Check it out my: * (outdated) homepage on http://fabio.pietrosanti.it * professional profile on http://www.linkedin.com/in/secret * slides archives on http://slideshare.net/fpietrosanti/
Check it out my: * (outdated) homepage on http://fabio.pietrosanti.it * professional profile on http://www.linkedin.com/in/secret * slides archives on http://slideshare.net/fpietrosanti/
It’s exciting to see the RFC finally released, as it’s an important milestone to set ZRTP as the official standard for end-to-end encryption much like PGP has been for emails.
Now any organization in the world will be officially able to implement ZRTP for end-to-end protocol voice encryption
Currently 3 different public implementations of ZRTP protocol exists:
Each of them provide different features of the protocol, but most important are known to be interoperable.
A new wave is coming to the voice encryption world, irrupting into a gray area where most of the companies doing phone encryption systems has been implementing custom encryption.
Now a standard has been setup and there are few reasons left to implementing something different.
Today it’s a great day, such kind of technology is now official and also with multiple existing implementation!
Philip, you did it again, my compliments to your pure spirit and determination :-)
The exciting world of mobile protocols (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, etc) hacking is getting official research activities from universities.
The investment to make opensource code releases of cracking software is giving the opportunity to students of university to work on it, improve it and do strong research.
Opening hardware, opening software, opening protocol demonstrate the weakness of any kind of proprietary method or process to build-up communication and security technologies.
It should be the goal of any scientists to try to open-up and crack any kind of proprietary and closed technology to force the industry to goes on only with interoperable and open approach while designing telecommunication protocols.
Early this year i decided that’s time to run a TOR exit node so i brought a VPS at hetzner.de (because they are listed as a Good TOR ISP)and setup the exit-node with nickname privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch with a 100Mbit/s connection for first 1TB of monthly data, then 10MBit/s flat.
In the first day i’ve been running the node i received immediately DMCA complain due to peer to peer traffic.
So i decided to filter-out some P2P traffic by using OpenDPI iptables module and DMCA complain automatically disappeared:
iptables -A OUTPUT -m opendpi –edonkey –gadugadu –fasttrack –gnutella –directconnect –bittorrent –winmx –soulseek -j REJECT
Then, because i am italian, i decided to avoid my TOR node to connect to the Italian internet address space in order to reduce the chance that a stupid prosecutor would wake me up at morning because did not understand that i am running a TOR node.
I tried, with the help of hellais that wrote a script to make Exit Policy reject statement, to reject all Italian netblocks based on ioerror’s blockfinder but we found that the torrc configuration files with +1000 lines was making TOR crash.
We went to open a ticket to report the crash about our attempt to block TOR exit policy by country and found a similar attempt where we contributed, but it still seems to be an open-issue.
The conclusion is that it’s not possible to make a Country Exit Policy for TOR exit node in a clean and polite way so i decided to go the dirty way by using iptables/geoip . After fighting to make it compile properly, it was one line of iptables to block traffic going to italy:
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -m state –state NEW -m geoip –dst-cc IT -j REJECT
Now from my exit-node no connection to italian networks will be done and i am safe against possibly stupid prosecutors not understanding TOR (i have an exception for all TOR node ip address applied before).
After some other days i started to receive complains due to portscan activities originated from my tor nodes.
From my own point of view i want to support anonymity network, not anonymous hacking attempt and so i want to filter-out portscan and attacks from originating from my node.That’s a complex matter that require some study, so in the meantime i installed scanlogd and snort because i want to evaluate how many attacks, which kind of attacks are getting out from my TOR exit node.
Later i will try to arrange some kind of filtering to be sure to be able to filter out major attacks.
For what’s related to portscan it seems that there are no public tools to detect and filter outgoing portscan but only to filter incoming portscan so probably will need to write something ad-hoc.
I will refer how things are going and if there will be some nice way to implement in a lightwave way snort-inline to selectively filter-out major attack attempt originating from my exit-node.
My goal is to keep an exit node running in long-term (at least 1TB of traffic per months donated to TOR), reducing the effort related to ISP complain and trying to do my best to run the exit-node with a reasonable liability.
It’s the TETRA version of GSM airprobe that unlock access to the data and frame of TETRA communication protocol, thus giving great hacking opportunity!
Now that also TETRA technology has been opened we should expect, during this 2011, to see opensource TETRA sniffers and most probably also TEA encryption (the Tetra Encryption Algorithm) cracked!
TETRA is used by Police, Emergency Services and Militaries as an alternative mobile communication network that can works even without the availability of network coverage (only mobile-to-mobile without a base station) and provide some special high availability services.
I wrote about TETRA in my slide Major Voice Security Protocol Review .
In OsmocomBB mailing lists there was already discussion about some TETRA network status:
It will be really fun to see that new Police and rescue service hacking coming back from old analog ages to the new digital radios :-)
The concepts behind WikiLeaks, OpenLeaks, GlobalLeaks, BalkanLeaks is much more than just revealing secrets to the public.
It’s part of a revolution that’s coming in government’s organization, transparency and cooperation with so called ‘web 2.0 / wiki’ collaborative systems.
Have a look at those Government 2.0 – Introduction by Anke Domscheit Berg, Innovative Government Program Leads of Microsoft Germany and wife of Daniel Berg, co-founder of WikiLeaks and now founder of OpenLeaks.
Have a look at Open Data government 2.0 initiative to enforce government transparency, reducing corruption and improving performance of government organization.
That revolution it’s just more than a group of anarco-libertarian funky guys that want to create chaos by spreading secrets, it’s just the start of the rush to achieve new organization model of governments by leveraging complete transparency and strong cooperation with citizens.
Hi all, today at PrivateWave Italia S.p.A, italian company engaged in developing technologies for privacy protection and information security in voice telecommunications where i am CTO, we release ZORG, a new open source ZRTP protocol implementation available for download from http://www.zrtp.org .
ZORG has been originally developed and implemented in PrivateWave’s PrivateGSM voice encryption products available for the following platforms: Blackberry, Nokia and iOS (iPhone) .
Zorg C++ has been integrated with PJSIP open source VoIP SDK  and it’s provided as integration patch against PJSIP 1.8.5. It has been tested on iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux and Mac OS X.
Zorg Java has been integrated within a custom version of MJSIP  open source SDK on Blackberry platform and it includes memory usage optimizations required to reduce at minimum garbage collector activity.
Both platforms have separated and modular cryptographic back-ends so that the cryptographic algorithms implementation could be easily swapped with other ones.
ZORG is licensed under GNU AGPL and source code is available on github at https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .
We are releasing it under open source and in coherence with our approach to security  as we really hope that it can be useful for the open source ecosystem to create new voice encryption systems in support of freedom of speech.
More than 20 pjsip-based open source VoIP encryption software and several written in Java could directly benefit from ZORG release.
We would be happy to receive proposal of cooperation, new integration, new cryptographic back-ends, bug scouting and whatever useful to improve and let ZRTP affirm as voice encryption standard.
Zorg is available from http://www.zrtp.org .
We just released a technical howto on how to build up Secured mobile to landline VoIP infrastructure with:
In next weeks others howto like this one will come out by using other server platforms such as FreeSWITCH, all in the spirit of transparency and leverage of opensource security technologies.
A very illuminating article on Eight Epic Failure of Regulating Cryptography and common misunderstanding by government regulators that doesn’t have a wide view on how technology works.
Ignorant government regulators does not understood that strict regulation would have the following drawbacks:
I absolutely avoid to use my own personal blog to make promotion of any kind of product.
That time it’s not different, but i want to tell you facts about products i work on without fancy marketing, but staying technical.
At PrivateWave we use a different approach respect to most voice encryption company out there, read our approach to security .
The relevance of this products in the technology and industry landscape can be summarized as follow:
Those suite of Mobile Secure Clients, designed for professional security use only using best telecommunication and security technologies, provide a high degree of protection along with good performance also in bad network conditions:
The applications are:
The supported mobile devices are:
Regarding ZRTP we decided to stress and stretch all the security and paranoid feature of the protocol with some little addition:
Our strict address book integration, goes beyond ZRTP RFC specification, that could be vulnerable to certain attacks when used on mobile phones because of user behavior of not to look at mobile screen.
Our paranoy way of using ZRTP mitigate such conditions, we will write about this later and/or will add specific details for RFC inclusion.
Some words on PrivateGSM Professional with end-to-end encryption with ZRTP
Read technical sheet there!
To download it click here and just put your phone number
Those are the results of hard work of all my very skilled staff (16 persons worked on this 6 projects for 3 different platforms) on challenging technologies (voice encryption) in a difficult operating environment (dirty mobile networks and dirty mobile operating systems) for more than 2 years.
I am very proud of our staff!
In next weeks you will see releasing of major set of documentations such as integration with asterisks, freeswitch and other Security Enabled PBX, along with some exciting other security technology news that i am sure will be noticed ;)
It has been an hard work and more have to be done but i am confident that the security and opensource community will like such products and our transparent approach also with open important releases and open source integration that make a very politically neutral (backdoor free) technology.
There are a lot of reason why one would need to access internet trough a VPN.
For example if you live in a country blocking certain contents (like anti-local-government website, porn, etc) and/or protocols (like skype, voip) you would probably want to move your internet connectivity outside the nasty blocking country by using encrypted VPN tunnels.
I evaluated several hosted VPN server and a couple of them sounds quite good among the widespread offering of such services:
Exit to the internet from Switzerland.
Cost 6 CHF / months
Optional public fixed IP address
Useful if you need:
Exit to the internet by choosing among 20 different countries (each time you connect).
Useful if you need to do:
My own ECC curve security and selection analysis
Most modern crypto use Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) that, with a smaller key size and reduce computation power, give equivalent security strength of traditional crypto system known as DH (Diffie-Hellman) or RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) .
Not everyone knows that ECC encryption is selected for any future encryption applications and that even TLS/SSL (encryption used for securing the web) is moving to ECC.
I found plenty of so called “proprietary encryption products” which abandoned RSA and DH to goes with ECC alternatives, that tend to arbitrary use ECC bit key size without even specifying which kind of ECC crypto get used.
However there is a lot of confusion around Elliptic Curves, with a lot of different names and key size making difficult for a non-cryptographically-experienced-user to make your own figure when evaluating some crypto stuff.
Because of so diffused confusion i decided to make my own analysis to find out which are the best ECC encryption curves and right ECC key size to use.
This analysis would like to provide a security industry based choice among various curves and key sizes, leaving the mathematical and crypto analytical considerations that has been already been done during the years, summarizing the various choices taken in several standards and security protocols.
First the conclusion.
From my analysis only the following ECC curves are to be considered for use in encryption systems because are the only one selected among different authorities (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC BrainPool), different security protocol standards (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS) and the only one matching NSA Suite B security requirements (de-facto standard also for NATO military environment):
with optional, just for really paranoid that want to get more key size bit, still not considered useful:
I would like to state that Koblitz curves should be avoided, in any key size (163 / 283 / 409 / 571) as they does not have enough warranty on crypto analytic activity and effectively they are:
I invite the reader to follow trough my analysis to understand the fundamentals that could be understood even without deep technical background but at least with a good technological background a some basic bit of cryptography.
Here we go with the analysis
My goal is to make an analysis on what/how the open scientific and security community choose ECC crypto system for usage in security protocols and standards defined by IETF RFC (the ones who define Internet Standards in a open and peer-reviewed way).
Below a set of RFC introducing ECC into existing system that get analyzed to understand what’s better to use and what’s better to exclude:
We will use the choice made by scientist defining Internet Security Protocols to make part of our evaluation.
Additionally it must be understood that the Curve selection comes from different authorities that made their own selection of Curves in order to tell to the industry what to use and what to skip:
We will use the choice made by scientist defining security requirements in the standardization agencies to make part of our evaluation.
Additionally, something that most people does not know, but that it’s extremely relevant to our analysis, is that there are different kind of ECC curve cryptography and their “size” it’s different depending on the kind of curve:
Given a security strength equivalence the Elliptic Curve and the Kobliz Curve have different key size, for example when we read ECC 571 we are referring to Koblitz Curve with an equivalent strength to ECC 521 Prime curve.
A comparison of strength between Elliptic Curves and Kotbliz Curves is reported below (from Mikey ECC internet Draft):
| Koblitz | ECC | DH/DSA/RSA | 163 | 192 | 1024 | 283 | 256 | 3072 | 409 | 384 | 7680 | 571 | 521 | 15360
Below there’s a comparison of all selected curves by all the various entities and their respective name (from IETF RFC4492 for ECC usage for TLS) :
Curve names chosen by different standards organizations ------------+---------------+------------- SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST ------------+---------------+------------- sect163k1 | | NIST K-163 sect163r1 | | sect163r2 | | NIST B-163 sect193r1 | | sect193r2 | | sect233k1 | | NIST K-233 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233 sect239k1 | | sect283k1 | | NIST K-283 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571 secp160k1 | | secp160r1 | | secp160r2 | | secp192k1 | | secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192 secp224k1 | | secp224r1 | | NIST P-224 secp256k1 | | secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521 ------------+---------------+-------------
What immediately appear is that there are only two curves selected by all authorities, and that there is a general dumping of koblitz curves by ANSI.The only commonly agreed among the 3 authorities are the following two ECC curve:
Of those selection of ECC curve for TLS the RFC5430 skipped completely koblitz curves and selected for usage only:
The ECC Brainpool skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected for usage the following ECC Curves:
The OpenPGP internet draft for ECC usage in PGP draft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 skipped completely Koblitz curves and selected the following ECC curves
So, sounds clear that the right selection of ECC is for P-256, P-384 and P-521 while the Koblitz curve have been skipped for Top Secret use and for any security sensitive protocol (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS).
I have done this analysis following a discussion i had regarding certain voice encryption products, all based on custom and proprietary protocols, that are all using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571 / 571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits .
All them are using the K-571 that, as described before, has been removed from all security sensitive environment and protocols and being myself a designer of voice encryption stuff i think that their cryptographic choice is absolutely not the best security choice.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz elliptic curve are faster than the top secret enabled prime elliptic curve and so give the product manager a chance to provide “more bit” in it’s own product while keeping the key exchange fast.
It’s a matter of philosophical choice.
I prefer to follow the trend of scientific community with the humility of not to considering myself a cryptographic expert, knowledgable more than the overall security and scientific community itself.
I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
I prefer to count the amount of brains working on the crypto i use, that check that’s really secure, that evaluate whether there’s some weakness.
The number of brais working on Crypto widely diffused are of order of magnitude more than the number of brains working on crypto used by just few people (like Koblitz curve).
So i am not demonizing who use ECDH 571 using Koblitz Curve, but for sure i can affirm that they did not taken the best choice in terms of security and that any security professionals doing a security benchmarking would consider the fact that Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit done with Koblitz Curve is not widely diffused, it’s dumped from standard security protocols and it’s not certified for top secret use.
I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.
SDR approach is a revolutionary system that’s completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.
Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.
And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.
That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.
We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)
I had to better understand the concepts, roles and duties related to Product management and Product marketing management in software companies, why are needed, which are the differences and how they fit inside an organization structure.
Most person i know never interested into this specific area of work, but when you want to be a product company (and not a consulting or solution company), you start having different products on different platforms for different target customers sold trough different channels with different pricing with a installation/different delivery process and that complexity must be managed in the proper way.
You realize that in order to let the product company grow in the right direction you need to organize product management activities formally, not closing your mind in rigid organization roles such as Marketing, Sales, R&D.
When we speak about Product Management i recommend the reading of the illuminating The strategic role of Product Management (How a market-driven focus leads companies to build products people want to buy) that clarify a lot of things, even if it outlook net separation of roles in product management, something that’s too heavy for a small company like a startup.
Still it provide a differentiation of duties between Product Management and Product Marketing.
A good understanding of the product management related to startup is given in the article Creating Product Management at Startup showing up different case related to the roles of the product visionary into the company.
It introduce the terms ceo of the product in the sense that the product management duties jump around into the various organization function by providing focus and effort where it’s needed, independently from the fact that the internal function requiring more effort is Development, Marketing, Sales or Communication. That’s means practically enhancing the product vision as it’s needed across all major product-related functions making the vision corporate-wide coherent.
A good representation of product management and product marketing activities is well described with the differentiation of between Strategical, Technical and Marketing sector and is not clearly separated between Management, Marketing(and Sales) and R&D :
I read that product manager background and knowledge are different depending on the company focus (where does product management belong in the organization?):
An illuminating (for me) and very important differentiation regarding product management duties is the differentiation between:
The specific duties belonging to Product Marketing vs Management are greatly explained in Role Definitions For Product Management and Product Marketing that i suggest to read, letting you to better define tasks and responsibilities across your organization. It also provide a good definition of job requirements if you need to look for that figure!
At the same time it’s important to understand what’s NOT product management, effectively Product management is not just feature prioritization.
At the same time it’s important to understand which professional figure is NOT itself a product manager:
The typical product management activities could be in extreme synthesis summarized as follow:
Product management so it’s not precisely development, is not precisely marketing, it’s not precisely sales, so typically it’s difficult to identify “where it should stay” inside the organization structure (it’s even difficult to understand that’s needed)?
The Silicon Valley Product Group provide a nice insight on Product Organization Structure by pointing out which are the advantages and risks of several choices. Still the Cranky Product Manager say that It doesn’t matter where the product manager live in the organization.
It’s relevant to be careful not to have persons that are too much technical or too much sales oriented in order to fill the gap among different organization. Too much fragmentation of assigned duties across the organization may lead to bureaucracy, too much duties on one person may lead to ineffective implementation of needed tasks in some area and to a internal competition perception respect to the traditional roles.
Check there a very nice Resume of a professional with practical experience in product management (it’s an half techie/half marketing guys).
Ah! Another very common misunderstanding is to confuse marketing with communication where a i found a so good definition of Marketing that i really like and understand for strict relationship with Product Management:
Marketing is know the market so well that the product sell itself
But what happen when you don’t handle a product management and product marketing management process in a defined way?
A nice story is shown as example in The strategic role of Product Management :
Your founder, a brilliant technician, started the company years ago when he quit his day job to market his idea full time. He created a product that he just knew other people needed. And he was right. Pretty soon he delivered enough of the product and hired his best friend from college as VP of Sales. And the company grew. But before long, the VP of Sales complained, “We’re an engineering-led company. We need to become customer-driven.” And that sounded fine. Except… every new contract seemed to require custom work. You signed a dozen clients in a dozen market segments and the latest customer’s voice always dominated the product plans. You concluded that “customer-driven” meant “driven by the latest customer” and that couldn’t be right.
If you want to be a product company it’s relevant to precisely follow a strategy driven by product marketing and management and not by sales.
Confusion between duties of product management/marketing and sales could lead to unsuccessful product company that are not able to proceed within their strategy, simply because they getting opportunities that drive the business out-of-scope.
A product company must invest in it’s own product development and marketing in order to let sales activity stay focused and guarantee that the organization is every day more effective on the market.
After this reading, my understanding is that it’s relevant to identify how to create a set of flexible business process on how to handle various product management and product marketing duties separating them from sales.
A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.
I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.
I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:
It’s a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.
Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.
But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.
We come in peace
We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.
We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.
We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.
We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…
Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)
See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!
As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.
However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.
Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl, released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.
It’s interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.
That’s the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.
Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release.
And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)
If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.
Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?
You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user’s information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.
A typical problem of product’s security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.
So there’s a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.
The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption, an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.
Let’s speak about Snake Oil Encryption
Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography, snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann, undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.
The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:
Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann
Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier
The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.
Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson:
“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can’t say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”
So, how to spot snake oil security products?
Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .
You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.
Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:
By checking that points it’s possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.
But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?
It’s very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.
It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.
You know that web2.0 world it’s plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.
Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.
On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.
Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:
- Blackberry PIN
- Phone Number
- Email Address
- Geographic positioning information
It’s plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.
Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?
Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it’s going to handle inside the mobile phone.
Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?
That’s a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.
p.s. yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it’s saturday morning and i gotta go!
I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it’s best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.
Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.
Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES, while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.
Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.
This post it’s a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .
Let’s goes on.
On one side Blackberry it’s a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom (now owned by RIM).
On the other side they does not provide only a device but an overlay access network, called BIS (Blackberry Internet Service), that’s a global worldwide wide area network where your blackberry enter while you browse or checkmail using blackberry.net AP.
When you, or an application, use the blackberry.net APN you are not just connecting to the internet with the carrier internet connection, but you are entering inside the RIM network that will proxy and act as a gateway to reach the internet.
The very same happen when you have a corporate use: Both the BB device and the corporate BES connect to the RIM network that act as a sort of vpn concentration network.
So basically all the communications cross trough RIM service infrastructure in encrypted format with a set proprietary encryption and communication protocols.
Just as a notice, think that google to provide gtalk over blackberry.net APN, made an agreement in order to offer service inside the BB network to the BB users. When you install gtalk you get added 3 service books that point to GTALKNA01 that’s the name of GTALK gateway inside the RIM network to allow intra-BIS communication and act as a GTALK gateway to the internet.
The mobile operators usually are not even allowed to inspect the traffic between the Blackberry device and the Blackberry Network.
So RIM and Blackberry are somehow unique for their approach as they provide a platform, a network and a service all bundled together and you cannot just “get the device and the software” but the user and the corporate are always bound and connected to the service network.
That’s good and that’s bad, because it means that RIM provide extremely good security features and capabilities to protect information, device and access to information at various level against third party.
But it’s always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.
Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides).
For example let’s consider the very same context for Nokia phones.
Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it’s also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.
So it’s a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.
In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.
So it’s a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.
If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it’s ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let’s consider and evaluate carefully whether it’s not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.
Now, let’s get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.
First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.
There’s a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.
Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:
And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:
Because it’s 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.
I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
p.s. i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it’s absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !
A cult book, ever green since 25 years.
It’s been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.
Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.
O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.
I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.
The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.
Reading of this article, is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.
I would say a must read.
How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?
How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?
Well, there’s a set of technologies whose implementation is open source (copyright) but that are patented (intellectual property right).
A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf).
i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.
It’s strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.
The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that’s a very cool tool!
A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual.
In the ’90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.
That’s before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.
I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure, making also some consideration on this today in 2010.
That’s called The Crypto AG case, an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG.
Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.
Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.
You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:
Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.
Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:
Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)
Time change the way things are approached.
I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:
“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”
The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.
It’s absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.
So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that’s based on security trough obscurity concepts?
I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.
I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:
The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer’s security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works.The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture.
I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor.
However there is still something missing:
The overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts.
You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts, it would legitimate to ask ourself:
Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).
The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.
I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.
Read here my slides on mobile security .
The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that’s always a insufficient resource.
I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.
I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.
There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.
For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.
That’s something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.
Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.
Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it’s something that i cannot accept.
I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.
I do strong voice encryption for it, but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.
I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.
I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “Exploration & Production” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.
On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:
Those countries’s oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.
As you can see there’s NO USA company doing extraction.
Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:
While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:
Don’t missing some Asian involvement.
As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.
To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.
Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?
Well, i don’t know how things will end up, but it’s possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).
It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn’t like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user’s comments.
In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .
In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.
Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .
Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.
Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):
The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?
Very good job Neil!
In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it’s difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.
Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…
Quantum cryptography it’s something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.
To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .
So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it’s assumed that the system is intercepted.
Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.
Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.
Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.
Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec.
One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars:
Death star getting blown up
Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn’t care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.
Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!
Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.
Because security of a cryptographic system it’s not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.
Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.
Extremely flexible approach: works everything
Extreme performance: very low latency
Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.
Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff’s principle .
So please don’t even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.
Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.
UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.
Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product.
He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 184.108.40.206, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:
“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm’s anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”
Let’s reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router)?Then let’s reflect on this other piece of information:
surfsolo.securstar.net – 220.127.116.11
surfsolo.securstar.com – 18.104.22.168
Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.
How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?
It’s possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that’s going to destroy our life?
Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.
Hey, I don’t need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.
I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.
p.s. I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Stay tuned.
I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.
Now it’s confirmed, it’s a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!
How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?
1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification
2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch
3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 22.214.171.124 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)
4) On http://126.96.36.199/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)
5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it’s the SecurStar GmbH:
6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH
Below the data and reference that let us discover that it’s all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.
The http referral tricks
When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.
The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that’s the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.
That’s the log entry:
188.8.131.52 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”
The PBX open on the internet tell us that’s SecurStar GmbH
The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.
Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 184.108.40.206 .
That’s also really fun!
They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet. :-)
I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->
They measured their marketing activity
Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It’s reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)
They reached my blog and i logged their search:
220.127.116.11 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=infosecurityguard+cryptophone” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”
18.104.22.168 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET /20100130/about-the-voice-encryption-analysis-phonecrypt-can-be-intercepted-serious-security-evaluation-criteria/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “http://www.google.de/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enDE350DE350&q=gold-lock+infosecurityguard” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”
The domain registration data
The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:
Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM
Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.
Updated Date: 01-dec-2009
Creation Date: 01-dec-2009
The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:
Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com
Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it’s activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)
The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt
Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.
As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.
They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products
They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.
They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That’s in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .
UPDATE: Who’s Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?
I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.
He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.
He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.
Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker’s ethic at all!
All in all, is that lawful?
Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:
”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense.
We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!
IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.
Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.
SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.
It’s unfair approach respect to hacking community.
It’s unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.
It’s unfair competition in the security market.
Let’s make some more important consideration on this.
Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys
When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.
If you do bad crypto people could die.
If you don’t follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.
You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don’t think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)
Security research need reference and transparency
Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.
Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally
Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.
If you work in the security market you work with hackers.
If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.
Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.
Consideration on the authority of the information online
That’s something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what’s going on.
However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.
What they have done is already illegal in UK
SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal.
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard.
Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it’s not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that’s a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).
But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it’s a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria
However a lot of important website reported it:
This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what’s going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.
I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.
Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.
Yes, it’s true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let’s review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)
A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:
Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don’t know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?
In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That’s exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That’s called “peer review”.
If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it’s secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it’s secure.
How a private company can even think to invent on it’s own a secure communication protocol when it’s scientifically stated that it’s not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it’s required for cryptography.
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”
As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it’s plenty of bugs.
Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it’s own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .
I don’t want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.
When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It’s absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.
To summarize let’s review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.
|Product name||Security Trough Obscurity||Public peer review||Open Source||Compromise locally?|
|Caspertec||Obscurity||No public review||Closed||Yes|
||No public review
|Cryptophone||Transparency||Limited public review||Public||Yes|
||No public review
||No public review
|No1.BC||Obscurity||No public review
||No public review
||No public review
||No public review
||No public review
||No public review
||No public review
||No public review
||No public review
*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto (transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.
But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).
Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.
I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED
Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.
No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.
Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.
The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there’s no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)
That’s the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It’s just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.
PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).
I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:
Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .
Also… let’s check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:
|Application||Screenshots of application||Video with demonstration of interception||Network demonstration|
It’s clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.
But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?
Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.
|Application||Number of paragraphs||Positive paragraphs||Negative paragraphs||Neutral paragraphs|
|Paragraph of review||Opinion expressed|
|From their website||Positive Marketing feedback|
|Apple iPhone||Positive Marketing feedback|
|Disk Encryption or voice Encryption||Positive Marketing feedback|
|PBX Compatibility? Really||Positive Marketing feedback|
|Cracking <10. Not.||Positive Marketing feedback|
|Good thinking!||Positive Marketing feedback|
|A little network action||Positive Marketing feedback|
|UI||Positive Marketing feedback|
|Good Taste||Positive Marketing feedback|
|Paragraph of review||Opinion expressed|
|From their website||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Real Company or Part Time hobby||Negative Marketing feedback|
|16.000 bit authentication||Negative Marketing feedback|
|DH 256||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Downad & Installation!||Neutral Marketing feedback|
|Cracking it <10||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Marketing BS101||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Cool video stuff||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Paragraph of review||Opinion expressed|
|From their website||Neutral Marketing feedback|
|A little background about cellcrypt||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Master of Marketing||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Secure Voice calling||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Who’s buying their wares||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Downad & Installation!||Neutral Marketing feedback|
|My Demo environment||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Did they forget some code||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Cracking it <5||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Cellcrypt unique features..||Negative Marketing feedback|
|Plain old interception||Negative Marketing feedback|
|The Haters out there||Negative Marketing feedback|
Now it’s clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that’s very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.
SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.
They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007
They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.
The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):
Now, let’s try to make some logical reassignment.
It’s part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don’t have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.
It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:
There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.
Additionally let’s look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.
What’s also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.
Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there’s some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?
If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.
You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.
Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
p.s. Those are my personal professional opinion, let’s speak about technology and security, not marketing.
p.p.s. i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!