naif
Seiceáil sé amach mo: sleamhnáin * (atá as dáta) leathanach baile ar phróifíl http://fabio.pietrosanti.it * gairmiúla ar http://www.linkedin.com/in/secret * cartlanna ar http://slideshare.net/fpietrosanti /
Ar deireadh ZRTP sannta oifigeach RFC sannadh, RFC6189 ZRTP: Meáin Comhaontú Eochair Conair do Unicast Secure RTP.
Bhí sé mar spleáchas an SRTP le méid AES eochair 256bit atá sainithe anois mar RFC6188 .
Tá sé spreagúil a fheiceáil an RFC scaoileadh ar deireadh, mar tá sé cloch mhíle thábhachtach ZRTP a leagan amach mar atá an caighdeán oifigiúil le haghaidh deireadh le deireadh criptithe i bhfad mar PGP tá do r-phoist.
Anois, beidh aon eagraíocht ar fud an domhain a bheith in ann go hoifigiúil ZRTP a chur i bhfeidhm le haghaidh deireadh le deireadh criptithe guth prótacal
Faoi láthair 3 implementations poiblí éagsúla ZRTP prótacal ann:
Gach ceann acu a chur ar fáil gnéithe éagsúla de na prótacail, ach is tábhachtaí is eol a bheith comh-inoibritheach.
Tá tonn nua atá ag teacht ar an domhan criptithe guth, irrupting isteach i limistéar ina bhfuil an chuid is mó liath de na cuideachtaí a dhéanamh ar chórais criptithe teileafóin a chur chun feidhme criptithe saincheaptha.
Anois tá caighdeán thus agus tá roinnt cúiseanna a chur i bhfeidhm d'fhág rud éigin difriúil.
Hurra tUasal Zimmermann agus gach pobal na cuideachtaí (cosúil le PrivateWave ) agus do dhaoine aonair (ar nós Werner Dittmann ) gur oibrigh ar é!
Inniu tá sé ina lá mór, de chineál ar nós na teicneolaíochta anois oifigiúil agus chomh maith le cur chun feidhme atá ann cheana féin il!
Philip, rinne tú arís é, mo compliments le do spiorad íon agus a chinneadh :-)
An domhan spreagúil do phrótacail arna póca (GSM, GSM-R, Tetra, UMTS, srl) ag dul hacking gníomhaíochtaí taighde oifigiúil ó ollscoileanna.
Tá an infheistíocht a dhéanamh scaoileadh chód opensource na bogearraí scoilteadh a thugann an deis do mhic léinn na hollscoile a bheith ag obair ar sé, é a fheabhsú agus taighde láidir a dhéanamh.
Tá an Ollscoil Freiburg scaoileadh ach an páipéar a fheidhmiú praiticiúil ar an Criptiú A5 GSM / 1 chomh maith le gsmframencoder uirlis tacaíochta chun feabhas a chur ar an bpróiseas sniffing, díchódaithe agus scoilteadh.
Oscailte crua-earraí, bogearraí a oscailt, prótacal a oscailt léiriú an laige de shaghas ar bith de mhodh dílseánaigh nó próiseas a thógáil suas teicneolaíochtaí cumarsáide agus slándála.
Ba chóir go mbeadh an sprioc aon eolaithe chun iarracht a oscailt suas agus de chineál ar bith teicneolaíocht dhílsithe agus dúnta chun bhfeidhm ar an tionscal a théann ar amháin le cur chuige comh-inoibritheach agus oscailte agus a dhearadh prótacail teileachumarsáide crack.
Go luath i mbliana chinn mé go bhfuil an t-am a rith nód scoir Tor sin thug me VPS ag hetzner.de (toisc go bhfuil siad liostaithe mar Dea-Tor ISP ) agus thus an scoir-nód le leasainm privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch le 100Mbit / s ceangal le haghaidh an chéad 1TB na sonraí míosúla, ansin 10MBit / s cothrom.
Tá sé ar siúl freisin TOR2WEB bogearraí ar http://tor.infosecurity.ch .
I thus an scoir-polasaí faoi mar a mhol reáchtáil scoir-nód le ciapadh íosta agus ullmhaigh teimpléad freagra mí-úsáid .
Sa chéad lá tá mé ag rith an nód a fuair mé láithreach DMCA gearán mar gheall ar piaraí tráchta piaraí.
Mar sin, chinn mé a scagadh amach roinnt tráchta P2P trí úsáid a bhaint OpenDPI iptables modúl agus DMCA gearán a dhéanamh imithe go huathoibríoch:
iptables-A ASCHUR-m-opendpi edonkey-gadugadu-suíomh gréasáin Foilsitheoir:-gnutella-directconnect-bittorrent-winmx-soulseek-j DIÚLTAIGH
Ansin, mar tá mé Iodáilis, chinn mé a sheachaint mo nód Tor chun ceangal leis an idirlíon spás hIodáile seoladh d'fhonn a laghdú an seans go mbeadh ionchúisitheoir dúr dúisigh mé suas ar maidin toisc nach raibh a thuiscint go bhfuil mé ag reáchtáil nód Tor.
Rinne mé, le cabhair ó hellais gur scríobh a script a dhéanamh Polasaí Scoir dhiúltú ráiteas , do gach netblocks Iodáilis bunaithe ar dhiúltú ioerror ar blockfinder ach fuair muid go raibh an chumraíocht torrc bhí comhaid le 1000 línte a dhéanamh tuairteála Tor.
Chuaigh muid go dtí a oscailt ticéad chun tuairisc a thabhairt ar an timpiste ar ár iarracht chun bealach polasaí amach Tor de réir na tíre agus aimsigh iarracht den chineál céanna nuair a chuir muid, ach dealraíonn sé fós a bheith i gceist oscailte.
Is é an chonclúid nach bhfuil sé indéanta a dhéanamh Polasaí Scoir Tír do nód scoir Tor ar bhealach glan agus dea-bhéasach sin shocraigh mé chun dul ar an mbealach salach trí úsáid a bhaint iptables / geoip . Tar éis troid chun é a dhéanamh le chéile i gceart, go raibh sé ar líne amháin de iptables chun bealach tráchta ag dul go dtí an Iodáil:
iptables-A ASCHUR-p rabhadh-m stát-stáit NUA-m-geoip DST-cc IT-j DIÚLTAIGH
Anois ó mo nód scoir-mbeidh aon bhaint acu le líonraí Iodáilis a dhéanamh agus tá mé slán i gcoinne nach bhfuil, b'fhéidir, ionchúisitheoirí dúr tuiscint a fháil ar Tor (I have eisceacht do gach seoladh IP nód Tor i bhfeidhm roimh).
Tar éis roinnt laethanta eile a thosaigh mé gearán a fháil mar gheall ar ghníomhaíochtaí portscan tháinig ó mo nóid Tor.
Ó mo thaobh féin de, ba mhaith liom chun tacú le líonra gan ainm, hacking iarracht gan ainm agus mar sin ba mhaith liom a scagadh amach portscan agus ionsaithe ó ábhar a thionscnaíonn ó mo node.That 's casta a cheangal ar roinnt staidéar, mar sin idir an dá linn suiteáilte i scanlogd agus Snort mar ba mhaith liom a mheas cé mhéad ionsaithe, tá a chineál na n-ionsaithe ag dul amach as mo nód scoir Tor.
Níos déanaí, beidh mé iarracht a dhéanamh de shaghas éigin scagadh a bheith cinnte a bheith in ann a scagadh amach ionsaithe móra.
Chun cad atá ar a bhaineann leis portscan is cosúil nach bhfuil aon uirlisí poiblí a bhrath agus a scagadh portscan ag dul as oifig ach amháin a scagadh portscan ag teacht isteach mar sin is dócha go mbeidh gá le rud éigin a scríobh ad-hoc.
Déanfaidh mé tagairt conas a bhfuil rudaí ag dul agus más rud é go mbeidh ar bhealach éigin deas a chur i bhfeidhm ar bhealach lightwave Snort-inlíne chun iarracht ionsaí roghnach scagaire-amach mór a thagann ó mo nód scoir-.
Is é mo sprioc a choinneáil nód scoir ag rith i fadtéarmach (ar a laghad de 1TB tráchta in aghaidh na mí bronnta ar Tor), ag laghdú ar an iarracht a bhaineann le ISP gearán agus ag iarraidh mo dhícheall a reáchtáil ar an slí amach-nód le dliteanas réasúnta.
Tá sé an-spreagúil a fheiceáil scaoileadh OsmocomTETRA , an CTS chéad opensource ( Raidió Bogearraí Sainithe ) cur i bhfeidhm Tetra demodulator, PHY agus sraitheanna níos ísle MAC.
Tá sé an leagan Tetra de airprobe GSM go scaoilfeadh glas ar rochtain ar na sonraí agus fráma Tetra cumarsáide prótacal, rud a thugann deis hacking iontach!
Anois go bhfuil freisin Tetra teicneolaíocht a osclaíodh ba cheart dúinn a bheith ag súil leis, le linn an 2011, a fheiceáil sniffers Tetra opensource agus is dócha TAE criptithe chomh maith (an Algartam Criptithe Tetra) scáinte!
Tetra atá in úsáid ag Póilíní, Seirbhísí Éigeandála agus militaries mar líonra cumarsáide soghluaiste eile is féidir a oibríonn go fiú gan an clúdach ar fáil líonra (ach amháin soghluaiste-le-póca gan stáisiún bonn) agus ar fáil ar roinnt seirbhísí ar fáil speisialta ard.
Scríobh mé faoi Tetra i mo sleamhnán Athbhreithniú Gutha Mór Prótacal Slándála .
I liostaí seoltaí OsmocomBB bhí cheana plé faoi roinnt stádas líonra Tetra:
Beidh sé i ndáiríre spraoi go póilíneachta nua agus ar ais tarrthála hacking seirbhíse ag teacht ó aois aschur d'aois a fheiceáil chun na raidiónna digiteach nua :-)
Na coincheapa taobh thiar WikiLeaks, OpenLeaks, GlobalLeaks, BalkanLeaks Tá i bhfad níos mó ná rúin nochtadh don phobal.
Tá sé mar chuid de réabhlóid ag teacht go i rialtais trédhearcacht eagraíocht, agus comhar le sin ar a dtugtar 'gréasáin 2.0 / wiki' córais comhoibritheach.
Féach ar na Rialtais 2.0 - Réamhrá ag Anke Domscheit Berg Tags, Clár Rialtais Nuálacha de Microsoft Ghearmáin agus bean Daniel Berg, comhbhunaitheoir WikiLeaks agus anois bunaitheoir OpenLeaks .
Féach ar Oscailte rialtais Sonraí 2.0 tionscnamh a chur i bhfeidhm trédhearcacht rialtais, laghdú éilliú agus feidhmíocht a fheabhsú d'eagraíocht rialtais.
Sin an réabhlóid tá sé ach níos mó ná grúpa de guys funky anarco-libertarian gur mian leo a chruthú chaos ag rúin a scaipeadh, tá sé ach tús na Rush a bhaint amach múnla eagraíocht nua rialtais ag leveraging trédhearcacht iomlán agus comhar láidir le saoránaigh.
Dia duit ar fad, sa lá atá inniu ag PrivateWave Italia SpA, cuideachta Iodáilis i mbun teicneolaíochtaí a fhorbairt do chosaint príobháideachta agus slándála faisnéise i teileachumarsáide gutha ina CTO i am, scaoileadh muid ZORG, nua foinse oscailte ZRTP prótacal i bhfeidhm ar fáil le híoslódáil ó http://www. zrtp.org .
ZORG tá forbairt déanta ar dtús agus cuireadh i bhfeidhm i dtáirgí PrivateWave ar PrivateGSM criptithe guth ar fáil le haghaidh an ardáin seo a leanas: Blackberry, Nokia agus iOS (iPhone).
Zorg C + + curtha comhtháite le PJSIP foinse oscailte VoIP SDK [2] agus tá sé ar fáil mar paiste lánpháirtiú i gcoinne PJSIP 1.8.5. Tá sé tar éis tástáil ar iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux agus Mac OS X.
Zorg Java Tá comhtháite laistigh de leagan saincheaptha de MJSIP [3] oscailte fhoinse SDK ar ardán Blackberry agus folaíonn sé optimizations úsáid cuimhne ag teastáil chun laghdú ar ghníomhaíocht truflais laghad bailitheoir.
An dá ardáin bhfuil scartha agus chripteagrafach modúlach ais chríochnaíonn-ionas go bhféadfaí an chripteagrafach halgartaim a chur chun feidhme a bhabhtáil go héasca le cinn eile.
. ZORG atá ceadúnaithe faoi GNU AGPL agus tá cód foinse atá ar fáil ar github ag https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .
Táimid ag scaoileadh sé faoi foinse oscailte agus i gcomhchuibheas le lenár gcur chuige chun slándáil [4] mar tá súil againn i ndáiríre gur féidir é a bheith úsáideach don éiceachóras foinse oscailte a chruthú córais guth criptithe nua chun tacú le saoirse cainte.
D'fhéadfaí níos mó ná 20 pjsip-bhunaithe foinse oscailte bogearraí criptithe VoIP agus roinnt scríofa i Java tairbhe dhíreach ó scaoileadh ZORG.
Ba mhaith linn a bheith sásta go bhfaighidh sé togra an chomhair, comhtháthú nua, chripteagrafach nua ar ais-foircinn, bug scouting agus is cuma cad úsáideach a fheabhsú agus a ligean ZRTP dhaingniú mar chaighdeán criptithe guth.
Zorg ar fáil ó http://www.zrtp.org .
[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] Slándáil chuige: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html
Againn ach scaoileadh ar howto teicniúil ar conas a thógáil suas soghluaiste Faighte le bonneagar VoIP líne talún le:
I howto seachtaine seo chugainn beidh daoine eile mar seo teacht amach trí úsáid a bhaint hardáin freastalaí eile, mar shampla FreeSWITCH, ar fad i spiorad na trédhearcachta agus ghiaráil teicneolaíochtaí slándála opensource.
Tá alt an-soilsiúcháin ar ocht Teip Epic de Rialáil Cripteagrafaíochta agus míthuiscint choitianta ag rialtóirí rialtas nach bhfuil dearcadh leathan ar conas a oibríonn an teicneolaíocht.
Ní rialtóirí rialtas ignorant Tuigtear go mbeadh rialachán dian ag na míbhuntáistí a leanas:
Mé a sheachaint go hiomlán úsáid a bhaint as mo bhlag pearsanta féin a dhéanamh ar chur chun cinn de chineál ar bith a táirge.
An am sin nach bhfuil sé difriúil, ach ba mhaith liom a insint duit fíricí mar gheall ar bheith ag obair i dtáirgí ar gan margaíocht sainiúil, ach fanacht teicniúla.
Inniu, ag PrivateWave áit i am CTO agus comhbhunaitheoir , scaoileadh muid go poiblí táirgí criptithe soghluaiste VoIP do Blackberry, iPhone agus Nokia:
Ag PrivateWave úsáid againn maidir le cur chuige difriúil leis an chuid is mó cuideachta criptithe guth amach ann, ár léamh cur chuige maidir le slándáil .
Is féidir leis an ábharthacht na táirgí seo sa tírdhreach teicneolaíochta agus tionscail a achoimriú mar seo a leanas:
Glacfar sraith na gCliant Secure Mobile sin, a cheapfar le haghaidh slándála gairmiúil a úsáid ach amháin ag baint úsáide as teileachumarsáide is fearr agus teicneolaíochtaí slándála, a sholáthar le leibhéal ard cosanta chomh maith le dea-fheidhmíocht freisin i gcoinníollacha líonra dona:
Tá na hiarratais:
Is iad na feistí tacaíocht soghluaiste:
Maidir ZRTP shocraigh muid a chur in iúl agus stráice na slándála agus an ghné paranoid an prótacal le roinnt maith beag:
Our strict address book integration, goes beyond ZRTP RFC specification , that could be vulnerable to certain attacks when used on mobile phones because of user behavior of not to look at mobile screen.
Our paranoy way of using ZRTP mitigate such conditions, we will write about this later and/or will add specific details for RFC inclusion.
Some words on PrivateGSM Professional with end-to-end encryption with ZRTP
Read technical sheet there!
To download it click here and just put your phone number
Those are the results of hard work of all my very skilled staff (16 persons worked on this 6 projects for 3 different platforms) on challenging technologies (voice encryption) in a difficult operating environment (dirty mobile networks and dirty mobile operating systems) for more than 2 years.
I am very proud of our staff!
What next?
In next weeks you will see releasing of major set of documentations such as integration with asterisks, freeswitch and other Security Enabled PBX, along with some exciting other security technology news that i am sure will be noticed ;)
It has been an hard work and more have to be done but i am confident that the security and opensource community will like such products and our transparent approach also with open important releases and open source integration that make a very politically neutral (backdoor free) technology.
There are a lot of reason why one would need to access internet trough a VPN.
For example if you live in a country blocking certain contents (like anti-local-government website, porn, etc) and/or protocols (like skype, voip) you would probably want to move your internet connectivity outside the nasty blocking country by using encrypted VPN tunnels.
I evaluated several hosted VPN server and a couple of them sounds quite good among the widespread offering of such services:
Exit to the internet from Switzerland.
Cost 6 CHF / months
Optional public fixed IP address
Useful if you need:
Exit to the internet by choosing among 20 different countries (each time you connect).
Useful if you need to do:
My own ECC curve security and selection analysis
Most modern crypto use Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) that, with a smaller key size and reduce computation power, give equivalent security strength of traditional crypto system known as DH (Diffie-Hellman) or RSA ( Rivest, Shamir and Adleman ) .
Not everyone knows that ECC encryption is selected for any future encryption applications and that even TLS/SSL (encryption used for securing the web) is moving to ECC.
I found plenty of so called “proprietary encryption products” which abandoned RSA and DH to goes with ECC alternatives, that tend to arbitrary use ECC bit key size without even specifying which kind of ECC crypto get used.
However there is a lot of confusion around Elliptic Curves, with a lot of different names and key size making difficult for a non-cryptographically-experienced-user to make your own figure when evaluating some crypto stuff.
Because of so diffused confusion i decided to make my own analysis to find out which are the best ECC encryption curves and right ECC key size to use.
This analysis would like to provide a security industry based choice among various curves and key sizes, leaving the mathematical and crypto analytical considerations that has been already been done during the years, summarizing the various choices taken in several standards and security protocols.
First the conclusion.
From my analysis only the following ECC curves are to be considered for use in encryption systems because are the only one selected among different authorities (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC BrainPool), different security protocol standards (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS) and the only one matching NSA Suite B security requirements (de-facto standard also for NATO military environment):
le roghnach, ach i ndáiríre do paranoid gur mhaith a fháil ar beagán níos mó méid príomh-ní, a mheas go fóill úsáideach:
Ba mhaith liom a rá gur chóir curves Koblitz a sheachaint, i méid ar bith eochair (163/283/409/571) mar nach bhfuil siad go leor ar bharántas rialaithe criptithe ghníomhaíocht anailíseach agus go héifeachtach go bhfuil siad:
Liom cuireadh a thabhairt don léitheoir trough a leanúint mo anailís ar a thuiscint an bunúsacha a d'fhéadfaí a thuiscint fiú gan cúlra teicniúil domhain ach ar a laghad le cúlra maith theicneolaíoch a roinnt beagán bunúsach cripteagrafaíochta.
Seo muid ag dul leis an anailís
Is é mo sprioc a dhéanamh ar anailís ar an méid a / conas an eolaíochta oscailte agus na slándála pobail a roghnú ECC rialaithe criptithe córas chun úsáide i prótacail slándála agus caighdeáin sainmhínithe ag IETF RFC (na cinn a shainiú Caighdeáin Idirlíon ar bhealach oscailte agus piara-athbhreithniú).
Anseo thíos tá sraith de RFC a thabhairt isteach i gcóras atá ann cheana féin ECC a fháil anailís a thuiscint cad atá níos fearr a bhaint as agus cad atá níos fearr a eisiamh:
Bainfimid úsáid as an rogha a rinne eolaí a shainiú Prótacail Slándáil Idirlíon a dhéanamh ar chuid dár meastóireachta.
Ina theannta sin ní mór é a thuiscint go dtagann an roghnú Cuar ó na húdaráis éagsúla a rinne a gcuid féin a roghnú de Curves d'fhonn a insint don tionscal cad a úsáid agus cad a skip:
Bainfimid úsáid as an rogha a rinne eolaí shainmhíníonn na ceanglais slándála sna gníomhaireachtaí caighdeánú a dhéanamh ar chuid dár meastóireachta.
Ina theannta sin, rud nach bhfuil a fhios ag daoine is mó, ach go bhfuil sé thar a bheith ábhartha do ár n-anailís is é sin, go bhfuil chineál éagsúla de ECC cuar cripteagrafaíochta agus a n "méid" Tá sé difriúil ag brath ar an gcineál cuar:
Mar gheall ar a neart slándála coibhéise the Curve éilipseacha agus an Cuar Kobliz Tá méid príomh-éagsúla, mar shampla nuair a léigh muid ECC 571 táimid ag tagairt do Cuar Koblitz le neart atá coibhéiseach leis ECC 521 cuar Príomh.
Tá comparáid idir neart Curves éilipseacha agus Curves Kotbliz tuairiscithe thíos (ó Mikey ECC idirlíon Dréacht ):
| Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA | 163 | 192 | 1024 | 283 | 256 | 3072 | 409 | 384 | 7680 | 571 | 521 | 15,360
Thíos tá ann comparáid a dhéanamh ar gach curves roghnaithe ag na haonáin éagsúla agus a n-ainm faoi seach (ó IETF RFC4492 le haghaidh úsáide ECC do TLS ):
Ainmneacha Cuar roghnaithe ag eagraíochtaí caighdeáin éagsúla ------------ + + --------------- ------------- SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST ------------ + + --------------- ------------- sect163k1 | | NIST K-163 sect163r1 | | sect163r2 | | NIST B-163 sect193r1 | | sect193r2 | | sect233k1 | | NIST K-233 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233 sect239k1 | | sect283k1 | | NIST K-283 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571 secp160k1 | | secp160r1 | | secp160r2 | | secp192k1 | | secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192 secp224k1 | | secp224r1 | | NIST P-224 secp256k1 | | secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521 ------------ + + --------------- -------------
Cad iad láithreach le feiceáil go bhfuil ach dhá curves roghnaithe ag gach údarás, agus go bhfuil ginearálta dumpáil curves koblitz ag ANSI.The amháin comhaontaithe i gcoiteann i measc na húdaráis 3 méid seo a leanas dhá ECC cuar:
Díobh siúd a roghnú le haghaidh cuar ECC TLS an RFC5430 ndearna hiomlán curves koblitz agus a roghnaíodh le haghaidh úsáid ach amháin:
An Brainpool ECC ndearna hiomlán curves Koblitz agus a roghnaíodh le haghaidh úsáid an Curves ECC seo a leanas:
An dréacht-idirlíon OpenPGP le haghaidh úsáide ECC i PGP d rafta-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 ndearna hiomlán curves Koblitz agus roghnaigh an curves ECC seo a leanas a
An prótacal ar easpa síneadh lena n-úsáid ECC, atá sainithe i RFC5349 agus sainmhínithe ag Microsoft don logáil isteach cárta cliste ndearna hiomlán curves Koblitz agus roghnaigh an curves ECC seo a leanas:
Mar sin, fuaimeanna, soiléir go bhfuil an rogha ceart ECC do P-256, P-384 P-521 agus fad an cuar Koblitz curtha ndearna lena n-úsáid Secret Barr agus le haghaidh aon prótacal slándála íogair (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, ar easpa, SSL / TLS).
Déanta agam an anailís seo tar éis plé a bhí i gcás táirgí áirithe criptithe guth, go léir atá bunaithe ar prótacail saincheaptha agus dílsithe, go bhfuil gach úsáid a bhaint as Cuar éilipseacha Diffie Hellman 571 giotán / ECDH 571/571-giotán ECDH / Koblitz 571 giotán.
Gach iad ag baint úsáide as an K-571 go, a bhfuil cur síos roimh, tá bainte ó gach thimpeallacht na slándála agus prótacail íogair agus a bheith féin dearthóir de rudaí criptithe guth i think go n-rogha chripteagrafach nach fíor an rogha is fearr slándála.
Is dócha go bhfuil sé déanta ach chun críche margaíochta, mar is cosúil K-571 (Koblitz cuar) níos láidre ná P-521 (cuar éilipseacha bunaithe ar líon na Príomh). Má tá tú "níos mó giotán" is féidir le do guys margaíochta a éileamh a bheith "níos sábháilte". Koblitz cuar éilipseacha Tá níos tapúla ná an rún cuar ar chumas barr príomh éilipseacha agus mar sin a thabhairt ar an bainisteoir a táirge deis a chur ar fáil "beagán níos mó" in sé a táirge féin agus a choinneáil ar an malartú tapa eochair.
Tá sé ina ábhar de rogha fealsúnachta.
Is fearr liom an treocht pobal eolaíochta le baint leis an ní a leanúint chun smaoineamh mé féin saineolaí chripteagrafach, níos mó ná an eolach slándála foriomlán agus pobal eolaíochta féin.
Is fearr liom ina ionad sin a úsáid ach amháin halgartaim a bheidh formheasta le húsáid i dtimpeallachtaí an-íogair (aicmiú rúnda barr), atá roghnaithe ag na húdaráis agus grúpa oibre a anailísiú halgartaim criptithe atá ann as-ann agus go léiríonn an rogha na slándála beagnach gach caighdeán prótacail (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, ar easpa, SSL / TLS, srl).
Is fearr liom a chomhaireamh an méid brains ag obair ar an rialaithe criptithe a úsáid i, a sheiceáil go bhfuil i ndáiríre slán, go mheas an níl roinnt laige.
Líon na n-brais ag obair ar Crypto go forleathan diffused bhfuil ord méadaíochta níos mó ná líon na n-brains obair ar rialaithe criptithe a úsáideann ach cúpla duine (cosúil le cuar Koblitz).
Mar sin, ní i am demonizing a bhaineann úsáid as ECDH 571 ag baint úsáide as Cuar Koblitz, ach le haghaidh cinnte is féidir liom a dhearbhú nach raibh glacadh leo an rogha is fearr ó thaobh na slándála agus go mbeadh aon urrús gairmithe ag déanamh tagarmharcála slándála a mheas ar an bhfíric go Cuar Diffie Hellman 571 éilipseacha giotán a dhéanamh le Cuar Koblitz nach bhfuil go forleathan diffused, tá sé dumpáladh ón prótacail slándála caighdeánach agus nach bhfuil sé deimhnithe lena n-úsáid top secret.
Bhí mé ag féachaint ar Defense Ghníomhaireacht Eorpach láithreán gréasáin agus fuair sé an ESSOR tionscadal, tionscadal atá maoinithe ag obair le haghaidh EUR 106mln a fhorbairt táirgí cumarsáide straitéiseach cosanta bunaithe ar nua Bogearraí Raidió Sainithe chuige.
Is é CTS cur chuige córas réabhlóideach go atá ag athrú go hiomlán ar an mbealach is eolaí agus tionscal cur chuige de chineál ar bith teicneolaíocht gan sreang.
Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.
For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:
And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.
That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.
In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .
We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)
I had to better understand the concepts, roles and duties related to Product management and Product marketing management in software companies, why are needed, which are the differences and how they fit inside an organization structure.
Most person i know never interested into this specific area of work, but when you want to be a product company (and not a consulting or solution company), you start having different products on different platforms for different target customers sold trough different channels with different pricing with a installation/different delivery process and that complexity must be managed in the proper way.
You realize that in order to let the product company grow in the right direction you need to organize product management activities formally, not closing your mind in rigid organization roles such as Marketing, Sales, R&D.
When we speak about Product Management i recommend the reading of the illuminating The strategic role of Product Management (How a market-driven focus leads companies to build products people want to buy) that clarify a lot of things, even if it outlook net separation of roles in product management, something t hat’s too heavy for a small company like a startup .
Still it provide a differentiation of duties between Product Management and Product Marketing .
A good understanding of the product management related to startup i s given in the article Creating Product Management at Startup showing up different case related to the roles of the product visionary into the company.
It introduce the terms ceo of the product in the sense that the product management duties jump around into the various organization function by providing focus and effort where it's needed, independently from the fact that the internal function requiring more effort is Development, Marketing, Sales or Communication. That's means practically enhancing the product vision as it's needed across all major product-related functions making the vision corporate-wide coherent.
A good representation of product management and product marketing activities is well described with the differentiation of between Strategical, Technical and Marketing sector and is not clearly separated between Management, Marketing(and Sales) and R&D :

I read that product manager background and knowledge are different depending on the company focus ( where does product management belong in the organization? ):
An illuminating (for me) and very important differentiation regarding product management duties is the differentiation between:
The specific duties belonging to Product Marketing vs Management are greatly explained in Role Definitions For Product Management and Product Marketing that i suggest to read, letting you to better define tasks and responsibilities across your organization. It also provide a good definition of job requirements if you need to look for that figure!
At the same time it's important to understand what's NOT product management, effectively Product management is not just feature prioritization .
At the same time it's important to understand which professional figure is NOT itself a product manager:
The typical product management activities could be in extreme synthesis summarized as follow:
Product management so it's not precisely development, is not precisely marketing, it's not precisely sales, so typically it's difficult to identify “where it should stay” inside the organization structure (it's even difficult to understand that's needed)?
The Silicon Valley Product Group provide a nice insight on Product Organization Structure by pointing out which are the advantages and risks of several choices. Still the Cranky Product Manager say that It doesn't matter where the product manager live in the organization .
It's relevant to be careful not to have persons that are too much technical or too much sales oriented in order to fill the gap among different organization. Too much fragmentation of assigned duties across the organization may lead to bureaucracy, too much duties on one person may lead to ineffective implementation of needed tasks in some area and to a internal competition perception respect to the traditional roles.
Check there a very nice Resume of a professional with practical experience in product management (it's an half techie/half marketing guys).
Ah! Another very common misunderstanding is to confuse marketing with communication where ai found a so good definition of Marketing that i really like and understand for strict relationship with Product Management:
Marketing is know the market so well that the product sell itself
But what happen when you don't handle a product management and product marketing management process in a defined way?
A nice story is shown as example in The strategic role of Product Management :
Your founder, a brilliant technician, started the company years ago when he quit his day job to market his idea full time. He created a product that he just knew other people needed. And he was right. Pretty soon he delivered enough of the product and hired his best friend from college as VP of Sales. And the company grew. But before long, the VP of Sales complained, “We're an engineering-led company. We need to become customer-driven.” And that sounded fine. Except… every new contract seemed to require custom work. You signed a dozen clients in a dozen market segments and the latest customer's voice always dominated the product plans. You concluded that “customer-driven” meant “driven by the latest customer” and that couldn't be right.
If you want to be a product company it's relevant to precisely follow a strategy driven by product marketing and management and not by sales.
Confusion between duties of product management/marketing and sales could lead to unsuccessful product company that are not able to proceed within their strategy, simply because they getting opportunities that drive the business out-of-scope.
A product company must invest in it's own product development and marketing in order to let sales activity stay focused and guarantee that the organization is every day more effective on the market.
After this reading, my understanding is that it's relevant to identify how to create a set of flexible business process on how to handle various product management and product marketing duties separating them from sales.
Fios go bhfuil mé ag léamh go cianda tapping fóin VoIP "ar VoIP Slándáil Alliance Blag ag Shawn Merdinger .
Is sampla nithiúil ar an gcaoi a bhfuil infreastruchtúr teileafónaíochta reatha ag fáil níos leochailí a n-ionsaithe cíbear.
Hi,
a rinneadh i caint faoi guth cumarsáide teicneolaíochtaí slándála ag Ollscoil Trento tar éis malartú faisnéise suimiúil le Crypto Lab bhainistiú tOllamh Massimiliano Sala .
Mé le fios do dhaoine leasmhara chun é a léamh, go háirithe an dara cuid, mar tá catagóiriú nuálach de na teicneolaíochtaí éagsúla guth criptithe a fháil a úsáidtear in earnálacha éagsúla.
Rinne mé a mhíniú agus a fháil amach ón earnáil seo go forleathan ilroinnte teicneolaíocha trí léargas leathan ar theicneolaíochtaí atá de ghnáth go hiomlán nach mbaineann aon-gach-eile ach go praiticiúil siad i bhfeidhm go léir criptithe le guth a leanas leis an aicmiú sin:
Tá sé ina slideware ollmhór, 122 sleamhnáin, a mholadh chun dul i léitheoireacht an gcuid 2 gan bacadh le tascradh teicneolaíochtaí forléargas atá folaithe cheana ag mo láthair de 2009.
Go háirithe is maith liom an coincheap de criptithe grád Seacláid gur mian a chur ar fáil ar roinnt nuálaíocht ar an gcoincheap Criptiú Snake Ola.
Ach i gá a fháil níos mó sa domhain mar gheall ar an gcomhthéacs criptithe Seacláid grád a bheidh, a dhéanamh is dócha roimh dheireadh na bliana de-trí chúrsa i bhfeidhm ar thuiscint agus measúnú a dhéanamh go praiticiúil i gcomhthéacs slándála fíor teicneolaíochtaí éagsúla guth criptithe.
Teacht againn i síocháin

Teacht againn i síocháin, dúirt an conquerers an Domhan Nua.
Teacht againn i síocháin, a deir an rialtas, nuair a thagann sé colonize, a rialáil, agus an domhan nua digiteach militarise.
Teacht againn i síocháin, a rá na cuideachtaí náisiún-stáit meánmhéide atá leagtha amach chun an idirlín agus in slabhra na n-úsáideoirí monetise a feistí nua lonrach.
Teacht againn i síocháin, deirimid mar hackers, geeks agus nerds, nuair atá leagtha amach againn i dtreo an saol fíor agus iarracht é a athrú, mar tá sé intruded isteach inár ngnáthóg nádúrtha, an cyberspace ...
Glaoigh ar pháipéar do rannpháirtíocht a 27C3 CCC chomhdháil atá oscailte, agus mé riamh chonaic payoff :-) spreagúla sin
Féach leat an 30 Nollaig 2010 i mBeirlín!
Mar chuid is mó de seo léitheoir bhlag fhios agat cheana féin, le blianta anuas bhí a lán de na gníomhaíochtaí a bhaineann le taighde poiblí le haghaidh iniúchadh GSM agus scoilteadh.
Mar sin féin nuair a bhí ollmhór sna meáin le torthaí taighde a GSM scoilteadh, na huirlisí a dhéanamh ar an cnagadh a bhí i ndáiríre go luath agus fós an-mí-éifeachtach.
Anois Frank Stevenson , cryptanalyst Ioruais gur bhris cheana féin ar an gCóras Ábhar scrambling ar diosca DVD físeán, rannpháirteacha chun an tionscadal a51 scáineadh tosaithe ag Karsten Nohl scaoileadh, Kraken , leagan nua feabhsaithe den chóras a51 scáineadh.
Tá sé suimiúil a thabhairt faoi deara go scáineadh wifi raibh scéal den chineál céanna, mar a bhí an chéad wifi fionnachtain scáineadh WEP mall go leor i dteicnící níos luaithe ach ina dhiaidh sin Korek, ar hacker ag obair ar chód scoilteadh, feabhas a chur ar an gcóras ionsaí drammatically.
Sin é an scéal an chomhair taighde slándála, dtosaíonn tú ar thaighde, ar dhuine a leanúint air agus é a fheabhsú, roinnt eile é a leanúint agus a fheabhsú agus é ag an deireadh a gheobhaidh tú an toradh.
Léigh níos mó ar an scaoileadh GSM bogearraí Kraken scáineadh .
Agus beidh fanacht tuned mar an tseachtain seo chugainn ag Blackhat Comhdháil Karsten Nohl míniú a thabhairt ar na sonraí is gá an thus crua-earraí agus na treoracha mionsonraithe ar conas é a dhéanamh :-)
Ba mhaith liom i ndáiríre a fheiceáil na huirlisí a ionchorprú i Tástáil Treáite Dáileadh cúlú Linux leis OSSTMM modheolaíocht bhfeidhm an tástáil a idircheapadh GSM agus fear i lár :-)
If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.
Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?
You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.
A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.
So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.
The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.
Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption
Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.
The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:
Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann
Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier
The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.
Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :
“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”
So, how to spot snake oil security products?
Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .
You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.
Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:
By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.
But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?
It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.
It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.
You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.
Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.
On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.
Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:
- Blackberry PIN
- Phone Number
- Email Address
- Geographic positioning information
Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .
It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.
Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?
Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.
Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?
That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.
ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!
I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.
The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.
Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.
Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.
This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .
Let's goes on.
On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).
On the other side they does not provide only a device but an overlay access network, called BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), that's a global worldwide wide area network where your blackberry enter while you browse or checkmail using blackberry.net AP.
When you, or an application, use the blackberry.net APN you are not just connecting to the internet with the carrier internet connection, but you are entering inside the RIM network that will proxy and act as a gateway to reach the internet.
The very same happen when you have a corporate use: Both the BB device and the corporate BES connect to the RIM network that act as a sort of vpn concentration network .
So basically all the communications cross trough RIM service infrastructure in encrypted format with a set proprietary encryption and communication protocols.
Just as a notice, think that google to provide gtalk over blackberry.net APN, made an agreement in order to offer service inside the BB network to the BB users. When you install gtalk you get added 3 service books that point to GTALKNA01 that's the name of GTALK gateway inside the RIM network to allow intra-BIS communication and act as a GTALK gateway to the internet.
The mobile operators usually are not even allowed to inspect the traffic between the Blackberry device and the Blackberry Network.
So RIM and Blackberry are somehow unique for their approach as they provide a platform, a network and a service all bundled together and you cannot just “get the device and the software” but the user and the corporate are always bound and connected to the service network.
That's good and that's bad, because it means that RIM provide extremely good security features and capabilities to protect information, device and access to information at various level against third party .
But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.
Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).
For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.
Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.
So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.
In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.
So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.
If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.
Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.
First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.
There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.
Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:
And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:
Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.
I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).
Cheers
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !
A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.
http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.
I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.
The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.
Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.
I would say a must read .
How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?
How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?
Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .
A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .
Hi go léir,
i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.
It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.
Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .
A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat
The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!
A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .
In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.
That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.
I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .
Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.
Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.
You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:
The demise of global telecommunication security
Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC
Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article
Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.
Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:
Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier
Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)
Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University
Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec
Time change the way things are approached.
I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:
“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”
Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:
The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.
It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.
So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?
I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.
I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:
The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .
I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:
T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .
You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:
Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).
The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.
NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .
I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.
Read here my slides on mobile security .
The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.
I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.
I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.
There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.
That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.
Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.
Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.
I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.
I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.
I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.
I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.
On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:
Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.
As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.
Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:
While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:
Don't missing some Asian involvement.
As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.
To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.
Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?
Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).
It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.
In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .
In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.
Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .
Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.
Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):
The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?
Very good job Neil!
In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.
Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…
Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.
To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .
So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.
Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.
The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .
Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.
Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.
When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?
-naif
Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .
One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :
The scene
Death star getting blown up
Infosec Analysis
Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.
Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!
Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.
Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.
Extremely flexible approach: works everything
Extreme performance: very low latency
but unfortunately…
Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.
Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .
So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.
Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.
UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.
UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .
Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .
He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:
“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”
Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:
surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74
surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133
Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.
How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?
It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?
Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.
Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.
I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.
Mhéin,
Fabio Pietrosanti
ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.
Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.
I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.
Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!
How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?
1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification
2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch
3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)
4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)
5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:
6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH
Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.
Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !
The http referral tricks
When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.
The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.
That's the log entry:
217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”
The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH
The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.
Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .
That's also really fun!
They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)
I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->
They measured their marketing activity
Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)
They reached my blog and i logged their search:
infosecurityguard+cryptophone
infosecurityguard+gold-lock
217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”
217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”
The domain registration data
The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:
Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM
Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.
Updated Date: 01-dec-2009
Creation Date: 01-dec-2009
The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:
Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com
Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)
The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt
Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.
As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.
They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products
They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.
They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .
UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?
I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.
He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.
He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.
Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!
All in all, is that lawful?
Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:
”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .
We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!
IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.
Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.
SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.
It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.
It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.
It's unfair competition in the security market.
Let's make some more important consideration on this.
Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys
When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.
If you do bad crypto people could die.
If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.
You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)
Security research need reference and transparency
Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.
Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally
Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.
If you work in the security market you work with hackers.
If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.
Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.
Consideration on the authority of the information online
That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.
However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.
What they have done is already illegal in UK
SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .
Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).
But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria
However a lot of important website reported it:
This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.
I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.
Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.
Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)
A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:
Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?
Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .
In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.
If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.
How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”
As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.
Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .
Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .
I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.
When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.
To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.
| Product name | Security Trough Obscurity | Public peer review | Open Source | Compromise locally? |
| Caspertec | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| CellCrypt | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| Cryptophone | Transparency | Limited public review | Public | Is ea |
| Gold-Lock | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| Illix | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| No1.BC | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| PhoneCrypt | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| Rode&Swarz | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| Secure-Voice | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| SecuSmart | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| SecVoice | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| SegureGSM | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| SnapCell | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| Tripleton | Obscurity | No public review | Closed | Is ea |
| Zfone | Transparency | Public review | Open | Is ea |
| ZRTP | Transparency | Public review | Open | Is ea |
*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.
But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).
Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.
I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED
Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.
No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.
Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.
The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)
That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.
On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .
PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
Conas?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).
I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:
Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .
Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:
| Application | Screenshots of application | Video with demonstration of interception | Network demonstration | |
| PhoneCrypt | 5 | 0 | 1 | |
| CellCrypt | 0 | 2 | 0 | |
| GoldLock | 1 | 2 | 0 |
It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.
But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?
Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.
| Application | Number of paragraphs | Positive paragraphs | Negative paragraphs | Neutral paragraphs |
| PhoneCrypt | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| CellCrypt | 12 | 0 | 10 | 2 |
| GoldLock | 9 | 0 | 8 | 1 |
| Paragraph of review | Opinion expressed |
| From their website | Positive Marketing feedback |
| Apple iPhone | Positive Marketing feedback |
| Disk Encryption or voice Encryption | Positive Marketing feedback |
| PBX Compatibility? Really | Positive Marketing feedback |
| Cracking <10. Not. | Positive Marketing feedback |
| Good thinking! | Positive Marketing feedback |
| A little network action | Positive Marketing feedback |
| UI | Positive Marketing feedback |
| Good Taste | Positive Marketing feedback |
| Paragraph of review | Opinion expressed |
| From their website | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Real Company or Part Time hobby | Negative Marketing feedback |
| 16.000 bit authentication | Negative Marketing feedback |
| DH 256 | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Downad & Installation! | Neutral Marketing feedback |
| Cracking it <10 | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Marketing BS101 | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Cool video stuff | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Paragraph of review | Opinion expressed |
| From their website | Neutral Marketing feedback |
| A little background about cellcrypt | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Master of Marketing | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Secure Voice calling | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Who's buying their wares | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Downad & Installation! | Neutral Marketing feedback |
| My Demo environment | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Did they forget some code | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Cracking it <5 | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Cellcrypt unique features.. | Negative Marketing feedback |
| Plain old interception | Negative Marketing feedback |
| The Haters out there | Negative Marketing feedback |
Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.
SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.
They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007
They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.
The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):
Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.
It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:
There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.
Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.
What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.
Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?
If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.
You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.
Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!