotų darbuotojų, 16 asmenys dirbo 3 skirtingose ​​platformose dėl šio 6 projektai), dėl sudėtingiausių technologijų (balso kodavimas) sudėtingą operacinę aplinką (Dirty judriojo ryšio tinklus ir purvinas mobiliųjų operacinių sistemų) daugiau nei 2 metai.

Aš labai didžiuojuosi mūsų darbuotojai!

Kas toliau?

Ateinančias savaites pamatysite atleidžiantis labai rinkinio dokumentai, pavyzdžiui, su žvaigždutėmis, freeswitch ir kitos su saugumu Įjungta PBX, kartu su kai kurių patrauklių kitos saugumo technologijų naujienų, kad aš esu įsitikinęs, kad integracijos bus pastebėta ;)

Tai buvo sunkus darbas ir daugiau turi būti padaryta, bet aš esu įsitikinęs, kad saugumas ir opensource bendruomenė patinka tokius produktus ir mūsų skaidrų požiūrį, taip pat su atviromis svarbių išleidžiamus ir atviro kodo integravimas, kad padaryti labai politiškai neutrali slaptas nemokamai) technologiją .

Dalis

Pora gražus VPN teikėjo

Yra daug priežasčių, kodėl vienas, reikia prisijungti prie interneto per VPN.

Pavyzdžiui, jei jūs gyvenate šalyje, blokuoja tam tikrą sudėtį (pavyzdžiui, kovos su vietos savivaldos svetainę, porno ir tt) ir / ar protokolus (pvz., Skype, VoIP), jūs tikriausiai norėsite perkelti savo interneto ryšį naudodami ne bjaurus blokuoti šalies šifruotų VPN tuneliai.

Aš įvertino keletą Patalpinta VPN serverio ir pora iš jų skamba gana gera tarp plačiai siūlo tokias paslaugas:

SwissVPN

Išeikite iš interneto iš Šveicarijos.

Ekonomiškai arba CHF 6 mėnesius

Nebūtinas viešojo fiksuotojo IP adresas

Naudinga, jei reikia:

  • Tiesiog apeiti vietos šalių geros didelio pralaidumo filtrus su
  • Atskleisti viešųjų paslaugų per VPN su papildomu viešuoju fiksuotu IP adresu.

Persistengti

Išeikite iš interneto rinktis iš 20 skirtingų šalių (kiekvieną kartą jums prijungti).

Naudinga, jei jums reikia padaryti:

  • verslo analitikos konkurento (atrodo, kad ateiti iš šalies X jungiantis juos)
  • pamatyti filmą / Televizijos filmas leidžiama tik iš nacionalinių IP interneto erdvėse
  • google rezultatus tarp įvairių šalių

Dalis

Ne kiekvienas elipsinės kreivės yra tas pats: ECC saugumo lovio

 Mano prg. ECC kreivė saugumo ir atrankos analizė

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Dauguma šiuolaikinių kriptografinę naudoti elipsinės kreivės Kriptografiniai (ECC), kad su mažesniu rakto dydis ir sumažinti skaičiavimo galią, suteikti lygiavertę slaptumo koncentracija tradicinės koduotą sistemą, žinomą kaip DH (Diffie-Hellman) arba RSA (Rivest, Shamir ir Adleman).

Ne visi žino, kad bet kokių būsimų šifravimo programų, ir kad net TLS / SSL (šifravimas naudojamas užtikrinti internete) juda ECC ECC šifravimo pasirinktas.

Radau daug vadinamųjų "patentuotų šifravimo produktų", apleistų RSA ir DH eina su EVC alternatyvų, kurie linkę savavališkai naudojimo ECC bitų rakto dydis net nurodant, kokios ECC kriptografijos priprasti.

Tačiau yra daug painiavos aplink Elipsinių kreivių, su daug įvairių pavadinimų ir raktų dydį sunku ne-kriptografiškai patyrusiam vartotojui atlikti savo paveikslą, kai įvertinti tam tikrą šifravimo stuff.

Dėl tiek išsklaidytos painiavos i nusprendė padaryti savo analizę, išsiaiškinti, kurie yra geriausi ECC šifravimo kreivės ir teisė ERK pagrindinis dydis naudoti.

Ši analizė norėtume suteikti saugumo pramonės pagrindu pasirinkti tarp įvairių kreivių ir pagrindinių dydžių, paliekant matematinius ir šifravimo analitiniais svarstymais, kad jau buvo daroma per metus, apibendrindama įvairius variantus, kurių buvo imtasi kelių standartų ir saugumo protokolų.

Pirmiausia išvada.

Iš savo analizę, tik šie ECC kreivės turi būti laikomi naudoti šifravimo sistemas, nes yra tik vienas, atrinkti iš skirtingų institucijų (NSI, ANSI, PPG, NIST, BrainPool EVC), įvairių saugumo protokolas standartai (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS), ir tik vienas atitikimo NSA Suite B saugumo reikalavimai de facto standartas taip pat NATO karinės aplinkos):

  • Elipsės formos pirmininkas Kreivės 256 bitų - P-256
  • Elipsės formos pirmininkas Kreivės 384 bitų - P-384

su neprivaloma, tik tikrai paranojikas, kad norite gauti daugiau rakto dydis šiek tiek, vis dar manoma, kad tai naudinga:

  • Elipsės formos pirmininkas Kreivės 521 bitų - P-521

Aš norėčiau nurodyti, kad Koblitz kreivės turėtų būti vengiama, bet rakto dydžio (163/283/409/571), nes jie nėra pakankamai garantiją koduotą analitinės veiklos ir efektyviai jie yra:

  • Ne dalis iš nevalstybinių subjektų Suite B kriptografijos atrankos,
  • Ne ECC Brainpool atrankos dalis
  • Ne ANSI X9.62 atrankos dalis
  • Ne OpenPGP ECC pratęsimo atrankos dalis
  • Ne dalis Kerberos pratęsimo ECC kreivės atrankos

Kviečiu skaitytoją sekti lovio mano analizė suprasti pagrindus, kad būtų galima suprasti net be gilaus techninį išsilavinimą, bet bent jau su gera technologinį pagrindą, kai pagrindinis bitų iš kriptografijos.

 Here we go su analizės
 

Mano tikslas yra atlikti analizę apie tai, ką / kaip atvira mokslo ir saugumo bendruomenė Pasirinkti ECC kriptografinė sistema naudojimo saugumo protokolų ir standartų, apibrėžtų IETF RFC tie, kurie atvirai ir recenzuotą būdu nustatyti interneto standartus).

Žemiau RFC nustatančios ECC rinkinį į esamą sistemą, kad gauti analizuojamu suprasti, kas geriau naudoti ir kas geriau išskirti:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Standartinis kreivių ir kreivės brėžimas
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B Kriptografiniai Suites IPSec
  • RFC5430 : NSI Suite B profilis Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSI SUITE B Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : nustatyti Privalumai Dėl viešųjų raktų, naudojamų keistis simetrinius raktus
  • RFC5349 : elipsinės kreivės kriptografija (ECC) Parama Viešojo rakto kriptografija pirminio autentifikavimo Kerberos straipsnio PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : elipsinės kreivės kriptografija (ECC) Cipher Suites Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP balso kodavimas pateikė Philip Zimmermann ECC kreivės
  • ECC OpenPGP (projektas d plaustas jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 )
  • ERK kreivės pasirinktus "Microsoft" SmartCard Kerberos Prisijungti

Mes naudosime mokslininkas apibrėžti Internet Security protokolus, kad dalis mūsų vertinimo pasirinkimą.
Be to, ji turi būti suprantama, kad kreivė pasirinkimas ateina iš skirtingų valdžios institucijų, kad atliktų savo pasirinkimą kreivių pasakyti pramonės ką naudoti ir ką praleisti:

Mes naudosime pasirinkti mokslininko apibrėžia saugumo reikalavimų standartizacijos agentūrų dalį mūsų vertinimo.
Be to, kažkas, kad dauguma žmonių nežino, bet kad tai labai aktuali mūsų analizė rodo, kad yra kitoks ECC kreivės kriptografijos ir jų "dydis" jis skiriasi priklausomai nuo rūšies kreivės:

  • ERK pirmininko srityje kreivės virš elipsinės kreivės dažnai vadinama ir atstovaujama P-keysize,)
  • ERK kreivės virš dvejetainis laukas dažnai, vadinama Koblitz Curve ir atstovauja K-keysize)

Atsižvelgiant į tai, saugumas stiprumas lygiavertiškumo elipsinės kreivės ir Kobliz kreivė, turi kitą pagrindinį dydį, pavyzdžiui, kai mes skaityti ECC 571, mes nuoroda į Koblitz Curve lygiaverčio stiprumo ECC 521 pirmininko kreivės.

Palyginus stiprumo tarp Elipsinių kreivių ir Kotbliz kreivių, pateikiami žemiau (iš " Mikey ECC interneto projekto ):

 | Koblitz | EVC | DH / PSI / PAR
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15.360

Žemiau yra visų pasirinktų kreivių palyginimas įvairių subjektų ir jų pavadinimą nuo TLS ECC naudojimo RFC4492 IETF ):

Curve names chosen by different standards organizations ------------+---------------+------------- SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST ------------+---------------+------------- sect163k1 | | NIST K-163 sect163r1 | | sect163r2 | | NIST B-163 sect193r1 | | sect193r2 | | sect233k1 | | NIST K-233 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233 sect239k1 | | sect283k1 | | NIST K-283 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571 secp160k1 | | secp160r1 | | secp160r2 | | secp192k1 | | secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192 secp224k1 | | secp224r1 | | NIST P-224 secp256k1 | | secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521 ------------+---------------+------------- 

What immediately appear is that there are only two curves selected by all authorities, and that there is a general dumping of koblitz curves by ANSI.The only commonly agreed among the 3 authorities are the following two ECC curve:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Of those selection of ECC curve for TLS the RFC5430 skipped completely koblitz curves and selected for usage only:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The ECC Brainpool skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected for usage the following ECC Curves:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 ( that's the only particular because it's not P-521 but P-512, the only key-size referred by ECC brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons from Athena SCS )

The OpenPGP internet draft for ECC usage in PGP d raft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

The Kerberos protocol extension for ECC use, defined in RFC5349 and defined by Microsoft for smartcard logon skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

So, sounds clear that the right selection of ECC is for P-256, P-384 and P-521 while the Koblitz curve have been skipped for Top Secret use and for any security sensitive protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS).

Why i made this analysis?

I have done this analysis following a discussion i had regarding certain voice encryption products, all based on custom and proprietary protocols, that are all using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571 / 571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits .
All them are using the K-571 that, as described before, has been removed from all security sensitive environment and protocols and being myself a designer of voice encryption stuff i think that their cryptographic choice is absolutely not the best security choice.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz elliptic curve are faster than the top secret enabled prime elliptic curve and so give the product manager a chance to provide “more bit” in it's own product while keeping the key exchange fast.

It's a matter of philosophical choice.

I prefer to follow the trend of scientific community with the humility of not to considering myself a cryptographic expert, knowledgable more than the overall security and scientific community itself.

I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
I prefer to count the amount of brains working on the crypto i use, that check that's really secure, that evaluate whether there's some weakness.

The number of brais working on Crypto widely diffused are of order of magnitude more than the number of brains working on crypto used by just few people (like Koblitz curve).
So i am not demonizing who use ECDH 571 using Koblitz Curve, but for sure i can affirm that they did not taken the best choice in terms of security and that any security professionals doing a security benchmarking would consider the fact that Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit done with Koblitz Curve is not widely diffused, it's dumped from standard security protocols and it's not certified for top secret use.

Dalis

ESSOR, European Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.

That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.

In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .

Mes galime tikėtis, kad kitos technologijos, silpna pagal dizainą, tačiau apsaugota apribojimų aparatūros įrenginių nulaužti žemo lygio protokolus, bus netrukus gauti nulaužė. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)

Dalis

Voice communication security workshop

Sveiki,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

Dalis

27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

We come in peace

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We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

Dalis

GSM krekingo, prasiskverbimo bandymų metodikos OSSTMM)?

Kadangi dauguma šio tinklaraščio skaitytojas jau žinote, per pastaruosius metus buvo daug veiklos, susijusios su viešųjų mokslinių tyrimų GSM audito ir skilinėjimą.

Tačiau, kai buvo didžiulis žiniasklaidos GSM krekingo mokslinių tyrimų rezultatus, įrankiai krekingo buvo labai ankstyvame etape ir vis dar labai neefektyvi.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Dalis

Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

Jūs žinote, darome saugumo technologija reiškia, kad esate asmeniškai atsakingas už vartotojo informacijos apsauga. Jūs turite padėti jiems suvokti, ką jie turi, ką jūsų darote, ir kokios grėsmės modelio jūsų produktas apsaugoti.

Tipinis produkto apsauginių savybių problema atstovaujamos vartotojo nesugebėjimas įvertinti saugumo reikalavimus patį produktą.

Taigi yra daug bendrovių, daro ne taip etikos rinkodaros apsauginių savybių, paremtos faktais, kad nė vienas vartotojas galės įvertinti.

Anksčiau paaiškinta situacija gyventi Snake Oil šifravimas, mokslo kriptografinės aplinkoje, kuri leidžia mums šiandien naudoti geriausias veislės informacijos apsaugos technologijas nereikės nerimauti per daug apie Backdoors ar dvejonės raidos saugumo tema.

Leiskite kalbėti apie Snake Oil šifravimą

Gyvatė Nafta Kriptografija : kriptografija , Snake Oil yra terminas, vartojamas aprašyti komercinius kriptografijos metodus ir produktus, kurie laikomi išgalvotas arba apgaulės. Atskirti saugoma kriptografiją iš nesaugios kriptografija gali būti sunku iš naudotojo požiūriu. Daugelis cryptographers, pavyzdžiui, Bruce Schneier ir Phil Zimmermann , įsipareigoja šviesti visuomenę kaip saugoma kriptografija daroma, taip pat pabrėžiant Klaidinanti reklama kai kurių kriptografiškai produktų.

Labiausiai nuorodos kriptografinę saugumo guru Philip Zimmermann ir Bruce Schneier 1. kalbėti apie Snake Oil šifravimo:

Gyvatė Nafta pateikė Philip Zimmermann

Gyvatė Nafta Bruce Schneier

. Mičiganas Telekomunikacijos ir technologijų Law Review taip pat padarė labai gerą analizę, susijusią su saugumo produktų apsauginių savybių, gyvatės ALIEJUS SAUGUMAS TEIGINIAI APIE "Sistemiškas MELAGINGĄ,,, APIE PREPARATO SAUGUMO . Jie paaiškins apie bjaurių naudojamų marketingo triukų į įgnybti vartotojams nesugebėjimą įvertinti saugumo funkcijų, įskaitant ekonominį ir teisinį atsakomybės netiesiogiai.

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : Keletas Snake Oil apsaugos produktų įmonės neturi paaiškinti ir neaišku, apie grėsmės pavyzdį produktas taikyti Labai garsus bausmės Russ Nelsonas :

"Atminkite, kriptografinę be grėsmės modelio yra kaip slapukus be pieno. ..... Kriptografija be grėsmės modelis yra kaip motinystę be obuolių pyragas. Negaliu pasakyti, kad pakankamai kartus. Apskritai, saugumo be grėsmės modelis yra iš esmės gali patirti nesėkmę. "

Taigi, kaip atpažinti gyvatės aliejaus apsaugos produktus?

Patikrinkite, vietoje Snake Oil Užšifravimo produktų gairę: Snake Oil Įspėjamieji, Šifravimo programinė įranga Venkite Matt Curtin .

Jūs galite pamatyti šiuos labai gerus kriptografini, Snake Oil pavyzdžiai Emility Ratliff (IBM Linux saugumo architektas), kad bandė padaryti aiškų pavyzdį, kaip atpažinti kriptografiniai Snake Oil.

Čia atstovaujama iš Matt Curtin popieriaus pagrindinę gairę :


Tikrinti, kad punktų, tai galima įvertinti, kaip šifravimo technologija ar produktas yra rimtas.

Bet apskritai, kaip nustatyti, kad neetišką saugumo požiūrį?

Tai labai Znaczeniowy ir tai būtų tikrai naudinga kiekvieno saugumo produktų kategorijos natūra, kai stipriai ir nepriklausomo vertinimo gairės (kaip ir skverbties bandymas OSSTMM už), kad šis saugumo vertinimo procesą tikrai naudotojo rankas.

Taip pat būtų labai malonu, kad kažkas saugumo produktų bendrovių analizę ir vertinimą, skelbiant pranešimus apie Snake Oil ženklams.

Dalis

Web2.0 privatumo nutekėjimas Mobilieji apps

Jūs žinote, kad web2.0 pasaulis tai daug bet kokios rūšies profiliavimas, profiliavimas, profiliavimo), susijusios su privatumo ir vartotojų nutekėjimo prasideda susirūpinęs .

Vartotojai nuolat atsisiųsti programas, žinant, ką jie daro detales, pavyzdžiui, iFart tik todėl, kad yra kietas, yra įdomus ir kartais yra naudinga.

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Dėl mobiliųjų telefonų vartotojams įdiegti nuo 1000% iki 10,000% daugiau paraiškų nei ant PC, ir šios programos gali būti kenkėjiškų programų arba kitų netikėtų funkcijų.

Neseniai infobyte išanalizavo ubertwitter klientą ir atrado, kad klientas buvo nesandarus ir siųsti savo serverio daugelio asmeninių ir jautrius duomenis, tokius kaip:

- BlackBerry PIN kodas

- Telefono numeris

- Elektroninio pašto adresas

- Geografinė pozicionavimo informacija

Skaitykite apie UbertTwitter "šnipinėjimo" atradimo čia pagal infoByte .

Tai daug, išsiskiriančių asmeninį ir jautrią informaciją, bet tiesiog niekas į jo išvaizdą.

Jei privalomo duomenų saugojimo ir privatumo politika tapo programų kūrimo ir pateikimo gaires, mobiliųjų telefonų?

IMHO a vartotojai turi ne tik įspėjo apie paraiškos galimybes ir API naudojimo, bet, ką darys su kokios informacijos jis ketina dirbti su mobiliojo telefono viduje.

Galimybės reiškia, leidžiantis naudoti tam tikrų funkcijų, pavyzdžiui naudoti geolokacijos API, tačiau ką darys ir kas teiks tokią informaciją, kai vartotojas suteikia įgaliojimus?

Tai, saugumo profiliavimas lygis, kad mobiliųjų telefonų gamintojas nenumato ir jie turėtų būti, nes sutelkti dėmesį į informaciją, o ne leidimas / sutikimas paraiškos atžvilgiu, naudojimo įrenginių pajėgumus.

ps taip! ok! Sutinku! Toks pareigų reikės 3-4 puslapiai ilgą diskusiją tema yra karštas ir gana sujungta, bet tai šeštadienį ryte ir i gotta go!

Dalis

AES algoritmas pasirinktas naudoti kosmose

Aš susidūrė gražią knygą apie analizę ir atsižvelgti šifravimo algoritmas, jis geriausiai tinka naudoti kosmosą kosminiu laivu ir įranga.

Popierius buvo padaryta konsultacinio komiteto su kosmine erdve susijusių duomenų sistemų, tai visų kosminės erdvės agentūros konsorciumas aplink, kad bendrai perkrauta daugiau nei 400 misijai į kosmosą .

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Skaityti popieriaus šifravimo algoritmą prekybos tyrimą, nes ji suteikia įdomų atsižvelgti ir palyginimus tarp skirtingų šifravimo algoritmai.

Akivaizdu, kad galutinai atrinktos algoritmas AES ,, o KASUMI (naudojamas tik UMTS tinkluose) buvo išvengta.

Dalis

BlackBerry Saugumas ir šifravimas: velnias ar angelas?

BlackBerry turėti gerą ir blogą reputaciją dėl savo saugumo pajėgumų, priklausomai nuo to, kuris kampas žiūrėti į jį.

Šis pranešimas yra apibendrinti informacijos leisti skaitytojui gauti vaizdą, neatsižvelgiant daug poziciją, kaip RIM Blackberry, gali būti laikoma, priklausomai nuo požiūriu, itin saugi platforma, arba itin pavojingo.

bblock.jpg

Tegul eina.

Dėl vienos šoninės Blackberry tai platforma daug šifravimo funkcijų, saugumo funkcijas visur, įtaisas, saugiame (Custom kriptografijos), ryšių šifruotų ( pasirinktinių patentuotais protokolais , pavyzdžiui, kaip OPVPP), labai geras Išplėstinė Saugumo parametrai, šifravimo vykdomos iš Certicom dabar priklauso RIM ).

Iš kitos pusės, jie ne tik prietaisas, bet overlay prieigos tinklą, vadinamą TAB ( BlackBerry Internet Service ), tai pasaulinis visame pasaulyje plačiajam tinklui, kur jūsų gervuogių įvesti, kai naršote ar CheckMail naudojant blackberry.net AP.

Kai jūs, ar paraiška, naudoti blackberry.net APN esate ne tik jungiantis prie su vežėjo interneto ryšį internetu, bet ar tikrai įvedėte RIM tinklo viduje, kad bus proxy ir veikia kaip vartai pasiekti internetą.

Tą pačią atsitikti, kai jūs turite įmonių naudoti: BB įrenginio ir įmonių BES prisijungti prie tinklo RIM, kad aktas, kaip rūšies vpn koncentracijos tinklo .

Taigi iš esmės visos komunikacijos kirsti mažiausioji RIM paslaugų infrastruktūrą šifruotu formatu nustatytą patentuotą šifravimo ir komunikacijos protokolus.

Lygiai taip pat pranešimo apie jį, manau, kad google gtalk per blackberry.net APN, padarė sandorą, kad pasiūlyti paslaugą viduje BB tinklo, BB vartotojams. Kai įdiegiate gtalk jums pridėjo 3 paslaugų knygas , kad taškas GTALKNA01 kad tai gtalk vartai viduje RIM tinklo leisti-bis vidaus komunikacijos ir veikia kaip dėl gtalk vartai, interneto vardas.

Mobiliojo ryšio operatoriai paprastai nėra netgi leidžiama apžiūrėti tarp BlackBerry įrenginio BlackBerry tinklo srautą.

Taigi RIM ir BlackBerry kažkaip unikalus savo požiūrį, nes jie suteikia su platforma, tinklui ir paslauga, kuri teikiama visa siejama kartu ir tu gali ne tik "gauti į prietaisą ir programinę įrangą", bet vartotojo ir bendrovės yra visuomet privalo ir prisijungti prie paslaugos tinklas.

That's good and that's bad, because it means that RIM provide extremely good security features and capabilities to protect information, device and access to information at various level against third party .

But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Cheers

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

Dalis

Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

Dalis

Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

Dalis

China Encryption Regulations

Hi all,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

Dalis

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

Dalis

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Dalis

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Dalis

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

Dalis

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

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Dalis

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

Dalis

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Pagarbiai,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.

Dalis

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Taip
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Taip
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Taip
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Taip
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Taip
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Taip

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
Kaip?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

Dalis

O3B Networks: a new satellite broadband approach

That's something amazing, “other 3 billion” broadband coverage not trough fiber but trough satellite.

A project where also google is one of the shareholder, covering 3 billion persons trough low orbit, low latency broadband (10GBit) satellite network.

Check here technical infrastructure details on ITU website.

Dalis

Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

Dalis

This is big business, this is the American way

43 years old “UFO eccentric” hacker Gary McKinnon just loses appeal against his extradition to the States for computer crimes he committed 7 years ago.

If you've lived under a rock during the last few years what this dude did was basically break into .gov computers looking for UFO related material.

Probably the last case of recreational hacking I've heard about.

So his case is obviously going to be a classical “Strike one to educate one hundred” kind of message to every hacker attacking american computer systems: we can reach you everywhere you live and have you extradited to our country where we will sentence you to life in prison.

Unless you are a multi millionaire cyber criminal living in Russia or a chinese spy, of course.

Dalis

Iphone jailbreaking crashing towers? FUD!

It's interesting to read a news about an anti-jailbreaking statement by apple that say that with jailbreaked phones it may be possible to crash mobile operator's towers:

By tinkering with this code, “a local or international hacker could potentially initiate commands (such as a denial of service attack) that could crash the tower software, rendering the tower entirely inoperable to process calls or transmit data,”

So fun, as the Baseband Processor interface of iPhone is precisely the same of Google android and all Windows Mobile powered devices:

Basically the operating system use AT commands (do you remember old hayes modem commands?) with additional parameters documented and standardized by 3GPP that let more deep (but not that much deep) interaction with the mobile networks.

Please note that those AT commands are standard and widely available on all phones and are the interface to the Baseband Processor .

On iPhone that's the list of commands that an from apple point of view could let “a international hacker to crash the tower software” :

Undocumented commands on iPhone

Damn, those European anarchist of Nokia are providing publicly also their AT command sets, and are AVAILABLE TO ANYONE:

Nokia AT Commands

Oh jesus! Also the terrorist oriented Microsoft corporation let third party to use AT commands:

Windows Mobile AT Commands

It's absolutely unacceptable that also RIM, canadian funky against USA, provide access to AT commands:

Blackberry AT commands

And it's unbelivable to see that Google Android also document how the system speak to the Baseband Processor and find on forums that it's ease to access it:

Google Android Basedband Processor

Not to speak to ALL other mobile manufactuer that use the very same approach and let any party to speak via AT commands to the baseband processor of the phone.

Is the baseband processor of iphone buggy and the AT&T tower software buggy so that it's dangerous to let the user make experiment with it?

Probably yes, and so those are only excuse because the software involved are not robust enough.

Apple, be careful, you have the trust of your users because you are apple you always have done things for the user advantages.

Users does like telephone companies that are huge lobbies that try to restrict and control users as much as possible.

If you, Apple, start behaving like a phone company users will not trust you anymore.

Be careful with FUD statements.

Dalis

Nokia World in Stuttgard 2-3 September

Everyone who's business is directly connected to mobile, aggregators, operators and generally speaking mobility application should really attend Nokia World where most of the world key people in the mobile business .

It's extremely interesting to see the evolution of the business models related to the Application Portals, how the mobile operators are changing their approach to the market, the increasing of value added services related to mobile industry.

And the most important things is, the mobile operators will be able to became financial operators to really provide mobile payment systems integrated into any day digital life?

And if this will happen, how the manufacturer and operating system provider will play this game?

Dalis

Saas: is the end of the myth?

Saas business models growth a lot during the past few years and i personally appreciate it.

No software to be installed, configured, maintained, service available when you needed with a early adoption time and most important reduction (or apparent reduction) of the total costs of ownership.

I had few experience with SaaS business (as a customer) and i have to say that the following Gartner Group analysis on SaaS businesses imho tell you the truth only for half of statements:

  • There is always a partial integration issue (not all systems are so flexible to really integrate into your business like you would like)
  • There is often a lacks of the technical requirements needed by the specific business case
  • I DO NOT agree that there is a barrier in the costs, as SaaS usually let you start spending only a few. However it's true that while doing the deployment you should be more conservative in the usage of features and items (es: I am using for my company a hosted VoIP PBX system, we pay for each extension we add. We don't have test extension or extensions that are not strictly needed because it costs. When we had an internal VoIP PBX system, we was plenty of test extension. This slightly increase some complexity in maintenance and deployment, even if the total cost of maintenance is a lot lower than an internal system to be managed.

So we can assume that Saas it's for most but not for all, especially if the need of customizations for the very specific business needs are relevant.

An in depth analysis and testing has to be carried on, in order to discover all the limits of the solution, on functionalities and pricing, to really discover if the specific solution fit the business need.

Dalis

Mobile platform hacking: worms and botnet from phones?

The hacking community is finally starting seriously auditing and hacking Symbian OS, even if it's difficult, hard to work on, unpleasant to debug it .

There are so many mobile operating systems (Symbian OS, Nokia S40, Windows Mobile, RIM OS, Mac OS X, Android/Linux, Brew) that a worm/virus being able to leverage a cross-platform vulnerability it's just a theory.

Trusted computing platforms, security model of J2ME Java only phones (like RIM and S40), digital signature everywhere are all tools that make massive hacking on mobile platform really difficult.

It's difficult and costly to develop on mobile platforms, it's difficult and costly too doing hacking on that platforms.

Still look at a very nice achievement of paper from SEC Consult called Pwning Nokia phones (and other Symbian based smartphones) .

Can we expect future worms or botnet on mobile? I don't expect so, too many different OS with hard-to-beat security model.

And even if a worm would be able to penetrate a single mobile paltform bugs, mobile operators would be able to block it very quickly (compare how many GSM/UMTS operator exists compared to Internet Service Provider?).

Dalis

The real goal of online marketing: lead generation

Often i discuss about online marketing, however it include the mysterious “marketing” magic word that's tipically subject to misunderstanding and misconception .

The end goal of online marketing is to generate qualified leads coming from international markets.

Some interesting links about it, and how things should be properly done are below:

I would really like to see an effective leverage of online techniques and tools as the main interface and providers of information, the main pre-sales agent of the company explaining almost everything required to get back a qualified lead.

Dalis

How the various audio compression codec sounds?

You know, we would not be able to use VoIP and have cheap international phone calls without audio compression codecs.

It's plenty of them, some royalty free, some patented by telco's lobby (think that some patented and royalty-based codec it's also a standard, where all market player have to pay the most aggressive one that acquired the patent while defining the standards).

However, there is a nice collection from vocal , to understand how they sounds.

Dalis

Voice Security and Privacy slides

Below my slides on voice security and privacy from Security Summit 2009 .

mmm, yes i am working in this area from 2005, will write again about it.

sux

Dalis