بایگانی برچسب: voicesecurity

RFC 6189: ZRTP است در نهایت به یک استاندارد!

در نهایت ZRTP واگذاری رسمی RFC، ZRTP RFC6189 : رسانه راه قرارداد کلید در دست برای Unicast و امن RTP نظر گرفته شده است .

آن را به عنوان یک وابستگی SRTP با سایز کلید AES 256bit که در حال حاضر به عنوان تعریف شده است RFC6188 .

بسیار هیجان انگیز است دیدن RFC در نهایت منتشر شد، آن را به عنوان نقطه عطف مهمی به تنظیم ZRTP به عنوان استاندارد رسمی برای پایان به پایان رمزگذاری بسیار شبیه به PGP برای ایمیل بوده است.

در حال حاضر هر سازمان در جهان رسما قادر خواهند بود برای اجرای ZRTP پروتکل رمزنگاری صدا برای پایان به پایان

در حال حاضر 3 مختلف پیاده سازی عمومی از ZRTP پروتکل وجود دارد:

هر کدام از آنها ویژگی های مختلف در این پروتکل، اما مهم ترین شناخته شده بود سازگار است.

موج جدید در حال آمدن است به جهان صدا رمزگذاری، irrupting به یک منطقه خاکستری که در آن بسیاری از شرکت ها انجام سیستم های رمزنگاری اطلاعات تلفن پیاده سازی رمزگذاری سفارشی شده است.

در حال حاضر استاندارد راه اندازی شده است و چند دلیل از چپ به اجرای چیزی متفاوت وجود دارد.

Hurra آقای Zimmermann و تمام جامعه از شرکت (مانند PrivateWave ) و افراد (مانند ورنر Dittmann ) که بر روی آن کار می کرد!

امروز آن روز بزرگ، چنین فن آوری در حال حاضر رسمی و همچنین با اجرای متعدد موجود!

فیلیپ، شما این کار را کرد دوباره، تعارف من به روح پاک و عزم خود را :-)

سهم

پیشرفت برای پارس جی اس ام شکستن در دانشگاه فرایبورگ

دنیای هیجان انگیز از پروتکل های تلفن همراه (GSM، GSM-R، تترا، UMTS، و غیره) هک شده است فعالیت های تحقیقاتی رسمی از دانشگاه.

سرمایه گذاری برای انتشار کد های opensource نرم افزار شکستن دادن فرصت به دانش آموزان از دانشگاه به کار بر روی آن، بهبود آن و انجام پژوهش های قوی است.

دانشگاه فرایبورگ منتشر شد مقاله تمرین عملی در رمزنگاری GSM A5 / 1 همراه با یک ابزار پشتیبانی gsmframencoder به بهبود روند خرناس، رمز گشایی و شکستن است.

افتتاح سخت افزار، نرم افزار باز کردن، باز کردن پروتکل نشان دادن ضعف از هر نوع روش اختصاصی و یا فرایند به ایجاد فن آوری های ارتباطات و امنیت است.

این باید هدف هر دانشمندان به سعی کنید برای باز کردن و شکستن هر نوع از تکنولوژی انحصاری و بسته را به زور از این صنعت می رود تنها با رویکرد سازگار و باز در حالی که طراحی پروتکل های مخابراتی.

سهم

هک تترا در حال آمدن است: OsmocomTETRA

این بسیار هیجان انگیز است به آزادی OsmocomTETRA ، از اولین SDR های opensource ( رادیو نرم افزار تعریف شده ) پیاده سازی تترا دمدولاتور، PHY و پایین لایه MAC است.

این نسخه تترا airprobe پارس جی اس ام را باز کند که دسترسی به داده ها و فریم تترا پروتکل ارتباطی، در نتیجه دادن فرصت بزرگ هک!

حالا که تترا فن آوری شده است باز ما باید انتظار داشت، در طول این 2011، برای دیدن شنود تترا های opensource و احتمالا رمزگذاری TEA (تترا الگوریتم رمزنگاری) ترک خورده!

تترا توسط پلیس، خدمات اورژانس و ارتش به عنوان یک شبکه ارتباطات سیار جایگزین است که می تواند حتی بدون در دسترس بودن پوشش شبکه (فقط تلفن همراه به تلفن همراه بدون ایستگاه پایه) کار می کند و ارائه برخی از خدمات ویژه در دسترس بودن بالایی استفاده می شود.

من در مورد تترا در اسلاید من نوشت: صدا عمده بررسی های امنیتی پروتکل .

در لیست پستی OsmocomBB بود در حال حاضر بحث در مورد برخی از وضعیت شبکه تترا وجود دارد:

  • پلیس بلژیک تترا آسترید شبکه: تکه تکه کردن
  • آلمانی پلیس آزمون تترا شبکه در آخن: تکه تکه کردن
  • برخی از سابق jugoslawia تترا شبکه: تکه تکه کردن
  • هلند C200 تترا شبکه: TEA2 رمزگذاری شده با کلید های استاتیک
  • Airwave تترا بریتانیا شبکه: TEA2 رمزگذاری با TEA2

این واقعا سرگرم کننده خواهد بود که پلیس های جدید و خدمات نجات هک به آینده را از سنین آنالوگ قدیمی به رادیوهای دیجیتال جدید را ببینید :-)

سهم

ZORG، جدید C + + و جاوا ZRTP اجرای آزادی های عمومی

سلام به همه، امروز در PrivateWave ایتالیا آبگرم، شرکت ایتالیایی فعال در فن آوری های در حال توسعه برای حفاظت از حریم خصوصی و امنیت اطلاعات در ارتباطات از راه دور صدا جایی که من هستم CTO، ما در آزاد ZORG، جدید باز منبع ZRTP پیاده سازی پروتکل موجود برای دانلود از به http://www.unicode.org/. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] پایان به پایان دادن به تبادل کلید با بیضوی منحنی Hellmann Diffie-384bit و AES-256 SRTP رمزنگاری فراهم می کند.

ZORG شده است در اصل در حال توسعه و اجرا در PrivateWave را PrivateGSM محصولات رمزگذاری صدا برای سیستم عامل های زیر در دسترس: توت سیاه، نوکیا و IOS (آی فون).

Zorg C + + با منبع باز PJSIP های VoIP SDK یکپارچه شده است [2] و آن را به عنوان پچ ادغام علیه PJSIP 1.8.5 ارائه شده است. در آی فون آزمایش شده است، سیمبیان، ویندوز، لینوکس و Mac OS X.

Zorg جاوا در نسخه های سفارشی از MJSIP یکپارچه شده است [3] منبع باز SDK بر روی پلت فرم بفرستد و آن را شامل بهینه سازی استفاده از حافظه مورد نیاز در فعالیت حداقل زباله را کاهش دهد.

هر دو سیستم عامل از هم جدا کرده اند و رمزنگاری مدولار به پایان می رسد به طوری که پیاده سازی الگوریتم های رمزنگاری می تواند به راحتی با افراد دیگر جابجا شده است.

. ZORG تحت GNU AGPL دارای مجوز و کد منبع در دسترس است در github در https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

ما در حال آزاد تحت منبع باز و در انسجام با رویکرد ما به امنیت [4] به عنوان ما واقعا امیدواریم که که آن را برای اکوسیستم منبع باز برای ایجاد سیستم های صوتی جدید رمزگذاری در حمایت از آزادی بیان می تواند مفید باشد.

بیش از 20 pjsip مبتنی بر منبع باز نرم افزار VoIP رمزگذاری و چند نوشته شده در جاوا به طور مستقیم می تواند از انتشار ZORG بهره مند شوند.

ما خوشحال خواهیم شد برای دریافت پیشنهاد همکاری، ادغام جدید، رمزنگاری به عقب پایان می رسد، سراغ مشکلات و آنچه مفید به منظور بهبود و ZRTP به عنوان استاندارد صدای رمزگذاری تصدیق.

Zorg از http://www.zrtp.org در دسترس است .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] رویکرد امنیتی: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

سهم

تلفن همراه های رمزگذاری شده به تماس تلفن ثابت با ستاره 1.8

HOWTO فنی منتشر شده که چگونه برای ساخت تلفن همراه امن به زیرساخت های VoIP تلفن ثابت با:

در هفته آینده HOWTO دیگران مثل این یکی با استفاده از سیستم عامل های سرور دیگر از جمله FreeSWITCH، همه در روح شفافیت و اهرم از فن آوری های امنیتی های opensource خواهد آمد.

سهم

PrivateGSM: توت سیاه / آی فون / نوکیا رمزگذاری صدای تلفن همراه با ZRTP یا SRTP / SDES

من مطلقا وبلاگ شخصی خود من به استفاده از ترویج هر نوع محصول را به اجتناب کنند.

آن زمان متفاوت نیست، اما من می خواهم به شما بگویم حقایق در مورد محصولات من بدون بازاریابی فانتزی، کار می کنم، اما ماندن فنی.

امروز، در PrivateWave من CTO و از بنیانگذاران ، ما منتشر عمومی محصولات VoIP تلفن همراه رمزنگاری برای شاه توت، آی فون و گوشی های نوکیا:

  • از 1st همیشه بفرستد های VoIP با ZRTP رمزگذاری - PrivateGSM های VoIP حرفه ای
  • از 1st تا کنون آیفون های VoIP با ZRTP رمزگذاری - PrivateGSM های VoIP حرفه ای
  • از 1st همیشه بفرستد رمزگذاری مشتری های VoIP با SRTP با SDES تبادل کلید بیش از SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM های VoIP سازمانی

لوگو privatewave-colore.png

در PrivateWave ما استفاده احترام رویکرد های مختلفی را برای اکثر شرکت رمزگذاری صدا خارج وجود دارد ما در رویکرد به امنیت ، خواندن است.

ارتباط از این محصولات در چشم انداز فناوری و صنعت را می توان به شرح زیر خلاصه کرد:

  • صدای اولین شرکت رمزگذاری با استفاده از پروتکل های استاندارد تنها امنیت (و ما انتظار داریم بازار خواهد شد واکنش نشان می دهند، آن را به عنوان روشن است که فن آوری های اختصاصی از میراث CSD می تواند ارزش را فراهم نمی کند)
  • این روش برای اولین بار در رمزنگاری صدا به استفاده از تنها منبع باز و موتور استاندارد رمزگذاری
  • این اولین صدای رویکرد رمزگذاری برای ارائه مدل های مختلف امنیتی با استفاده از فن آوری های مختلف (پایان به پایان برای این ZRTP و پایان به سایت برای SRTP )

کسانی که مجموعه ای از مشتریان تلفن همراه امن، طراحی شده برای حرفه ای امنیتی در استفاده از تنها با استفاده از ارتباط از راه دور بهترین و فن آوری های امنیتی، درجه بالایی از حفاظت را فراهم می کند همراه با عملکرد خوب در شرایط شبکه بد:

برنامه های کاربردی عبارتند از:

icona-pgsm.png

پشتیبانی از دستگاه های تلفن همراه عبارتند از:

با توجه به ZRTP ما تصمیم گرفت تا تنش و کشش تمام امنیت و ویژگی پارانوئید از پروتکل با برخی علاوه بر کوچک:

ادغام آدرس دقیق کتاب ما، فراتر می رود ZRTP RFC خصوصیات است که می تواند در معرض حملات خاص در زمانی که بر روی گوشی های تلفن همراه به دلیل رفتار کاربر در صفحه نمایش تلفن همراه به نظر نمی آید استفاده می شود.

راه paranoy ما با استفاده از ZRTP کاهش چنین شرایطی، ما در این مورد بنویسید و بعد از / یا جزئیات خاص برای گنجاندن RFC اضافه کنید.

برخی از کلمات در PrivateGSM حرفه ای با رمزنگاری با پایان به پایان ZRTP

دفعات بازدید: ورق های فنی وجود دارد!

برای دانلود اینجا را کلیک کنید و فقط با قرار دادن شماره تلفن خود را

اینها نتایج کار سخت کارکنان بسیار ماهر (16 نفر در این 6 پروژه برای 3 سیستم عامل های مختلف کار می کرد) در فن آوری های چالش برانگیز (رمزگذاری صدا) در محیط عملیاتی دشوار (شبکه های تلفن همراه کثیف و کثیف سیستم عامل های تلفن همراه) برای اطلاعات بیشتر از 2 سال است.

من بسیار افتخار کارکنان ما!

بعد چه؟

در هفته های بعدی خواهید دید که آزاد از مجموعه بزرگ مستندات از قبیل یکپارچگی با ستاره، freeswitch و امنیت دیگر فعال PBX، همراه با برخی از امنیتی و سایر سازمان های خبری فن آوری هیجان انگیز است که من مطمئن هستم خواهد شد متوجه شده ؛)

این یک کار سخت شده است و بیشتر که باید انجام شود اما من مطمئن هستم که امنیت و جامعه های opensource محصولات و رویکرد شفاف ما را نیز با انتشار باز مهم و یکپارچه سازی منبع باز که بسیار از لحاظ سیاسی بی طرف (درپشتی آزاد) فن آوری است.

سهم

هر منحنی بیضی همان است: از طریق در ECC امنیت

 امنیت خود را ECC من منحنی و تجزیه و تحلیل انتخاب

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

مدرن ترین ومخفی استفاده از منحنی رمزنگاری بیضوی (ECC) که با اندازه کلید کوچکتر و کاهش قدرت محاسبه، معادل قدرت امنیت سیستم های سنتی سری ومخفی شناخته شده به عنوان DH (Diffie-هلمن) و یا RSA (Rivest، شامیر و Adleman).

هر کس نمی داند که رمزگذاری ECC برای هر برنامه رمزنگاری آینده و حتی TLS / SSL (رمزگذاری برای تامین امنیت وب سایت استفاده می شود) در حال حرکت است به کمیسیون شکایات انتخاباتی انتخاب شده است.

من مقدار زیادی از به اصطلاح "محصولات رمزگذاری اختصاصی" که در آن رها RSA و DH می رود ECC جایگزین، که تمایل به استفاده خودسرانه ECC اندازه بیت کلید حتی بدون تعیین نوع ECC ومخفی عادت.

با این حال بسیاری از سردرگمی در اطراف منحنی های بیضوی، با بسیاری از نام های مختلف و اندازه های کلیدی دشوار برای غیر cryptographically، تجربه کاربر را به شکل خود را هنگامی که ارزیابی برخی از مسائل ومخفی است.

از آنجا که از سردرگمی بنابراین منتشر تصمیم گرفتم به تجزیه و تحلیل خود من برای پیدا کردن که بهترین منحنی ECC رمزگذاری و حق ECC اندازه کلید برای استفاده.

این تجزیه و تحلیل می خواهم یک امنیت مبتنی بر انتخاب صنعت در میان منحنی های مختلف و اندازه های کلیدی، می روم ملاحظات تحلیلی ریاضی و ومخفی است که در حال حاضر در طول سال انجام شده، خلاصه از انتخاب های مختلف گرفته شده در استانداردها و پروتکل های امنیتی است.

اول به این نتیجه است.

از تجزیه و تحلیل منحنی ECC زیر را برای استفاده در سیستم های رمزنگاری اطلاعات در نظر گرفته شود، زیرا تنها انتخاب میان مقامات مختلف (NSA، ANSI، شره، NIST، BrainPool ECC)، استانداردهای پروتکل های امنیتی مختلف (از IPSec، آزمایشی، ZRTP از Kerberos، SSL / TLS) و تنها مطابق NSA سوئیت B نیازمندی های امنیتی (دوفاکتو استاندارد نیز برای محیط زیست نظامی ناتو):

  • منحنی بیضی نخست 256 بیتی - P-256
  • منحنی بیضی نخست 384 بیتی - P-384

با اختیاری، فقط برای واقعا پارانوئید که می خواهید برای دریافت کلید اندازه کمی بیشتر، هنوز هم در نظر گرفته نمی مفید:

  • منحنی بیضی نخست 521 بیتی - P-521

من می خواهم به دولت که منحنی Koblitz باید، اجتناب در هر اندازه اصلی (163/283/409/571) آنها به عنوان گارانتی به اندازه کافی در فعالیت های تحلیلی ومخفی نیست و به طور موثر هستند:

  • NSA سوئیت-B انتخاب رمزنگاری
  • از انتخاب Brainpool ECC بخش نیست
  • ANSI X9.62 انتخاب
  • انتخاب فرمت ECC آزمایشی
  • فرمت از Kerberos برای انتخاب منحنی ECC

خواننده دعوت می کنم به دنبال از طریق تجزیه و تحلیل من به درک اصول است که می تواند حتی بدون پس زمینه های فنی عمیق اما حداقل با یک پس زمینه خوب فن آوری بعضی از بیت اساسی رمزنگاری درک.

 در اینجا ما با تجزیه و تحلیل
 

هدف من این است که تجزیه و تحلیل بر روی چه / چگونه باز علمی و امنیت جامعه را انتخاب کنید ECC سیستم ومخفی برای استفاده در پروتکل های امنیت و استانداردهای تعریف شده توسط IETF RFC (آنهایی که به تعریف استانداردهای اینترنت در راه باز و همکار بررسی).

در زیر مجموعه ای از RFC معرفی ECC را به سیستم های موجود دریافت که تجزیه و تحلیل برای درک بهتر است برای استفاده و چه بهتر است حذف:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool منحنی استاندارد و ایجاد منحنی
  • RFC4869 : NSA سوئیت سوئیت B رمزنگاری برای IPsec را
  • RFC5430 : NSA سوئیت B مشخصات برای امنیت لایه حمل و نقل (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA سوئیت B در اینترنت ضمیمهها پست الکترونیکی امن / چند منظوره (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : نقاط قوت تعیین کلید های عمومی مورد استفاده برای تبادل کلید متقارن
  • RFC5349 : منحنی رمزنگاری بیضوی (ECC) پشتیبانی از رمزنگاری کلید عمومی برای تایید اولیه از Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : منحنی رمزنگاری بیضوی (ECC) صفر سوئیت برای امنیت لایه حمل و نقل (TLS)
  • ZRTP رمزگذاری صدای فیلیپ Zimmermann ECC منحنی
  • ECC در آزمایشی (پیش نویس د قایق-jivsov آزمایشی-ECC-06 )
  • منحنی های ECC توسط مایکروسافت برای انتخاب هوشمند از Kerberos ورود

ما انتخاب شده توسط دانشمند تعریف پروتکل های امنیتی اینترنت را به بخشی از ارزیابی ما استفاده کنید.
علاوه بر آن باید درک شود که منحنی انتخاب از سوی مقامات مختلف ساخته شده است که انتخاب خود را از منحنی به منظور گفتن به صنعت چه استفاده و چه به جست و خیز می آید:

ما انتخاب شده توسط دانشمند تعریف نیازمندی های امنیتی در سازمان های استاندارد را به بخشی از ارزیابی ما استفاده کنید.
علاوه بر این، چیزی است که اکثر مردم نمی دانند، بلکه به این است که آن را بسیار مربوط به تجزیه و تحلیل ما این است که نوع دیگری از "اندازه" خود را از آن بسته به نوع منحنی منحنی رمزنگاری و ECC وجود دارد:

  • منحنی ECC بیش از فیلد نخست (اغلب به عنوان منحنی بیضی به آن اشاره شده و نشان داده شده توسط P-keysize)
  • منحنی ECC بیش از رشته دودویی (اغلب عنوان منحنی Koblitz ارجاع می شد، و نشان داده شده توسط K-keysize)

با توجه به قدرت امنیتی هم ارزی منحنی بیضی و منحنی Kobliz، اندازه های مختلف، به عنوان مثال هنگامی که ما ECC 571 اشاره به منحنی Koblitz با قدرت معادل 521 ECC منحنی نخست.

مقایسه بین منحنی های بیضوی منحنی Kotbliz و قدرت گزارش شده است ( Mikey ECC اینترنت پیش نویس ):

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15،360

در زیر مقایسه ای از تمام منحنی های انتخاب شده توسط تمام نهادهای مختلف و مربوطه نام خود را (از IETF RFC4492 برای استفاده از ECC برای TLS ):

 نام منحنی انتخاب شده توسط سازمان های استاندارد مختلف
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

بلافاصله ظاهر می شود این است که تنها دو منحنی شده توسط همه مقامات انتخاب شده وجود دارد، و آن به طور کلی آزادسازی در منحنی koblitz شده توسط ANSI.The تنها به طور معمول بین 3 مقامات توافق وجود دارد زیر دو ECC منحنی:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

کسانی که مجموعه ای از منحنی ECC برای TLS RFC5430 قلم به طور کامل منحنی koblitz انتخاب و تنها برای استفاده:

  • P-256، P 384، P-521

Brainpool ECC منحنی Koblitz قلم به طور کامل انتخاب و برای استفاده از منحنی های ECC زیر:

  • P-160، P-192، P-224، P-256، P-320، P-384، P-512 (که به طور خاص فقط این به دلیل آن است P-521 اما P-512، نه تنها کلید و اندازه از طرف ECC brainpool. Tnx ایان سایمونز از آتنا SCS )

پیش نویس آزمایشی اینترنت برای استفاده از ECC در PGP د قایق-jivsov آزمایشی-ECC-06 قلم به طور کامل به منحنی Koblitz و انتخاب زیر منحنی ECC

  • P-256، P 384، P-521

از Kerberos فرمت پروتکل برای استفاده از ECC، تعریف شده در RFC5349 و توسط مایکروسافت برای تعریف لاگین کارت هوشمند قلم به طور کامل منحنی Koblitz و انتخاب منحنی ECC زیر:

  • P-256، P 384، P-521

بنابراین، به نظر می رسد روشن است که انتخاب صحیح از ECC برای P-256، P 384 و P-521 در حالی که منحنی Koblitz برای استفاده محرمانه و برای هر پروتکل امنیتی حساس به قلم شده اند (از IPSec، آزمایشی، ZRTP، از Kerberos، SSL / TLS).

چرا من این تجزیه و تحلیل؟

این تجزیه و تحلیل پس از بحث من تا به حال در مورد برخی از محصولات صوتی رمزگذاری، بر اساس پروتکل های سفارشی و اختصاصی است، که همه با استفاده از منحنی بیضوی Diffie هلمن 571 بیت / ECDH: از شماره 571 /: از شماره 571، بیت ECDH / Koblitz 571 بیت انجام می شود.
همه آنها با استفاده از K-571 که به عنوان قبل از شرح داده شده است از تمام محیط امنیتی حساس و پروتکل های حذف شده و در حال خودم را طراح از مسائل صدا رمزگذاری من فکر می کنم که انتخاب رمزنگاری آنها مطلقا بهترین انتخاب های امنیتی است.
احتمالا فقط برای هدف بازاریابی انجام می شود، چرا که K-571 (Koblitz منحنی) به نظر می رسد قوی تر از P-521 (منحنی های بیضوی بر اساس عدد اول). اگر شما "بیت" بچه های بازاریابی خود را می توانید ادعا می شود "امن تر". منحنی های بیضوی Koblitz هستند سریعتر از راز بالا فعال منحنی نخست بیضوی و غیره را یک مدیر محصول شانس خود را برای ارائه "کمی بیشتر" را در محصول خود آن را در حالی که نگه داشتن سرعت تبادل کلید.

این ماده از انتخاب های فلسفی است.

من ترجیح می دهم به دنبال روند جامعه علمی با فروتنی نه با توجه به خودم متخصص، رمزنگاری knowledgable از امنیت کلی و جامعه علمی خود.

به جای آن من ترجیح می دهم به استفاده از الگوریتم های که برای استفاده در محیط های بسیار حساس (بر اساس طبقه بندی محرمانه بالا)، که توسط همه مقامات و گروه های کاری تجزیه و تحلیل الگوریتم های رمز نگاری موجود در خارج وجود دارد انتخاب شده اند که نشان دهنده انتخاب تقریبا همه استاندارد امنیتی تایید شده پروتکل (از IPSec، آزمایشی، ZRTP از Kerberos، SSL / TLS، و غیره).
من ترجیح می دهم برای شمارش مقدار از مغز کار بر روی سری ومخفی استفاده کنید، من که چک است که واقعا امن است، که ارزیابی اینکه آیا برخی از ضعف وجود دارد.

تعداد brais کار بر روی به طور گسترده ای منتشر ومخفی منظور از قدر بیشتر از مغز کار بر روی سری ومخفی استفاده می شود تنها تعداد کمی از مردم (مثل منحنی Koblitz) هستند.
بنابراین من اهریمنی توصیف که استفاده از ECDH 571 با استفاده از منحنی Koblitz نیست، اما برای اطمینان می توانید تصدیق که آنها بهترین انتخاب از لحاظ امنیتی گرفته نشده باشد و هر گونه حرفه ای امنیت انجام محک زنی های امنیتی این واقعیت است که منحنی های بیضوی Diffie هلمن 571 در نظر بگیرند کمی با منحنی Koblitz انجام شده است به طور گسترده ای منتشر نیست، آن را از پروتکل های امنیتی استاندارد ریخته و آن را برای استفاده از راز بالا گواهی.

سهم

از راه دور متوقف کردن گزینه تلفن های اینترنتی

من پیشنهاد می کنم خواندن از راه دور بهره برداری از تلفن VoIP در امنیت VoIP اتحاد وبلاگ توسط Shawn Merdinger .

مثال عینی در زیرساخت های تلفن در حال حاضر در حال گرفتن بیشتر در معرض خطر حملات سایبر است.

سهم

کارگاه آموزشی امنیت ارتباطات صوتی

سلام،

من بحث در مورد صدای فن آوری ارتباطات امنیت در دانشگاه ترنتو پس از تبادل اطلاعات جالب با ومخفی آزمایشگاه موفق استاد ماسیمیلیانو سالا .

من پیشنهاد می کنم مردم علاقه مند به آن را بخوانید، به خصوص در بخش دوم، به عنوان طبقه بندی خلاقانه از فن آوری های صوتی رمزگذاری های مختلف که در بخش های مختلف مورد استفاده قرار می وجود دارد.

من سعی کردم به توضیح و خارج از این بخش به طور گسترده ای پراکنده و فن آوری با ارائه مرور گسترده ای در فن آوری است که معمولا کاملا نامربوط، هر یک از دیگری است، اما عملا همه آنها درخواست صدای رمزگذاری است که طبقه بندی:

  • صنعت تلفن همراه TLC استاندارد رمزگذاری صدا
  • استاندارد رمزگذاری صدا و نظامی دولت
  • عمومی ایمنی استاندارد رمزگذاری صدا
  • IETF استاندارد رمزگذاری صدا
  • فن آوری های متفرقه صدا اختصاصی رمزنگاری

این slideware بزرگ، 122 اسلاید، من پیشنهاد می کنم به خواندن بخش 2 پرش رهگیری مروری فن آوری های حال حاضر با ارائه در سال 2009 تحت پوشش.

امنیت ارتباطات صوتی


مشاهده بیشتر ارائه از فابیو Pietrosanti .

به خصوص من دوست دارم مفهوم رمزگذاری شکلات درجه است که می خواهید به ارائه برخی از نوآوری در مفهوم نفت رمزگذاری مار است.

اما من نیاز به عمق بیشتری را در مورد شکلات زمینه رمزگذاری درجه، احتمالا قبل از پایان سال را با ارائه یک دوره آموزشی به کار رفته در درک و ارزیابی عملا زمینه امنیت واقعی از فن آوری های رمزنگاری های مختلف صوتی انجام دهید.

سهم

پارس جی اس ام شکستن در روش های تست نفوذ (OSSTMM)؟

از آنجا که اکثر این خواننده وبلاگ در حال حاضر می دانیم، در سال های گذشته بود، بسیاری از فعالیت های مرتبط با حسابرسی پارس جی اس ام و ترک برای پژوهش های عمومی وجود دارد.

با این حال هنگامی که پوشش رسانه های بزرگ به نتایج تحقیقات پارس جی اس ام شکستن وجود دارد، ابزاری برای ترک واقعا در مراحل اولیه است و هنوز هم بسیار ناکارآمد است.

در حال حاضر فرانک استیونسون ، cryptanalyst نروژی که در حال حاضر شکست محتوا سیستم دلخواه خود از دیسک ویدئویی DVD، شرکت ترک A51 پروژه آغاز شده توسط کارستن Nohl ، منتشر شد: Kraken ، نسخه جدید بهبود یافته A51 سیستم شکستن.

جالب است توجه کنید که ترک فای تا به حال یک داستان مشابه، به عنوان اولین ترک فای WEP کشف بسیار آهسته در روش های قبلی بود، اما بعد Korek، هکر کار بر روی کد ترک خوردگی، بهبود سیستم حمله drammatically.

که داستان همکاری پژوهش های امنیتی، شما شروع به پژوهش، کسی آن را دنبال و بهبود آن، برخی دیگر آن را دنبال و آن را بهبود و در پایان نتیجه را دریافت می کنید.

در GSM Kraken انتشار ترک نرم افزار ادامه مطلب .

باشید به عنوان هفته آینده در کنفرانس کارستن Nohl تبادل نظر خواهد شد جزئیات بیشتر از مورد نیاز را توضیح نصب سخت افزار و دستورالعمل و اطلاعاتی دقیق در مورد چگونگی انجام این کار :-)

من واقعا به آن دسته از ابزار را به گنجانیده نفوذ لینوکس تست توزیع رد گم کردن با OSSTMM روش اجرای آزمایش رهگیری پارس جی اس ام و مرد در وسط :-)

اگر چیزهایی را ادامه دهید که راه و تحقیقات Ettus (تولید کننده را رادیو USRP2 نرم افزار مورد استفاده برای هزینه های پایین دریافت سیگنال GSM) گرفته نخواهد شد پایین، ما هنوز هم می توانید این را ببینید.

سهم

امنیت روغن مار ادعا می کند در ومخفی محصول امنیتی

رشد بازار امنیت، بیشتر شرکت به بازار می رود، اما بسیاری از آنها جدی گرفتن آنچه انجام می دهند؟

شما می دانید، انجام فن آوری امنیتی این معنی است که شما شخصا مسئول حفاظت از اطلاعات کاربر است. شما باید با آنها را از آنچه آنها نیاز دارند آگاه است، دقیقا همان چیزی است که شما انجام می دهند که نوع تهدید از مدل محصول خود را محافظت می کند.

یک مشکل معمول از ویژگی های امنیتی محصول ناتوانی از کاربر را به ارزیابی ادعاهای امنیتی محصول خود را نشان داده است.

بنابراین شرکت های زیادی انجام بازاریابی نه چندان اخلاقی از ویژگی های امنیتی، بر اساس واقعیت است که هیچ کاربر قادر خواهد بود تا آن را ارزیابی وجود دارد.

وضعیت قبلا توضیح داده شده اقامت در موضوع امنیتی رمزگذاری روغن مار، تحول در محیط رمزنگاری علمی است که اجازه دهید که ما امروزه استفاده از فن آوری های حفاظت از اطلاعات نژاد بدون نیاز به نگرانی بیش از حد در مورد درهای پشتی و یا ناامنی.

بیایید در مورد مار رمزگذاری نفت صحبت می کنند

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

روغن مار توسط Bruce Schneier

میشیگان ارتباطات و فناوری بررسی قانون نیز بسیار خوب ساخته شده و تجزیه و تحلیل مربوط به ویژگی های امنیتی از محصولات امنیتی، امنیت روغن مار ادعا می کند "نادرست سیستماتیک امنیت محصول آنها در مورد کلاهبرداری های بازاریابی تند و زننده استفاده می شود به نیشگون گرفتن و کشیدن عدم توانایی کاربران برای بررسی را توضیح دهد. ویژگی های امنیتی، از جمله مفهوم مسئولیت اقتصادی و حقوقی است.

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : چند روغن مار امنیتی محصول شرکت می کند را توضیح نمی دهد و در مورد مدل تهدید که محصول اعمال روشن نیست بسیار مشهور است به حکم اهل روسیه نلسون :

"به یاد داشته باشید، بدون مدل تهدید ومخفی است مانند کوکی ها، بدون شیر. ..... رمزنگاری بدون یک مدل تهدید مثل مادر بدون پای سیب است. آیا می توان گفت که زمان به اندازه کافی نیست. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

سهم

China Encryption Regulations

سلام به همه،

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

سهم

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

سهم

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

سهم

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

201006011551.jpg

For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

سهم

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

سهم

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

سهم

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

سهم

SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

با احترام،

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.

سهم

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

سهم

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

سهم

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed بله
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public بله
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
بله
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
بله
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open بله
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open بله

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
چرا؟
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
چگونه؟
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

سهم

Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

سهم

Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? Yikes!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

Mike

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

Think about it…

سهم

Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Read more here .

سهم

Voice encryption in government sectors

I will make some in depth articles about how voice encryption really works in government environments.

The open standards and open source still have to reach the military and government environments for what's related to secure speech.

To give you an idea of the complexity and kind of particular issues that exists, look at the USA 3G Wireless Security: A Government Perspective and the A Waveform Architecture to Support Security and Interoperability in Multi-National Wireless Networks for Tactical Communication .

They are using so-custom protocols like Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol that require the use of patented MELPe ultra-narrowband codec that there's not a real market of application and equipment using this. Only a small elite of government controlled companies from few countries manage this de-facto lobby.

Should we change this bringing open standards also to government sectors?

سهم

How the various audio compression codec sounds?

You know, we would not be able to use VoIP and have cheap international phone calls without audio compression codecs.

It's plenty of them, some royalty free, some patented by telco's lobby (think that some patented and royalty-based codec it's also a standard, where all market player have to pay the most aggressive one that acquired the patent while defining the standards).

However, there is a nice collection from vocal , to understand how they sounds.

سهم