Tag Archives: mobil

Fremskridt for GSM revner i Freiburg universitet

Den spændende verden af ​​mobile protokoller GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS osv.) hacking bliver officielle forskningsaktiviteter fra universiteter.

Den investering at gøre opensource kode versioner af revner software giver mulighed for at studerende på universitetet til at arbejde på det, forbedre det og gøre en stærk forskning.

The University of Freiburg netop frigivet det papir Praktisk træning på GSM kryptering A5 / 1 sammen med en gsmframencoder støtte værktøj til at forbedre snuse, afkodning og krakningsproces.

Åbning af hardware, åbne software, åbne protokol demonstrere svaghed enhver form for proprietære metode eller proces at opbygge kommunikations-og sikkerhedsteknologier.

Det bør være målet for alle forskere at forsøge at åbne op og knække enhver form for proprietære og lukkede teknologi til at tvinge industrien til at går på kun med interoperable og åbne tilgang samtidig med at designe telekommunikation protokoller.

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TETRA hacking er på vej: OsmocomTETRA

Det er meget spændende at se frigivelse af OsmocomTETRA , den første opensource SDR ( Software Defined Radio ) gennemførelse af TETRA demodulator, PHY og lavere MAC lag.

Det er TETRA version af GSM airprobe at låse adgang til data og ramme i TETRA kommunikationsprotokol, hvilket giver stor hacking chance!

Nu også TETRA teknologi er blevet åbnet, vi skal forvente i løbet af denne 2011, for at se opensource TETRA sniffere og sandsynligvis også TEA kryptering (Tetra Encryption Algorithm) revnet!

TETRA bliver brugt af politiet, redningstjenester og militær som et alternativ mobilkommunikationsnetværket, der kan arbejder selv uden adgang til nettets dækning (kun mobil-til-mobil uden en base station) og give nogle særlige høje tilgængelighed tjenester.

Jeg skrev om TETRA i min slide Major Voice Security Protocol anmeldelse .

I OsmocomBB postlister der allerede var diskussion om nogle TETRA-netværk status:

  • Belgien Politi TETRA ASTRID netværk: ukrypteret
  • Tyske politi test TETRA-netværk i Aachen: ukrypteret
  • Nogle ex-jugoslawia TETRA-netværk: ukrypteret
  • Holland C200 TETRA-netværk: TEA2 krypteret med statiske nøgler
  • Storbritannien Airwave TETRA-netværk: TEA2 krypteret med TEA2

Det vil være rigtig sjovt at se, at nye politiet og redningstjenesten hacking kommer tilbage fra gamle analoge aldre til de nye digitale radioer :-)

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Zorg, nye C + + og Java ZRTP implementering offentlige frigivelse

Hej alle, i dag på PrivateWave Italia SpA, italiensk selskab beskæftiger sig med udvikling af teknologier til beskyttelse af privatlivets fred og informationssikkerhed i taletelefoni hvor jeg CTO, slipper vi Zorg, en ny open source ZRTP protokolimplementering kan downloades fra http://www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] ende-til-ende nøgleudveksling med elliptisk kurve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit og AES-256 SRTP kryptering.

Zorg er oprindeligt udviklet og implementeret i PrivateWave har PrivateGSM stemme krypteringsprodukter til rådighed til følgende platforme: Blackberry, Nokia og iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C + + er blevet integreret med PJSIP open source VoIP SDK [2], og det er tilvejebragt som integration plaster mod PJSIP 1.8.5. Det er blevet testet på iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux og Mac OS X.

Zorg Java er blevet integreret i en speciel version af MJSIP [3] open source SDK på Blackberry platform, og det omfatter hukommelsesbrug optimeringer, der er nødvendige for at reducere på minimum skrald indsamler aktivitet.

Begge platforme har adskilt og modulopbygget kryptografisk back-enderne, således at den kryptografiske algoritmer implementeringen let kan byttes ud med andre.

. Zorg er licenseret under GNU AGPL og kildekoden er tilgængelig på GitHub på https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Vi frigiver den under open source og i overensstemmelse med vores tilgang til sikkerhed [4], som vi håber virkelig, at det kan være nyttigt for open source økosystemet til at skabe nye stemme krypteringssystemer til støtte for ytringsfriheden.

Mere end 20 pjsip-baserede open source VoIP krypteringssoftware og flere er skrevet i Java kunne drage direkte fordel af Zorg udgivelse.

Vi vil være glade for at modtage forslag om samarbejde, nye integration, ny kryptografisk back-ender, bug scouting og hvad nyttigt at forbedre og lade ZRTP bekræfter som stemme kryptering standard.

Zorg er tilgængelig fra http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] Sikkerhed tilgang: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

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Krypteret mobil til fastnet opkald med Asterisk 1,8

Vi har lige udgivet en teknisk howto om hvordan man kan opbygge Sikker mobil til fastnet VoIP infrastruktur med:

I næste uge andre howto som denne vil komme ud ved hjælp af andre serverplatforme såsom FreeSWITCH, alle i en ånd af åbenhed og løftestangseffekt af opensource sikkerhedsteknologier.

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PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia mobil voice kryptering med ZRTP eller SRTP / SDES

Jeg er helt undgå at bruge min egen personlige blog til at gøre fremme af enhver form for produkt.

Denne gang er det ikke anderledes, men jeg vil gerne fortælle dig fakta om produkter, jeg arbejder på uden fancy markedsføring, men opholder sig teknisk.

I dag, kl PrivateWave hvor jeg er CTO og medstifter , vi udgivet offentligt mobile VoIP krypteringsprodukter til Blackberry, iPhone og Nokia:

  • Den 1. nogensinde Blackberry krypteret VoIP med ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • Den 1. nogensinde iPhone krypteret VoIP med ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Professional
  • Den 1. nogensinde Blackberry krypteret VoIP-klient med SRTP med SDES nøgleudveksling løbet af SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

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Hos PrivateWave bruger vi en anden tilgang i forhold til de fleste stemme kryptering selskab derude, læse vores tilgang til sikkerhed .

Relevansen af ​​disse produkter i teknologi og industri landskab kan opsummeres som følger:

  • Det er den første stemme kryptering virksomhed kun bruger standarder sikkerheds protokoller (og vi forventer, at markedet vil reagere, da det er klart, at proprietære tech kommer fra arv CSD ikke kan give samme værdi)
  • Det er den første metode i stemmen kryptering til kun at bruge open source & standard kryptering motor
  • Det er den første stemme kryptering tilgang til at give forskellig sikkerhed model ved hjælp af forskellige teknologier (ende-til-ende for ZRTP og end-to-site for SRTP )

De suite af Mobile Secure klienter, der er designet til professionel sikkerhed brug kun ved hjælp af bedste tele-og sikkerhedsteknologier, giver en høj grad af beskyttelse sammen med gode resultater også i dårlige netværk betingelser:

Ansøgningerne er:

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De understøttede mobile enheder er:

Med hensyn til ZRTP besluttede vi at understrege og strække al den sikkerhed og paranoide træk protokollen med nogle lidt ud:

Vores strenge adressebog integration, går ud over ZRTP RFC specifikation, der kan være sårbare over for visse angreb, når der bruges på mobiltelefoner på grund af brugernes adfærd ikke at se på mobil skærm.

Vores paranoy måde at bruge ZRTP afbøde sådanne betingelser, vil vi skrive om det senere og / eller vil tilføje specifikke detaljer for RFC integration.

Nogle ord på PrivateGSM Professional med end-to-end kryptering med ZRTP

Læs tekniske ark der!

For at downloade det klik her og bare sætte dit telefonnummer

Det er resultatet af hårdt arbejde af alle mine meget dygtige medarbejdere (16 personer har arbejdet på dette 6 projekter i 3 forskellige platforme) på udfordrende teknologier (stemme kryptering) i et vanskeligt driftsmiljø (beskidte mobilnet og beskidte mobile operativsystemer) for mere end 2 år.

Jeg er meget stolt af vores medarbejdere!

Hvad bliver det næste?

I næste uger vil du se frigivelse af store sæt af dokumentationer, såsom integration med stjerner, freeswitch og anden sikkerhed aktiveret PBX, sammen med nogle spændende anden sikkerhedsteknologi nyheden om, at jeg er sikker på vil blive bemærket ;)

Det har været en hårdt arbejde og mere skal gøres, men jeg er overbevist om, at sikkerhed og opensource samfund vil gerne, at disse produkter og vores gennemsigtig fremgangsmåde også med åbne vigtige udgivelser og open source-integration, der gør en meget politisk neutral (bagdør gratis) teknologi .

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ESSOR, europæiske Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

Jeg havde et kig på europæisk forsvarsagentur hjemmeside og fandt ESSOR projektet, en arbejdsgruppe projekt finansieret for 106mln EUR til at udvikle strategiske forsvar kommunikations-produkter baseret på ny Software Defined Radio tilgang.

SDR tilgang er et revolutionerende system, der er fuldstændig ændre den måde, videnskabsmand og industrien er tilgang enhver form for trådløs teknologi.

Grundlæggende stedet for at brænde hardware chip, der gennemfører de fleste af de højfrekvente protokoller og teknikker, bliver de skubbet i "software" til specialiseret radio hardware, der kan arbejde på en masse forskellige frekvenser, som radiogrænseflade for en masse forskellige radio-protokoller.

For eksempel USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) fra Ettus Research , der koster 1000-2000USD fuldt lastet, gennem den opensource GnuRadio har rammer, set opensource gennemførelse af:

Og en masse flere protokoller og transmission teknologier.

Den slags ny tilgang til Radio transmissionssystem destinated at ændre den måde radiosystemet er gennemført, giver ny mulighed som at opgradere den "radioprotokol sig selv" i software for at give "Radio-protokollen" forbedringer.

På kort sigt har vi også set meget stærk sikkerhed forskning ved hjælp af SDR teknologier såsom GSM revner og Bluetooth Sniffing .

Vi kan forvente, at andre teknologier, svag af design, men beskyttet af begrænsning til hardwareenheder at hacke de lave niveau-protokoller, der snart vil blive hacket. I den første liste jeg ville virkelig gerne se hacking af TETRA, en teknologi født med lukket tankegang og hemmelige krypteringsalgoritmer, noget jeg virkelig ikke kan lide ;-)

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Talekommunikation sikkerhed værksted

Hej,

Jeg lavede en snak om talekommunikation sikkerheden teknologier ved University of Trento efter en interessant udveksling af oplysninger med Crypto Lab lykkedes professor Massimiliano Sala .

Jeg foreslår interesserede folk til at læse den, især den anden del, da der er en innovativ kategorisering af de forskellige stemmen krypteringsteknologi, der får anvendes i flere sektorer.

Jeg forsøgte at forklare og komme ud fra dette meget opsplittet teknologisk sektor ved at give et bredt overblik over teknologier, der normalt er absolut uafhængige en-hver-anden, men stort set de anvender til at udtrykke kryptering efter kategorisering:

  • Mobile TLC Industri stemme krypteringsstandarder
  • Regering og Militær voice krypteringsstandarder
  • Offentlige sikkerhed stemme krypteringsstandarder
  • IETF stemme krypteringsstandarder
  • Misc proprietære stemme krypteringsteknologier

Det er en kæmpe slideware, 122 sider, vil jeg foreslå at gå læse 2. del springe aflytning teknologier overblik allerede er dækket af min præsentation af 2009.

Talekommunikation sikkerhed

Især Jeg kan godt lide konceptet Chokolade kryptering, der ønsker at give nogle innovation på Snake Oil Kryptering koncept.

Men jeg er nødt til at få mere i dybden om Chokolade kryptering sammenhæng, vil sandsynligvis gøre inden udgangen af året ved at give en påført kursus på forståelse og evaluering næsten reel sikkerhed sammenhæng med forskellige voice krypteringsteknologier.

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Web2.0 privatliv lækage i mobile apps

Du ved, at web2.0 verden er det masser af lækage af enhver art (profilering, profilering, profilering) i forbindelse med personlige oplysninger og brugere begynder at blive bekymret over det.

Brugere løbende hente programmer uden at kende detaljerne i, hvad de gør, for eksempel iFart bare fordi er cool, er sjove og nogle gange er nyttige.

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På mobiltelefoner brugerne at installere fra 1000% op til 10,000% flere ansøgninger end på en pc, og disse programmer kan indeholde malware eller andre uventede funktionaliteter.

For nylig infobyte analyseret ubertwitter klient og opdagede, at kunden var utæt, og sender til deres server mange personlige og følsomme data såsom:

- Blackberry PIN

- Telefonnummer

- E-mail adresse

- Geografisk positionsoplysninger

Læs om UbertTwitter 'spyware' features opdagelse her ved infoByte .

Det er masser af ansøgninger utætte private og følsomme oplysninger, men bare ingen have et kig på det.

Skulle obligatorisk opbevaring af data og privatlivets fred politik blev en del af applikationsudvikling og underkastelse rettesnor for mobil applikation?

IMHO nogle brugere skal ikke kun advaret om anvendelsesmulighederne evner og API, men også hvad vil gøre med, hvilken type oplysninger det kommer til at håndtere inde i mobiltelefonen.

Capabilities betyder bemyndigelse programmet til at bruge nogle bestemte funktioner, for eksempel at bruge Geolocation API, men hvad programmet vil gøre, og hvem der vil give sådanne oplysninger, når brugeren har givet tilladelse til det?

Det er en sikkerhed profilering niveau, mobiltelefon producenten ikke kan levere, og de burde, fordi det fokuserer på de oplysninger og ikke om anvendelsen godkendelse / tilladelse hensyn til brugen af ​​enhedens muligheder.

ps ja! ok! Jeg er enig! Denne form af post vil kræve 3-4 sider lang diskussion, som emnet er varmt og meget artikuleret, men det er lørdag morgen, og jeg må gå!

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Blackberry Sikkerhed og kryptering: Devil eller Angel?

Blackberry har gode og dårlige ry med hensyn til hans sikkerhed kapacitet, afhængig af fra hvilken vinkel man ser på det.

Dette indlæg er det en sammenfattet sæt af oplysninger at lade læseren får billede, uden at tage meget en stilling som RIM og Blackberry kan overvejes, afhængigt af synspunkt, en meget sikker platform eller en ekstremt farlig en.

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Lad os går på.

På den ene side Blackberry det er en platform masser af kryptering funktioner, sikkerhedsfunktioner overalt, enhed krypteret (med custom crypto), kommunikation krypteret (med brugerdefinerede proprietære protokoller som f.eks IOPP'er), meget gode Avancerede sikkerhedsindstillinger, Kryptering ramme fra Certicom ( nu ejet af RIM ).

På den anden side, de giver ikke kun en enhed, men en overlay accessnettet, kaldet BIS ( BlackBerry Internet Service ), som er et globalt verdensomspændende wide area network, hvor din BlackBerry ind, mens du surfer eller checkmail hjælp blackberry.net AP.

Når du, eller et program, skal du bruge blackberry.net APN du ikke bare at forbinde til internettet med luftfartsselskabet internetforbindelse, men du indtaster inde i RIM netværk, der vil proxy og fungere som en gateway for at nå internettet.

Det samme sker, når du har en virksomhedernes brug: Både BB enheden og virksomhedernes BES forbindelse til RIM netværk, der fungerer som en slags VPN koncentration netværk .

Så dybest set alle de meddelelser krydser lavpunktet RIM serviceinfrastruktur i krypteret format med en række proprietære kryptering og kommunikationsprotokoller.

Ligesom en meddelelse, tror, ​​at Google til at levere gtalk løbet blackberry.net APN, lavet en aftale for at tilbyde service indenfor BB netværket til BB brugerne. Når du installerer gtalk du får tilføjet 3 service-bøger, der peger på GTALKNA01 , der er navnet på GTalk gateway inde i RIM-netværket til at tillade intra-BIS kommunikation og fungere som en GTalk gateway til internettet.

De mobilselskaber normalt ikke engang lov til at inspicere trafikken mellem BlackBerry-enhed og Blackberry Network.

Så RIM og Blackberry eller anden måde er unikke for deres tilgang som de giver en platform, et netværk og en service hele bundtet sammen, og du kan ikke bare "få enheden og softwaren" men brugeren og virksomhedens er altid bundet og forbundet til tjenesten netværk.

Det er godt, og det er slemt, fordi det betyder, at RIM giver særdeles gode sikkerhedsfunktioner og muligheder for at beskytte oplysninger, udstyr og adgang til oplysninger på forskellige plan mod tredjemand.

Men det er altid vanskeligt at vurdere den trussel og risiko knyttet til RIM sig selv, og som kunne gøre det politiske pres mod RIM.

Husk, at jeg ikke siger "RIM kigger på dine data", men en objektiv risikoanalyse: for, hvordan platformen er gjort RIM har myndighed på enheden, på de oplysninger on-the-enheden og på de oplysninger, som krydser netværk. (Læs mine Mobile Security Slides ).

For eksempel lad os overveje det samme forbindelse til Nokia-telefoner.

Når Nokia-enheden er solgt, har Nokia ikke har myndighed på enheden, eller om den information on-the-enhed, eller om de oplysninger, der krydser netværket. Men det er også sandt, at Nokia bare give enheden og ikke giver merværdi tjenester såsom Enterprise integration (RIM VPN tunnel), BIS accessnettet og alle de lokale og Ekstern sikkerhed hensættelser funktioner, Blackberry giver.

Så det er et spørgsmål om at overveje den risiko sammenhæng på den rigtige måde, når de vælger platformen, med et eksempel minder meget om at vælge Microsoft Exchange Server (på din egen tjeneste) eller om at få en SaaS-tjeneste, som Google Apps.

I begge tilfælde er du nødt til at stole på udbyderen, men i første eksempel du nødt til at stole på Microsoft, der ikke sætter en bagdør på den software, mens der i 2. eksempel du har brug for at stole på Google, som en platform og tjenesteudbyder, betyder det ikke adgang til dine oplysninger.

Så det er et andet paradigme, der skal evalueres afhængigt af din trussel model.

Hvis din trussel model lader du overveje RIM som en betroet tredjepart tjenesteudbyder (ligesom Google), end det er ok. Hvis du har en meget høj risiko sammenhæng, ligesom top-hemmelig, lad os så os overveje og vurdere nøje, om det ikke er bedre at holde Blackberry services fuldt isoleret fra enheden eller bruge en anden system uden interaktion med producentens servere og tjenester.

Lad os nu komme tilbage til noget forskning og nogle fakta om brombær og solbær sikkerheden selv.

Først og flere regeringer skulle beskæftige sig med RIM med henblik på at tvinge dem til at give adgang til de oplysninger, der krydser deres service-netværk, mens andre besluttede at direkte forbyde Blackberry brug for højtstående embedsmænd på grund af servere placeret i England og USA, mens andre besluttede at installere deres egne bagdøre.

Der er megen diskussion, når emnerne er RIM Blackberry og regeringer, af forskellige årsager.

Nedenfor en række officielle Security relaterede oplysninger om RIM BlackBerry-platform:

Og her et sæt af uofficiel sikkerhed og Hacking relaterede oplysninger om RIM Blackberry platform:

Fordi det er 23,32 (GMT +1), jeg er træt, jeg tror, ​​at denne stilling vil ende her.

Jeg håber at have givet læseren en række nyttige oplysninger og overvejelser at gå mere i dybden med at analysere og overveje den samlede brombær sikkerhed (i det gode og det dårlige, det altid afhænger af din trussel model!).

Skål

Fabio Pietrosanti (Naif)

ps jeg er administrerende sikkerhed teknologisk udvikling (voice kryptering tech) på BlackBerry-platform, og jeg kan fortælle dig, at fra udviklingen synspunkt er det absolut bedre end Nokia med hensyn til kompatibilitet og hastigheden af ​​udviklingen, men kun bruge RIMOS 5,0 +!

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Mobile Security snak på WHYMCA konference

Jeg vil gerne dele nogle dias jeg plejede at tale om mobil sikkerhed på whymca mobile konference i Milano.

Læs her mine dias på mobil sikkerhed .

De slides giver en bred en tilbundsgående overblik over mobile sikkerhedsrelaterede spørgsmål, skal jeg gøre noget slidecast om det sætte også lyd. Måske vil gøre, måske ikke, det afhænger af tid, der er altid en utilstrækkelig ressource.

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iPhone PIN-kode: ubrugelig kryptering

Jeg har for nylig skiftet en af ​​mine mange mobiltelefoner, som jeg går rundt til iPhone.

Jeg er især bekymret for databeskyttelse i tilfælde af tyveri, og så begyndte at få et kig rundt om iPhone ydede beskyttelse system.

Der er en interessant sæt af iPhone Business Security Funktioner , der gør mig til at tænke, at iPhone går i den rigtige vej til sikring af telefonen, men stadig en masse ting der skal gøres, især for seriøs Enterprise og offentlige brugere.

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For eksempel viste det sig, at iPhone PIN-beskyttelse er ubrugelig, og den kan brydes bare at tilslutte iPhone til en Linux-maskine og få adgang til enheden som en USB-stick.

Det er noget forstyrre min paranoide mentalitet, der gør mig til at tænke om ikke at bruge følsomme data på min iPhone, hvis jeg ikke kan beskytte mine data.

Sandsynligvis en iPhone uafhængig disk kryptering produkt ville være meget nyttige for at lade markedet opretter beskyttede skemaer, der passer til de forskellige risikofaktorer sammenhænge, ​​at forskellige brugere kan have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

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About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Ja
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Ja
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Ja
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Ja
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Ja
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Ja

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Lad os nu prøve at gøre nogle logiske omplacering.
Det er en del af den måde, de gør markedsføring, en meget uvenlig og uhøflig tilgang med kunder, journalist og brugere forsøger at give forkerte sikkerhedskoncepter for et marked fordel. At være sikker på, at der læser ikke har alle de færdigheder til at gøre i dybden sikkerhed evaluering og finde frem til sandheden bag deres markedsføring ture.

Hvem er hacker notrax?

Det lyder som en camouflage af en falsk identitet, skal have en "uafhængig hacker", der gør en "uafhængig undersøgelse", der er mere stærk på omdømme bygning.
Læs om hans bio:

¾ Human ¼ Android (Tja, det ville være cool mindst.) Jeg er bare en entusiast af stort set alt, der taler binært, og hvis det har en RS232 port endnu bedre. I løbet af dagen jeg giver sig ud for en ingeniør, der arbejder på nogle ret fede projekter til tider, men for det meste gør jeg det sjove natten. Jeg har tænkt på at starte en officiel blog i ca 4,5 år til at dele nogle af de ting jeg kommet på tværs, kan ikke finde ud af, eller blot krydse mit sind. På grund af mit job og min natten indblanding, vil jeg opdatere denne, når jeg kan. Jeg håber, at nogle finder det nyttigt, hvis du ikke gør det, godt du gør ikke.

Der er ingen oplysninger om denne fyr på google.
Næsten enhver hacker at få offentlig have artikler online, post i mail arkivet og / eller et forum eller en følge af deres aktivitet.
For notrax er intet tilgængeligt.

Derudover lad os se på domænet ...
Domænet infosecurityguard.com er privatlivet beskyttet af domainsbyproxy at forhindre forståelse hvem der er ejeren.
Domænet er blevet oprettet 2 måneder siden den 01-december-09 på godaddy.com registrator.

Hvad er også meget interessant at bemærke, at denne "ukendte hacker uden spor på google om ham, der dukkede op på December 2009 på nettet" er nævnt på SecurStar GmbH pressemeddelelse som "En it-sikkerhed ekspert".

Måske de "kender personligt" hvem er denne anonyme notrax? :)

Er jeg efter min egen sammensværgelse tænkning eller måske der er en rimelig tvivl om, at alt var arrangere i, at sjov måde bare for en markedsføringstilladelse aktivitet?

Social overvejelse

Hvis du er en vagtselskab du jobbet har også nogle sociale aspekter, bør du også arbejde på at gøre verden til et bedre sted (sørg for at gøre forretning, men "ikke at være onde"). Du kan ikke snyde de færdigheder hos slutbrugerne at evaluere sikkerhed at gøre falsk vildledende oplysninger.

Du bør gøre opmærksom på slutbrugerne, for at gøre dem mere bevidste om sikkerhedsspørgsmål, give dem redskaber til at forstå og bestemme selv.

Håber du havde det sjovt at læse denne artikel, og du har lavet din egen overvejelser om dette.

Fabio Pietrosanti (Naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

Del

Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

Del

O3B Networks: a new satellite broadband approach

That's something amazing, “other 3 billion” broadband coverage not trough fiber but trough satellite.

A project where also google is one of the shareholder, covering 3 billion persons trough low orbit, low latency broadband (10GBit) satellite network.

Check here technical infrastructure details on ITU website.

Del

Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

Del

Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

Så ... De vil betale $ 100k, hvis du får gennem AES og besværet med nøgler.
Hvis nogen ville trække det ud de ville helt sikkert gøre en vognlæs flere penge andre steder. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? Yikes!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

Mike

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

Tænk over det ...

Del

Iphone jailbreaking crashing towers? FUD!

It's interesting to read a news about an anti-jailbreaking statement by apple that say that with jailbreaked phones it may be possible to crash mobile operator's towers:

By tinkering with this code, “a local or international hacker could potentially initiate commands (such as a denial of service attack) that could crash the tower software, rendering the tower entirely inoperable to process calls or transmit data,”

So fun, as the Baseband Processor interface of iPhone is precisely the same of Google android and all Windows Mobile powered devices:

Basically the operating system use AT commands (do you remember old hayes modem commands?) with additional parameters documented and standardized by 3GPP that let more deep (but not that much deep) interaction with the mobile networks.

Please note that those AT commands are standard and widely available on all phones and are the interface to the Baseband Processor .

On iPhone that's the list of commands that an from apple point of view could let “a international hacker to crash the tower software” :

Undocumented commands on iPhone

Damn, those European anarchist of Nokia are providing publicly also their AT command sets, and are AVAILABLE TO ANYONE:

Nokia AT Commands

Oh jesus! Also the terrorist oriented Microsoft corporation let third party to use AT commands:

Windows Mobile AT Commands

It's absolutely unacceptable that also RIM, canadian funky against USA, provide access to AT commands:

Blackberry AT commands

And it's unbelivable to see that Google Android also document how the system speak to the Baseband Processor and find on forums that it's ease to access it:

Google Android Basedband Processor

Not to speak to ALL other mobile manufactuer that use the very same approach and let any party to speak via AT commands to the baseband processor of the phone.

Is the baseband processor of iphone buggy and the AT&T tower software buggy so that it's dangerous to let the user make experiment with it?

Probably yes, and so those are only excuse because the software involved are not robust enough.

Apple, be careful, you have the trust of your users because you are apple you always have done things for the user advantages.

Users does like telephone companies that are huge lobbies that try to restrict and control users as much as possible.

If you, Apple, start behaving like a phone company users will not trust you anymore.

Be careful with FUD statements.

Del

Nokia World in Stuttgard 2-3 September

Everyone who's business is directly connected to mobile, aggregators, operators and generally speaking mobility application should really attend Nokia World where most of the world key people in the mobile business .

It's extremely interesting to see the evolution of the business models related to the Application Portals, how the mobile operators are changing their approach to the market, the increasing of value added services related to mobile industry.

And the most important things is, the mobile operators will be able to became financial operators to really provide mobile payment systems integrated into any day digital life?

And if this will happen, how the manufacturer and operating system provider will play this game?

Del

Mobile platform hacking: worms and botnet from phones?

The hacking community is finally starting seriously auditing and hacking Symbian OS, even if it's difficult, hard to work on, unpleasant to debug it .

There are so many mobile operating systems (Symbian OS, Nokia S40, Windows Mobile, RIM OS, Mac OS X, Android/Linux, Brew) that a worm/virus being able to leverage a cross-platform vulnerability it's just a theory.

Trusted computing platforms, security model of J2ME Java only phones (like RIM and S40), digital signature everywhere are all tools that make massive hacking on mobile platform really difficult.

It's difficult and costly to develop on mobile platforms, it's difficult and costly too doing hacking on that platforms.

Still look at a very nice achievement of paper from SEC Consult called Pwning Nokia phones (and other Symbian based smartphones) .

Can we expect future worms or botnet on mobile? I don't expect so, too many different OS with hard-to-beat security model.

And even if a worm would be able to penetrate a single mobile paltform bugs, mobile operators would be able to block it very quickly (compare how many GSM/UMTS operator exists compared to Internet Service Provider?).

Del